Amanda C. v. Case

requires each party to produce proof supporting their claims.
Because the evidence did not support an offset of the Franks’
damages, I would give the Franks the benefit of their jury ver-
dict for the interest they paid to the IRS.
amanda c., by and thRough gaRy R ichmond , natuRal paRent
and next FRiend , appellee , v . kelly case , appellant .
749 N.W.2d 429
Filed May 23, 2008. 	No. S-06-1097.
1. Summary Judgment. Summary judgment is proper if the pleadings and admis-
sible evidence offered at the hearing show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material facts, or as to the ultimate inferences that may be drawn from those facts,
and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
2. Summary Judgment: Proof. A party makes a prima facie case that it is entitled
to summary judgment by offering sufficient evidence that, assuming it went
uncontested at trial, would entitle the party to a favorable verdict.
3. ____: ____. If the moving party makes a prima facie case that it is entitled to
summary judgment, the burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to avoid sum-
mary judgment by producing admissible contradictory evidence which raises a
genuine issue of material fact.
4. Summary Judgment: Appeal and Error. In reviewing a summary judgment, an
appellate court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against
whom the judgment was granted, giving that party the benefit of all reasonable
inferences deducible from the evidence.
5. Judgments: Appeal and Error. On questions of law, an appellate court is obli-
gated to reach a conclusion independent of the determination reached by the
court below.
6. Judgments: Collateral Estoppel. Under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, also
known as issue preclusion, an issue of ultimate fact that was determined by a valid
and final judgment cannot be litigated again between the same parties or their
privities in any future lawsuit.
7. ____: ____. Collateral estoppel is applicable where (1) an identical issue was
decided in a prior action, (2) the prior action resulted in a judgment on the merits
which was final, (3) the party against whom the doctrine is to be applied was
a party or was in privity with a party to the prior action, and (4) there was an
opportunity to fully and fairly litigate the issue in the prior action.
8. Constitutional Law: Actions. A civil remedy is provided under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(2000) for deprivations of federally protected rights, statutory or constitutional,
caused by persons acting under color of state law.
9. ____: ____. In any 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) action, the initial inquiry must focus
on whether the two essential elements to a § 1983 action are present: (1) whether
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Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
11/01/2026 04:55 AM CST

758 	275 NeBRASkAR ePORTS
the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state
law and (2) whether this conduct deprived a person of rights, privileges, or immuni-
ties secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.
10. Constitutional Law: Parental Rights: Minors. Under the U.S. Supreme Court’s
longstanding precedent, a parent has a constitutional right to retain custody and
control of his or her child.
11. Due Process: Parental Rights: Parent and Child. The substantive due process
right to family integrity protects not only the parent’s right to companionship,
care, custody, and management of his or her child, but also protects the child’s
reciprocal right to be raised and nurtured by his or her biological parent.
12. Due Process: Parent and Child. Both parents and their children have cognizable
substantive due process rights to the parent-child relationship.
13. ____: ____. The Due Process Clause would be offended if a state were to
attempt to force the breakup of a natural family without some showing of unfit-
ness and for the sole reason that to do so was thought to be in the children’s
best interests.
14. ____: ____. Substantive due process rights between a parent and child do not
arise simply by virtue of a genetic connection. Rather, they depend on a deeper,
more enduring relationship.
15. Due Process: Parental Rights: Minors. Blood alone may not suffice to permit
a parent to assert the due process right to custody and control of his or her child
if the parent has altogether failed to shoulder the responsibilities inherent in
the parenthood.
16. Civil Rights: Public Officers and Employees: Immunity. Public officials who
have been sued in their personal capacities under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) may
invoke qualified immunity as a shield from liability if the official’s conduct does
not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reason-
able person would have known.
17. Appeal and Error. An appellate court will not review errors that were not
assigned and argued in a party’s brief.
18. Actions: Civil Rights: Damages: Proof. To recover compensatory damages in a
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) action, the claimant must show that the violation of his
or her rights resulted in some actual harm.
19. Actions: Civil Rights: Torts. Causation issues in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000)
actions are generally resolved according to common-law tort principles.
20. Proximate Cause: Words and Phrases. As a general matter, a proximate cause is
defined as that cause which, in a natural and continuous sequence, without any effi-
cient, intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the injury would
not have occurred.
21. Proximate Cause: Proof. Ordinarily a plaintiff must meet three basic require-
ments in establishing proximate cause: (1) that without the misconduct, the injury
would not have occurred, commonly known as the “but for” rule; (2) that the
injury was a natural and probable result of the misconduct; and (3) that there was
no efficient intervening cause.
22. Negligence: Proximate Cause: Proof. When multiple causes act to produce a
single injury, any one of those acts can still qualify as a proximate cause of that
harm so long as it was a substantial factor in bringing about the injury.

23. Summary Judgment. In the summary judgment context, a fact is material only
if it would affect the outcome of the case.
Appeal from the District Court fork imball County: kRistine
R. cecava, Judge. Affirmed.
Jon Bruning, Attorney General, and Michael J. Rumbaugh for
appellant.
Montel . Neilan, of Douglas,k elly, Ostdiek, Bartels &
Neilan, P.C., for appellee.
heavican, 	C.J., 	wRight, 	connolly, 	geRRaRd, 	stephan,
mccoRmack, and milleR-leRman, JJ.
heavican, C.J.
I. INTRODUCTION
Amanda 	C., 	by 	and 	through 	her 	natural 	father, 	Gary
Richmond, sought damages, costs, and attorney fees fromk elly
Case, an employee of the Nebraska Department of Health and
Human Services (DHHS). The suit was filed against Case in
her personal capacity based on her alleged interference with
Amanda’s constitutional right to a relationship with Richmond.
The district court fork imball County granted summary judg-
ment in favor of Amanda on the issue of Case’s “liability” and
held a bench trial to determine damages. The court ultimately
awarded Amanda $150,000 in damages, $53,437.50 in legal
fees, and $11,260.03 in costs and expenses. Case now appeals.
We affirm for reasons set forth below.
II. BACkGROUND
Richmond and Carol C. married and settled in the Omaha,
Nebraska area. While living in Omaha, Richmond and Carol
had two children together. For reasons that are not entirely
clear from the record, both of these children were taken into
DHHS custody at birth. It is clear, however, that Carol suffered
from a mental illness, and this may have been a contributing
factor. Regardless, both of the children were eventually placed
with Carol’s father and stepmother, Clyde and Connie C., who
also lived in Omaha. Richmond and Carol eventually relin-
quished their custodial rights to both children.
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760 	275 NeBRASkAR ePORTS
When Carol became pregnant with Amanda, Richmond and
Carol moved from Omaha tok imball, Nebraska. The move
was apparently made to prevent DHHS from seizing Amanda
at birth. Amanda was born on July 21, 1987. Approximately
5 years later, a neighbor reported that Carol was abusing
Amanda. No allegations of abuse were or have been made
regarding Richmond. On July 23, 1993, DHHS took Amanda
into its custody.
Initially, Amanda was placed in a foster home ink imball,
where she prospered and had regular visitation with Richmond.
It appears, however, that Carol still managed to abuse Amanda,
though it is not clear exactly how she did so. Regardless, on
June 1, 1995, DHHS placed Amanda with her maternal grand-
father and stepgrandmother, Clyde and Connie, in Omaha.
Richmond was not consulted about this move. No arrangements
were made to allow Richmond to have regular visitation with
Amanda. There is some evidence that Richmond did not have
a friendly relationship with Clyde and Connie. Once Amanda
was relocated to Omaha, her visits with Richmond ceased.
On September 4, 1996, thek imball County Attorney filed
a petition in the county court fork imball County to termi-
nate Richmond’s parental rights. On July 29, 1997, the court
appointed Monte Neilan to represent Richmond in the matter.
Meanwhile, DHHS representatives began contacting Richmond
and asking him to voluntarily relinquish his parental rights.
Richmond repeatedly refused these requests. Not long after
Neilan was appointed to represent Richmond, the two lost con-
tact for the better part of a year. On May 5, 1998, the juvenile
court entered an order stating that Neilan would be excused
from the case if Richmond did not immediately contact him.
Richmond resumed contact with Neilan a day or two later.
On August 4, 1998, Case, a caseworker at DHHS, was
assigned to Amanda’s file. As with prior caseworkers before
her, Case wanted Richmond to relinquish his parental rights so
that Amanda could be formally adopted by Clyde and Connie.
To that end, Case spoke with Richmond over the telephone and
met with him in person immediately after she was assigned to
the case. Richmond initially explained that he was not will-
ing to relinquish his rights. However, he also indicated that

he wanted to take Amanda’s preferences into account. During
their conversations, Case explained that if they could arrange
an open adoption, Richmond could still visit Amanda even if
he relinquished his parental rights. Case also explained that
such visitation opportunities would disappear if Richmond’s
parental rights were terminated in the proceeding pending in
county court.
On August 13, 1998, Case met with Richmond at the DHHS
office in Scottsbluff, Nebraska. During the meeting, Case placed
a call to Clyde and Connie’s residence in Omaha. A confer-
ence call was held with Case and Richmond in Scottsbluff
and Connie and Amanda in Omaha. During the telephone call,
Amanda stated that she wanted to be adopted by Clyde and
Connie, since she was in Omaha and Richmond was ink imball.
However, Amanda also stated that she wanted to have contact
and visits with Richmond. Promises were made—though it is
not clear whether by Case, Connie, or both—that an open adop-
tion would be used. Notably, Case did not inform Neilan, the
kimball County Attorney, Amanda’s guardian ad litem, or the
county court about any of the above.
After the conference call, Case prepared the documents that,
once signed, would divest Richmond of his parental rights over
Amanda. Case then contacted Neilan to inform him that she
was working with Richmond to secure his relinquishment of
parental rights. In response, Neilan sent a letter to Case stating
that Richmond did not want to relinquish his parental rights.
Case would later claim that she did not receive the letter.e ither
way, Case avoided further contact with Neilan.
Case then met with Richmond to discuss the relinquish-
ment. Notably, Case once again counseled Richmond regard-
ing the legal ramifications of a relinquishment as opposed to
a court-ordered termination of parental rights. In particular,
Case explained that relinquishment left open the possibility of
visitation with Amanda, whereas termination would not. Case
left the relinquishment documents with Richmond and told
him to discuss them with his attorney. It is not clear whether
Richmond ever did. Once again, Case never notified Amanda’s
guardian ad litem, the county attorney, or the county court
about these meetings.
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762 	275 NeBRASkAR ePORTS
Case and Richmond met for a final time on August 25, 1998.
Case again explained the legal benefits of relinquishment and
stated that relinquishment was in Richmond’s best interests.
Richmond then signed the documents and thereby relinquished
his parental rights over Amanda. Case filed the documents with
the county court.
In 1999, Richmond sued Case based on the aforemen-
tioned sequence of events.1 Richmond alleged that, among other
things, Case engaged in the unauthorized practice of law—and
thereby abused her authority as a DHHS employee—when she
counseled Richmond about the legal benefits of relinquish-
ing his parental rights. Richmond alleged that this action
deprived him of his substantive due process right to custody
of his child and therefore sought relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (2000).
A jury trial was held on February 6, 2003. The jury found
in favor of Richmond on his § 1983 claim, but awarded him
a mere $1 in compensatory damages. The jury did, however,
award Richmond $65,000 in punitive damages. It is unclear
whether attorney fees were awarded. Moreover, the relinquish-
ment agreements were declared null and void by the court in its
June 3, 2003, judgment.
Case appealed to this court. While that appeal was pend-
ing, the parties agreed to a settlement. Case agreed to aban-
don the appeal if Richmond accepted a $130,000 settle-
ment, of which $84,031.65 was for attorney fees and another
$4,977.17 for costs. The remaining $40,991.18 represented
“compensatory damages” under the terms of the agreement.
Richmond accepted the offer, and the appeal was dismissed by
joint stipulation.
On May 20, 2004, less than a year later, Richmond filed
another complaint against Case in the district court fork imball
County. This time, Richmond filed the complaint against Case
in her personal capacity on behalf of his then minor daugh-
ter, Amanda. Among other claims, the complaint alleged that
Case’s misconduct had deprived Amanda of her substantive
due process rights to a parent-child relationship in violation of
1 See Richmond v. Case,k imball County District Court, case No. CI99-82.

§ 1983. All other causes of action were quickly abandoned so
that only the § 1983 claim remained. Amanda then moved for
summary judgment on the issue of “liability.” A hearing was
held on November 1, 2005, to resolve the motion.
The district court found that the judgment against Case in the
previous suit ink imball County District Court, case No. CI99-82
(hereinafter CI99-82), had a preclusive effect regarding her mis-
conduct in dealing with Richmond. The court concluded that
such misconduct not only violated Richmond’s parental rights,
but also violated Amanda’s substantive due process rights as a
child. Finally, the court relied on deposition testimony by Dr.
Daniel Scharf, a psychologist who evaluated Amanda, in con-
cluding that the relinquishment had caused harm to Amanda.
Accordingly, the court granted Amanda’s motion for summary
judgment as to Case’s liability and scheduled a bench trial on the
issue of damages.
On May 24, 2006, the district court issued a judgment award-
ing Amanda $150,000 in damages. In its judgment, the court
recounted the aforementioned sequence of events. The court
also noted that sometime after the relinquishment, Amanda
began to use drugs, ran away from (and refuses to return to)
the home of Clyde and Connie, gave birth to a child out of
wedlock, and appears to be suffering financially. In short, the
court found that Case “interfered with [Amanda’s] parent-child
relationship with [Richmond].” and that Amanda’s life “spun
out of control” as a result.
After the court issued its judgment, Amanda filed a petition
on June 13, 2006, requesting legal fees, expenses, and costs.
Per a stipulated order, the court awarded Amanda $53,437.50
in attorney fees and another $11,260.03 in costs and expenses.
Case now appeals.
III. ASSIGNMeNTS OFe RROR
Case assigns, restated, that the district court erred when it
(1) relied on the doctrine of collateral estoppel to find that
Case violated Amanda’s substantive due process rights, (2) mis-
handled the inquiry into whether Case’s actions caused actual
harm to Amanda, and (3) failed to recognize the existence of
genuine issues of fact.
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764 	275 NeBRASkAR ePORTS
IV. STANDARD OF ReVIeW
[1] Summary judgment is proper if the pleadings and admis-
sible evidence offered at the hearing show that there is no genu-
ine issue as to any material facts, or as to the ultimate infer-
ences that may be drawn from those facts, and that the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.2
[2,3] A party makes a prima facie case that it is entitled
to summary judgment by offering sufficient evidence that,
assuming it went uncontested at trial, would entitle the party
to a favorable verdict.3 If the moving party makes such a case,
the burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to avoid sum-
mary judgment by producing admissible contradictory evidence
which raises a genuine issue of material fact.4
[4,5] In reviewing a summary judgment, an appellate court
views the evidence in the light most favorable to the party
against whom the judgment was granted, giving that party the
benefit of all reasonable inferences deducible from the evi-
dence.5 On questions of law, an appellate court is obligated to
reach a conclusion independent of the determination reached by
the court below.6
V. ANAlYSIS
1. collateRal estoppel
In her first assignment of error, Case contends that the district
court erroneously concluded that the judgment in CI99-82 had
a preclusive effect regarding whether Case violated Amanda’s
constitutional rights in this case. To refresh, in CI99-82, a jury
found that Case violated Richmond’s substantive due process
right to custody of Amanda. The district court found that Case’s
“interference with the parent-child relationship between Gary
Richmond and Amanda C[.]” was an issue “fully determined”
2 See Didier v. Ash Grove Cement Co., 272 Neb. 28, 718 N.W.2d 484
(2006).
3 See Marksmeier v. McGregor Corp., 272 Neb. 401, 722 N.W.2d 65 (2006).
4 See id.
5 See Didier, supra note 2.
6 Ichtertz v. Orthopaedic Specialists of Neb., 273 Neb. 466, 730 N.W.2d 798
(2007).

in CI99-82. This conclusion was based on the court’s belief that
“[t]he facts are the same and the same relationship was affected
[in this case].” As a result, the court determined that the judg-
ment in CI99-82 rendered it unnecessary to relitigate whether
Case violated Amanda’s constitutional rights.
[6,7] Under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, also known
as issue preclusion, an issue of ultimate fact that was deter-
mined by a valid and final judgment cannot be litigated again
between the same parties or their privities in any future lawsuit.7
Collateral estoppel is applicable where (1) an identical issue was
decided in a prior action, (2) the prior action resulted in a judg-
ment on the merits which was final, (3) the party against whom
the doctrine is to be applied was a party or was in privity with
a party to the prior action, and (4) there was an opportunity to
fully and fairly litigate the issue in the prior action.8
There is no dispute that CI99-82 resulted in a final judg-
ment on the merits. Nor is there a dispute that Case—the
party against whom issue preclusion is sought—was a party
in CI99-82. The only real question is whether Case’s interfer-
ence with Richmond’s substantive due process rights regarding
Amanda is identical to the underlying issue of whether Case
interfered with Amanda’s substantive due process rights, if
any, regarding Richmond. If so, then Case had the opportunity
to fully and fairly litigate that issue in CI99-82 and Amanda
would therefore be entitled to collateral estoppel.
[8,9] Amanda alleged that Case interfered with her substan-
tive due process rights regarding the parent-child relationship
between her and Richmond. Accordingly, Amanda sought relief
under § 1983, which provides a civil remedy for “depriva-
tions of federally protected rights,” statutory or constitutional,
“caused by persons acting under color of state law.”9
[I]n any § 1983 action the initial inquiry must focus on
whether the two essential elements to a § 1983 action
7 See Stevenson v. Wright, 273 Neb. 789, 733 N.W.2d 559 (2007).
8 See id.
9 Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535, 101 S. Ct. 1908, 68l .e d. 2d 420
(1981), overruled on other grounds, Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 106
S. Ct. 662, 88l .e d. 2d 662 (1986).
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766 	275 NeBRASkAR ePORTS
are present: (1) whether the conduct complained of was
committed by a person acting under color of state law;
and (2) whether this conduct deprived a person of rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or
laws of the United States.10
Case concedes that she was acting under color of state law
at all times relevant to this controversy. The only remain-
ing 	question, 	then, 	is 	whether 	Case’s 	interference 	with
Richmond’s constitutional rights also deprived Amanda of her
constitutional rights.
[10] It is beyond dispute that under the U.S. Supreme Court’s
longstanding precedent, a parent has a constitutional right to
retain custody and control of his or her child.11 A fundamental
question here is whether the corollary is true—that is, whether
a child has a constitutional right to be under the care, custody,
and control of his or her parent.
[11,12] In In re Guardianship of D.J., we observed that both
“‘parents and their children have a recognized unique and legal
interest in, and a constitutionally protected right to, compan-
ionship.’”12 In other words, the substantive due process right
to family integrity “‘protects not only the parent’s right to the
companionship, care, custody, and management of his or her
child, but also protects the child’s reciprocal right to be raised
and nurtured by [his or her] biological . . . parent.’”13 It is clear,
therefore, that both parents and their children have cognizable
substantive due process rights to the parent-child relationship.
Nevertheless, Case presents two arguments as to why her
interaction with Richmond, however wrongful, did not actually
violate Amanda’s substantive due process rights to be raised
10 Id.
11 See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 120 S. Ct. 2054, 147l .e d. 2d 49
(2000) (plurality opinion) (citing Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 64
S. Ct. 438, 88l .e d. 645 (1944); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510,
45 S. Ct. 571, 69l .e d. 1070 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 43
S. Ct. 625, 67l .e d. 1042 (1923)).
12 In re Guardianship of D.J., 268 Neb. 239, 246, 682 N.W.2d 238, 244 (2004)
(emphasis supplied).
13 Id. (emphasis supplied).

and nurtured by Richmond. First, Case suggests that even
if she violated Richmond’s constitutional rights by persuad-
ing him to relinquish his right to custody, she did not violate
Amanda’s constitutional rights because the relinquishment was
ultimately in Amanda’s best interests. Case does not, however,
support her conclusion with any proof that the relinquish-
ment was in Amanda’s best interests. In fact, the evidence
presented at the summary judgment stage suggests quite the
opposite—that the relinquishment led to a downward spiral in
Amanda’s development.
[13] The irony is that due to Case’s intervention, the county
court fork imball County was never able to accurately deter-
mine if, in fact, a termination of Richmond’s parental rights
was in Amanda’s best interests. This is significant because, as
the U.S. Supreme Court observed in Quilloin v. Walcott,14 “the
Due Process Clause would be offended ‘[i]f a State were to
attempt to force the breakup of a natural family . . . without
some showing of unfitness and for the sole reason that to do
so was thought to be in the children’s best interest.’” Under
Quilloin, Case’s belief that she was acting in Amanda’s best
interests does not diminish the fact that Case violated Amanda’s
constitutional rights by subverting established procedure in an
attempt to divest Richmond of his parental rights.
[14] Case next argues that her conduct did not actually impli-
cate either Richmond’s or Amanda’s substantive due process
rights because the parent-child relationship had deteriorated by
the time she intervened. As Case correctly points out, substan-
tive due process rights between a parent and child do not arise
simply by virtue of a genetic connection. Rather, they depend
on a deeper, more enduring relationship.
[15] For example, in Lehr v. Robertson,15 the U.S. Supreme
Court held that a father who
14 Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255, 98 S. Ct. 549, 54l .e d. 2d 511
(1978) (alteration in original) (quoting Smith v. Organization of Foster
Families, 431 U.S. 816, 97 S. Ct. 2094, 53l .e d. 2d 14 (1977) (Stewart, J.,
concurring in judgment)).
15 Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 262, 103 S. Ct. 2985, 77l .e d. 2d 614
(1983).
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768 	275 NeBRASkAR ePORTS
accepts some measure of responsibility for the child’s
future . . . may enjoy the blessings of the parent-child
relationship and make uniquely valuable contributions
to the child’s development. [But if] he fails to do so,
the Federal Constitution will not automatically compel
a State to listen to his opinion of where the child’s best
interests lie.
We can infer from this language that blood alone may not suffice
to permit a parent to assert the due process right to custody and
control of his or her child if the parent has altogether failed to
shoulder the responsibilities inherent in the parenthood. Relying
on such sentiments, Case reminds us that Richmond had largely
failed to maintain the father-daughter relationship in the years
prior to Case’s intervention.
But even if Richmond did neglect Amanda, such neglect is
irrelevant because this case involves Amanda’s constitutional
rights, not Richmond’s. It is doubtful that Lehr’s emphasis on
responsibility works exactly the same in reverse—that is, that
a minor child could not assert his or her due process right to
parental control where the child “allowed” his or her parental
relationship to lapse. But even if it does, Case has not shown
that Amanda, a young child at the time, voluntarily failed to
embrace her relationship with Richmond. The evidence shows
that at a very young age, Amanda was taken from her home,
placed in DHHS custody, and thereafter relocated as DHHS
saw fit. Although the bond between Amanda and Richmond
had withered before Case even intervened, it was not due to
Amanda’s failure to nurture it. So while Richmond’s alleged
failure to embrace his relationship with Amanda might have
affected his ability to invoke his parental rights and thus recover
under § 1983, it will not prevent Amanda from doing so.
[16] Having rejected those two arguments, we pause to note
another avenue Case could have pursued—but inexplicably
avoided—in an attempt to evade liability. We refer, of course,
to the defense of qualified immunity. Public officials like Case
who have been sued in their personal capacities under § 1983
may invoke qualified immunity as “a shield from liability”
if the “official’s conduct does not violate clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person

would have known.”16 This defense is commonly raised by, and
has been granted to, social service workers.17
[17] Case referred to the qualified immunity defense in her
responsive pleading before the district court. It is clear that
the district court did not grant Case qualified immunity. But
the record does not show whether this was because the court
concluded that Case was not entitled to such immunity or
because Case abandoned the claim herself.e ither way, Case
did not mention the defense in her brief before this court. We
will not review errors that were not assigned and argued in
a party’s brief.18 Accordingly, we will not consider whether
Case is entitled to qualified immunity. Instead, we mention
the qualified immunity defense only to dispel any notion that
state employees will automatically be held personally liable for
substantial monetary damages any time they infringe upon a
citizen’s constitutional rights.
We conclude that proof that Case wrongfully interfered
with Richmond’s custody and control over Amanda would
also establish that Case wrongfully interfered with Amanda’s
constitutional right to be in Richmond’s custody. Whether
Case wrongfully interfered with Richmond’s right to custody
and control of Amanda was the issue at the heart of CI99-82.
Case suffered an adverse judgment on that issue after full and
fair litigation. Accordingly, the district court did not err in
concluding that the judgment in CI99-82 precludes Case from
contesting whether she interfered with Amanda’s constitutional
rights by wrongfully counseling Richmond to relinquish cus-
tody of Amanda.
2. causation
In her next assignment of error, Case contends that the dis-
trict court mishandled the inquiry into whether Case’s conduct
was the cause of Amanda’s harm. Case’s argument in this
16 Williams v. Baird, 273 Neb. 977, 985, 735 N.W.2d 383, 391 (2007).
17 See id. n.32 (collecting cases).
18 See, Fickle v. State, 273 Neb. 990, 735 N.W.2d 754 (2007), modified on
other grounds 274 Neb. 267, 759 N.W.2d 113; Epp v. Lauby, 271 Neb. 640,
715 N.W.2d 501 (2006).
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770 	275 NeBRASkAR ePORTS
regard proceeds in two parts. First, Case argues that Amanda
failed to present sufficient evidence that Case’s misconduct
resulted in actual harm to Amanda. Second, Case argues that
the district court’s causation analysis was inherently flawed
because it considered evidence of Amanda’s “damages” instead
of confining its analysis solely to issues of “liability.”
(a) Actual Harm
[18] To recover compensatory damages in a § 1983 action,
the claimant must show that the violation of his or her rights
resulted in some actual harm.19 This requires both proof of some
actual harm to the claimant and a causal relationship between
that harm and the violation of the claimant’s federal rights.
Case does not seem to dispute that Amanda actually suf-
fers from numerous social problems. Rather, Case seems to
argue that those problems did not result from any misconduct
by Case, but stem from a number of other threats to Amanda’s
ordinary social development. As Case points out, Amanda was
abused by her mother, Carol; removed from her biological
home at an early age; relocated fromk imball to Omaha to live
with Clyde and Connie; and was unable to see Richmond on a
regular basis, if at all.All of these things, Case argues, affected
Amanda’s development and cannot be attributed to Case. At
bottom, this argument refers to causation.
[19-21] Causation issues in § 1983 actions are generally
resolved according to common-law tort principles.20 As a gen-
eral matter, a proximate cause is defined as “that cause which,
in a natural and continuous sequence, without any efficient,
intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the
injury would not have occurred.”21 So, ordinarily,
19 See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266, 98 S. Ct. 1042, 55l .e d. 2d 252
(1978).
20 See, e.g., Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 100 S. Ct. 553, 62l .e d. 2d
481 (1980) (citing Grimm v. Arizona Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 115 Ariz.
260, 564 P.2d 1227 (1977), and Palsgraf v. Long Island R. R. Co., 248 N.Y.
339, 162 N.e. 99 (1928)); Ricketts v. City of Columbia, Missouri, 36 F.3d
775 (8th Cir. 1994).
21 Haselhorst v. State, 240 Neb. 891, 899, 485 N.W.2d 180, 187 (1992).

a plaintiff must meet three basic requirements in establish-
ing proximate cause: (1) that without the [misconduct],
the injury would not have occurred, commonly known as
the “but for” rule; (2) that the injury was a natural and
probable result of the [misconduct]; and (3) that there was
no efficient intervening cause.22
[22] We have also held, however, that an act need not be the
sole cause of harm to qualify as a proximate cause. When mul-
tiple causes act to produce a single injury, any one of those acts
can still qualify as a proximate cause of that harm so long as it
was a substantial factor in bringing about the injury.23
In support of her motion for summary judgment, Amanda
presented deposition testimony and an accompanying affidavit
from Scharf, a psychologist licensed in the State of Nebraska.
Scharf evaluated Amanda and reviewed her file. Scharf’s tes-
timony supports the conclusion that the relinquishment was
a substantial factor in bringing about Amanda’s subsequent
social problems.
Scharf acknowledged that Amanda faced a number of “risk
factors” in addition to Richmond’s relinquishment of cus-
tody and thus, that the “relinquishment [was] one of a couple
of risk factors” affecting Amanda’s development. However,
Scharf also noted that Amanda seemed to handle most of the
other developmental risk factors without many adverse effects.
Scharf found that “until about age 12 or 13,” the approximate
time of the relinquishment, Amanda had “adjusted fairly well
. . . and done real well in school and done well with friends.”
But soon after the relinquishment, Amanda faced a “decrease in
scholastic achievement, . . . substance abuse, [and] difficulties
with depression.” Ultimately, this led Scharf to conclude that
“the relinquishment did have an effect on Amanda.”
Scharf’s testimony not only supports a finding that Amanda
suffered actual harm, but also that the relinquishment was a
substantial factor in causing that harm. Scharf’s testimony
22 Stahlecker v. Ford Motor Co., 266 Neb. 601, 609-10, 667 N.W.2d 244, 254
(2003).
23 Reimer v. Surgical Servs. of the Great Plains, 258 Neb. 671, 605 N.W.2d
777 (2000).
AMANDA C. v. CASe 	771
Cite as 275 Neb. 757

772 	275 NeBRASkAR ePORTS
suggests that the relinquishment was at least as significant an
agent as the other obstacles Amanda faced in bringing about
her downward social spiral. Amanda’s presentation of such
evidence therefore shifted the burden to Case to present con-
tradictory evidence that Amanda did not suffer actual harm
or at least evidence that the formal relinquishment was not a
substantial factor in bringing about such harm. Case did not
present any such evidence. The court did not err, therefore, in
concluding that summary judgment was proper on the issue of
proximate causation.
(b) Consideration of “Damages”e vidence at Causation Stage
At one point in her brief, Case argues that the district court’s
causation analysis was flawed because the court “failed to dis-
tinguish [(1)] the causal connection between [Case’s] conduct
and the alleged violation of [Amanda’s] civil rights from [(2)]
the causal connection between the violation of [Amanda’s] civil
rights and the alleged injury to [Amanda].”24 Case believes that
the first inquiry—whether Case’s conduct violated Amanda’s
civil rights—is a question of liability and was therefore prop-
erly considered by the court at the summary judgment stage.
But Case believes that the second question—whether the
alleged violation of Amanda’s civil rights caused any actual
harm—is more a question of damages. Thus, Case believes that
the district court erroneously merged these two issues when, in
the course of ruling on Case’s “liability,” it considered Scharf’s
testimony regarding actual harm to Amanda.
There is no limit, however, to the issues that a party can
focus on in his or her own motion for summary judgment.
Amanda moved for summary judgment on the “issue of liabil-
ity” and was free to define the scope of that motion. To Amanda,
“liability” appears to have meant not only that Case’s conduct
violated her constitutional rights, but also that the violation of
those rights caused actual harm to her. On the former issue,
Amanda offered evidence of the prior judgment in CI99-82 and
argued that the judgment had preclusive effect. Regarding the
24 Reply brief for appellant at 7.

latter issue, Amanda offered Scharf’s deposition testimony and
a sworn affidavit.
By arguing that the district court improperly considered
Scharf’s testimony at the summary judgment stage, Case
attempts to supplant her own characterization of what Amanda
actually sought with her motion for summary judgment. That
is, Case attempts to characterize Amanda’s motion as a motion
for summary judgment only on the issue of whether Case vio-
lated Amanda’s constitutional rights.
But if Amanda sought summary judgment on that issue
alone, there was no reason to submit Scharf’s testimony and
affidavit in support of her motion. As was shown above, that
evidence does nothing more than establish the existence of
actual harm and provide a causal link between that harm and
the violation of Amanda’s rights. As such, the inclusion of that
evidence should have sent a clear sign to Case that if the court
granted Amanda’s motion in full, the only issue left to resolve
regarding “damages” would be the extent, not the existence, of
those damages. Case had the opportunity, therefore, to present
evidence that would negate the existence of Amanda’s damages.
For whatever reason, Case did not make the most of that oppor-
tunity. But Case’s omission does not mean the district court
erred in its causation analysis.
3. genuine issues oF F act
In her final assignment of error, Case contends that the
district court erred by failing to recognize the existence of
genuine factual disputes regarding Case’s conduct and proxi-
mate causation.
(a) Genuine Issues Regarding Case’s Conduct
As Case notes, the parties disagree on a number of details
surrounding Case and Richmond’s interactions before Richmond
agreed to relinquish custody of Amanda. Case believes that
these factual disputes raise legitimate issues of fact as to
whether she truly violated Amanda’s constitutional rights.
These factual disputes, however, are made irrelevant by
the preclusive effect that the prior judgment in CI99-82 is
entitled to in this case. Factual disputes between the parties
regarding Richmond and Case’s encounters leading up to the
AMANDA C. v. CASe 	773
Cite as 275 Neb. 757

774 	275 NeBRASkAR ePORTS
relinquishment did not deter a jury from finding that Case
violated Richmond’s rights. If Case has no right to challenge
that determination, it obviously follows that she has no right to
question the facts upon which that determination depends.
(b) Genuine Issues Regarding Causation
Case also argues that genuine issues of fact exist regarding
whether Case’s misconduct caused Amanda any harm. In sup-
port of this proposition, Case renews the argument that Amanda
and Richmond were essentially estranged before she even
intervened. Indeed, Case maintains that “it was by no means a
for[e]gone conclusion that [Richmond] would be reunited with
[Amanda] but for the signing of the relinquishment papers.”25
This may be true, but the argument misses the point.
[23] The question at this stage is whether there are genuine
issues of material fact.26 In the summary judgment context, a
fact is material only if it would affect the outcome of the case.27
Proof that Amanda and Richmond would not have reunited even
without Case’s intervention is not material because, according
to Scharf’s testimony, the formal relinquishment caused harm
to Amanda in and of itself. As Scharf testified, the relinquish-
ment harmed Amanda because it contributed to a downward
spiral in her social life, not because it reduced the odds that
Amanda and Richmond would unite.
The only real evidence that might raise a genuine issue of
material fact in light of Scharf’s testimony would be contrary
testimony by another psychological expert. But Case did not
present such evidence. Accordingly, it cannot be said that
genuine issues of material fact remain regarding the causal
relationship between Case’s violation of Amanda’s rights and
the resulting harm to Amanda.
VI. CONClUSION
The district court did not err in concluding that the judg-
ment in CI99-82, the prior controversy involving Richmond
25 Id. at 11.
26 See Didier, supra note 2.
27 See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 91l .
ed. 2d 202 (1986).

and Case, precluded Case from relitigating the wrongfulness
of her decision to counsel Richmond to relinquish custody of
Amanda. A violation of Richmond’s constitutional rights as a
parent would also result in a violation of Amanda’s reciprocal
constitutional rights as a child. Therefore, under the doctrine
of collateral estoppel, the judgment in CI99-82 precluded Case
from disputing the fact that she violated Amanda’s constitu-
tional rights.
The district court also did not err in concluding that Case’s
violation of Amanda’s rights resulted in actual harm to Amanda.
The evidence shows that the relinquishment that Case wrong-
fully orchestrated was a substantial factor in Amanda’s down-
ward social spiral. Nor did the court err in considering such
evidence at the summary judgment stage.
Finally, there are no genuine issues of material fact regard-
ing Case’s liability to Amanda. Any factual disputes regarding
Case’s actual conduct are made irrelevant by the preclusive
effect of the judgment in CI99-82. Similarly, the fact that
Amanda might not have reunited with Richmond even if Case
never intervened is irrelevant. The evidence shows that the
relinquishment in and of itself caused harm to Amanda. From
the above, we conclude that the district court did not err in
granting summary judgment to Amanda.
aFFiRmed .
shaRon k. R ankin , appellant , v .
w.k. stetson , m.d.,
et al ., appellees .
749 N.W.2d 460
Filed May 23, 2008. 	No. S-07-073.
1. Summary Judgment: Appeal and Error. In reviewing a summary judgment, an
appellate court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against
whom the judgment is granted and gives such party the benefit of all reasonable
inferences deducible from the evidence.
2. Rules of Evidence. In proceedings where the Nebraskae vidence Rules apply, the
admissibility of evidence is controlled by such rules; judicial discretion is involved
only when the rules make such discretion a factor in determining admissibility.
RANkIN v. STeTSON 	775
Cite as 275 Neb. 775