In re Trust Created by Hansen

I n re TrusT C reaTed by H enry s. H ansen, deCeased.
Wells Fargo bank , n.a., TrusTee oF THe H enry s.
H ansen TrusT, eT al ., appellees , v. esTaTe oF
ruTH elaIne M ansFIeld, appellanT.
798 N.W.2d 398
Filed June 10, 2011. 	Nos. S-10-537, S-10-902.
1. Judgments: Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error. A jurisdictional issue that does
not involve a factual dispute presents a question of law, which an appellate court
independently decides.
2. Summary Judgment: Appeal and Error. An appellate court will affirm a lower
court’s granting of summary judgment if the pleadings and admissible evidence
offered at the hearing show that there is no genuine issue as to any material facts
or as to the ultimate inferences that may be drawn from those facts and that the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
3. ____: ____. In reviewing a summary judgment, the court views the evidence in
the light most favorable to the party against whom the judgment was granted, and
the court gives that party the benefit of all reasonable inferences deducible from
the evidence.
4. Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error. Before reaching the legal issues presented for
review, it is the duty of an appellate court to settle jurisdictional issues presented
by a case.
5. Appeal and Error. An appellate court is not obligated to engage in an analysis
that is not necessary to adjudicate the case and controversy before it.
Appeals from the County Court for Douglas County: edna
aTkIns, Judge. Judgment in No. S-10-537 affirmed. Appeal in
No. S-10-902 dismissed.
Michael D. McClellan and William E. Gast, of Gast &
McClellan, for appellant.
M.H. Weinberg, of Weinberg & Weinberg, P.C., for appellees
Paula Baird-Kaminski and Stephen Scholder.
William R. Johnson, of Lamson, Dugan & Murray, L.L.P.,
and Raymond E. Walden, of Walden Law Office, for appellee
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
H eavICan, 	C.J., 	C onnolly, 	gerrard, 	sTepHan, 	and
MCC orMaCk, JJ.
sTepHan, J.
This case is before us for the second time. It presents the
question of whether a trustee violated its fiduciary duty by
IN RE TRuST CREATED By HANSEN 	693
Cite as 281 Neb. 693
Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
11/01/2026 04:45 AM CST

declining to pay the amount of the beneficiary’s last-illness
expenses to the beneficiary’s estate following her death. In
the first appeal, we held that a decedent beneficiary’s estate
can seek to enforce the beneficiary’s interests in a trust to the
same extent that the beneficiary could have enforced his or her
interests immediately before death, and we remanded the cause
to the county court for Douglas County with directions to hold
an evidentiary hearing.1 These consolidated appeals are from
the county court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of the
trustee and the remainder beneficiaries.
FACTS AND PROCEDuRAL BACKGROuND
In June 1979, Henry S. Hansen executed an inter vivos trust.
The trust provided for the care, support, and maintenance of
Hansen during his lifetime. upon Hansen’s death, the residue
of his estate was to be held in trust for the lifetime benefit of
his daughters. Article I provided: “The Trust shall continue for
the duration of the lives of Grantor’s two daughters, MILDRED
B. BONACCI and RuTH E. MANSFIELD, and until the death
of the survivor of them.” Article II provided in part:
The Trustee shall make two divisions of the corpus of
the Trust, one for MILDRED B. BONACCI and one for
RuTH E. MANSFIELD. During the lifetime of each of
said daughters, the Trustee shall pay the net income of
the respective divisions of the Trust to said daughters in
installments not less frequently than quarterly. In addition,
should either of said daughters, by reason of accident or
illness require funds in excess of the net income of the
Trust, then the Trustee shall make such payments from
such daughter’s division of the principal as it may deem
proper for the benefit of such daughter.
Article III provided that upon the death of one of the daugh-
ters, the trust would continue for the benefit of the surviving
daughter, “with the division of the Trust for the deceased
daughter remaining in the Trust for the use and benefit of the
surviving daughter.” Article III instructed that upon the surviv-
ing daughter’s death, the trustee was to pay out of the “corpus
1 In re Trust Created by Hansen, 274 Neb. 199, 739 N.W.2d 170 (2007).
694 	281 NEBRASKA REPORTS

of both divisions of the Trust” $5,000 to each of Hansen’s four
great-grandchildren, if living, and to then distribute the remain-
ing funds to his two grandchildren, Paula Sue Baird-Kaminski
and Stephen Scholder (remainder beneficiaries). At all relevant
times, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (Wells Fargo), has served as
trustee of Hansen’s trust.
Hansen died in 1979, and Mildred B. Bonacci died in 1986.
Ruth Elaine Mansfield (Ruth) died at the age of 87 on January
8, 2005, in New york City, where she had resided as an adult.
For the last 13 or 14 years of her life, Ruth suffered from dif-
fuse cerebrovascular disease, which was gradually progressive
and eventually resulted in severe dementia. By June 2002, her
medical condition required that she have home health care. In
August 2004, she was placed in a nursing home in New york,
where she resided until her death. Ruth did not have children.
Beginning in late 2002, Jane Falion assisted Ruth in arranging
home health care and eventually residential long-term care serv-
ices. Falion was the daughter of Ruth’s longtime companion
who resided with her and predeceased her.
In August 2004, a social worker advised Falion that Ruth
“needed the appointment of a guardian for her person and
property.” Falion, assisted by an attorney, began the process of
having herself appointed as Ruth’s guardian in a proceeding
initiated in a New york state court. During the pendency of the
guardianship proceeding, Falion and her attorney learned of the
existence of the Hansen trust. During September and October
2004, Falion attempted to contact the trustee regarding Ruth’s
circumstances but was not permitted to speak with a trust
officer because she had not been appointed Ruth’s guardian.
The remainder beneficiaries appeared in the New york guard-
ianship proceeding for the purpose of asserting their interest
in the Hansen trust and objecting to its use to pay Ruth’s
expenses. On or about December 22, 2004, Dawn Heese, the
Wells Fargo trust administrator assigned to the Hansen trust,
received unsigned copies of documents pertaining to the New
york guardianship proceedings, apparently sent by one of the
remainder beneficiaries.
On January 5, 2005, Heese received a telephone call from
the attorney representing Falion in the New york guardianship
proceedings. The attorney told Heese that Ruth was not doing
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Cite as 281 Neb. 693

well and that a judge had entered an order requiring the trust to
pay her medical expenses until a guardian was appointed. The
attorney said that he would fax a copy of the order to Heese,
but he never did. Heese told the attorney that Wells Fargo
would need to see documentation of the claimed expenses,
which the attorney agreed to provide. On or about January 7,
another Wells Fargo trust administrator received a message
from the attorney representing the remainder beneficiaries in
the New york guardianship proceeding, stating that they were
not objecting to the appointment of a guardian but were taking
the position that Ruth’s assets “should be utilized for her care
first before the Trust is invaded.”
On January 10, 2005, one of the remainder beneficiaries
informed Heese that Ruth had died on January 8. Also on
January 10, the New york guardianship proceedings were dis-
missed as moot as a result of Ruth’s death. Several days later,
Heese received copies of Ruth’s medical bills from Falion. In
an accompanying letter dated January 5, 2005, Falion identi-
fied herself as Ruth’s stepdaughter and requested payment of
“all of [Ruth’s] medical expenses” from the Hansen trust prin-
cipal. Falion’s letter instructed Heese to contact her attorney
regarding any questions and identified the same attorney with
whom Heese had spoken on January 5. In e-mail correspond-
ence sent to Heese on February 2, one of the remainder bene-
ficiaries questioned Falion’s right to make any claim against
the trust and stated her belief that Falion was attempting to
maximize the assets of Ruth’s estate because she stood to
inherit from it.
On March 10, 2005, Heese sent letters to Falion’s attorney
and the attorney representing the remainder beneficiaries, stat-
ing that the trustee would not pay the claimed expenses because
Ruth’s interest in the trust terminated upon her death and
Ruth’s estate had sufficient assets to pay the expenses. Falion’s
attorney responded in a letter dated March 22, 2005, indicating
that his firm was representing Ruth’s estate and requesting that
the trust pay $69,000 in medical expenses and $9,175 for the
cost of the guardianship proceeding.
In May 2005, the trustee registered the trust with the county
court for Douglas County, with notice to interested parties,
including Ruth’s estate and the remainder beneficiaries. Shortly
696 	281 NEBRASKA REPORTS

thereafter, the remainder beneficiaries filed an action to deter-
mine their interests in the trust, specifically raising the issue of
whether the estate’s claim for Ruth’s last-illness expenses was
payable from the trust. In the same docketed proceeding, Wells
Fargo filed a petition requesting the court, pursuant to Neb.
Rev. Stat. § 30-3812 (Reissue 2008), to determine whether
Ruth’s last-illness expenses were payable from the trust, and
Ruth’s estate filed a petition to compel the trustee to pay
the expenses.
The county court initially concluded that the trust was a
discretionary support trust and that the trustee had properly
denied payment of the medical bills because the purpose of the
trust had ended with Ruth’s death. In our opinion in the first
appeal, we concluded that the provision in the trust that the
trustee “shall” make payments for the daughters’ benefit if they
should require funds in excess of the trust’s income because of
an accident or illness was “the functional equivalent of a term
providing that ‘“the trustee ‘shall pay or apply only so much of
the . . . principal . . . as is necessary for the [medical care] . . .
of a beneficiary.’”’”2 In light of this language, we stated that
the trustee “had discretion to determine whether and how much
additional support Ruth properly required as the result of an
accident or illness, but it did not have discretion to determine
whether to support her.”3
Our prior opinion also rejected the premise that the trustee
properly refused to make payments under the trust because
the trust’s purpose ended when Ruth died. In this respect, we
noted the “general common-law rule” that a beneficiary’s estate
may recover income of the trust, which is accrued and payable
at the time of the beneficiary’s death but has not been paid
over, “unless the trustee had uncontrolled discretion whether
to make distributions of income.”4 We held that “Ruth’s estate
can seek to enforce Ruth’s interests in the trust to the extent
that Ruth could have enforced her interests immediately before
2 Id. at 209, 739 N.W.2d at 179, quoting Pohlmann v. Nebraska Dept. of
Health & Human Servs., 271 Neb. 272, 710 N.W.2d 639 (2006).
3 In re Trust Created by Hansen, supra note 1, 274 Neb. at 209, 739 N.W.2d
at 179.
4 Id. at 212, 739 N.W.2d at 181.
IN RE TRuST CREATED By HANSEN 	697
Cite as 281 Neb. 693

her death.”5 We adopted the legal standard set forth in the
Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 506 for determining whether
the estate was entitled to recover the beneficiary’s last-illness
expenses from the trust.
Following remand, additional proceedings were conducted.
On December 12, 2008, the county court entered an order on
a motion for partial summary judgment filed by Ruth’s estate
and a motion for summary judgment filed by the remainder
beneficiaries. The court made findings of fact but overruled
both motions and directed the trustee to determine “whether
to pay [Ruth’s] expenses related to her illness, and, if payable,
how much as it may deem proper” utilizing the legal standard
adopted in our previous opinion applied to the facts as deter-
mined by the court. Ruth’s estate filed a motion for new trial,
which the court overruled.
Subsequently, the trustee declined the estate’s request that
Ruth’s last medical expenses be paid from the trust and pro-
posed a distribution of all trust assets in accordance with
article III of the trust instrument, with Hansen’s four great-
grandchildren to receive $5,000 each and the balance paid
in equal shares to the remainder beneficiaries. Ruth’s estate
objected to the proposed distribution. The trustee and remain-
der beneficiaries filed motions for summary judgment. On
November 3, 2009, the court entered a “Final Judgment Order”
and granted the motions, concluding that the trustee “did not
breach its fiduciary duty or abuse its discretion toward Ruth
. . . or her Estate, and its proposed distribution is proper and
not contrary to law.”
Through apparent inadvertence, the county court’s November
3, 2009, order was never mailed to the parties. upon realizing
this, Ruth’s estate filed a motion asking the court to vacate
the November 3 order due to lack of notice to the parties. The
court conducted a hearing on this motion on May 5, 2010,
at which counsel for all parties were present. Counsel orally
agreed that the motion to vacate should be granted. The court
announced on the record that the November 3, 2009, order
5 Id.
6 Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 50, comment d(5) (2003).
698 	281 NEBRASKA REPORTS

was vacated and made a written docket entry reflecting this
action. The court then issued a new “final” order on May 5,
2010, which was identical to the November 3, 2009, order. The
May 5, 2010, order made no reference to the vacating of the
November 3, 2009, order.
The estate filed an appeal from the May 5, 2010, order
on May 26, and that appeal is docketed in this court as case
No. S-10-537. Apparently still concerned about the jurisdic-
tional issue, the trustee, the estate, and the remainder beneficia-
ries then jointly sought an order nunc pro tunc from the county
court. The rationale was that the court’s failure to address the
motion to vacate in the May 5 order was a clerical error that
could be corrected via a motion nunc pro tunc. In response to
this joint request, and while the appeal from the May 5 order
was pending, the county court then issued a “Final Judgment
Order and Order Nunc Pro Tunc” on August 13. The August
13 order is substantively identical to both the November 3,
2009, and May 5, 2010, orders, except that the August 13 order
specifically states that the November 3, 2009, order is vacated
effective May 5, 2010. It also states that the effective date of
the final order is May 5. On September 9, Ruth’s estate filed a
notice of appeal from the August 13 order, and that appeal is
docketed as case No. S-10-902.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
Ruth’s estate assigns, restated and summarized, that the
county court erred in (1) finding that the trustee did not breach
a duty to pay or abuse its discretion in refusing to pay the
estate for Ruth’s medical expenses, (2) finding that the trustee
did not unduly delay its response to Ruth’s claim, (3) failing to
find that the trustee breached fiduciary duties to Ruth during
her lifetime, and (4) construing the language of the trust.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
[1] A jurisdictional issue that does not involve a fac-
tual dispute presents a question of law, which we indepen-
dently decide.7
7 Countryside Co-op v. Harry A. Koch Co., 280 Neb. 795, 790 N.W.2d 873
(2010).
IN RE TRuST CREATED By HANSEN 	699
Cite as 281 Neb. 693

[2,3] An appellate court will affirm a lower court’s granting
of summary judgment if the pleadings and admissible evidence
offered at the hearing show that there is no genuine issue as to
any material facts or as to the ultimate inferences that may be
drawn from those facts and that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.8 In reviewing a summary judg-
ment, the court views the evidence in the light most favorable
to the party against whom the judgment was granted, and the
court gives that party the benefit of all reasonable inferences
deducible from the evidence.9
ANALySIS
appellaTe JurIsdICTIon
[4] Before reaching the legal issues presented for review, it
is the duty of an appellate court to settle jurisdictional issues
presented by a case.10 In preargument filings, both Ruth’s
estate and the remainder beneficiaries questioned whether the
appeals before us are from final orders. We ordered the parties
to address these issues in the briefs.
From our review of the record, we are satisfied that the
county judge entered a final order resolving all pending sub-
stantive and procedural issues on May 5, 2010. Accordingly,
the notice of appeal filed in case No. S-10-537 was timely
and sufficient to confer appellate jurisdiction. We address the
merits of that appeal and dismiss the subsequently filed appeal
designated as case No. S-10-902.
suMMary JudgMenT
As we noted in our previous opinion, the trust provided that
Ruth was to receive the net income from her division of the
trust for her lifetime. It further provided: “‘In addition, should
[Ruth], by reason of accident or illness require funds in excess
8 Id.; Community Dev. Agency v. PRP Holdings, 277 Neb. 1015, 767 N.W.2d
68 (2009).
9 State ex rel. Wagner v. Gilbane Bldg. Co., 280 Neb. 223, 786 N.W.2d 330
(2010). See Ashby v. State, 279 Neb. 509, 779 N.W.2d 343 (2010).
10 Davis v. Choctaw Constr., 280 Neb. 714, 789 N.W.2d 698 (2010); In re
Estate of Hockemeier, 280 Neb. 420, 786 N.W.2d 680 (2010).
700 	281 NEBRASKA REPORTS

of the net income of the Trust, then the Trustee shall make
such payments from [Ruth’s] division of the principal as it may
deem proper for the benefit of [Ruth].’”11
It is undisputed that Ruth suffered from an illness that
commenced in 2002 and that the expenses she incurred as
a result of that illness were in excess of the net income she
received from the trust during the time period of the illness.
Ruth’s estate argues that under the language of the trust, these
facts alone trigger the trustee’s duty to pay Ruth’s last-illness
expenses, regardless of whether her other assets were sufficient
to satisfy her obligations. The estate relies in part on our state-
ment in the prior appeal that “[t]he language of Hansen’s trust
indicates that his primary concern was the care of his daughters
in the event of an accident or illness.”12
But the estate’s interpretation of the trust language fails to
consider the whole of our prior opinion. Immediately after the
language on which the estate relies, we stated: “We conclude
that Hansen authorized the trustee to exercise the same degree
of discretion created by an ordinary support trust but limited
Ruth’s interests in the trust’s principal to the support she needed
upon the happening of a designated event.”13 We also expressly
stated that the trust language was the “functional equivalent” of
a trust providing that the trustee “shall” pay or apply “only so
much” of the principal “as is necessary” for the medical care
of the beneficiary. We noted that the trustee therefore “had dis-
cretion to determine whether and how much additional support
Ruth properly required as the result of an accident or illness,
but it did not have discretion to determine whether to support
her.”14 The statements mean that the trustee was required under
the trust instrument to support Ruth through regular payments
of trust income, and also had the power to determine whether
additional support should be paid from the trust principal for
her medical expenses. Thus, contrary to the estate’s argument,
11 In re Trust Created by Hansen, supra note 1, 274 Neb. at 201, 739 N.W.2d
at 174.
12 Id. at 210, 739 N.W.2d at 179.
13 Id.
14 Id. at 209, 739 N.W.2d at 179 (emphasis supplied).
IN RE TRuST CREATED By HANSEN 	701
Cite as 281 Neb. 693

we have already determined that the language of the trust
did not impose a duty on the trustee to pay Ruth’s medical
expenses from the trust principal simply because they exceeded
the amount of the trust income.
In our prior opinion, we adopted the following standard for
an estate’s recovery of the beneficiary’s last-illness expenses
from the Restatement:
A question may arise, following the death of the bene-
ficiary of a discretionary interest, whether a support or
other standard authorizes or requires the trustee to pay
the beneficiary’s funeral and last-illness expenses and
debts incurred by the beneficiary for support. ultimately,
the question is one of interpretation when the terms of
the trust are unclear, with the presumption being that the
trustee has discretion to pay these debts and expenses.
A duty to do so is presumed only to the extent
that (i) probate estate, revocable trust, and other assets
available for these purposes are insufficient or (ii) the
trustee, during the beneficiary’s lifetime, either agreed
to make payment or unreasonably delayed in responding
to a claim by the beneficiary for which the terms of the
trust would have required payment while the beneficiary
was alive.15
Focusing on the second paragraph of the standard, we first
consider whether the trustee is presumed to have a duty to
pay Ruth’s medical expenses. The evidence does not support a
reasonable inference that Ruth’s assets were insufficient to pay
her last expenses. At the time of her death, Ruth owned assets
valued at approximately $574,000, notwithstanding the fact
that according to her tax returns, she paid health care expenses
of over $200,000 in the 3-year period preceding her death. An
intermediate accounting filed in Ruth’s estate reflected unpaid
claims for medical expenses as of December 31, 2005, in the
amount of only $23,081. In 2006, Ruth’s estate had sufficient
funds to make distributions totaling $270,000 to various insti-
tutions and individuals, including Falion. Clearly, the only
reasonable inference is that Ruth’s assets were sufficient to pay
15 Restatement, supra note 6 at 269.
702 	281 NEBRASKA REPORTS

any medical expenses which had not already been paid at the
time of her death.
The estate argues that, notwithstanding our adoption of the
Restatement standard in the prior appeal, the sufficiency of
Ruth’s assets is irrelevant in Nebraska. It bases this argument
upon our holding in Roats v. Roats.16 In that case, we held that
a trustee who was required to use as much of the trust principal
as he deemed necessary for the care and support of the benefi-
ciary had a duty to pay the cost of a new home for the bene-
ficiary. We found that this duty existed regardless of the suf-
ficiency of the beneficiary’s other assets. Roats, however, was
based on the trustee’s specific promise to the beneficiary that
he would purchase the home for her. Here, there is no evidence
that the trustee ever agreed to pay any of the expenses which
the estate claims, and Roats is therefore distinguishable.
Instead, because Ruth’s assets were sufficient to cover her
medical expenses and the trustee made no promise to pay those
expenses, under the Restatement, the trustee had a duty to pay
Ruth’s medical expenses only if it “unreasonably delayed in
responding to a claim by the beneficiary for which the terms
of the trust would have required payment while the beneficiary
was alive.” There is no evidence that Ruth ever requested that
the trustee pay her medical expenses during her lifetime. The
first such request was made by Falion and her attorney on or
about January 5, 2005, just a few days before Ruth’s death.
It is clear from the record that Falion had not been appointed
Ruth’s guardian when she made the request, and there is no
evidence that Falion acted pursuant to a power of attorney or
any other form of legal authorization. Ruth died before the
trustee received the documentation for Falion’s claim. These
uncontroverted facts do not support a reasonable inference
that Wells Fargo “unreasonably delayed” in responding to
the claim. And in any event, the claim as a matter of law was
not one “for which the terms of the trust would have required
payment while the beneficiary was alive.” As we stated in our
prior opinion, the “trustee had discretion to determine whether
and how much additional support Ruth properly required as
16 Roats v. Roats, 128 Neb. 194, 258 N.W. 264 (1935).
IN RE TRuST CREATED By HANSEN 	703
Cite as 281 Neb. 693

the result of an . . . illness.”17 The same discretionary standard
applied to the trustee both before and after Ruth’s death, and
we have already held that the trustee did not have a duty to pay
Ruth’s medical expenses under this standard. We conclude that
the evidence establishes as a matter of law that the trustee did
not have a duty to pay Ruth’s last-illness expenses under the
Restatement standard adopted in our prior opinion.
Clearly, however, the trustee had the discretion to pay Ruth’s
medical expenses. The remaining question then is whether the
trustee abused that discretion in declining to pay her medical
expenses from the trust principal. under the trust instrument,
the trustee’s discretionary authority to make payments to Ruth
from the trust principal involved an assessment of whether
Ruth “‘by reason of accident or illness require[d] funds in
excess of the net income of the Trust . . . .’”18 Contrary to the
estate’s argument, one factor in this determination was Ruth’s
ability to meet her expenses without a payment from the trust
principal. As we noted in our prior opinion, the trust instrument
“limited Ruth’s interests in the trust’s principal to the sup-
port she needed upon the happening of a designated event.”19
Whether Ruth “needed” a disbursement from the trust prin-
cipal to pay her medical expenses depended upon what other
resources were available to her. The trustee initially declined
the request made by Falion and her attorney to pay the last-
illness expenses, based in part upon its understanding that the
estate had “sufficient assets to pay those expenses,” and the
record shows that that understanding was correct.
The estate argues that the trustee breached a fiduciary duty
to inquire as to Ruth’s health and her possible need for pay-
ments from the trust principal and that it had improper com-
munications with the remainder beneficiaries. We consider
these arguments only to the extent that they pertain to the issue
of whether the trustee abused its discretion in declining to pay
the last-illness expenses, because the estate has made no other
17 In Re Trust Created by Hansen, supra note 1, 274 Neb. at 209, 739 N.W.2d
at 179.
18 Id. at 201, 739 N.W.2d at 174.
19 Id. at 210, 739 N.W.2d at 179.
704 	281 NEBRASKA REPORTS

claim against the trustee. We find no language in the trust
instrument which requires the trustee to make specific inquiries
regarding the health of a beneficiary. But even if such a duty
did exist, there is no indication that inquiries made in 2002,
2003, or 2004 would have disclosed facts different from those
in the record, i.e., that Ruth’s health was deteriorating but that
she was able to meet the increased health care expenses from
her existing resources without the need for payments from the
trust principal. We find no basis in the record for the estate’s
argument that the trustee’s communications with the remainder
beneficiaries were improper or that they resulted in an abuse
of discretion with respect to the trustee’s decision not to pay
Ruth’s last-illness expenses. In summary, we find no evidence
in the record which would support a reasonable inference that
the trustee abused its discretion in declining to pay the last-
illness expenses.
[5] Finally, the estate argues that the county court erred in
construing article II of the trust instrument as creating separate
and distinct “divisions” of the trust principal for the daugh-
ters’ benefit. This issue is not material to our disposition of
the appeal, and because an appellate court is not obligated to
engage in an analysis that is not necessary to adjudicate the
case and controversy before it, we need not address it.20
CONCLuSION
Applying the legal standard adopted in our prior appeal,
the county court concluded that there was no genuine issue of
material fact and that the trustee and remainder beneficiaries
were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. For the reasons
discussed, we find no error and therefore affirm.
JudgMenT In no. s-10-537 aFFIrMed.
appeal In no. s-10-902 dIsMIssed.
WrIgHT and MIller-lerMan, JJ., not participating.
20 Law Offices of Ronald J. Palagi v. Howard, 275 Neb. 334, 747 N.W.2d 1
(2008).
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