Anderson Excavating Co. v. Neth

986 	275 NeBrASKA reporTS
never acquired subject matter jurisdiction,” and we have already
found this contention to be without merit.
CoNCLUSIoN
We find no merit to edward’s assignments of error in the cur-
rent appeal, and we affirm the judgment. Having done so, we
need not consider the plaintiffs’ cross-appeal.
A ffirmed .
ANdersoN excAvATiNg co ., AppellANT, v .
beverly N eTh , direcTor , depArTmeNT
of moTor vehicles , sTATe of
N ebrAskA, Appellee .
751 N.W.2d 595
Filed June 27, 2008. 	No. S-07-539.
1. Administrative Law: Judgments: Appeal and Error. A judgment or final order
rendered by a district court in a judicial review under the Administrative procedure
Act may be reversed, vacated, or modified by an appellate court for errors appear-
ing on the record.
2. ____: ____: ____. When reviewing a district court’s order under the Administrative
procedure Act for errors appearing on the record, the inquiry is whether the deci-
sion conforms to the law, is supported by competent evidence, and is neither arbi-
trary, capricious, nor unreasonable.
3. Administrative Law: Statutes: Appeal and Error. The meaning and interpreta-
tion of statutes and regulations are questions of law for which an appellate court
has an obligation to reach an independent conclusion irrespective of the decision
made by the court below.
Appeal from the District Court for Lancaster County: J effre
cheuvroNT, Judge. Affirmed.
Timothy L. Moll and Sara S. pillen, of rembolt Ludtke,
L.L.p., for appellant.
Jon 	Bruning, Attorney 	general, 	and 	L. 	Jay 	Bartel 	for
appellee.
wrighT, coNNolly, gerrArd, sTephAN, and miller -lermAN,
JJ.
Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
11/01/2026 04:54 AM CST

coNNolly, J.
I. SUMMArY
Anderson excavating Co. (Anderson) is licensed under the
International Fuel Tax Agreement (IFTA) and registered under
the International registration plan (Irp). Nebraska is Anderson’s
base jurisdiction for IFTA and Irp. After an audit of Anderson’s
records, the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) concluded
that the records failed to comply with the recordkeeping require-
ments of IFTA and Irp. Consequently, the DMV disallowed
tax credits under IFTA and assessed additional registration fees
under Irp. Anderson sought review by the district court. The
district court affirmed the DMV’s assessments.
To obtain credits for taxes paid in fuel purchases, an IFTA
provision purports to require that licensees retain receipts show-
ing the unit number of the vehicle being fueled to verify that
the fuel was placed in an IFTA-qualified vehicle. Many receipts
Anderson supplied for the audit did not include the unit num-
ber, so the DMV disallowed tax-paid credit for those purchases.
Anderson contends that it was not required to document unit
numbers and that the only requirement was that it could dis-
tinguish between qualified and nonqualified fuel purchases.
Anderson claims it can connect fuel purchases to qualified
vehicles because the receipts identified the drivers and Anderson
can link drivers to qualified units. Anderson therefore contends
that the DMV should not have disallowed the tax-paid credits
under IFTA.
Irp requires that a registrant maintain mileage records sup-
porting the registrant’s claimed total distance traveled in each
jurisdiction. If the registrant’s mileage records are inadequate
and an estimate of the registrant’s true liability cannot be
determined, the auditing jurisdiction may assess 100-percent
registration fees for that jurisdiction. Anderson did not maintain
the required mileage records, so the DMV assessed 100-percent
fees for Nebraska. Anderson claims that even though it did not
maintain mileage records, the DMV can estimate the percent-
age of miles Anderson traveled in each jurisdiction. Anderson
argues that the DMV can estimate the percentage by looking at
payroll records showing the percentage of hours worked in each
jurisdiction. Anderson argues that the DMV can determine an
ANDerSoN exCAVATINg Co. v . NeTH 	987
Cite as 275 Neb. 986

988 	275 NeBrASKA reporTS
estimate of Anderson’s true liability and that therefore, the 100-
percent assessment was improper.
We affirm the district court’s IFTA decision because we con-
clude that Anderson’s records were insufficient for the DMV
to verify Anderson’s claims for tax-paid credit. We also affirm
the court’s Irp decision because we conclude that Anderson’s
payroll records did not enable the DMV to estimate Anderson’s
Irp liability.
II. BACKgroUND
1. ifTA ANd irp
IFTA is a cooperative fuel tax agreement between Nebraska
and other states. Under IFTA, licensees report and pay motor
fuel use taxes to a base jurisdiction for distribution to other
member jurisdictions in which the licensee traveled and incurred
motor fuel use tax liability. The licensee’s base jurisdiction
has the primary responsibility for administering the agree-
ment and executing its provisions with respect to the licensee.
For instance, the base jurisdiction audits its licensees for all
member jurisdictions.
Irp is a registration reciprocity agreement among states of the
United States and provinces of Canada providing for payment of
license fees based on the distance traveled in all jurisdictions.
Under Irp, the operator of a fleet of apportionable vehicles
registers the fleet in the base jurisdiction. The base jurisdiction
then apportions and distributes registration fees to the cooperat-
ing jurisdictions. The registration fees are based in part on the
percentage of miles traveled in each member jurisdiction. As
with IFTA, the base jurisdiction is responsible for auditing its
registrants for the other jurisdictions.
2. ANdersoN’ s A udiT
Anderson is an excavation contractor. Anderson demolishes
buildings, bridges, and other structures and hauls the debris to
landfills or recycling centers. Anderson primarily operates in
omaha, Nebraska, and Council Bluffs, Iowa, but does some
work in other states.
In 2005, the DMV audited Anderson’s records for compli-
ance with IFTA and Irp. The IFTA audit period was from July

1, 2003, through June 30, 2004. The Irp audit period included
the registration years 2003 through 2005, but only registration
years 2003 and 2004 are at issue here. The DMV found that
Anderson’s records were incomplete. Because Anderson failed
to maintain proper records, the DMV disallowed more than
$17,000 of tax-paid fuel credits Anderson had included on its
IFTA return and assessed a 100-percent Irp registration fee
for Nebraska.
Anderson protested the alleged deficiencies. After IFTA and
Irp hearings, the hearing officer affirmed the deficiency determi-
nations. Anderson appealed to the district court, which affirmed
the hearing officer’s orders.
III. ASSIgNMeNTS oF error
Anderson assigns, restated, that the district court erred in con-
cluding that Anderson (1) was not entitled to credit for tax-paid
fuel under IFTA and (2) owed additional registration fees to the
DMV under Irp.
IV. STANDArD oF reVIeW
[1,2] 	The Administrative 	procedure Act 	(ApA) 	governs
Anderson’s appeal.1 A judgment or final order rendered by a dis-
trict court in a judicial review under the ApA may be reversed,
vacated, or modified by an appellate court for errors appearing
on the record.2 When reviewing a district court’s order under the
ApA for errors appearing on the record, the inquiry is whether
the decision conforms to the law, is supported by competent
evidence, and is neither arbitrary, capricious, nor unreasonable.3
[3] The meaning and interpretation of statutes and regulations
are questions of law for which an appellate court has an obliga-
tion to reach an independent conclusion irrespective of the deci-
sion made by the court below.4
1 See Neb. rev. Stat. §§ 60-3,198(4) (Cum. Supp. 2006) and 66-1411(1)
(reissue 2003).
2 See Holmes v. State, ante p. 211, 745 N.W.2d 578 (2008).
3 See id.
4 Betterman v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 273 Neb. 178, 728 N.W.2d 570
(2007).
ANDerSoN exCAVATINg Co. v . NeTH 	989
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990 	275 NeBrASKA reporTS
V. ANALYSIS
1. ifTA A ssessmeNT
Anderson claimed a tax-paid credit on its IFTA return for
diesel purchases on which Anderson had already paid fuel
tax. The DMV disallowed many credits, claiming Anderson’s
records were insufficient to prove the gallons Anderson reported
on its return. Anderson argues the DMV improperly disallowed
the credit.
To resolve this issue, we review Nebraska statutes5 and regu-
lations6 and the IFTA governing documents, which include the
articles of agreement, procedures manual, and audit manual.
The record contains copies of the IFTA governing documents.
The copies show that some provisions, including provisions on
which we rely, were revised after the relevant audit periods. The
copies contain the provisions as revised and do not include the
prerevision language. Because these copies were included in the
record, we assume the parties intended for us to rely on the text
therein, including the revisions.
Section r700 of the articles of agreement requires that licens-
ees maintain records to substantiate information reported on
their IFTA tax returns. The audit manual’s § A550.200 further
provides, “When tax paid fuel documentation is unavailable,
all claims for tax paid fuel will be disallowed.” So, to decide
whether the DMV properly disallowed the tax paid fuel credits,
we must determine whether the “tax paid fuel documentation
[was] unavailable.” And to determine whether the documenta-
tion was unavailable, we must first decide what documents
were required.
Sections r700 and r1010.200 of the articles direct us to the
procedures manual for the specific recordkeeping requirements.
The procedures manual’s § p560 establishes the recordkeeping
requirements for tax-paid retail purchases:
.100 retail purchases must be supported by a receipt
or invoice . . . .
5 See Neb. rev. Stat. §§ 66-1401 to 66-1419 (reissue 2003, Cum. Supp. 2006
& Supp. 2007).
6 See 251 Neb. Admin. Code, ch. 1 (1998).

.200 receipts for retail fuel purchases must identify
the vehicle by the plate or unit number or other licensee
identifier, as distance traveled and fuel consumption may
be reported only for vehicles identified as part of the
licensee’s operation.
.300 An acceptable receipt or invoice must include, but
shall not be limited to, the following:
.005 Date of purchase;
.010 Seller’s name and address;
.015 Number of gallons or liters purchased;
.020 Fuel type;
.025 price per gallon or liter or total amount of sale;
.030 Unit numbers; and
.035 purchaser’s name . . . .
(emphasis supplied.) For our analysis, we will focus on the item
in subsection .300.030—unit numbers.
After auditing Anderson’s records, the DMV allowed tax-paid
credit for purchases documented by receipts listing a unit number
for the truck being fueled. But many receipts Anderson supplied
for the audit did not include the unit number. The DMV claimed
that without a unit number, it could not verify that Anderson put
the fuel in an IFTA-qualified vehicle. So, the DMV disallowed
tax-paid credit when the receipts did not include a unit number.
Anderson does not dispute that many receipts were missing
unit numbers. Instead, Anderson contends that unit numbers
were unnecessary. Anderson argues that the IFTA procedures
manual does not require unit numbers. Anderson also argues that
the Nebraska IFTA regulations do not require unit numbers. As
discussed below, we conclude that the district court did not err
in its findings.
(a) Contrary to Anderson’s Argument, Its records Were
Insufficient even Under the procedures Manual’s § p560.200
Anderson contends that it met the recordkeeping requirements
in the procedures manual’s § p560. Section p560 contains three
subsections: .100, .200, and .300. Subsection .300 lists several
items that must be included on each receipt, including unit
numbers. But Anderson argues that subsection .200 clarifies
subsection .300. Subsection .200 states, “receipts for retail fuel
ANDerSoN exCAVATINg Co. v . NeTH 	991
Cite as 275 Neb. 986

992 	275 NeBrASKA reporTS
purchases must identify the vehicle by the plate or unit number
or other licensee identifier, as distance traveled and fuel con-
sumption may be reported only for vehicles identified as part of
the licensee’s operation.” (emphasis supplied.) relying on sub-
section .200, Anderson argues that a specific unit number is not
required if another “licensee identifier” exists. Anderson claims
the receipts included a licensee identifier because although not
all the receipts included unit numbers, they did identify the
driver by name or credit card number.
Admittedly, the language in subsection .200 appears incon-
sistent with the language in subsection .300: subsection .200
requires “plate or unit number or other licensee identifier,” while
subsection .300 specifically requires unit numbers.
The parties have not favored us with an explanation of IFTA’s
tax-paid credits. Without such an explanation, we are unable to
reconcile the apparent inconsistency between subsections .200
and .300. It may simply be an issue of fuzzy drafting. But even
if subsection .200 applied and allowed a licensee to provide a
vehicle identifier other than a unit number, we conclude that the
identifier must be sufficient for the DMV to properly conduct
its audit.
The articles of the IFTA agreement explain that to qualify for
the tax-paid credit, the fuel must be placed in an IFTA-qualified
vehicle. Not all vehicles in a licensee’s fleet will necessarily be
qualified vehicles. For instance, the record shows Anderson had
smaller diesel trucks that were not IFTA-qualified. Therefore,
even if subsection .200 applies to allow an identifier other
than a unit number, the identifier must enable the DMV to
verify that the fuel was placed in an IFTA-qualified vehicle.
We agree with the DMV that Anderson provided insufficient
identification information.
Anderson counters it can link fuel purchases to qualified
vehicles. relying on a company policy that requires drivers to
use the same truck each day, Anderson argues that the driver’s
name on the receipt adequately identifies the truck being fueled.
We disagree with Anderson’s assertion that “the identification of
the driver is the functional equivalent to a unit number.”7
7 Brief for appellant at 12.

During the audit period, Buck’s, Inc., was the primary vendor
Anderson used for fueling its fleet of trucks. At Buck’s, each
driver would sign his or her name to a log and list the date, the
number of gallons purchased, and the total amount of the sale.
Though most drivers did not list a unit number when signing the
log, “r.D.” often included his unit number. He most often listed
unit No. 317, but occasionally, he listed other units, includ-
ing Nos. 154, 324, and 306. The log shows that although r.D.
usually drove unit No. 317, not every purchase r.D. made was
for unit No. 317. A driver’s name is simply not equivalent to a
unit number.
Also, as mentioned, Anderson had smaller diesel trucks that
were not IFTA-qualified. Therefore, knowing a particular driver
made a diesel purchase is insufficient to determine that the fuel
went into a qualified vehicle because without a vehicle identi-
fier, the DMV cannot verify that the driver was not driving one
of these nonqualified trucks.
We conclude that even if subsection .200 applies to allow an
identifier other than a unit number, Anderson’s records were
insufficient. With only the driver’s name, the DMV could not
verify that Anderson met the threshold condition of placing the
fuel in an IFTA-qualified vehicle. Anderson’s reliance on sub-
section .200 fails.
(b) Anderson’s reading of the DMV’s regulation
Does Not Help Anderson
Anderson also relies on a DMV regulation implementing
IFTA to argue that its receipts were adequate even without unit
numbers. That regulation provides: “No tax-paid credit fuel shall
be allowed pursuant to IFTA unless licensee is able to distin-
guish fuel used by qualified versus non-qualified motor vehicles
as specified in the agreement.”8 Anderson contends that the regu-
lation does not require licensees to provide receipts listing unit
numbers. According to Anderson, the regulation requires only
that the licensee can distinguish between qualified and nonquali-
fied fuel purchases. Anderson again argues that unit numbers
are simply one means of connecting fuel purchases to qualified
8 251 Neb. Admin. Code, ch. 1, § 016.02.
ANDerSoN exCAVATINg Co. v . NeTH 	993
Cite as 275 Neb. 986

994 	275 NeBrASKA reporTS
vehicles, but not the sole means. Anderson claims it can link
fuel purchases to qualified vehicles by using the driver’s name
on the receipt.
even if Anderson’s reading of the regulation is correct, the
regulation does not help Anderson under these facts. As dis-
cussed, we conclude that Anderson’s receipts were insufficient
to link fuel purchases to qualified vehicles. With no vehicle
identifier other than a driver’s name, the DMV could not verify
that the fuel was placed in a qualified vehicle.
(c) The District Court Did Not err in Affirming
the DMV’s IFTA Deficiency Determination
Nebraska, as Anderson’s base jurisdiction, is responsible for
conducting an accurate audit for the other member jurisdic-
tions. The audit manual’s § A100 stresses the base jurisdic-
tion’s responsibility:
The IFTA requires licensees to pay fuel taxes to each
participating jurisdiction commensurate with the distance
traveled in each jurisdiction. To fulfill this requirement,
an effective and uniform audit program is necessary to
verify the integrity of IFTA tax returns. It is essential that
the basic audit program adopted by each jurisdiction be
uniform and thorough to insure accuracy. It is each juris-
diction’s responsibility to . . . conduct an accurate audit in
a professional manner . . . .
Nebraska cannot fulfill its responsibility of conducting an accu-
rate audit when the licensee’s records are insufficient to verify
information on the licensee’s IFTA tax return.
We conclude that to support Anderson’s claims for tax-paid
credit, the IFTA governing documents required Anderson to
maintain receipts showing the fuel was placed in an IFTA-
qualified vehicle. But for many of Anderson’s purchases, the
receipts were insufficient for the DMV to verify that the fuel
was placed in an IFTA-qualified vehicle. The “tax paid fuel
documentation [was] unavailable” for those purchases repre-
sented by receipts with only the driver’s name. Therefore, under
the audit manual’s § A550.200, the DMV properly disallowed
those claims for tax-paid fuel credits. The district court did not
err in affirming the IFTA deficiency determination.

2. irp A ssessmeNT
Anderson filed renewal applications in Nebraska in 2003
and 2004 for apportioned registration under Irp. The DMV
conducted an audit of Anderson’s records to verify the mileage
reported in the applications. Anderson did not keep mileage
records during the audit period because Anderson believed it
was not feasible to do so. After concluding that Anderson failed
to maintain proper mileage records, the DMV assessed addi-
tional registration fees for Nebraska. Anderson claims the DMV
improperly assessed these additional fees.
To resolve this issue, we review Nebraska statutes9 and regula-
tions,10 the Irp itself, and the Irp audit procedures manual. The
record contains copies of the Irp documents. The copies show
that some of the provisions on which we rely were amended
during the 2004 audit period. As with the IFTA documents, the
copies in the record contain only the revised language. Again,
because the parties made these copies part of the record, we will
rely on the language contained therein.
An Irp registrant pays all registration fees to the base
jurisdiction. The base jurisdiction then apportions the fees and
distributes them to all member jurisdictions through which the
registrant traveled. The registration fees are based in part on
the percentage of miles traveled in each member jurisdiction.
As such, the distance the registrant’s vehicles traveled in the
respective jurisdictions is critical information for Irp’s opera-
tion. The Irp and its audit procedures manual set forth record-
keeping requirements so that the base jurisdiction can verify the
registrant’s reported miles.
The Irp’s § 1501 provides that a registrant must maintain
records to prove its application filing. Section 1501 states that
the source documents “must contain necessary details to trace
vehicle movement.” Section 1501 directs us to the audit proce-
dures manual’s § 400 for specific recordkeeping requirements.
Subsection 401 of the audit procedures manual mandates that
the registrant “maintain operational records that support the total
9 See Neb. rev. Stat. §§ 60-3,192 to 60-3,206 (Cum. Supp. 2006 & Supp.
2007).
10 See 251 Neb. Admin. Code, ch. 2 (1999).
ANDerSoN exCAVATINg Co. v . NeTH 	995
Cite as 275 Neb. 986

996 	275 NeBrASKA reporTS
distance traveled in each jurisdiction and total distance traveled
everywhere.” Section 400 lists information that these mileage
records must contain. The mileage records must include the trip
origin and destination, total trip distance traveled, distance trav-
eled by jurisdiction, and route of travel or beginning and ending
odometer readings. A DMV regulation implementing the Irp
similarly requires Nebraska registrants to maintain these mile-
age records.11
If a registrant fails to maintain the required records, the juris-
diction may impose an assessment of liability. Under the Irp’s
§ 1502, the member jurisdiction must estimate the registrant’s
“true liability” from (1) information the registrant furnished, (2)
information the member jurisdiction gathered, (3) information
relative to other similar registrants based in the jurisdiction, or
(4) any other information available to the member jurisdiction.
But “[i]f an estimate of the registrant’s true liability cannot be
determined,” subsection 603 of the audit procedures manual pro-
vides that “the registrant may be assessed 100% registration fees
for the [auditing] jurisdiction.” (emphasis supplied.) Similarly, a
DMV regulation states, “If adequate records are not maintained
or are not made available for audit, the registrant may lose the
right to apportioned registration and may be subject to a possible
full fee assessment.”12
Anderson did not maintain mileage records during the audit
period. According to Anderson, such logs were not feasible
because of Anderson’s day-to-day business operations, where
the drivers drive all day, making multiple short trips between
the jobsite and dumpsite. And, when the project is in downtown
omaha, the drivers often cross into Iowa for a dumpsite in
Council Bluffs. Anderson claims that it was not feasible to log
odometer readings for each “trip.”13
After 	deciding 	it 	could 	not 	determine 	an 	estimate 	of
Anderson’s true liability without the required mileage records,
the DMV assessed 100-percent registration fees for Nebraska.
11 See 251 Neb. Admin. Code, ch. 2, § 014.
12 251 Neb. Admin. Code, ch. 2, § 013.07.
13 Brief for appellant at 14.

The deficiency determination (an additional $18,000 in regis-
tration fees) represented the difference between the percentage
of Nebraska miles Anderson stated on its renewal application
and the 100-percent assessment. The auditor testified that this
assessment increased the reported Nebraska percentage to 100
percent. The assessment, however, left the other jurisdictions’
percentages as Anderson initially reported, meaning the 100-
percent assessment for Nebraska did not deny the other jurisdic-
tions the amounts to which they were entitled.
The issue is whether the DMV correctly concluded it could
not determine an estimate of Anderson’s true liability.
Anderson claims that an estimate of its true liability can be
determined and that therefore, the 100-percent assessment for
Nebraska fees was not justified. Although Anderson did not
keep the required mileage records, it offered payroll records
to show the percentage of hours drivers worked in various
jurisdictions. The records show that during the audit period,
Anderson performed jobs in states other than Nebraska, includ-
ing Iowa, Alabama, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Missouri, and
Tennessee. The records also purportedly show that, on aver-
age, 67 percent of the hours worked by Anderson drivers were
in Nebraska, 15 percent were in Iowa, and another 19 percent
were in other states. Anderson contends that these percentages
provide a reasonable estimate of the percentage of miles driven
in the respective jurisdictions because the employees spent their
working hours driving.
The DMV argues that Anderson’s reliance on general labor
records that bear no relation to mileage cannot be accepted
because the Irp requires documents showing actual mileage.
We agree with the DMV that the payroll records are insufficient
to estimate mileage traveled. At one point in her testimony,
Anderson’s bookkeeper stated, “I couldn’t prove in any way,
shape, or form, that they left that job site for any reason. They
could have been sitting there all day long waiting for their truck
to be filled up.” This testimony shows no direct correlation exists
between hours worked and miles driven because there is no
guarantee that the drivers spend every working hour driving.
The payroll records, without any mileage information, did not
enable the DMV to estimate the percentage of distance traveled
ANDerSoN exCAVATINg Co. v . NeTH 	997
Cite as 275 Neb. 986

998 	275 NeBrASKA reporTS
in each jurisdiction. Because “an estimate of [Anderson’s] true
liability cannot be determined,” the audit procedures man-
ual allows for an assessment of 100-percent registration fees
for Nebraska.14
As with IFTA, Nebraska has a responsibility to protect the
integrity of Irp by performing a complete and accurate audit.
Section 100 of the audit manual recognizes the importance of
this responsibility:
100.2 The purpose of auditing registrants under the
[Irp] is to protect the integrity of the vehicle registra-
tion laws of all jurisdictions party to the Irp and to
ensure equitable treatment of all registrants subject to the
Irp. . . . [I]t is incumbent upon each jurisdiction to meet
its obligations under the provisions of the Irp, i.e., pro-
portional registration of commercial vehicles, by insuring
proper documentation of carrier total distance operated,
and official examination and verification of the appropri-
ate records . . . .
Nebraska cannot carry out its responsibility of conducting an
accurate audit when a registrant fails to provide the required
mileage records or other records from which the DMV can esti-
mate the registrant’s true liability.
We conclude that without the mileage records, the DMV
could 	not 	estimate 	Anderson’s 	true 	liability. 	The 	DMV
was therefore justified in imposing the 100-percent assess-
ment against Anderson for its failure to maintain the proper
records. The district court did not err in affirming the Irp defi-
ciency determination.
VI. CoNCLUSIoN
We conclude that Anderson was not entitled to IFTA tax-paid
credit for fuel purchases when the receipts only identified the
driver. Therefore, the DMV properly disallowed Anderson’s
claims for credit on those purchases. The district court did not
err in affirming the DMV’s IFTA deficiency determination.
We further conclude that because Anderson failed to maintain
mileage records documenting distance traveled in Irp member
14 See, also, 251 Neb. Admin. Code, ch. 2, § 013.07.

jurisdictions, the DMV was unable to estimate Anderson’s Irp
liability. Therefore, Irp allowed an assessment against Anderson
of 100-percent registration fees for Nebraska. The district court
did not err in affirming the DMV’s 100-percent assessment
against Anderson.
A ffirmed .
mccormAck, J., participating on briefs.
heAvicAN, C.J., not participating.
ST. MoNICA’S v. LANCASTer CTY. BD. oF eqUAL. 	999
Cite as 275 Neb. 999
sT. moNicA’ s , AppellANT, v .
lANcAsTer couNTy boArd
of equAlizATioN, Appellee .
751 N.W.2d 604
Filed June 27, 2008. 	No. S-07-1031.
1. Taxation: Judgments: Appeal and Error. Decisions rendered by the Tax
equalization and review Commission shall be reviewed by an appellate court for
errors appearing on the record of the commission.
2. Judgments: Appeal and Error. When reviewing a judgment for errors appearing
on the record, an appellate court’s inquiry is whether the decision conforms to
the law, is supported by competent evidence, and is neither arbitrary, capricious,
nor unreasonable.
3. Taxation: Appeal and Error. questions of law arising during appellate review
of Tax equalization and review Commission decisions are reviewed de novo on
the record.
4. Taxation: Charities. Neb. rev. Stat. § 77-202(1)(d) (reissue 2003) requires
(1) the property be owned by an educational, religious, charitable, or cemetery
organization and (2) the property be used exclusively for educational, religious,
charitable, or cemetery purposes.
5. Taxation: Time. Neb. rev. Stat. § 77-202.03(3)(a) (Cum. Supp. 2006) provides
that the exempt use be determined as of the date of application for exemption.
6. Taxation: Property: Intent. The intention to use property in the future for an
exempt purpose is not a use of the property for exempt purposes.
7. Taxation: Property. The ownership of property is not evidence of use under Neb.
rev. Stat. § 77-202(1)(d) (reissue 2003).
Appeal from the Tax equalization and review Commission.
Affirmed.
William e. peters, of peters & Chunka, p.C., L.L.o., for
appellant.