In re Interest of Tyler T.

out-of-school suspensions be served in a detention center as a
condition of probation. Regardless of the court’s intentions, it
simply did not have the legal authority under the juvenile code
to order detention while Dakota remained on probation.
Nor does § 29-2270 authorize the detention order. That
statute provides that a person who is less than 19 years of age
and is subject to the supervision of a juvenile or adult proba-
tion officer shall, as a condition of probation, be required to
attend school or vocational training, and it authorizes a district,
county, or juvenile court to “take appropriate action to enforce,
modify, or revoke its order granting probation” in the event of
noncompliance with this condition.11 But “appropriate action”
for a juvenile court is limited to that which is authorized by the
juvenile code, and it does not include detention of a juvenile
who is on probation.12
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed, we reiterate our prior holding that
juvenile courts do not have the statutory authority to impose
detention as a condition of probation. Accordingly, we reverse
and vacate the juvenile court’s detention order in this case.
Because this resolves the appeal, we do not address Dakota’s
due process argument.
R eveRsed and vacated.
H eavican, C.J., not participating.
11 § 29-2270.
12 See In re Interest of Dustin S., supra note 1.
in Re inteRest of tyleR t., a cHild undeR 18 yeaRs of age .
state of nebRaska , appellee , v.
tyleR t., appellant.
781 N.W.2d 922
Filed April 29, 2010. 	Nos. S-09-631 through S-09-633.
1. Juvenile Courts: Appeal and Error. An appellate court reviews juvenile cases
de novo on the record and reaches its conclusions independently of the juvenile
court’s findings.
806 	279 NeBRASkA RepORTS
Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
11/01/2026 04:48 AM CST

2. Statutes: Appeal and Error. To the extent an appeal calls for statutory interpre-
tation or presents questions of law, an appellate court must reach an independent
conclusion irrespective of the determination made by the court below.
3. Juvenile Courts: Records. Separate juvenile courts and county courts sitting as
juvenile courts are courts of record.
Appeals from the County Court for Madison County: donna
f. tayloR, Judge. Reversed and vacated, and causes remanded
for further proceedings.
Melissa A. Wentling, Madison County public Defender, for
appellant.
Joseph M. Smith, Madison County Attorney, and Gail e.
Collins for appellee.
WRigHt, connolly, geRRaRd, stepHan, MccoRMack , and
M illeR-leRMan, JJ.
stepHan, J.
Following multiple adjudications by the county court for
Madison County, sitting as a juvenile court, Tyler T. was
placed on probation and ordered to successfully complete
juvenile drug treatment court. In these consolidated appeals,
Tyler appeals from an order apparently entered by that court in
each of these cases, requiring that he serve 1 day in a juvenile
detention center for failing a drug test administered by the drug
treatment court. Because the record is insufficient for meaning-
ful appellate review, we reverse, vacate the orders, and remand
each cause for further proceedings.
BACkGROUND
On March 13, 2007, Tyler was adjudicated pursuant to Neb.
Rev. Stat. § 43-247(2) (Cum. Supp. 2006) and placed on proba-
tion. On September 24, he was adjudicated under § 43-247(1)
and found to be in violation of the prior probation order. The
juvenile court extended his probation and made it applicable
to both cases. On March 25, 2008, the juvenile court again
adjudicated Tyler pursuant to § 43-247(1). The juvenile court
extended the probation on the two prior adjudications and
made it applicable to all three cases.
IN Re INTeReST OF TyLeR T. 	807
Cite as 279 Neb. 806

The State filed motions to revoke probation in all three
cases on June 25, 2008. Instead of revoking Tyler’s proba-
tion, the juvenile court extended the probation for 9 months
and imposed additional conditions. The State again moved to
revoke probation in all three cases on April 9, 2009. Following
a hearing on the motions, the juvenile court again extended the
probation for 1 year and added the condition that Tyler attend
and successfully complete the drug treatment court program.
The record shows that Tyler participated in that program from
June 2 to 16. But there is no verbatim record of any proceed-
ings after June 16. The final entry in the bill of exceptions
states, “There was no recording made of Tyler[’s] hearing on
June 23, 2009.”
The notice of appeal filed in each case indicates that Tyler
appeals from an “Arrest and/or Detention Authorization” filed
June 23, 2009, but that document does not appear in any of the
transcripts. On Tyler’s motion, confessed by the State, the Court
of Appeals entered orders in each appeal staying commitment
of Tyler pending further order of the court. In each case, there
is a praecipe requesting documents pertaining to proceedings
that occurred on June 23, but the county court responded with
a “Showing” which states, “[The] requested [documents] are
in possession of the probation Office and are not a part of the
County Court filings. Therefore these items are not included
in the transcript.” After the appeals were docketed, the parties
filed a stipulation in each case regarding what transpired on
June 23 and their unsuccessful efforts to obtain a record from
the court. We moved the appeals to our docket pursuant to
our statutory authority to regulate the dockets of the appellate
courts1 of this state and ordered the appeals consolidated for
oral argument and disposition.
ASSIGNMeNT OF eRROR
Tyler assigns, restated, that the lower court erred in impos-
ing detention as a sanction for allegedly failing a drug test
when (1) such sanction constitutes a due process violation
and (2) the lower court did not have the statutory authority to
1 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 24-1106(3) (Reissue 2008).
808 	279 NeBRASkA RepORTS

impose such sanction. In its briefs, the State concedes that the
juvenile court was without authority to commit Tyler to a juve-
nile detention center.
STANDARD OF ReVIeW
[1,2] An appellate court reviews juvenile cases de novo on
the record and reaches its conclusions independently of the
juvenile court’s findings.2 To the extent an appeal calls for
statutory interpretation or presents questions of law, an appel-
late court must reach an independent conclusion irrespective of
the determination made by the court below.3
ANALySIS
Recently and again today, we held that a juvenile court does
not have statutory authority to order detention of a juvenile who
is on probation.4 The same issue is presented in these appeals,
but we are unable to reach it because of glaring deficiencies
in the record. An appellate court obviously cannot conduct
a de novo review “on the record” where there is no record
of that portion of a proceeding to which error is assigned.
While it is generally incumbent upon the appellant to present
a record supporting the errors assigned,5 it is apparent in the
present case that no verbatim record was made of the hearing
conducted on June 23, 2009. Additionally, when a transcript,
containing the pleadings and order in question, is sufficient to
present the issue for appellate disposition, a bill of exceptions
is unnecessary to preserve an alleged error of law regarding
the proceedings under review.6 But here, the transcripts do not
include the orders apparently entered on that date to which
error was assigned, because, according to the county judge, the
2 In re Interest of C.H., 277 Neb. 565, 763 N.W.2d 708 (2009); In re Interest
of Dustin S., 276 Neb. 635, 756 N.W.2d 277 (2008).
3 In re Interest of Dustin S., supra note 2; In re Interest of Markice M., 275
Neb. 908, 750 N.W.2d 345 (2008).
4 In re Interest of Dakota M., ante p. 802, 781 N.W.2d 612 (2010); In re
Interest of Dustin S., supra note 2.
5 See In re Interest of Hope L. et al., 278 Neb. 869, 775 N.W.2d 384
(2009).
6 Foster v. Foster, 266 Neb. 32, 662 N.W.2d 191 (2003).
IN Re INTeReST OF TyLeR T. 	809
Cite as 279 Neb. 806

orders are in the possession of the “probation Office” and were
never made a part of the court file.
The parties urge us to consider their stipulation filed in each
case as the record on appeal. Our rules of appellate practice
permit the parties to agree on a statement of a case which shall
constitute the bill of exceptions on appeal, but we require that
the case stated be certified by the trial judge and included in
the transcript.7 That did not occur here, and we therefore can-
not consider the stipulation filed in each case as a “case stated”
under this rule.8 We are thus left with no record on appeal
regarding the assigned errors, despite what we believe to be the
sincere and diligent efforts of both parties to obtain a record
from the county court.
[3] It is apparent from the arguments of counsel and the
incomplete bill of exceptions that some type of hearing was
held on June 23, 2009, and that it resulted in some type of
detention order from which Tyler is attempting to appeal. There
is no indication that the parties waived a record of the hearing.
Separate juvenile courts and county courts sitting as juvenile
courts are courts of record.9 It was the responsibility of the
county court, sitting as a juvenile court, to ensure that any
testimony or other oral proceedings during the hearing were
recorded.10 And likewise, it was the responsibility of the county
court to file its order so that the order could be included in the
transcript and reviewed on appeal.
These responsibilities were not excused or diminished by
the fact that this was a juvenile drug treatment court pro-
ceeding. The Legislature has generally authorized drug courts
and other problem-solving-court programs to be established
7 See Neb Ct. R. App. p. § 2-105(B)(13) (rev. 2008).
8 Id.
9 See, Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 24-502 (Reissue 2008), 24-517(10) (Supp. 2009),
and 43-2,111 (Reissue 2008); In re Interest of R.A., 226 Neb. 160, 410
N.W.2d 110 (1987), disapproved on other grounds, In re Interest of J.S.,
A.C., and C.S., 227 Neb. 251, 417 N.W.2d 147 (1987).
10 See, Gerdes v. Klindt’s, Inc., 247 Neb. 138, 525 N.W.2d 219 (1995);
Holman v. Papio-Missouri River Nat. Resources Dist., 246 Neb. 787, 523
N.W.2d 510 (1994); Lockenour v. Sculley, 8 Neb. App. 254, 592 N.W.2d
161 (1999).
810 	279 NeBRASkA RepORTS

and operated in accordance with rules promulgated by this
court.11 Under our rules, problem-solving courts encompass
“programs and services established within the district, county
or juvenile courts,” including but not limited to “drug court
programs established pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. § 24-1302.”12
problem-solving courts may exist and be established only upon
approval of this court.13 They are “postplea or postadjudication
in nature.”14
Given the therapeutic component of problem-solving-court
programs, we are not prepared to say that each and every
action taken in such a proceeding must be a matter of record.
But we have no difficulty in concluding that when a judge of a
problem-solving court conducts a hearing and enters an order
affecting the terms of the juvenile’s probation, the proceeding
must be on the record. We agree with other courts which have
held that where a liberty interest is implicated in problem-
solving-court proceedings, an individual’s due process rights
must be respected.15
Here, Tyler contends that the county court, sitting as a juve-
nile problem-solving court, ordered his detention without legal
authority and in violation of his due process rights. We cannot
undertake a meaningful appellate review of this claim because
of the complete absence of a verbatim record of the hearing or
the resulting order. Accordingly, in each appeal, we reverse the
decision, vacate the purported detention order entered on June
23, 2009, and remand the cause for further proceedings.
R eveRsed and vacated, and causes ReManded
foR fuRtHeR pRoceedings.
H eavican, C.J., not participating.
11 Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 24-1301 and 24-1302 (Reissue 2008).
12 Neb. Ct. R. § 6-1202.
13 Neb. Ct. R. § 6-1201.
14 Neb. Ct. R. § 6-1208(A).
15 See, e.g., Torres v. Berbary, 340 F.3d 63 (2d Cir. 2003); Harris v. Com.,
279 Va. 541, 689 S.e.2d 713 (2010); State v. Rogers, 144 Idaho 738, 170
p.3d 881 (2007); People v. Anderson, 358 Ill. App. 3d 1108, 833 N.e.2d
390, 295 Ill. Dec. 557 (2005); State v. Cassill-Skilton, 122 Wash. App.
652, 94 p.3d 407 (2004).
IN Re INTeReST OF TyLeR T. 	811
Cite as 279 Neb. 806