South Sioux City Ed. Assn. v. Dakota Cty. Sch. Dist.

CONCLUSION
We conclude that Reed’s concern does not rise to the level of
great public concern that is necessary to qualify for an excep-
tion to standing requirements. The district court was correct in
dismissing Reed’s cause of action for lack of standing.
A ffirmed.
South Sioux C ity eduCAtion ASSoCiAtion, An uninCorporAted
ASSoCiAtion, Appellee , v. dAkotA C ounty SChool diStriCt
no. 22-0011, AlSo known AS South Sioux C ity
C ommunity SChoolS, A politiCAl SubdiviSion
of the StAte of nebrASkA, AppellAnt.
772 N.W.2d 564
Filed September 25, 2009. 	No. S-08-1307.
1. Commission of Industrial Relations: Appeal and Error. Any order or decision
of the Commission of Industrial Relations may be modified, reversed, or set aside
by an appellate court on one or more of the following grounds and no other: (1)
if the commission acts without or in excess of its powers, (2) if the order was
procured by fraud or is contrary to law, (3) if the facts found by the commission
do not support the order, and (4) if the order is not supported by a preponderance
of the competent evidence on the record considered as a whole.
2. Commission of Industrial Relations: Evidence: Appeal and Error. In an
appeal from an order by the Commission of Industrial Relations regarding prohib-
ited practices, an appellate court will affirm a factual finding of the commission
if, considering the whole record, a trier of fact could reasonably conclude that the
finding is supported by a preponderance of the competent evidence.
3. Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error. Before reaching the legal issues presented for
review, it is the duty of an appellate court to determine whether it has jurisdiction
over the matter before it.
4. Commission of Industrial Relations: Administrative Law. The Commission of
Industrial Relations is not a court and is in fact an administrative body perform-
ing a legislative function. It has only those powers delineated by statute, and
should exercise that jurisdiction in as narrow a manner as may be necessary.
Appeal 	from 	the 	Commission 	of 	Industrial 	Relations.
Affirmed.
Kelley Baker and Steve Williams, of Harding, Shultz &
Downs, P.C., L.L.O., for appellant.
572 	278 NeBRASKA RePORTS
Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
11/01/2026 04:49 AM CST

Scott J. Norby, of McGuire & Norby, for appellee.
heAviCAn, 	C.J., 	wright, 	C onnolly, 	gerrArd, 	StephAn,
mCC ormACk, and miller-lermAn, JJ.
wright, J.
NATURe OF CASe
Dakota County School District No. 22-0011, also known as
South Sioux City Community Schools (District), appeals from
a decision of the Commission of Industrial Relations (CIR).
The CIR found that the District’s board of education (Board)
had committed a prohibited labor practice in its hiring of
Bethany Manning as a long-term substitute teacher. The CIR
ordered the District to pay Manning backpay in the amount
of $6,321.37.
SCOPe OF ReVIeW
[1] Any order or decision of the CIR may be modified,
reversed, or set aside by an appellate court on one or more of
the following grounds and no other: (1) if the CIR acts without
or in excess of its powers, (2) if the order was procured by
fraud or is contrary to law, (3) if the facts found by the CIR
do not support the order, and (4) if the order is not supported
by a preponderance of the competent evidence on the record
considered as a whole. Omaha Police Union Local 101 v. City
of Omaha, 276 Neb. 983, 759 N.W.2d 82 (2009).
FACTS
The District employed a teacher for the deaf and hard of
hearing from August 2003 until the end of the 2006-07 school
year, when she resigned. The District advertised the position
and received three applications. Two of the applicants did not
have the required certification. Manning had been employed by
the District for 4 years as a substitute sign language interpreter
and substitute teacher. She had certifications in deaf educa-
tion, elementary education, and english as a second language.
Manning also had a master’s degree from the University of
Northern Colorado and had previously taught in Colorado,
Wyoming, and New Mexico.
SOUTH SIOUx CITy eD. ASSN. v. DAKOTA CTy. SCH. DIST. 	573
Cite as 278 Neb. 572

Three school administrators were involved in evaluating the
applicants: the student services director, the assistant superin-
tendent, and the principal. The student services director con-
ducted the interview with Manning and was not convinced that
Manning “would be good for the job, but she was the only cer-
tified person that was available.” Because there were no other
certificated candidates, the student services director and the
assistant superintendent decided to offer Manning a position as
a long-term substitute.
The student services director sent Manning a letter on June
29, 2007, stating that she would be paid $95 per day for the
first 20 days of substitute teaching. On the 21st day, Manning’s
pay was adjusted on the District’s salary schedule to reflect her
degree and experience.
During the fall semester of 2007, the District again adver-
tised and solicited applications for the deaf educator position.
Manning applied but was not hired. Instead, a previous appli-
cant who, after the initial interview, received her degree and
certification was hired for the position as a full-time teacher,
with a contract commencing at the beginning of the sec-
ond semester.
The South Sioux City education Association (Association)
filed a grievance on December 10, 2007, alleging that the
District should have issued Manning a probationary teacher’s
contract as required by law. On December 11, Manning was
notified that her services were no longer needed as a long-
term substitute, effective December 13. The District denied the
grievance, and the Association appealed to the Board, which
also denied the grievance. Manning was encouraged to remain
on the active substitute list and was retained as a substitute
teacher. However, following the initiation of these proceedings,
her name was removed from the active substitute list.
The Association commenced an action in the CIR against
the District, claiming that it committed a prohibited labor
practice. The Association alleged that Manning was a member
of the bargaining unit represented by the Association and that
she was entitled to be paid a salary and fringe benefits under
the collective bargaining agreement (Agreement) between the
Board and the Association. It was not disputed that Manning
574 	278 NeBRASKA RePORTS

replaced a permanent member of the District’s certificated
teaching staff who had severed her employment. Manning was
not compensated as a member of the bargaining unit repre-
sented by the Association. She was compensated as a substi-
tute teacher.
The petition alleged that the District’s failure and refusal
to compensate Manning as provided by the terms of the
Agreement constituted a unilateral deviation in the terms of the
Agreement, which deviation violated the integrity of the collec-
tive bargaining process and, as such, was a prohibited practice
under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 48-824(2)(a) and (f) (Reissue 2004).
The Association asked the CIR to (1) find that the District
and the Board committed prohibited labor practices, (2) enter
a cease-and-desist order, (3) award Manning backpay, and (4)
award the Association costs and attorney fees.
The District’s answer alleged that the CIR lacked jurisdic-
tion, that the petition was time barred, and that the petition
failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
The 	parties 	stipulated 	to 	the 	following 	facts: 	(1) 	The
Association is the recognized collective bargaining agent for
all nonadministrative certificated employees of the District; (2)
the Association is a labor organization as defined by Neb. Rev.
Stat. § 48-801(6) (Cum. Supp. 2008); (3) the District is a politi-
cal subdivision of the State of Nebraska and is an employer as
the term is defined in § 48-801(4); (4) the parties entered into
the Agreement for the 2007-08 school year; (5) Manning com-
menced her employment with the District on August 8, 2007,
which was the first service day for certificated teaching staff
for the 2007-08 school year; and (6) the District made no con-
tribution or withholding for Manning’s benefit to the Nebraska
School employees Retirement System.
On November 14, 2008, the CIR directed the District to
cease and desist from implementing unilateral deviations from
the provisions of the Agreement, including its compensation
provisions. The CIR also ordered the District to reimburse
Manning backpay in the amount of $6,321.37, which was
equal to the difference between the amount she received for
her bargaining unit duties and the amount to which she would
have been entitled under the Agreement. It declined to award
SOUTH SIOUx CITy eD. ASSN. v. DAKOTA CTy. SCH. DIST. 	575
Cite as 278 Neb. 572

attorney fees, finding that the District’s actions were not willful
or flagrant. The District appeals.
ASSIGNMeNTS OF eRROR
The District assigns, summarized and restated, the following
errors: The CIR erred in finding that (1) it had subject matter
jurisdiction; (2) the factual allegations of the petition stated
a claim of a prohibited practice upon which relief could be
granted; (3) the claim was not time barred; and (4) Manning
was a certificated employee and, therefore, a member of the
bargaining unit.
ANALySIS
[2] In an appeal from a CIR order regarding prohibited prac-
tices, an appellate court will affirm a factual finding of the CIR
if, considering the whole record, a trier of fact could reason-
ably conclude that the finding is supported by a preponderance
of the competent evidence. See Omaha Police Union Local
101 v. City of Omaha, 274 Neb. 70, 736 N.W.2d 375 (2007).
The issues before the CIR were (1) whether the CIR had
jurisdiction, (2) whether the District committed a prohibited
labor practice in violation of § 48-824 by failing to compen-
sate an employee in accordance with the 2007-08 negotiated
Agreement, (3) whether the petition was time barred, and (4)
whether Manning was a certificated employee and member of
the bargaining unit represented by the Association.
SubJeCt mAtter JuriSdiCtion
[3] The District first argues that the CIR lacked jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the petition and that the CIR lacked
the authority to provide the relief requested by the Association.
Before reaching the legal issues presented for review, it is the
duty of an appellate court to determine whether it has jurisdic-
tion over the matter before it. Kilgore v. Nebraska Dept. of
Health & Human Servs., 277 Neb. 456, 763 N.W.2d 77 (2009).
The District asserts that the issues raised by the Association
should have been addressed in an action for breach of con-
tract. The District argues that two cases control the issue of
jurisdiction: Transport Workers of America v. Transit Auth.
of City of Omaha, 205 Neb. 26, 286 N.W.2d 102 (1979), and
576 	278 NeBRASKA RePORTS

Central Nebraska Education Association v. Central Technical
Community College Area, 6 C.I.R. 237 (1982).
In Transport Workers of America, supra, the union filed a
petition against the employer, claiming that the employer had
refused to pay for a short-term disability benefit for employees
as agreed to in a collective bargaining agreement. The parties
stipulated that the only issue was whether employees who were
receiving workers’ compensation benefits were also entitled to
receive short-term disability benefits as provided in the collec-
tive bargaining agreement.
The CIR found that the employer had breached its agree-
ment with the union. On appeal, this court addressed whether
the CIR had jurisdiction to declare the rights, duties, and obli-
gations of the parties under an existing agreement. We deter-
mined that the CIR, as an administrative body performing a
legislative function, had “no power or authority other than that
specifically conferred by statute or by a construction necessary
to accomplish the plain purpose” of the statutes. Id. at 30, 286
N.W.2d at 105.
We found no authority in the state Constitution or statutes
which allowed the CIR to hear cases involving an alleged breach
of contract and to grant equitable relief such as an accounting.
We stated that the statutes governing the CIR provided a forum
for public employers and employees to discuss wages, hours,
and conditions or terms of employment without interruption
of necessary public service. “It is the public interest in having
uninterrupted public service that is principally sought to be
protected by the creation of the [Industrial Relations] Act and
not the creation of a specialty forum for the trying of breach
of contract cases by public employees.” Transport Workers of
America, 205 Neb. at 32, 286 N.W.2d at 106. We reversed the
judgment and remanded the cause to the CIR with directions to
dismiss the petition.
In Central Nebraska Education Association, supra, the union
sought a determination from the CIR whether nurses who were
members of the bargaining unit were being paid in accord with
the collective bargaining agreement.
The CIR reasoned that pursuant to this court’s decision
in Transport Workers of America, supra, once a collective
SOUTH SIOUx CITy eD. ASSN. v. DAKOTA CTy. SCH. DIST. 	577
Cite as 278 Neb. 572

bargaining agreement had been reached and a subsequent
breach of that agreement was alleged, the parties were required
to litigate their disputes concerning alleged breaches of collec-
tive bargaining agreements in a court of general jurisdiction.
Therefore, an action for breach of contract must be brought in
a court of general jurisdiction.
Subsequently, the Legislature passed § 48-824, which states
in relevant part:
(1) 	It 	is 	a 	prohibited 	practice 	for 	any 	employer,
employee, employee organization, or collective-bargaining
agent to refuse to negotiate in good faith with respect to
mandatory topics of bargaining.
(2) It is a prohibited practice for any employer or the
employer’s negotiator to:
(a) Interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the
exercise of rights granted by the Industrial Relations Act;
. . . .
(f) Deny the rights accompanying certification or rec-
ognition granted by the Industrial Relations Act[.]
Both Transport Workers of America v. Transit Auth. of
City of Omaha, 205 Neb. 26, 286 N.W.2d 102 (1979), and
Central Nebraska Education Association v. Central Technical
Community College Area, 6 C.I.R. 237 (1982), predated the
adoption in 1995 of § 48-824. In Ewing Educ. Ass’n v. Holt Co.
School Dist. No. 29, 12 C.I.R. 242 (1996), the CIR addressed
the question whether a unilateral change in a condition of
employment contained in a collective bargaining agreement
was a prohibited labor practice. In that case, the employer
changed the terms and conditions of employment by altering
the health insurance provided to union members. The union
filed a petition with the CIR alleging that the employer’s action
was a prohibited practice. The employer argued that the ques-
tion was whether the contract had been breached and whether
the CIR had jurisdiction over such an issue.
In response, the CIR stated:
That a unilateral change in a term or condition of
employment contained in a collective bargaining agree-
ment may be a breach of contract and actionable as such
goes without saying. We will not determine whether a
578 	278 NeBRASKA RePORTS

breach of contract has occurred in this case because we
have no jurisdiction to do so. The question is whether a
unilateral change in a condition of employment contained
in a collective bargaining agreement is also a prohibited
practice. The [union] argues that neb. rev. StAt. § 48-824
and § 48-825 . . . grant to the [CIR] the specific statutory
authority to find and declare what is known elsewhere in
labor law as an unfair labor practice. We agree.
Ewing Educ. Ass’n, 12 C.I.R. at 244. The CIR determined that
it had jurisdiction over the petition and that the employer had
committed a prohibited practice by agreeing to provide a cer-
tain level of insurance coverage and then unilaterally changing
that provision.
In the present case, the CIR concluded that § 48-824 gave the
CIR jurisdiction over prohibited practices. The issue was pre-
sented whether the District’s actions interfered with, restrained,
or coerced employees in the exercise of rights or denied
the rights accompanying recognition granted by the Industrial
Relations Act, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 48-801 et seq. (Reissue 2004 &
Cum. Supp. 2008). The CIR determined that the Association’s
petition alleged facts that were within its jurisdiction. It con-
cluded that the Association had alleged a prohibited practice
which impacted the Association. The CIR was not requested to
determine whether a breach of contract occurred, but whether
the District’s acts constituted a prohibited practice. The CIR
concluded it had subject matter jurisdiction. We agree.
The Association did not allege that the District breached
its contract with Manning but that the District committed a
prohibited practice under § 48-824(2)(a) and (f). It claimed
that the failure and refusal of the District to compensate
Manning was a unilateral deviation of the economic terms of
the Agreement. The pretrial report described the first issue as
whether the District committed a prohibited labor practice in
violation of § 48-824 by failing to compensate Manning in
accordance with the 2007-08 negotiated Agreement. Breach of
contract was not alleged in the petition or stated as an issue in
the pretrial report.
[4] The CIR is not a court and is in fact an administrative
body performing a legislative function. Omaha Police Union
SOUTH SIOUx CITy eD. ASSN. v. DAKOTA CTy. SCH. DIST. 	579
Cite as 278 Neb. 572

Local 101 v. City of Omaha, 274 Neb. 70, 736 N.W.2d 375
(2007). It has only those powers delineated by statute, and
should exercise that jurisdiction in as narrow a manner as may
be necessary. Id. Section 48-823 states that all grants of power,
authority, and jurisdiction made under the Industrial Relations
Act “shall be liberally construed to effectuate the public policy
enunciated in section 48-802.”
Industrial disputes involving governmental service “shall be
settled by invoking the jurisdiction” of the CIR. § 48-810. “The
statutory jurisdiction of the CIR is to settle pending controver-
sies.” NAPE v. Game & Parks Comm., 220 Neb. 883, 885, 374
N.W.2d 46, 48 (1985). Sections 48-824 and 48-825 define pro-
hibited practices and set forth the process for filing a complaint
alleging a prohibited practice.
The District hired Manning and identified her as a long-term
substitute teacher when she was in fact a certificated teacher
hired to replace a teacher who had resigned and was not plan-
ning to return. Manning was not hired as a substitute for a
teacher on leave. At the end of the semester, the District ter-
minated Manning’s contract and hired a replacement, who was
placed on the salary schedule as a full-time teacher.
The CIR was presented with an industrial dispute involving
allegations that the District interfered with the rights granted
by the Industrial Relations Act and denied rights accompany-
ing certification. These issues were within the jurisdiction
of the CIR, which had the statutory authority to consider
whether the District’s actions were prohibited practices. The
CIR properly exercised jurisdiction over the issues presented
to it.
C lAim for relief
The District argues that the petition failed to state a claim
upon which relief could be granted. It asserts that the payment
of a substitute teacher was not a “focal point” of negotiations
or a priority for the Association. See brief for appellant at 13.
It claims that the petition did not state a claim for relief unless
the prohibited practice was a focal point of negotiations. The
District offers no statutory or case law to support this position.
And we have found no requirement that in order for an action
580 	278 NeBRASKA RePORTS

to rise to the level of a prohibited practice, the issue must be
related to a “focal point” of negotiations.
State law makes it a prohibited practice for an employer to
interfere with employees’ rights under the Industrial Relations
Act. See § 48-824(2). The Association demonstrated that the
District unilaterally altered the wages of Manning, a bargaining
unit member, during the term of the Agreement without first
obtaining the consent of the Association.
Manning was a certificated teacher hired to replace a teacher
who had left the District’s employ with no plans to return.
Manning was paid as a substitute teacher, even though she
was a probationary employee. The District’s employment of
Manning as a “long-term substitute” was a prohibited practice,
as alleged by the Association. The Association stated a claim
for relief. This assignment of error has no merit.
timelineSS of petition
Section 48-825(1) provides that a petition must be filed
within 180 days after the alleged violation. The District claims
that the petition was time barred because it was not filed within
180 days after the alleged violation. The District relies upon
Regina Davis, et. al. v. FOP Lodge 8, 15 C.I.R. 1, 15 (2004),
in which the CIR noted that the limitation period for a “duty
of fair representation” claim begins to run when the cause of
action accrues. The District argues that the limitations period
began to run when Manning was offered the position as a long-
term substitute.
The District claims that Manning was on notice she would
not be covered by the contract when she received a letter from
the student services director on June 29, 2007. The letter stated
that as a long-term substitute, Manning was not contractually
bound to the District. The District asserts that if a prohibited
practice occurred, it took place on June 29 when Manning
received the letter.
The CIR concluded that the cause of action first arose when
the District implemented the deviation from the salary schedule
and not when Manning was offered the position. The CIR deter-
mined that the prohibited practice occurred on September 21,
2007, when Manning’s pay was changed. The petition asserted
SOUTH SIOUx CITy eD. ASSN. v. DAKOTA CTy. SCH. DIST. 	581
Cite as 278 Neb. 572

that the alleged prohibited practice was the unilateral deviation
from the salary schedule, which first occurred on September
21, 2007. The petition was filed on January 16, 2008. The CIR
found that the petition was timely filed.
The District’s reliance on Regina Davis, et. al., supra, is
misplaced. That case involved a duty of fair representation
claim, and in such cases, the limitations period begins to run
when the employee knew or should have known of the viola-
tion. See, e.g., Howard v. Lockheed-Georgia Co., 742 F.2d 612
(11th Cir. 1984); Sixel v. Transportation Communications, 708
F. Supp. 240 (D. Minn. 1989).
In cases involving the unilateral modification of economic
terms of employment, federal courts have uniformly held that
the limitations period for claims alleging an unfair labor prac-
tice does not begin to run until the date the union received
actual and unequivocal notice of the employer’s unilateral
modification. See, N.L.R.B. v. Walker Const. Co., 928 F.2d 695
(5th Cir. 1991); N.L.R.B. v. Glover Bottled Gas Corp., 905 F.2d
681 (2d Cir. 1990); Esmark, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 887 F.2d 739 (7th
Cir. 1989); Teamsters Local Union No. 42 v. N.L.R.B., 825 F.2d
608 (1st Cir. 1987).
Since the cause involves a claim alleging a prohibited labor
practice, the question is when the Association had notice of
the District’s unilateral modification of the terms and condi-
tions of Manning’s employment. The burden of proof was
on the District to demonstrate when the Association had
notice of the alleged prohibited practice. See Broekemeier
Ford v. Clatanoff, 240 Neb. 265, 481 N.W.2d 416 (1992). The
District failed to prove that the Association was aware of the
alleged prohibited practice prior to the filing of a grievance on
December 10, 2007. The 180-day statute of limitations began
on December 10, and the filing of the petition on January 16,
2008, was timely.
The limitations period began on the date the Association
knew or should have known of the alleged prohibited practice.
The CIR used September 21, 2007, as the beginning of the lim-
itations period, finding that the change in terms of Manning’s
contract did not occur until she was paid on that date. even if
September 21 is used as the starting date for the limitations
582 	278 NeBRASKA RePORTS

period, the petition was timely because September 21 is within
the 180-day time period preceding the filing of the petition.
The petition was timely filed, and this assignment of error has
no merit.
C ertifiCAted employee And member of bArgAining unit
The District argues that Manning was not a member of the
bargaining unit, because she was hired as a long-term substi-
tute teacher and not as a regular certificated employee.
The District relies on the statutory definition of a cer-
tificated employee to argue that substitute teachers are not
certificated. This reliance is without merit. Neb. Rev. Stat.
§ 79-824(1) (Reissue 2008) provides that certificated employ-
ees are all teachers and administrators as defined in Neb. Rev.
Stat. § 79-101 (Reissue 2008), other than substitute teachers.
Section 79-101(9) defines a teacher as “any certified employee
who is regularly employed for the instruction of pupils in
the public schools.” Neb. Rev. Stat. § 79-902(38) (Reissue
2008), which provides definitions for the school employees’
retirement systems, states that a “[s]ubstitute employee” is “a
person hired by a public school as a temporary employee on
an intermittent basis to assume the duties of regular employ-
ees due to the temporary absence of the regular employees.”
Manning was not hired due to the temporary absence of a
regular employee.
The CIR found that in hiring Manning, the District deviated
from its previous practices. Administrators who testified could
not recall an instance in the previous 24 years that the District
had hired a teacher at the beginning of the school year as a
long-term substitute when the teacher was not actually fulfill-
ing the duties of another staff member who was on a leave of
absence. Of the 34 new teachers hired for the 2007-08 school
year, Manning was the only teacher not issued a teacher’s con-
tract. All other new teachers were compensated based on the
Agreement. Manning did not receive fringe benefits, life insur-
ance, personal leave benefits, or sick leave that was provided
to the other teachers. The District attempted to treat her as a
substitute teacher even though she was not taking the place of
a teacher who planned to return.
SOUTH SIOUx CITy eD. ASSN. v. DAKOTA CTy. SCH. DIST. 	583
Cite as 278 Neb. 572

The CIR correctly determined that Manning was a member
of the bargaining unit. As a member of the bargaining unit, she
was entitled to be paid under the salary schedule, and thus,
paying her on a different basis was a unilateral deviation from
the economic terms in the Agreement.
A teacher who is hired to fill an open position is not a sub-
stitute employee. The District therefore arbitrarily designated
Manning as a long-term substitute. To allow the District to
designate her as such would, as the CIR so determined, allow
the District to “unilaterally control the composition of the bar-
gaining unit.”
We also find no merit to the argument that Manning was
employed “less than one-half time” because she served only
83.5 days out of a total of 188 teacher service days in 2007-08.
See brief for appellant at 16. Manning was not hired to assume
the duties of an employee who was temporarily absent. Her
predecessor resigned from the position. The District unilater-
ally decided to end Manning’s employment in December after
she taught nearly every day of the first semester. The authority
of the Association and its rights would be undermined if the
District were allowed to unilaterally designate probationary
teachers as long-term substitutes. The District’s designation of
Manning as a long-term substitute had the effect of unilaterally
removing her from the bargaining unit.
The CIR correctly concluded that Manning was not a long-
term substitute, but performed as a probationary certificated
employee and was therefore a member of the bargaining
unit. The act of unilaterally paying Manning on a basis other
than as provided in the Agreement and without bargaining
with the Association about such a change was a violation
of § 48-824.
Any order or decision of the CIR may be modified, reversed,
or set aside by an appellate court on one or more of the fol-
lowing grounds and no other: (1) if the CIR acts without
or in excess of its powers, (2) if the order was procured by
fraud or is contrary to law, (3) if the facts found by the CIR
do not support the order, and (4) if the order is not supported
by a preponderance of the competent evidence on the record
584 	278 NeBRASKA RePORTS

considered as a whole. Omaha Police Union Local 101 v. City
of Omaha, 276 Neb. 983, 759 N.W.2d 82 (2009).
The CIR acted within its powers when it exercised juris-
diction to determine whether the District had committed a
prohibited practice. The CIR found that the District had imple-
mented unilateral deviations from the Agreement, including
compensation provisions. It ordered the District to reimburse
Manning backpay equal to the difference between the amount
received for her bargaining unit duties and the amount to which
she would have been entitled under the Agreement. The CIR’s
order was not procured by fraud and is not contrary to law.
The order of the CIR is supported by a preponderance of the
evidence on the record.
CONCLUSION
The District unilaterally changed the terms of the Agreement,
which is a prohibited practice. Manning, a member of the
Association, was a probationary teacher who was not compen-
sated properly under the Agreement. The CIR had jurisdiction
to hear the controversy, and the petition was not time barred.
The judgment of the CIR is affirmed.
A ffirmed.
SOUTH SIOUx CITy eD. ASSN. v. DAKOTA CTy. SCH. DIST. 	585
Cite as 278 Neb. 572