Herrington v. P.R. Ventures

M ary H errington, appellant, v. p.r. ventures , llC,
doing business as M isty’s restaurant, and
H arleysville , its workers’ CoMpensation
Carrier , appellees.
781 N.W.2d 196
Filed April 23, 2010. 	No. S-09-1076.
1. Workers’ Compensation: Statutes: Appeal and Error. The meaning of a statute
is a question of law, and an appellate court is obligated in workers’ compensation
cases to make its own determinations as to questions of law.
2. Statutes. Absent a statutory indication to the contrary, words in a statute will be
given their ordinary meaning.
3. Statutes: Appeal and Error. An appellate court will not read anything plain,
direct, or unambiguous out of a statute.
4. Statutes. A court must attempt to give effect to all parts of a statute, and if it
can be avoided, no word, clause, or sentence will be rejected as superfluous or
meaningless.
5. ____. A court must place on a statute a reasonable construction which best
achieves the statute’s purpose, rather than a construction which would defeat
that purpose.
6. Statutes: Intent: Appeal and Error. In construing a statute, an appellate court
looks to the statutory objective to be accomplished, the evils and mischiefs sought
to be remedied, and the purpose to be served.
Appeal from the Workers’ Compensation Court. Affirmed.
Jeffrey A. Bloom and Joseph C. Dowding, of Dowding,
Dowding & Dowding, for appellant.
Jason A. Kidd, of Engles, Ketcham, Olson & Keith, P.C., for
appellees.
H eaviCan, 	C.J., 	wrigHt, 	C onnolly, 	gerrard, 	stepHan,
MCC orMaCk, and M iller-lerMan, JJ.
stepHan, J.
This appeal presents an issue of statutory interpretation.
We conclude that the review panel of the Nebraska Workers’
Compensation 	Court 	correctly 	interpreted 	Neb. 	Rev. 	Stat.
§ 48-191 (Reissue 2004), and therefore affirm.
The facts are simple and undisputed. In July 2008, Mary
Herrington filed a petition in the Workers’ Compensation
Court, alleging that she had been injured in accidents arising
754 	279 NEBRASKA REPORTS
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out of and in the course of her employment with P.R. Ventures,
LLC. The parties agreed to a settlement, and on December 4,
the Workers’ Compensation Court entered an order approving
a lump-sum payment of $10,000 to Herrington. A draft for
$10,000 was sent by P.R. Ventures to Herrington’s attorney
by overnight mail on Monday, January 5, 2009. Herrington
received the draft on January 6.
In February 2009, Herrington filed a motion for waiting-
time penalties, attorney fees, and interest, claiming that the
draft was sent outside the 30-day time period specified by
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 48-125 (Reissue 2004). P.R. Ventures resisted
the motion, arguing that the draft was timely sent pursuant to
§ 48-191, which provides:
Notwithstanding 	any 	more 	general 	or 	special 	law
respecting the subject matter hereof, whenever the last
day of the period within which a party to an action may
file any paper or pleading with the Nebraska Workers’
Compensation 	Court, 	or 	take 	any 	other 	action 	with
respect to a claim for compensation, falls on a Saturday,
a Sunday, any day on which the compensation court
is closed by order of the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court, or any day declared by statutory enactment or
proclamation of the Governor to be a holiday, the next
following day, which is not a Saturday, a Sunday, a day
on which the compensation court is closed by order of
the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, or a day declared
by such enactment or proclamation to be a holiday, shall
be deemed to be the last day for filing any such paper or
pleading or taking any such other action with respect to a
claim for compensation.
(Emphasis 	supplied.) 	The 	trial 	judge 	awarded 	Herrington
waiting-time penalties, attorney fees, and interest, reasoning
that § 48-191 applied only to interactions between parties and
the court, and did not apply to interactions between the par-
ties. The review panel reversed, reasoning that the statutory
phrase “‘other action with respect to a claim for compensa-
tion’” was “generally broad and include[d] payment of a claim
for compensation.”
HERRINGTON v. P.R. VENTuRES 	755
Cite as 279 Neb. 754

Herrington filed a timely appeal, and we granted her petition
to bypass and then ordered that the case be submitted without
oral argument.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
Herrington’s sole assignment of error is that the review
panel erred in finding that the lump-sum payment was timely
made pursuant to the provisions of § 48-191.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
[1] The meaning of a statute is a question of law, and an
appellate court is obligated in workers’ compensation cases to
make its own determinations as to questions of law.1
ANALYSIS
The lump-sum settlement was approved by the Workers’
Compensation Court on December 4, 2008. The 30-day period
in which the $10,000 payment had to be sent in order to avoid
penalties, attorney fees, and interest commenced on December
5.2 The final day of the 30-day period was therefore Saturday,
January 3, 2009. It is undisputed that the payment was not
sent until Monday, January 5. The sole issue in this appeal is
whether the payment was timely under § 48-191, which extends
the time period for an “action with respect to a claim for com-
pensation” when the final day of the time period falls on a
Saturday, a Sunday, or a day when the Workers’ Compensation
Court is otherwise legally closed.
[2-6] Familiar general principles guide our analysis in this
case. Absent a statutory indication to the contrary, words in
a statute will be given their ordinary meaning.3 An appellate
court will not read anything plain, direct, or unambiguous out
1 Miller v. Regional West Med. Ctr., 278 Neb. 676, 772 N.W.2d 872 (2009);
Powell v. Estate Gardeners, 275 Neb. 287, 745 N.W.2d 917 (2008).
2 See, § 48-125; Soto v. State, 269 Neb. 337, 693 N.W.2d 491 (2005),
modified on denial of rehearing 270 Neb. 40, 699 N.W.2d 819; Brown v.
Harbor Fin. Mortgage Corp., 267 Neb. 218, 673 N.W.2d 35 (2004).
3 In re Estate of Chrisp, 276 Neb. 966, 759 N.W.2d 87 (2009).
756 	279 NEBRASKA REPORTS

of a statute.4 A court must attempt to give effect to all parts
of a statute, and if it can be avoided, no word, clause, or sen-
tence will be rejected as superfluous or meaningless.5 A court
must place on a statute a reasonable construction which best
achieves the statute’s purpose, rather than a construction which
would defeat that purpose.6 In construing a statute, an appellate
court looks to the statutory objective to be accomplished, the
evils and mischiefs sought to be remedied, and the purpose to
be served.7
Based on these general principles, we conclude that the
review panel correctly interpreted § 48-191. The statute is not
ambiguous. The plain language “any other action with respect
to a claim for compensation” is broad enough to include not
only transactions between a party and the court, but also
transactions between the parties. Except in circumstances not
applicable here, § 48-125 directs that payments of workers’
compensation benefits “shall be sent directly to the person
entitled to compensation or his or her designated representa-
tive.”8 Clearly, the mailing of a lump-sum settlement check to
its intended recipient is an “action with respect to a claim for
compensation” such that the time for mailing must be deter-
mined pursuant to § 48-191.
Contrary to Herrington’s argument, we perceive no incon-
sistency between §§ 48-125 and 48-191. The former provides
a penalty for payments made more than 30 days after entry of
a judgment; the latter simply directs how this time period, as
well as others under the Nebraska Workers’ Compensation Act,
is to be computed. Nor are we persuaded by the argument that
4 In re Estate of Lienemann, 277 Neb. 286, 761 N.W.2d 560 (2009); City of
Elkhorn v. City of Omaha, 272 Neb. 867, 725 N.W.2d 792 (2007).
5 Concrete Indus. v. Nebraska Dept. of Rev., 277 Neb. 897, 766 N.W.2d 103
(2009); State ex rel. Lanman v. Board of Cty. Commissioners, 277 Neb.
492, 763 N.W.2d 392 (2009).
6 Concrete Indus. v. Nebraska Dept. of Rev., supra note 5; Burns v. Nielsen,
273 Neb. 724, 732 N.W.2d 640 (2007).
7 TracFone Wireless v. Nebraska Pub. Serv. Comm., ante p. 426, 778 N.W.2d
452 (2010).
8 § 48-125(1) (now found at § 48-125(1)(a) (Supp. 2009)).
HERRINGTON v. P.R. VENTuRES 	757
Cite as 279 Neb. 754

application of § 48-191 would contravene the general purpose
of § 48-125, which is to “encourage prompt payment by mak-
ing delay costly if the award has been finally established.”9
Section 48-191 simply provides a practical, uniform stan-
dard for computing time periods under the Nebraska Workers’
Compensation Act.
CONCLuSION
For these reasons, we affirm the order denying the award of
waiting-time penalties, attorney fees, and interest.
affirMed.
9 Soto v. State, supra note 2, 269 Neb. at 345-46, 693 N.W.2d at 499.
Accord Roth v. Sarpy Cty. Highway Dept., 253 Neb. 703, 572 N.W.2d 786
(1998).
in re appliCation of antHony ybarra
for adMission to tHe nebraska
state bar on exaMination.
781 N.W.2d 446
Filed April 23, 2010. 	No. S-34-090002.
1. Rules of the Supreme Court: Attorneys at Law: Appeal and Error. under
Neb. Ct. R. § 3-115, the Nebraska Supreme Court considers the appeal of an
applicant from a final adverse ruling of the Nebraska State Bar Commission de
novo on the record made at the hearing before the commission.
2. Rules of the Supreme Court: Attorneys at Law: Proof. The Nebraska State
Bar Commission’s rules place on an applicant the burden of proving good
character by producing documentation, reports, and witnesses in support of the
application.
3. Rules of the Supreme Court: Attorneys at Law. The Nebraska Supreme Court
is vested with the sole power to admit persons to the practice of law in this state
and to fix qualifications for admission to the Nebraska bar.
4. Attorneys at Law. Where the record of an applicant for admission to the
Nebraska State Bar demonstrates a significant lack of honesty, trustworthiness,
diligence, or reliability, a basis may exist for denying his or her application.
5. ____. When evidence exists to indicate that an applicant has engaged in conduct
demonstrating a lack of character and fitness, the Nebraska State Bar Commission
must determine whether present character and fitness qualify the applicant for
admission.
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