Garey v. Nebraska Dept. of Nat. Resources

speedy trial. The information was filed December 8, 2003, and
the accused has continued the trial from that date. One has only
to read the opinion of this court to observe the mental gymnas-
tics required to determine whether the State has slipped and
fallen victim to the law.
I concur in the result, but point out that the law is flawed.
H eavican, C.J., and connolly, J., join in this concurrence.
angus garey et al ., appellees and cross -appellants , v.
nebraska department of natural resources et al .,
appellants and cross -appellees.
759 N.W.2d 919
Filed February 6, 2009. 	No. S-08-581.
1. Constitutional Law: Statutes: Appeal and Error. Whether a statute is constitu-
tional is a question of law; accordingly, the Nebraska Supreme Court is obligated
to reach a conclusion independent of the decision reached by the trial court.
2. Constitutional Law: Taxation: Property. Neb. Const. art. VIII, § 1A, states that
the State shall be prohibited from levying a property tax for state purposes.
3. ____: ____: ____. Neb. Const. art. VIII, § 1A, contains two aspects: First, the
property tax at issue must be levied by the State, and second, the property tax at
issue must be levied for a state purpose.
4. Legislature: Political Subdivisions: Taxation: Property. Where the Legislature
has provided that a local political subdivision is authorized to levy property taxes
for state purposes, it should not conclusively be considered as a local property tax
levy merely because the levy is enforced by local authorities.
5. Constitutional Law: Taxation: Property. The State cannot circumvent the con-
stitutional mandate of Neb. Const. art. VIII, § 1A, by converting the traditional
state functions into local functions supported by property taxes.
6. Statutes: Intent. When state and local purposes are intermingled in a statute,
the crucial issue is whether the controlling and predominant purposes are state
purposes or local purposes.
7. States: Federal Acts. An interstate compact is agreed upon by the states, ratified
by the state legislatures, and then ratified by the U.S. Congress, at which time it
becomes the law of the United States.
8. Constitutional Law: Taxation: Property. A property tax in furtherance of com-
pliance with an interstate compact is, for purposes of analysis under Neb. Const.
art. VIII, § 1A, a property tax levied by the State for state purposes.
Appeal from the District Court for Lancaster County: paul
d. merritt, Jr ., Judge. Affirmed.
gArey v. NebrASkA DepT. OF NAT. reSOUrCeS 	149
Cite as 277 Neb. 149
Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
11/01/2026 04:51 AM CST

Jon 	bruning, Attorney 	general, 	Justin 	D. 	Lavene, 	and
katherine J. Spohn for appellants Nebraska Department of
Natural resources et al.
Donald g. blankenau and Thomas r. Wilmoth, of Husch,
blackwell & Sanders, L.L.p., for appellants Upper republican
Natural resources District et al.
Jeanelle r. Lust, rodney M. Confer, Leroy W. Sievers, and
Jocelyn W. golden, of knudsen, berkheimer, richardson &
endacott, L.L.p., for appellees.
H eavican, 	c.J., 	WrigHt, 	connolly, 	gerrard, 	stepHan,
mccormack , and miller-lerman, JJ.
miller-lerman, J.
NATUre OF THe CASe
plaintiffs-appellees, who are residents and taxpayers of
the Upper, Middle, and Lower republican Natural resources
Districts of the State of Nebraska (NrD’s), filed an action
for declaratory and injunctive relief in the district court for
Lancaster County alleging that a property tax levy authorized
by § 11(1)(d) of 2007 Neb. Laws, L.b. 701, and found at Neb.
rev. Stat. § 2-3225(1)(d) (reissue 2007) is unconstitutional.
The district court concluded that the challenged provision was
unconstitutional and entered an order granting declaratory judg-
ment, severed the offending portion of L.b. 701, and enjoined
defendants-appellants, who are various governmental agencies,
from enforcing § 11(1)(d) of L.b. 701. Appellants appeal this
decision, and appellees cross-appeal.
We conclude that the challenged property tax provision of
L.b. 701 violates the prohibition found in Neb. Const. art.
VIII, § 1A, against levying a property tax for a state purpose.
Although the decision of the district court concluding that the
challenged provisions of L.b. 701 were unconstitutional was
based on different reasoning, we nevertheless affirm.
STATeMeNT OF FACTS
Appellees in this case are residents and taxpayers of the
NrD’s. Defendant-appellant Department of Natural resources
150 	277 NebrASkA repOrTS

is an administrative department of the State and has jurisdiction
over matters pertaining to water rights for irrigation, power, or
other useful purposes. Neb. rev. Stat. § 61-206(1) (Cum. Supp.
2006). Defendants the NrD’s are districts within the State; one
of their purposes is the regulation of ground water within their
respective districts. Neb. rev. Stat. § 46-707 (Supp. 2007). The
remaining appellants in this case are individuals and entities
with the authority to impose and collect property taxes in the
counties that make up the NrD’s.
The following statement of facts, for which we find sup-
port in the record, comes largely from the facts outlined in the
district court’s order granting injunctive relief and enjoining
appellants. The states of Colorado, kansas, and Nebraska and
the United States are party signatories to the republican river
Compact of 1943, 2A Neb. rev. Stat. appx. § 1-106 (reissue
2008) 	(Compact). The 	primary 	purposes 	of 	the 	Compact
are to
provide for the most efficient use of the waters of the
republican river basin (hereinafter referred to as the
“basin”) for multiple purposes; to provide for an equi-
table division of such waters; to remove all causes, pres-
ent and future, which might lead to controversies; to
promote interstate comity; to recognize that the most
efficient utilization of the waters within the basin is for
beneficial consumptive use; and to promote joint action
by the States and the United States in the efficient use of
water and the control of destructive floods.
Id., art. I at 1183.
Under the terms of the Compact, each signatory state is
allotted an annual number of acre-feet of water for “beneficial
consumptive use.” Id., art. IV at 1184. The specific alloca-
tions and the sources of those allocations are found in article
IV of the Compact and provide that Colorado is to receive
11 percent of the annual allotment, kansas is to receive 40
percent of the annual allotment, and Nebraska is to receive 49
percent of the annual allotment. As the district court noted, by
entering into the Compact, Nebraska agreed to limit its con-
sumption of water from the republican river basin to ensure
gArey v. NebrASkA DepT. OF NAT. reSOUrCeS 	151
Cite as 277 Neb. 149

that downstream kansas would receive its allotted share of
the water.
In 1999, kansas was allowed to file a bill of complaint with
the U.S. Supreme Court alleging that Colorado and Nebraska
were violating the Compact by using more than their allotted
shares of the water supply. After a special master approved
a settlement agreement among the parties without reserva-
tions, the case was settled, thereby dismissing any claims as
of December 15, 2002. Among other things, the settlement
established a procedure for measuring water usage using a
computer model; allowed the use of allocated water anywhere
in a state in normal years and, in Nebraska, anywhere upstream
of guide rock in dry years; and provided that water imported
into the republican river basin from another river basin can
be considered as a credit against a state’s computed beneficial
consumptive uses.
In 2004, Nebraska’s governor and Attorney general informed
the NrD’s’ water users that to comply with the settlement
agreement, water consumption would need to be reduced in
dry years, and that to ensure compliance with the Compact,
the State could step in if the NrD’s failed to control usage.
In 2006 and 2007, the department leased or purchased surface
water rights from the bostwick Irrigation District to assist the
State in meeting its obligations under the Compact.
On May 1, 2007, the governor signed L.b. 701 into
law. Section 11 of L.b. 701, at issue in this case, amended
§ 2-3225(1)(d) and (2), and the statute provides as follows:
[(1)](d) In addition to the power and authority granted
in subdivisions (a) through (c) of this subsection, a dis-
trict with jurisdiction that includes a river subject to an
interstate compact among three or more states and that
also includes one or more irrigation districts within the
compact river basin may annually levy a tax not to exceed
ten cents per one hundred dollars of taxable valuation of
all taxable property in the district for the payment of prin-
cipal and interest on bonds and refunding bonds issued
pursuant to section 2-3226.01. . . .
(2) The proceeds of the tax levies authorized in sub-
divisions (1)(a) through (c) of this section shall be used,
152 	277 NebrASkA repOrTS

together with any other funds which the district may
receive from any source, for the operation of the district.
When adopted by the board, the tax levies authorized
in subdivisions (1)(a) through (d) of this section shall
be certified by the secretary to the county clerk of each
county which in whole or in part is included within the
district. Such levy shall be handled by the counties in
the same manner as other levies, and proceeds shall be
remitted to the district treasurer. Such levy shall not be
considered a part of the general county levy and shall not
be considered in connection with any limitation on levies
of such counties.
On May 1, 2007, the office of the Nebraska governor issued
a press release stating that the passage of L.b. 701 created a
cash fund which, among other things, could “be used to help
the state continue to comply with interstate compacts and
agreements.” The press release went on to state that L.b. 701
provided $3 million to allow the department “to negotiate a
one-year lease of surface water rights in the bostwick Irrigation
District to help the state comply with the . . . Compact.” The
record shows that prior to the enactment of L.b. 701, the State
had purchased or leased these water rights.
In June 2007, the NrD’s entered into an interlocal coopera-
tion agreement creating the republican river basin Coalition
(rrbC). The purpose of the rrbC is to
provide the authority, resources, services, studies, and
facilities needed for the representation of the interests of
the [NrD’s] in proceedings before all agencies, tribunals,
courts, and any administrative, legislative, executive, or
judicial bodies concerning or affecting the NrDs’ actions,
decisions, and policies to regulate/manage water to ensure
the State of Nebraska remains in compliance with the . . .
Compact . . . .
The agreement stated, “The rrbC shall specifically act within
the authorities granted by Lb 701 . . . .” The rrbC has entered
into various agreements to lease water.
On September 13, 2007, letters were sent on behalf of
appellees to each of the NrD’s, formally requesting that the
NrD’s “vote not to levy any property taxes . . . sanctioned by
gArey v. NebrASkA DepT. OF NAT. reSOUrCeS 	153
Cite as 277 Neb. 149

the Nebraska Legislature in L.b. 701, as a means of meeting
Nebraska’s commitment to comply with the . . . Compact.”
Nevertheless, in September 2007, the NrD’s each adopted
property tax levies authorized by L.b. 701.
In response to the levies, appellees filed this action seek-
ing a declaratory judgment and alleging that the property tax
levy found in L.b. 701 is unconstitutional and unenforceable.
Appellees claim that the property tax levy in § 11(1)(d) of
L.b. 701 represents a property tax levy for state purposes, in
violation of Neb. Const. art. VIII, § 1A; results in a commu-
tation of taxes, in violation of Neb. Const. art. VIII, § 4; and
constitutes special legislation, in violation of Neb. Const. art.
III, § 18.
After a trial on stipulated facts, the district court entered an
order granting declaratory judgment and injunctive relief to
appellees, concluding that although § 11(1)(d) of L.b. 701 does
not violate Neb. Const. art. VIII, § 1A or § 4, it is special legis-
lation, in violation of Neb. Const. art. III, § 18, and, therefore,
unconstitutional. The district court concluded that pursuant to
the severability provision of § 34 of L.b. 701, the court’s ruling
had no bearing on the remaining provisions of L.b. 701. The
district court enjoined appellants from enforcing and imple-
menting any property tax levy authorized by § 11(1)(d) of L.b.
701 and found at § 2-3225(1)(d). Appellants appeal, and appel-
lees cross-appeal.
ASSIgNMeNTS OF errOr
Appellants appeal the decision of the district court which
concluded that § 11(1)(d) of L.b. 701 is unconstitutional and
granted declaratory and injunctive relief, and appellees cross-
appeal, claiming that the district court erred when it concluded
that L.b. 701 did not violate Neb. Const. art. VIII, §§ 1A and
4. In particular, on cross-appeal, appellees claim that the dis-
trict court erred when it concluded that the property tax levy
in § 11(1)(d) of L.b. 701 is not a property tax levy for state
purposes, in violation of Neb. Const. art. VIII, § 1A. because
we find merit to this assignment of error on cross-appeal and
our resolution of this assignment of error resolves this case, we
do not reach the parties’ remaining assignments of error.
154 	277 NebrASkA repOrTS

STANDArD OF reVIeW
[1] Whether a statute is constitutional is a question of law;
accordingly, the Nebraska Supreme Court is obligated to reach
a conclusion independent of the decision reached by the trial
court. Stenger v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 274 Neb. 819, 743
N.W.2d 758 (2008).
ANALySIS
In this case, the district court entered an order granting
declaratory judgment and injunctive relief to appellees, con-
cluding that although § 11(1)(d) of L.b. 701 does not violate
Neb. Const. art. VIII, § 1A or § 4, it is special legislation in
violation of Neb. Const. art. III, § 18. Appellants challenge the
district court’s determination that the complained-of portion
of L.b. 701 is special legislation, in violation of Neb. Const.
art. III, § 18. Appellees cross-appeal, challenging the district
court’s determinations that the complained-of portion of L.b.
701 does not violate either Neb. Const. art. VIII, § 1A, prohib-
iting a property tax levy for state purposes, or Neb. Const. art.
VIII, § 4, dealing with improper commutation of taxes. We first
address the issue raised in the cross-appeal claiming that the
district court erred when it failed to conclude that § 11(1)(d)
of L.b. 701 violated Neb. Const. art. VIII, § 1A. We conclude
that § 11(1)(d) of L.b. 701 violates the prohibition against a
property tax levy for state purposes contained in Neb. Const.
art. VIII, § 1A, and therefore, we conclude that § 11(1)(d) of
L.b. 701 is unconstitutional on this basis.
Under §§ 6(1) and 9 of L.b. 701, the NrD’s are given the
power to issue bonds for the purpose of acquiring ground water
rights, surface water rights, or surface water storage rights to
pay for the acquisition of canals and other works or for vegeta-
tion management. (L.b. 701, § 6(1), is codified at Neb. rev.
Stat. § 2-3226.01(1) (reissue 2007); L.b. 701, § 9, is codified
at Neb. rev. Stat. § 2-3226.04 (reissue 2007).) The NrD’s
can then repay the bond debt by, among other ways, imposing
a property tax levy on all taxable property within the NrD’s’
districts. § 2-3225(1)(d). It is the constitutionality of the prop-
erty tax levy found in § 2-3225(1)(d), originating in § 11(1)(d)
of L.b. 701, that is challenged in this case.
gArey v. NebrASkA DepT. OF NAT. reSOUrCeS 	155
Cite as 277 Neb. 149

[2,3] Neb. Const. art. VIII, § 1A, states that “[t]he state shall
be prohibited from levying a property tax for state purposes.”
This constitutional provision contains two aspects: First, the
property tax at issue must be levied by the State, and second,
the property tax at issue must be levied for a state purpose.
The purpose of this section was to require the State, after the
adoption of state sales and income taxes, to leave the realm
of property taxation for local purposes. Swanson v. State, 249
Neb. 466, 544 N.W.2d 333 (1996).
[4] With respect to our determination of whether a prop-
erty tax is levied by the State, we have noted that where the
Legislature has provided that a local political subdivision is
authorized to levy property taxes for state purposes, it should
not conclusively be considered as a local property tax levy
merely because the levy is enforced by local authorities. See
State ex rel. Western Nebraska Technical Com. Col. Area v.
Tallon, 192 Neb. 201, 219 N.W.2d 454 (1974). In Tallon, we
stated that “[t]o construe the constitutional amendment [at art.
VIII, § 1A,] to prohibit only a direct statewide property tax
levy by the State itself would emasculate the amendment and
render it virtually meaningless and wholly ineffective.” 192
Neb. at 212, 219 N.W.2d at 460.
[5,6] We have also explained that the State cannot cir-
cumvent the constitutional mandate of Neb. Const. art. VIII,
§ 1A, by “converting the traditional state functions into local
functions supported by property taxes.” Swanson, 249 Neb.
at 476, 544 N.W.2d at 340. When state and local purposes
are intermingled in a statute, the crucial issue is whether “the
controlling and predominant purposes . . . are state purposes
or local purposes.” Rock Cty. v. Spire, 235 Neb. 434, 446-47,
455 N.W.2d 763, 770 (1990) (citing State ex rel. Western
Nebraska Technical Com. Col. Area v. Tallon, supra). There
is no sure test for determining which state purposes may be
distinguished from local purposes, and we have said that this
court must consider each case as it arises and draw the line of
demarcation. State ex rel. Western Nebraska Technical Com.
Col. Area v. Tallon, supra.
In assessing § 11(1)(d) of L.b. 701 for constitutional analy-
sis, we look to the legislative history, as did the district court.
156 	277 NebrASkA repOrTS

See Craig v. Board of Equalization, 183 Neb. 779, 164 N.W.2d
445 (1969) (looking to legislative history of constitutional
section when determining whether special levies imposed by
statute serve state or local purpose). We have recently stated
in the context of a special legislation analysis that “[g]enerally,
outside of the plain language used in legislation, a legislative
body’s purpose or intent in enacting legislation is determined
through an examination of the legislative history of a particular
enactment.” Hug v. City of Omaha, 275 Neb. 820, 824, 749
N.W.2d 884, 888 (2008).
In the instant case, it is clear from the legislative history that
L.b. 701 has the purpose of ensuring the State’s compliance
with the Compact and additionally addressing the water prob-
lems of the republican river basin. The Introducer’s Statement
of Intent for L.b. 701 states that the bill “[p]rovide[s] a way to
guarantee that Nebraska stays in compliance with the [Compact
agreement] with kansas on an annual basis” and that L.b. 701
“is designed to address the water problem in the republican
river basin.” Committee on Natural resources, 100th Leg., 1st
Sess. (Feb. 28, 2007).
given this comment and others not repeated here, we con-
clude that the purposes of the property tax provisions found
at § 11(1)(d) of L.b. 701 are intermingled state and local
purposes. As we have done in previous cases in this area, our
analysis and determination of whether the primary purpose
of the property tax provisions in L.b. 701 is a state purpose
or a local purpose address both aspects in the constitutional
amendment at issue: i.e., whether the property tax was levied
by the State and whether it was levied for a state purpose.
See, Rock Cty. v. Spire, supra; State ex rel. Western Nebraska
Technical Com. Col. Area v. Tallon, 192 Neb. 201, 219 N.W.2d
454 (1974).
In its order, the district court concluded that L.b. 701 does
not violate Neb. Const. art. VIII, § 1A, because the predomi-
nant purpose of the challenged property tax levy authorized by
L.b. 701 is to meet a local purpose. The district court stated
that “[t]hrough Lb 701, the population of the republican river
basin can use the tax levy option, if it desires, to meet its agri-
cultural goals, while, at the same time, assisting the state in
gArey v. NebrASkA DepT. OF NAT. reSOUrCeS 	157
Cite as 277 Neb. 149

complying with the Compact.” given the stipulated facts and
applicable law, we disagree with the district court’s assessment
and conclude, as a matter of law, that the property tax levy in
L.b. 701 is effectively a state levy and that its primary purpose
is for a state purpose. We, therefore, conclude that the prop-
erty tax levy, § 11(1)(d) of L.b. 701, violates Neb. Const. art.
VIII, § 1A.
In determining that the property tax at issue is primarily
for state purposes, we note that the legislative history, some
of which is quoted by the district court in its order, is replete
with testimony that the predominant purpose of the property
tax provision of L.b. 701 is for the purpose of maintaining the
State’s compliance with the Compact. The following are certain
examples of comments from the legislative hearing on L.b.
701 which inform our decision and lead us to conclude that
§ 11(1)(d) of L.b. 701 had as its controlling purpose compli-
ance with the Compact:
DAN SMITH[,] manager of the Middle republican
Natural resources District[:] . . . [W]ith the funds pro-
posed for [the department, w]e have the opportunity to
purchase water from four different irrigation districts
and help Nebraska achieve its first year of compliance
since the settlement was approved. This new authority to
generate fund[s] from bonds for a variety of groundwater
management activities and some actions that will be rele-
vant to [C]ompact compliance . . . can only be good for
Nebraska. . . .
. . . .
MIke CLeMeNTS[,] manager of the Lower republican
[Natural resources District:] . . . There is no simple fix
for the issues facing the republican basin. Lb701 does,
however, provide additional tools that can be coupled
with our existing controls that can be used to help us
work towards [C]ompact compliance. . . .
. . . .
JASper FANNINg[,] manager of the Upper republican
Natural resources District[:] . . . but at the end of the
day, we have a plan that we feel can get us and keep us
in compliance with this compact so that we can continue
158 	277 NebrASkA repOrTS

to irrigate in the basin. . . . but at the end of the day, we
need enough total funds available to pay the cost that it’s
going to take to keep us in compliance so that we can
minimize the economic impact of the [C]ompact on the
basin. . . .
. . . .
ANN bLeeD[,] director of the [d]epartment[:] . . . I
believe that passage of this bill will be extremely helpful
in allowing the state and the natural resources districts to
do what is necessary to comply with the . . . Compact. . . .
The bill, in providing authority for the natural resources
districts to issue bonds, fees, or property tax levies, will
provide valuable and, I believe, necessary tools to natural
resources districts so that they can fairly share responsi-
bility for [C]ompact compliance.
Committee on Natural resources Hearing, L.b. 701, 100th
Leg., 1st Sess. 397-434 (Apr. 4, 2007).
The plain language of § 2-3225 also suggests that the
primary purpose of the property tax provision of L.b. 701
is to ensure compliance with the Compact. The provision’s
authority to tax is narrow, and the funds received, curiously,
do not appear to be specifically available for the operation of
the districts.
The language of § 11(1)(d) of L.b. 701 grants property tax-
ing authority only to those districts with a jurisdiction which
includes “a river subject to an interstate compact among three
or more states and that also includes one or more irrigation dis-
tricts within the compact river basin.” (emphasis omitted.) See
§ 2-3225(1)(d). On its face, § 2-3225 narrows the applicability
of the taxing authority and, according to the record, includes
only those districts which are appellants in this case. Further,
§ 2-3225(2) provides that tax levies authorized and raised in
§ 2-3225(1)(a) through (c) shall be used “for the operation
of the district,” but the tax levy at issue in the instant case
which is authorized under (1)(d), is, on the face of the statute,
excluded from being used for the operation of the district. The
failure to include property taxes raised under § 2-3225(1)(d)
from being used for the operation of the district suggests that
such revenue will be channeled elsewhere, arguably to meet
gArey v. NebrASkA DepT. OF NAT. reSOUrCeS 	159
Cite as 277 Neb. 149

the expenses associated with the State’s obligation to comply
with the Compact. based on the legislative history and the
plain language of the statute, we conclude that the controlling
and predominant purpose behind the property tax provision
in § 11(1)(d) of L.b. 701 is for the purpose of maintain-
ing compliance with the Compact, which we conclude is a
state purpose.
[7] Indeed, an interstate compact, such as the one at issue
in this case, is agreed upon by the states, ratified by the state
legislatures, and then ratified by the U.S. Congress, at which
time it becomes the law of the United States. See, Compact;
U.S. Const. art. I, § 10. See, also, Texas v. New Mexico, 482
U.S. 124, 107 S. Ct. 2279, 96 L. ed. 2d 105 (1987). If an
action is brought to enforce the Compact, such action would
be an original action before the U.S. Supreme Court and that
court could enter an order instructing a party to the Compact
to comply with its terms and award damages for noncompli-
ance. See Texas v. New Mexico, supra (explaining that com-
pact is legal document and must be construed and applied in
accordance with its terms). The Supreme Court has stated that
the proper plaintiff in a case involving a compact is the state.
See id.
The Compact was signed by the State, and the special mas-
ter overseeing the settlement agreement stated:
[T]he Compact is self-executing. . . . [A] State has an
enforceable legal obligation to comply with the Compact,
which constitutes the law of the United States as well
as of all three compacting States. If a State fails to meet
that obligation, it is subject to liability for breach of
the Compact.
Kansas v. Nebraska, No. 126 Original, Second report of the
Special Master, appx. D3 at D3-26 to D3-27 (2003), http://
www.supremecourtus.gov/SpecMastrpt/Org126_4162003.pdf
(last visited Feb. 2, 2009).
[8] The State has acknowledged that compliance with the
Compact is the State’s responsibility by entering into the
final settlement stipulation resolving the litigation which was
initiated by the State of kansas in 1998. Further, prior to
the enactment of L.b. 701, it was the State rather than local
160 	277 NebrASkA repOrTS

entities which leased or purchased surface water rights from
the bostwick Irrigation District to further compliance with the
Compact. Neither the department nor the individual NrD’s
were parties or signatories to the Compact or the settlement.
The State is obligated to comply with the Compact, and a
property tax in furtherance of compliance is, for purposes of
analysis under Neb. Const. art. VIII, § 1A, a property tax levied
by the State for state purposes.
CONCLUSION
We conclude that L.b. 701(1)(d) violates the prohibition
against levying a property tax for state purposes found in Neb.
Const. art. VIII, § 1A, and that such provision is therefore
unconstitutional. Under § 34 of L.b. 701, we sever the offend-
ing provision and our ruling has no bearing on the remaining
provisions of L.b. 701. because of our resolution of this case,
we need not consider the remaining assignments of error. See
Papillion Rural Fire Prot. Dist. v. City of Bellevue, 274 Neb.
214, 739 N.W.2d 162 (2007). Although our reasoning dif-
fers from that of the district court, which also concluded that
§ 11(1)(d) of L.b. 701 was unconstitutional, albeit on another
basis, see Tyson Fresh Meats v. State, 270 Neb. 535, 704
N.W.2d 788 (2005), we affirm the order of the district court,
which declared § 11(1)(d) of L.b. 701 unconstitutional and
enjoined its enforcement.
affirmed.
gArey v. NebrASkA DepT. OF NAT. reSOUrCeS 	161
Cite as 277 Neb. 149