Scott v. County of Richardson

of the attorneys’ office, and that this is somehow determina-
tive. But whether considered attorney work product or the
expert’s opinions, it is clear from the rules above that, at the
very least, the Podrazas had to demonstrate a substantial need
for the materials.
There is no such substantial need to use at trial for impeach-
ment purposes someone else’s characterization that the retained
expert had indicated that an unbiased radiologist would “hope-
fully” have a favorable reading of the CT scan. This is not a
case, such as those relied upon by the Podrazas, where the
Podrazas are seeking information necessary to understand the
basis for the expert’s opinion. Indeed, the correspondence
in question relates more to administrative matters within the
attorneys’ office than to the formation and basis of any expert’s
testimony. Nor do we find merit to the Podrazas’ contention
that the inadvertent disclosure waived the protections afforded
by the discovery rules. The trial court did not abuse its discre-
tion in granting a protection order in favor of New Century for
the e-mail communications.
VI. CONCLUSION
We reverse the trial court’s order of summary judgment in
favor of New Century, but affirm its grant of a protection order
for e-mail correspondence between New Century’s attorneys’
office and its expert witness. We affirm the trial court’s denial
of the Podrazas’ partial motion for summary judgment.
A ffirmed in pArt, And in pArt
reversed And remAnded.
JAmes m. scott, Appellee , v. county
of richArdson, AppellAnt.
789 N.W.2d 44
Filed October 15, 2010. 	No. S-10-039.
1. Administrative Law: Appeal and Error. In reviewing an administrative agency
decision on a petition in error, both the district court and the appellate court
review the decision to determine whether the agency acted within its jurisdiction
and whether sufficient, relevant evidence supports the decision of the agency.
694 	280 NeBraSka rePOrTS
Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
11/01/2026 04:47 AM CST

2. Constitutional Law: Due Process. The determination of whether the procedures
afforded an individual comport with constitutional requirements for procedural
due process presents a question of law.
3. Judgments: Appeal and Error. On a question of law, an appellate court is obli-
gated to reach a conclusion independent of the court below.
4. Due Process: Public Officers and Employees: Property: Contracts. a public
employee’s due process rights arise from a contractually created property right to
continued employment.
5. Termination of Employment: Due Process: Case Overruled. Deficiencies in
due process during pretermination proceedings may be cured if the employee
is provided adequate posttermination due process. To the extent that Martin v.
Nebraska Dept. of Public Institutions, 7 Neb. app. 585, 584 N.W.2d 485 (1998),
holds to the contrary, it is expressly overruled.
6. Public Officers and Employees: Termination of Employment: Due Process.
Due process requires that a public employer provide its employees with appropri-
ate pretermination and posttermination proceedings.
appeal from the District Court for richardson County:
dAniel e. BryAn, Jr ., Judge. reversed and remanded with
directions.
Vincent Valentino for appellant.
Jeanette Stull, of Perry, Guthery, Haase & Gessford, P.C.,
L.L.O., for appellee.
heAvicAn, 	c.J., 	Wright, 	connolly, 	gerrArd, 	stephAn,
mccormAck , and miller-lermAn, JJ.
Wright, J.
NaTUre OF CaSe
after James M. Scott was terminated from his employment
as a deputy sheriff for richardson County (County), he filed a
grievance. richardson County’s grievance board (Board) found
irregularities in the manner in which Scott was terminated, and
it reinstated his employment for the period between his termi-
nation and the date of the grievance hearing. Scott was also
awarded backpay and benefits. Finding just cause, the Board
subsequently terminated Scott’s employment effective the date
of the grievance hearing. after Scott filed a petition in error,
the district court reversed and vacated the Board’s decision
to terminate Scott’s employment and ordered that he be rein-
stated. The County appeals.
SCOTT v. COUNTy OF rICHarDSON 	695
Cite as 280 Neb. 694

SCOPe OF reVIeW
[1] In reviewing an administrative agency decision on a
petition in error, both the district court and the appellate court
review the decision to determine whether the agency acted
within its jurisdiction and whether sufficient, relevant evidence
supports the decision of the agency. Pierce v. Douglas Cty.
Civil Serv. Comm., 275 Neb. 722, 748 N.W.2d 660 (2008).
[2,3] The determination of whether the procedures afforded
an individual comport with constitutional requirements for pro-
cedural due process presents a question of law. Hickey v. Civil
Serv. Comm. of Douglas Cty., 274 Neb. 554, 741 N.W.2d 649
(2007). On a question of law, an appellate court is obligated to
reach a conclusion independent of the court below. Id.
FaCTS
Scott’s employment was terminated by randy raney, who
was the chief deputy and Scott’s supervisor, on February 17,
2009. as a deputy sheriff, his employment with the sheriff’s
department was covered by a labor agreement between the
County and the International Union of Operating engineers,
Local 571 (Union). The agreement includes a multistep griev-
ance procedure.
Scott filed a grievance with Sheriff Vernon Buckminster, who
denied it. Scott next submitted a complaint to the richardson
County Board of Commissioners, which complaint was also
denied. He then appealed to the Board, which consists of two
members appointed by the county commissioners, two mem-
bers appointed by the Union, and one member agreed upon by
the County and the Union. The Board upheld the termination of
Scott’s employment effective July 16, 2009.
Testimony 	about 	the 	basis 	for 	Scott’s 	termination 	was
received at a hearing before the Board on July 16, 2009. raney
testified that June Dettmann, a dispatcher and jailer for the
sheriff’s office, complained in December 2008 that Scott had
“become affectionate toward her” and indicated he wanted a
relationship with her. Dettmann stated that after she told Scott
she was not interested in a relationship, Scott became distant,
slammed doors when he left the office area, failed to contact
her on the radio as required by office policy, and hung up on
696 	280 NeBraSka rePOrTS

her when she called him. raney asked Dettmann to submit her
complaint in writing, and raney subsequently met with Scott
and advised him that his conduct was not acceptable and that
it could be considered sexual harassment. raney advised Scott
not to talk to Dettmann about personal matters at work. Scott
denied Dettmann’s allegations.
Dettmann contacted raney on January 25, 2009, to report
that Scott’s behavior had deteriorated. That night, Scott had
been in the office and responded to a disturbance call in the
southeast part of the county. He did not report to Dettmann that
he was responding to the call. raney said office policy pro-
vided that the dispatcher is to be informed of where an officer
is going and of the type of call because the dispatcher serves
as a lifeline for officers and needs to be able to dispatch other
officers for assistance.
When Scott returned to the office, Dettmann was prepar-
ing a crime report about the disturbance call. Scott asked her
to change the report because he thought it would bring undue
attention to him. Dettmann told raney she felt pressured to
change the report lest Scott have her fired.
On January 29, 2009, raney informed Scott that he was
on paid suspension for gross insubordination and harass-
ment pending an internal investigation. raney met with Scott,
Buckminster, and a Union representative on February 6. raney
gave Scott a detailed report stating the reasons for the discipli-
nary action against him, including (1) that Scott asked Dettmann
to participate in a sexual relationship and other behavior that
could be considered sexual harassment if it continued; (2) that
raney found a letter, dated January 24, 2008, written by Scott
on a sheriff’s office computer, which letter made allegations of
inappropriate conduct by Dettmann; (3) that raney received a
complaint in april 2008 from another dispatcher about Scott
and Dettmann’s spending time together in the office or in
Scott’s patrol car when Dettmann was not on duty; and (4)
that Dettmann called raney on January 25, 2009, reporting
that Scott had failed to inform her of his location, hung up on
her, tried to turn other employees against her, and coerced her
into changing a crime report. Scott denied all the allegations
included in the report.
SCOTT v. COUNTy OF rICHarDSON 	697
Cite as 280 Neb. 694

Between February 6 and 17, 2009, raney investigated the
allegations against Scott. On February 16, Scott submitted to a
polygraph examination; however, the results were not offered
or admitted at the hearing. On February 17, at a meeting
attended by Scott, raney, Buckminster, and the Union repre-
sentative, raney asked for Scott’s resignation. Scott refused to
resign, and raney terminated his employment.
Dettmann also testified at the grievance hearing. She stated
that on January 25, 2009, Scott called in on the police radio
but she did not know his location. Scott reported that he had
left the information on the counter in the office. Dettmann
found a note from Scott underneath the logbook indicating
that he was responding to a call. Dettmann called Scott to
tell him she was upset because he had not followed office
procedure. In response, Scott told her that he had drafted a
complaint about her that he was going to submit to raney.
Scott said that if they could work things out, he would shred
the complaint.
When Scott returned to the office, Dettmann was working on
the crime report for the disturbance call. Scott said he had torn
up the complaint about her. Scott asked Dettmann to change
the crime report so it would not include his violation of office
policy, because it would reflect poorly on him. She changed the
report because she was upset and intimidated by Scott.
The Board found that just cause existed to terminate Scott’s
employment as of July 16, 2009. The evidence showed that
Scott sexually propositioned Dettmann and that he denied the
accusation when questioned by raney. The Board concluded
that Scott lied to raney, his supervisor, and, in doing so,
was insubordinate and unprofessional. The Board found that
Scott left the office on January 25 and failed to follow office
policy and procedure by not properly notifying Dettmann of
his destination or his purpose in leaving. Upon his return to the
office, Scott pressured, intimidated, and coerced Dettmann into
altering the crime report. The Board found that this conduct
was inappropriate, unprofessional, and contrary to department
policy and procedure and that it constituted insubordination
and unprofessional conduct.
698 	280 NeBraSka rePOrTS

However, the Board expressed reservations about the man-
ner in which Scott’s termination had been handled and whether
there was inappropriate reliance on the results of a polygraph
examination. The Board determined that any irregularities
could effectively be cured by granting Scott’s grievance in part.
It ordered that Scott’s employment be reinstated with back-
pay and benefits from July 16, 2009 (the date of the Board’s
decision), retroactively to February 17 (the date of Scott’s
termination of employment). However, the Board determined
that Scott’s due process rights had been fully honored in the
proceedings before the Board, and it denied the grievance as to
Scott’s employment beyond July 16.
Scott filed a petition in error pursuant to Neb. rev. Stat.
§ 25-1901 (reissue 2008). The district court concluded that
Scott’s pretermination due process rights under Cleveland Board
of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 105 S. Ct. 1487, 84
L. ed. 2d 494 (1985), were violated. Under Loudermill, supra,
a public employee with a property interest in his employment
has the right to due process of law, which requires that the
employee be provided with oral or written notice of the charges
against him, an explanation of the employer’s evidence, and an
opportunity to explain his or her side of the story.
The district court determined that Scott was not given ade-
quate notice of the charges, an explanation of his employer’s
evidence, and an opportunity to explain his side of the story
before his employment was terminated. The court concluded
that Scott was told only that he was on paid suspension
for gross insubordination and harassment, without any details
regarding Dettmann’s complaints about him.
The district court concluded that no process was followed
to ensure that Scott’s rights under Loudermill, supra, were
“provided in a meaningful way.” The court relied upon Martin
v. Nebraska Dept. of Public Institutions, 7 Neb. app. 585, 584
N.W.2d 485 (1998), in which the Nebraska Court of appeals
held that posttermination proceedings cannot cure violations
of pretermination due process. It held that the pretermination
denial of Scott’s due process rights caused the Board’s deci-
sion to be a nullity. The court reversed and vacated the Board’s
SCOTT v. COUNTy OF rICHarDSON 	699
Cite as 280 Neb. 694

decision to terminate Scott’s employment effective July 16,
2009. The County appeals.
aSSIGNMeNTS OF errOr
The County assigns the following errors, which we have
summarized and restated: The district court erred (1) in con-
cluding that an extensive posttermination due process hearing
did not cure pretermination due process deficiencies and (2) in
failing to find that Scott waived his pretermination due process
argument by accepting backpay.
aNaLySIS
In this case, we are presented with whether violations of
an employee’s pretermination due process rights can be cured
by posttermination proceedings. In Martin, supra, the Court
of appeals held that such violations cannot be cured by post-
termination proceedings. The appellate court concluded that
the posttermination proceedings, which included a de novo
review of the case in the district court, although procedur-
ally adequate, did not cure the pretermination violations of
the employee’s right to procedural due process. It is against
this legal background that we begin our analysis in the case
at bar.
[4] a public employee’s due process rights arise from a
contractually created property right to continued employment.
Loudermill, supra. Neither party disputes that Scott had a pro-
tected property interest in his continued employment. When
a state deprives a public employee of that right, the depriva-
tion must “‘be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing
appropriate to the nature of the case.’” Cleveland Board of
Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542, 105 S. Ct. 1487,
84 L. ed. 2d 494 (1985). Loudermill divides procedural due
process claims into three stages. Krentz v. Robertson, 228 F.3d
897 (8th Cir. 2000).
Initially, an employee receives notice that he will be ter-
minated, and he is given an opportunity to respond: that
is “pretermination process.” Then, the employer actu-
ally fires the employee. Finally, in the third stage, an
employee has an opportunity to receive some measure of
700 	280 NeBraSka rePOrTS

post-termination process, usually a hearing with height-
ened procedural safeguards.
Id. at 902, citing Loudermill, supra. See, also, Hickey v. Civil
Serv. Comm. of Douglas Cty., 274 Neb. 554, 741 N.W.2d
649 (2007).
The determination of whether the procedures afforded an
individual comport with constitutional requirements for pro-
cedural due process presents a question of law. Id. On a ques-
tion of law, an appellate court is obligated to reach a conclu-
sion independent of the court below. Id.
The County argues that the district court erred in concluding
that the posttermination hearing did not cure the pretermination
due process deficiencies. We have not addressed this question,
and other courts are split.
The district court relied upon Martin v. Nebraska Dept. of
Public Institutions, 7 Neb. app. 585, 584 N.W.2d 485 (1998).
In that case, the employee was dismissed based on alleged
insubordination and failure to fulfill basic job responsibilities.
after an evidentiary hearing, the hearing officer found suf-
ficient evidence to support the insubordination allegation, but
not to support the allegation that the employee had failed to
fulfill job responsibilities. The Nebraska State Personnel Board
found that the employee had been dismissed for just cause, and
the district court affirmed.
The Court of appeals reversed the decision and remanded
the cause with directions because it found that information
relied upon in the decision to dismiss the employee was
not available to the employee prior to the termination of his
employment and that he was not given an adequate explanation
of the evidence gathered in the investigation or an opportunity
to respond. Id.
after determining that the employee’s due process rights
were violated, the Court of appeals concluded that a failure to
provide sufficient pretermination process cannot be cured by
the availability of posttermination procedures.
“To hold that a procedurally adequate post-termination
hearing remedies the deprivation inflicted on a discharged
employee by an earlier decision based on a pretermination
hearing completely devoid of due process of law would
SCOTT v. COUNTy OF rICHarDSON 	701
Cite as 280 Neb. 694

be to render the United States Supreme Court’s holding
in [Loudermill] a nullity. Furthermore, no matter how
fair and adequate the procedures at the post-termination
hearing may be, the initial decision made after the pre-
termination hearing inevitably will have diminished sig-
nificantly the employee’s chances of prevailing at the
post-termination hearing.”
Martin, 7 Neb. app. at 594, 584 N.W.2d at 491-92, quoting
Stallworth v. City of Evergreen, 680 So. 2d 229 (ala. 1996).
Other courts have similarly held that there is no cure for a
pretermination violation of due process. “Where an employee
is fired in violation of his due process rights, the availability of
post-termination grievance procedures will not ordinarily cure
the violation.” Cotnoir v. University of Maine Systems, 35 F.3d
6, 12 (1st Cir. 1994). If an employee is fired without pretermi-
nation protections, the constitutional deprivation is complete
and posttermination procedures cannot compensate. Id.
a posttermination judicial finding as to an employment
dismissal is not a substitute for a pretermination due process
hearing. Abraham v. Pekarski, 728 F.2d 167 (3d Cir. 1984).
The availability of postdeprivation grievance procedures does
not cure a due process violation. Schultz v. Baumgart, 738 F.2d
231 (7th Cir. 1984). See, also, Murray v. Dept. of Revenue
& Taxation, 543 So. 2d 1150 (La. app. 1989) (posttermi-
nation hearing does not cure failure to provide pretermina-
tion hearing).
However, other courts have held that due process vio-
lations may be cured. “[Cleveland Board of Education v.]
Loudermill[, 470 U.S. 532, 105 S. Ct. 1487, 84 L. ed. 2d 494
(1985),] instructs us that extensive post-termination proceed-
ings may cure inadequate pretermination proceedings.” Krentz
v. Robertson, 228 F.3d 897, 902 (8th Cir. 2000). The Krentz
court interpreted Loudermill “to require only limited preter-
mination process, especially if post-termination proceedings
are available and extensive.” 228 F.3d at 902-03. “Ultimately,
[the Krentz court’s] conclusion that [the employee in Krentz]
received adequate pretermination process depends heavily upon
the fact that robust post-termination proceedings may cure
superficial pretermination proceedings.” Id. at 903. See, also,
702 	280 NeBraSka rePOrTS

Smutka v. City of Hutchinson, 451 F.3d 522 (8th Cir. 2006);
Schleck v. Ramsey County, 939 F.2d 638 (8th Cir. 1991)
(employer not required to provide full hearing or to disclose
all details of charges against employee); Agarwal v. Regents of
University of Minnesota, 788 F.2d 504 (8th Cir. 1986) (employ-
ee’s due process rights not violated even if employee did not
receive all procedural safeguards during initial proceeding as
long as hearing was granted at later date).
Other federal courts have also held that errors in pretermi-
nation procedures can be cured by subsequent posttermina-
tion proceedings. See, Glenn v. Newman, 614 F.2d 467 (5th
Cir. 1980); McKinney v. Pate, 20 F.3d 1550 (11th Cir. 1994).
State courts have held similarly. See, e.g., City of North Pole
v. Zabek, 934 P.2d 1292 (alaska 1997) (evidence presented in
posttermination hearing may be sufficient to justify suspension
or termination even if insufficient to justify summary suspen-
sion or termination); Maxwell v. Mayor & Alder. of Savannah,
226 Ga. app. 705, 487 S.e.2d 478 (1997) (no violation of pro-
cedural due process rights unless and until employer refuses to
make remedy available); Smith v. Five Rivers MetroParks, 134
Ohio app. 3d 754, 732 N.e.2d 422 (1999) (posttermination
arbitration hearing sufficient to cure any deficiencies in notice
of charges); Ross v. Medical Univ. of South Carolina, 328 S.C.
51, 492 S.e.2d 62 (1997) (posttermination proceedings rem-
edied pretermination deficiencies).
This court has never addressed whether proceedings after a
termination of employment can remedy the failure of due proc-
ess prior to the termination of employment. although we cited
Martin v. Nebraska Dept. of Public Institutions, 7 Neb. app.
585, 584 N.W.2d 485 (1998), in Hickey v. Civil Serv. Comm. of
Douglas Cty., 274 Neb. 554, 741 N.W.2d 649 (2007), we did
not discuss the specific issue presented here.
[5] Stating that it was bound to follow the “rulings of law”
in Martin, the district court concluded in the case at bar that
the posttermination proceedings did not cure the pretermina-
tion due process violations. We disagree with that conclusion.
We hold that deficiencies in due process during pretermination
proceedings may be cured if the employee is provided adequate
posttermination due process. Such measures can be provided
SCOTT v. COUNTy OF rICHarDSON 	703
Cite as 280 Neb. 694

by grievance procedures that have been agreed upon by the
employer and the employee. To the extent that Martin holds to
the contrary, it is expressly overruled.
[6] The interpretation of Cleveland Board of Education v.
Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 105 S. Ct. 1487, 84 L. ed. 2d 494
(1985), by the eighth Circuit is the better reasoning. Loudermill
requires only limited pretermination process, especially if post-
termination proceedings are available and extensive. Krentz v.
Robertson, 228 F.3d 897 (8th Cir. 2000). Due process requires
that a public employer provide its employees with appropriate
pretermination and posttermination proceedings. Smutka v. City
of Hutchinson, 451 F.3d 522 (8th Cir. 2006). a pretermination
hearing need not be elaborate. Loudermill, supra. Informal
meetings with supervisors are sufficient. Schleck v. Ramsey
County, 939 F.2d 638 (8th Cir. 1991).
a pretermination hearing need not “definitively resolve the
propriety of the discharge. It should be an initial check against
mistaken decisions—essentially, a determination of whether
there are reasonable grounds to believe that the charges against
the employee are true and support the proposed action.”
Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 545-46. To require more than notice of
the charges, an explanation of the employer’s evidence, and an
opportunity to present the employee’s side of the story “would
intrude to an unwarranted extent on the government’s interest
in quickly removing an unsatisfactory employee.” Id., 470 U.S.
at 546.
In the case at bar, the labor agreement outlined the steps in
the grievance process. an employee is first required, before fil-
ing a grievance, to verbally inform his or her immediate super-
visor of the cause of dissatisfaction and give the supervisor
an opportunity to correct the situation. If the employee is not
satisfied, he or she may present a grievance in writing to the
supervisor, who has 5 working days to answer. If the employee
remains dissatisfied, he or she may refer the matter to the
Union, which must then contact the sheriff in writing and pre-
sent the employee’s case. If the matter remains unsatisfactorily
settled, the Union must present the grievance in writing to the
richardson County Board of Commissioners. If no settlement
is reached, the grievance is presented in writing to the Board,
704 	280 NeBraSka rePOrTS

which is made up of two members appointed by the county
commissioners, two members appointed by the Union, and
one member agreed upon by the County and the Union. This
multistep grievance process provides employees with the due
process required under Loudermill, supra.
after Scott met with raney on January 29, 2009, he was
placed on paid suspension for gross insubordination and harass-
ment pending an internal investigation. On February 6, in a
meeting also attended by Buckminster and a Union represent-
ative, raney gave Scott a detailed report stating the reasons
for the disciplinary action. The report included Dettmann’s
statement that Scott wanted a sexual relationship with her and
that after she rejected such offer, Scott’s behavior changed.
He would not answer the radio, hung up the telephone, and
slammed doors when he left the office. Scott was told he could
be responsible for a sexual harassment complaint if his conduct
continued. The report also noted the January 25, 2009, incident
of Scott’s failure to report his location to Dettmann, at a time
when she was the dispatcher on duty, and attempt to coerce her
into changing a crime report. He was given an opportunity to
tell his side of the story at the February 6 meeting, where he
denied all the allegations.
Following the termination of his employment, Scott was
given a hearing before the Board. Prior to the hearing, he
was furnished with notice, a listing of the charges, and a
detailed explanation of the exhibits and witnesses. The charges
described in detail Scott’s attempt to participate in a sexual
relationship with Dettmann and his behavior surrounding the
January 25, 2009, incident, reiterating the allegations of his
failure to notify Dettmann of his destination as well as his
intimidation of Dettmann so she would change her report. He
was advised that he had provided dishonest responses when
questioned by investigators about the above events.
at the hearing, evidence was presented in the form of tes-
timony and documents. Scott was represented by an attorney.
The Board then deliberated and made its decision. The par-
ties had specifically contracted for such procedures relating to
employee grievances, and we conclude these procedures were
adequate to provide the due process required.
SCOTT v. COUNTy OF rICHarDSON 	705
Cite as 280 Neb. 694

Having concluded that the violation of Scott’s due process
rights was cured by the extensive posttermination hearing,
we consider whether the Board acted within its jurisdiction
and whether sufficient relevant evidence supports the deci-
sion of the Board. In reviewing an administrative agency
decision on a petition in error, both the district court and the
appellate court review the decision to determine whether the
agency acted within its jurisdiction and whether sufficient,
relevant evidence supports the decision of the agency. Pierce
v. Douglas Cty. Civil Serv. Comm., 275 Neb. 722, 748 N.W.2d
660 (2008).
The labor agreement granted the County the right to “hire,
promote, demote, suspend, discipline or discharge for just
cause.” The grievance procedure granted the Board the author-
ity to determine whether Scott’s employment had been termi-
nated for just cause. Thus, pursuant to the labor agreement, the
Board had jurisdiction to affirm the termination of his employ-
ment. We do not decide any other issue concerning the Board’s
authority in this appeal.
We also note that the evidence supports the termination of
Scott’s employment for just cause. The record shows that Scott
sexually propositioned Dettmann, a fellow employee of the
sheriff’s department, and lied to raney, his supervisor, about
the incident. He failed to follow office policy when responding
to a disturbance call, and he coerced Dettmann into altering a
crime report. This evidence is sufficient to support disciplinary
action, including termination of employment.
The County also argues that Scott waived his pretermination
due process argument by accepting backpay. Given our rever-
sal of the district court’s order, it is not necessary to reach the
waiver issue.
CONCLUSION
There is no dispute whether Scott’s due process rights were
lacking in some respects. However, any violation of Scott’s due
process rights during the pretermination process was cured by
the posttermination proceedings. Thus, the district court erred
in ordering that Scott be reinstated to his employment with the
County. The district court’s judgment is reversed, and the cause
706 	280 NeBraSka rePOrTS

is remanded with directions to reinstate the order of termina-
tion entered by the Board.
reversed And remAnded With directions.
BUrNHaM v. PaCeSeTTer COrP. 	707
Cite as 280 Neb. 707
thomAs e. BurnhAm , AppellAnt, v. the pAcesetter
corporAtion And liBerty mutuAl
group, Appellees.
789 N.W.2d 913
Filed October 15, 2010. 	Nos. S-10-229, S-10-344.
1. Jurisdiction: Judgments: Appeal and Error. Determination of a jurisdictional
issue which does not involve a factual dispute is a matter of law which requires
an appellate court to reach an independent conclusion.
2. Judgments: Appeal and Error. an appellate court independently decides ques-
tions of law.
3. Workers’ Compensation: Jurisdiction: Statutes. The Workers’ Compensation
Court is not a court of general jurisdiction, but, rather, is a statutorily cre-
ated court.
4. ____: ____: ____. No Nebraska statute grants equity jurisdiction to the Workers’
Compensation Court.
5. Workers’ Compensation: Courts: Statutes. a statutorily created court, such
as the Workers’ Compensation Court, has only such authority as has been con-
ferred upon it by statute, and its power cannot extend beyond that expressed in
the statute.
appeals from the Workers’ Compensation Court. affirmed.
eric W. kruger, of rickerson & kruger, for appellant.
Scott a. Lautenbaugh, of Hansen, Lautenbaugh & Buckley,
L.L.P., for appellees.
heAvicAn, 	c.J., 	Wright, 	connolly, 	gerrArd, 	stephAn,
mccormAck, and miller-lermAn, JJ.
heAvicAn, C.J.
INTrODUCTION
This 	case 	comes 	to 	us 	from 	the 	Nebraska 	Workers’
Compensation Court. Thomas e. Burnham was injured while
working for The Pacesetter Corporation, and in 2007, the
Nebraska 	Court 	of 	appeals 	granted 	summary 	affirmance