In re Interest of Jamyia M.

However, we take this opportunity to note that we are cogni-
zant that respondent has received prior discipline by this court
and the Iowa Supreme Court. Given this history, we caution
that more severe sanctions will be considered in connection
with any further disciplinary actions.
CONCLUSION
It is the judgment of this court that respondent should be and
hereby is publicly reprimanded. Respondent is directed to pay
costs and expenses in accordance with §§ 7-114 and 7-115 of
the Nebraska Revised Statutes and §§ 3-310(P) and 3-323(B)
of the disciplinary rules within 60 days after an order imposing
costs and expenses, if any, is entered by the court.
Judgment of public reprimand.
H eavican, C.J., not participating.
in re interest of Jamyia m., a cHild
under 18 years of age .
state of nebraska , appellee and cross -appellee , v.
Jamison m., appellee and cross -appellant,
and sHinai s., appellant.
800 N.W.2d 259
Filed July 22, 2011. 	No. S-10-208.
1. Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error. A jurisdictional question which does not
involve a factual dispute is determined by an appellate court as a matter of law.
2. Judgments: Appeal and Error. On a question of law, an appellate court is obli-
gated to reach a conclusion independent of the court below.
3. Juvenile Courts: Appeal and Error. An appellate court reviews juvenile cases
de novo on the record and reaches its conclusions independently of the juvenile
court’s findings.
4. Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error. Before reaching the legal issues presented for
review, an appellate court must determine whether it has jurisdiction.
5. Final Orders: Appeal and Error. There are three types of final orders that may
be reviewed on appeal: (1) an order which affects a substantial right and which
determines the action and prevents a judgment, (2) an order affecting a substantial
right made during a special proceeding, and (3) an order affecting a substantial
right made upon summary application in an action after a judgment is rendered.
6. Juvenile Courts: Appeal and Error. A proceeding before a juvenile court is a
special proceeding for appellate purposes.
964 	281 NeBRASkA RePORTS
Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
11/01/2026 04:45 AM CST

7. Jurisdiction: Final Orders: Time: Notice: Appeal and Error. In order to vest
an appellate court with jurisdiction, a notice of appeal must be filed within 30
days of the entry of the final order.
8. Courts: Appeal and Error. Upon reversing a decision of the Nebraska Court
of Appeals, the Nebraska Supreme Court may consider, as it deems appropriate,
some or all of the assignments of error the Court of Appeals did not reach.
9. Judges: Recusal: Presumptions. A party alleging that a judge acted with bias
or prejudice bears a heavy burden of overcoming the presumption of judicial
impartiality.
10. Appeal and Error. Plain error is error plainly evident from the record and of
such a nature that to leave it uncorrected would result in damage to the integrity,
reputation, or fairness of the judicial process.
Petition for further review from the Court of Appeals, inbody,
Chief Judge, and moore and cassel, Judges, on appeal thereto
from the Separate Juvenile Court of Douglas County, elizabetH
crnkovicH, Judge. Judgment of Court of Appeals reversed, and
cause remanded with directions.
Jeremy R. Shirk for appellant.
Donald W. kleine, Douglas County Attorney, and Amy
Schuchman for appellee State of Nebraska.
Thomas C. Riley, Douglas County Public Defender, and
Christine D. kellogg for appellee Jamison M.
H eavican, c.J., connolly, gerrard, stepHan, mccormack ,
and miller-lerman, JJ.
gerrard, J.
The State of Nebraska seeks further review of a Nebraska
Court of Appeals’ decision which reversed the order of the
juvenile court for Douglas County terminating the parental
rights of Jamyia M.’s natural parents, Shinai S. and Jamison
M. Jamyia, a minor child of Navajo descent, was removed
from her parents’ home after doctors discovered that she suf-
fered injuries consistent with shaken baby syndrome. Shinai
and Jamison appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed.1
The State petitioned for further review. For the following
reasons, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and
1 In re Interest of Jamyia M., 18 Neb. App. 679, 791 N.W.2d 343 (2010).
IN Re INTeReST OF JAMyIA M. 	965
Cite as 281 Neb. 964

remand the cause with directions to affirm the order of the
juvenile court.
I. BACkGROUND
On September 30, 2008, 2-month-old Jamyia was hospi-
talized with a posterior occipital subdural hemorrhage and
either 	a 	subarachnoid 	hemorrhage 	or 	cerebral 	contusion.
Doctors concluded that Jamyia’s injuries were consistent with
shaken baby syndrome and that her injuries were intentionally
inflicted. Shinai and Jamison claimed that they did not cause
Jamyia’s injuries.
The State filed an adjudication petition alleging that the juve-
nile court had obtained jurisdiction in these proceedings based
upon the natural parents’ placing Jamyia in a situation which
was dangerous to her life or limb or injurious to her health or
morals within the meaning of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-247(3)(a)
(Reissue 2008). The State then filed an amended petition,
alleging that Shinai’s and Jamison’s parental rights should be
terminated pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-292(2), (8), (9),
and (10)(d) (Reissue 2008).
The State also alleged that pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat.
§ 43-1505(4) (Reissue 2008) of the Nebraska Indian Child
Welfare Act (NICWA), “active efforts” had been made to pre-
vent the breakup of the Indian family, but that those efforts
had been unsuccessful; so NICWA’s requirement of provid-
ing active efforts before foster care placement or termination
of Shinai’s and Jamison’s parental rights was satisfied. The
State argued, in the alternative, that active efforts to prevent
the breakup of the Indian family were not required because
Jamyia’s parents subjected her to aggravated circumstances.
Shinai and Jamison argued that NICWA contained no aggra-
vated circumstances exception and that active efforts had not
been made. Adjudication hearings were held from February
19 to November 12, 2009. A summary of the salient testimony
adduced during the adjudication hearings follows.
Dr. katherine Penny, Jamyia’s pediatrician, testified that
Jamyia had been brought in to her office for care on September
29, 2008, because she had been screaming and fussy, had cold
symptoms, and refused to eat. Penny testified that she fed
966 	281 NeBRASkA RePORTS

Jamyia 2 ounces of Pedialyte and that at that time, Jamyia was
able to suck and swallow and exhibited no unusual breathing,
no unusual eye movement, or any appearance of being abnor-
mally limp. Shinai testified that she and Jamison had taken
Jamyia to Penny because Jamyia had a fever, had saliva run-
ning from her mouth, and had diarrhea, and because her eyes
were “fluttering.” Shinai stated that Jamyia was diagnosed with
“hand, mouth, [and] foot virus.” Shinai said that after seeing
Penny, the family returned to Jamison’s mother’s home, where
they had been staying.
Jamison testified that Jamyia was often sick and was a
colicky baby. Jamison stated that Jamyia had been taken to
Penny because she had difficulty breathing, was crying, and
had a cough and diaper rash. He also stated that her tongue and
eyes fluttered. Jamison stated that after returning from Penny’s
office, Jamyia cried all night, as if in pain.
Shinai and Jamison said that on September 30, 2008, Shinai
went to the store with Jamison’s mother to pick up a prescrip-
tion and left Jamyia in Jamison’s care. Jamison claimed that he
fed Jamyia two or three times. Jamison said that after his mother
and Shinai returned from the store, he and Shinai attempted to
wake Jamyia but that the baby was unresponsive. Shinai said
that she called the 911 emergency dispatch service.
Dr. Jeffrey DeMare, a pediatric specialist and the former
medical director of a team which evaluates and coordinates
care for abused children, was the attending physician the
night Jamyia was admitted to the hospital. DeMare testi-
fied that he commonly reviews cases to determine whether a
child’s injury is consistent with child abuse. DeMare noted that
upon admission, Jamyia was actively seizing, hypoxic, and in
need of mechanical ventilation. Magnetic resonance imaging
of Jamyia’s brain indicated subdural blood within the posterior
occipital space and in the high parietal area, which injuries
were recent in nature. Due to the severity of the hemorrhaging,
DeMare determined that Jamyia’s brain injuries were intention-
ally inflicted.
Dr. Sebastian J. Troia, a pediatric ophthalmologist, also
examined Jamyia’s injuries and testified that bilateral retinal
hemorrhages established that Jamyia’s injuries were the result
IN Re INTeReST OF JAMyIA M. 	967
Cite as 281 Neb. 964

of trauma. Troia said that Jamyia’s retinal hemorrhaging was
consistent with shaken baby syndrome, and he ruled out other
possible causes of Jamyia’s retinal hemorrhaging.
Tammy Burk, a protection and safety worker from the
Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), testi-
fied that she had conducted an assessment soon after Jamyia’s
admission to the hospital. Burk recounted that Jamyia was
unable to eat orally because she could not suck or swallow,
required a feeding tube, and was on a ventilator. Burk inter-
viewed Shinai and Jamison, who claimed that Jamyia’s inju-
ries were the result of a misdiagnosis by Penny. Burk stated
that Shinai and Jamison disputed the doctors’ conclusions that
Jamyia had been shaken, but were unable to provide any rea-
sonable explanation for Jamyia’s injuries.
The 	evidence 	adduced 	during 	the 	adjudicative 	hearings
established that Jamyia has cognitive motor delays, language
delays, visual impairment due to retinal hemorrhages to both
eyes, seizures, and neurological problems. Jamyia has dif-
ficulty swallowing and requires a feeding tube to supplement
her daily oral feeding. Jamyia’s hands and feet are curled when
they are not in splints, and though she is placed in a “stander”
twice daily to strengthen her legs, she was unable to walk or
talk at 17 months of age.
The State’s expert witness, evelyn Labode, cited the grave
nature of Jamyia’s injuries, coupled with a review of the medi-
cal and investigative agency reports, as evidence that returning
Jamyia to her natural parents would result in further emo-
tional or physical damage to the child. Labode said it was her
opinion that it was in Jamyia’s best interests for Shinai’s and
Jamison’s parental rights to be terminated. Burk concurred,
explaining that because there was no reasonable explanation
for how Jamyia had suffered such extensive injuries, there
were no assurances that Jamyia would not suffer additional
injuries if returned to her natural parents. Burk stated that
DHHS supported the termination of Shinai’s and Jamison’s
parental rights.
An expert for Shinai and Jamison, Dr. Steven Gabaeff, testi-
fied that Jamyia’s injuries were not the result of being shaken,
but were due to infection, recurrent seizures, or choking and
968 	281 NeBRASkA RePORTS

respiratory arrest. Gabaeff noted that Jamyia’s medical records
did not indicate that viral meningitis had been ruled out, which
he claimed could account for an increase in cranial pres-
sure which could cause Jamyia’s retinal hemorrhages. Shinai
acknowledged that physicians had testified that Jamyia’s inju-
ries were not accidental, but Shinai maintained that she had
not abused Jamyia and claimed that Jamison would never
harm Jamyia.
On December 2, 2009, at the conclusion of the adjudication
phase, the juvenile court entered an order determining that
conditions existed for termination of Shinai’s and Jamison’s
parental rights pursuant to § 43-292(2), (8), and (9). The
court also found that active efforts to prevent the breakup of
the Indian family had been made but that those efforts were
unsuccessful, so the State had satisfied § 43-1505(4). The
court took under advisement whether continuing custody with
Shinai and Jamison would likely result in further harm to
Jamyia and whether reasonable efforts to preserve and reunify
the family were required under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-283.01
(Reissue 2008).
The State alleged that reasonable efforts to preserve and
reunify the family, as provided for by § 43-283.01, were not
required because Shinai and Jamison had subjected Jamyia
to “aggravated circumstances, including, but not limited to,
abandonment, torture, chronic abuse, or sexual abuse” under
§ 43-283.01(4)(a). After a dispositional hearing on January
11, 2010, the juvenile court entered its dispositional order
on February 12. The juvenile court determined that it was in
Jamyia’s best interests to terminate Shinai’s and Jamison’s
parental rights and that reasonable efforts to prevent the breakup
of Jamyia’s family were not required pursuant to § 43-283.01
as to both parents, because Jamyia was subjected to aggravated
circumstances. On February 26, Shinai filed a notice of appeal
from the juvenile court’s February 12 dispositional order. On
March 2, Jamison filed a notice of appeal, purporting to appeal
from the December 2, 2009, adjudication order, as well as from
the February 12, 2010, dispositional order.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, Shinai and Jamison
argued, among other things, that the juvenile court erred in
IN Re INTeReST OF JAMyIA M. 	969
Cite as 281 Neb. 964

finding that the State had made active efforts, as required
under § 43-1505(4), to prevent the breakup of their Indian
family and that those efforts were unsuccessful. The Court
of Appeals determined that the services DHHS provided to
Shinai and Jamison had been successful and that Shinai and
Jamison had attempted to remain involved in Jamyia’s life, so
the State had not proved that it made active efforts pursuant to
§ 43-1505(4) to provide remedial services and rehabilitative
programs designed to prevent the breakup of the Indian family
and that those efforts had been unsuccessful.2
The Court of Appeals then examined whether the exception
to providing reasonable efforts when aggravated circumstances
exist, as contained in § 43-283.01(4)(a), relieved the State of
its burden to provide active efforts under NICWA’s § 43-1505.
The Court of Appeals determined that the statutes were sepa-
rate and distinct, that they did not conflict, that NICWA did
not have an aggravated circumstances exception, and that even
if they did conflict, NICWA’s § 43-1505 was more specific
than § 43-283.01, and therefore was controlling. The Court
of Appeals determined that the State had failed to prove that
active efforts to prevent the breakup of Jamyia’s family were
provided but unsuccessful, and it reversed the juvenile court’s
termination of Shinai’s and Jamison’s parental rights.3 The
State sought further review of the Court of Appeals’ decision,
which we granted.
II. ASSIGNMeNT OF eRROR
The State assigns that the Court of Appeals erred when it
determined that the State was required to provide active efforts
to Shinai and Jamison to prevent the breakup of the family
within the meaning of § 43-1505(4) when aggravated circum-
stances were present.
III. STANDARD OF ReVIeW
[1,2] A jurisdictional question which does not involve a fac-
tual dispute is determined by an appellate court as a matter of
2 Id.
3 Id.
970 	281 NeBRASkA RePORTS

law.4 On a question of law, an appellate court is obligated to
reach a conclusion independent of the court below.5
[3] An appellate court reviews juvenile cases de novo on the
record and reaches its conclusions independently of the juve-
nile court’s findings.6
IV. ANALySIS
1. active efforts
Before the Court of Appeals, Shinai and Jamison argued
that the State had not proved that it had made active efforts,
pursuant to § 43-1505(4), to prevent the breakup of the Indian
family and that those efforts were unsuccessful, and the court
ultimately agreed. Though the State argued that active efforts
were 	not 	required 	because 	the 	aggravated 	circumstances
exception contained in § 43-283.01(4)(a) applied to NICWA,
the Court of Appeals determined that the aggravated circum-
stances exception was not part of NICWA’s statutory scheme,
so the State was not excused from proving the active efforts
requirement before terminating Shinai’s and Jamison’s paren-
tal rights.
[4] The State seeks further review, again arguing that the
presence of aggravated circumstances excused the State from
providing active efforts within the meaning of § 43-1505(4).
The issue is one we need not decide, because we lack juris-
diction to review the merits of the order in which the juve-
nile court determined that active efforts had been made but
were unsuccessful. Before reaching the legal issues presented
for review, an appellate court must determine whether it
has jurisdiction.7
[5-7] There are three types of final orders that may be
reviewed on appeal: (1) an order which affects a substantial
right and which determines the action and prevents a judgment,
4 In re Estate of Muncillo, 280 Neb. 669, 789 N.W.2d 37 (2010).
5 Travelers Indem. Co. v. Gridiron Mgmt. Group, ante p. 113, 794 N.W.2d
143 (2011).
6 In re Interest of Jorge O., 280 Neb. 411, 786 N.W.2d 343 (2010).
7 Cargill Meat Solutions v. Colfax Cty. Bd. of Equal., ante p. 93, 798
N.W.2d 823 (2011).
IN Re INTeReST OF JAMyIA M. 	971
Cite as 281 Neb. 964

(2) an order affecting a substantial right made during a special
proceeding, and (3) an order affecting a substantial right made
upon summary application in an action after a judgment is
rendered.8 We have previously determined that a proceeding
before a juvenile court is a special proceeding for appellate
purposes and that a judicial determination in an adjudication
order that the State satisfied the active efforts requirement
contained in § 43-1505(4) affects the substantial right of par-
ents to raise their children, and is therefore a final, appealable
order.9 In order to vest an appellate court with jurisdiction, a
notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days of the entry of
the final order.10
In the juvenile court’s December 2, 2009, adjudication order,
it determined that the State had satisfied § 43-1505(4)’s active
efforts requirement. That finding was properly part of the
adjudication, because § 43-1505(4) requires it for a foster care
placement or termination of parental rights. The adjudication
order was a final, appealable order when entered on December
2. Shinai did not appeal from the adjudication order. And
though Jamison attempted on March 2, 2010, to appeal from
the adjudication and disposition orders, his appeal was not
timely with respect to the adjudication order.11
Because neither Shinai nor Jamison perfected an appeal
from the juvenile court’s adjudication order determining that
the State had made active efforts pursuant to § 43-1505(4),
there exists no appellate jurisdiction to review Shinai’s and
Jamison’s argument that the active efforts requirement con-
tained in § 43-1505(4) was not proved. Therefore, the Court
of Appeals did not have jurisdiction to reach the active efforts
issue, and it erred when it reversed the juvenile court’s deter-
mination that the State had satisfied § 43-1505(4) before ter-
minating Shinai’s and Jamison’s parental rights. We reverse the
Court of Appeals’ judgment in that regard.
8 See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1902 (Reissue 2008).
9 See In re Interest of Walter W., 274 Neb. 859, 744 N.W.2d 55 (2008).
10 See, DeBose v. State, 267 Neb. 116, 672 N.W.2d 426 (2003); Neb. Rev.
Stat. § 25-1912(1) (Reissue 2008).
11 See § 25-1912(1) and Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-2,106.01(1) (Reissue 2008).
972 	281 NeBRASkA RePORTS

[8] The Court of Appeals, finding that the active efforts
issue was dispositive, did not address Shinai’s and Jamison’s
other arguments on appeal. Upon reversing a decision of the
Nebraska Court of Appeals, we may consider, as we deem
appropriate, some or all of the assignments of error the Court
of Appeals did not reach.12 Because there is no appellate juris-
diction on the active efforts issue, we now address Shinai’s and
Jamison’s remaining arguments.
2. Jamison’s appeal
Jamison’s remaining assignments of error, summarized and
restated, are that the juvenile court erred when it (1) found
that continuing custody of Jamyia with Jamison would likely
result in serious emotional or physical damage to the child and
terminated Jamison’s parental rights; (2) found that there was
sufficient evidence to establish grounds for termination under
§§ 43-292(2), (8), and (9); and (3) failed to conduct the pro-
ceedings in a fair and impartial manner.
(a) Termination of Parental Rights
Jamison argues that the juvenile court erred when it ter-
minated his parental rights after determining that continued
custody of Jamyia with Jamison would likely result in serious
emotional or physical damage to the child. Before terminat-
ing an Indian child’s parental rights, the State must establish,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the continued custody of the
child by the parent is likely to result in serious emotional or
physical damage to the child under NICWA, § 43-1505(6),
in addition to proving that the State provided active efforts
under § 43-1505(4). Here, the juvenile court determined in
its disposition order that continued custody of Jamyia with
Jamison would likely result in serious emotional or physi-
cal damage to Jamyia within the meaning of § 43-1505(6).
Jamison argues that the evidence was insufficient to support
a determination beyond a reasonable doubt that continued
custody would likely result in serious emotional or physical
12 Capitol Construction v. Skinner, 279 Neb. 419, 778 N.W.2d 721 (2010).
IN Re INTeReST OF JAMyIA M. 	973
Cite as 281 Neb. 964

damage to Jamyia. Our review of the record does not coincide
with Jamison’s position.
In its December 2, 2009, order, the juvenile court deter-
mined, among other things, that Jamyia’s injuries were the
result of nonaccidental trauma, that Jamison had inflicted seri-
ous bodily injury upon Jamyia, and that Jamyia was at risk of
further harm. Those findings and the record as a whole sup-
port a determination beyond a reasonable doubt that continued
custody of Jamyia with Jamison would likely result in serious
emotional or physical damage to the child.
The attending pediatric specialist, DeMare, testified that
he commonly reviewed cases to determine whether a child’s
injury was consistent with child abuse and that in this case,
he ultimately determined that Jamyia’s severe injuries were
intentionally inflicted. This determination was consistent with
the observations of the ophthalmologist, who testified that
Jamyia’s retinal hemorrhaging was consistent with shaken
baby syndrome and that there were no other possible causes
for Jamyia’s injuries. And Shinai’s and Jamison’s testimony
established that Jamyia was in the exclusive care of Jamison
before 	the 	discovery 	of 	Jamyia’s 	injuries. 	Furthermore,
Labode opined that Jamyia’s grave injuries, coupled with a
review of the medical and investigative agency reports, evi-
denced that returning Jamyia to her parents would result in
further emotional or physical damage to the child. Though
Jamison contends that Labode’s testimony was based on
incomplete information, the record reflects that Labode can-
didly cited the documents on which she relied in forming
her opinion and that Jamison was given a full opportunity to
cross-examine her. And nothing in the record suggests that
the court relied solely on Labode’s testimony in making its
determination.
Shinai’s 	and 	Jamison’s 	expert, 	Gabaeff, 	testified 	that
Jamyia’s injuries could have been caused by cranial pressure
from viral meningitis. However, there is no evidence in the
record that Jamyia actually contracted viral meningitis, and we
find the testimony of the State’s medical witnesses to be far
more persuasive. After considering Jamison’s contentions and
reviewing the record, we conclude that the State has proved
974 	281 NeBRASkA RePORTS

beyond a reasonable doubt that continued custody of Jamyia
with Jamison is likely to result in serious emotional or physical
damage to the child.
(b) Juvenile Court’s Adjudication Order
Jamison argues that the juvenile court erred when it found
in the adjudication phase that there was sufficient evidence
to establish grounds for termination under § 43-292(2), (8),
and (9). We note that the court’s findings were made in the
adjudication order and that as discussed above, Jamison failed
to perfect an appeal from the adjudication order. This raises
a potential question as to whether we have jurisdiction to
review those findings. We conclude, however, that the court’s
determination that there was sufficient evidence to establish
grounds for termination, though entered at the same time as
the adjudication order, was not actually part of the adjudica-
tion. This is because the juvenile court’s jurisdiction over
and placement of Jamyia did not rest on those findings. Nor
did the court’s determination affect any substantial right of
Jamison, because his parental rights were not actually affected
until they were terminated. Jamison therefore did not waive
his right to appeal the § 43-292 determination when he failed
to perfect an appeal from the adjudication order. Therefore, we
will address Jamison’s argument that the evidence was insuf-
ficient to establish grounds for termination under § 43-292(2),
(8), and (9).
The evidence, as summarized above, amply supports the
court’s finding of statutory grounds for termination of Jamison’s
parental rights. Section 43-292(2) permits termination when a
parent has “neglected and refused” to give the juvenile “neces-
sary parental care and protection.” Section 43-292(8) permits
termination if “[t]he parent has inflicted upon the juvenile,
by other than accidental means, serious bodily injury.” And
§ 43-292(9) permits termination when the parent has sub-
jected the juvenile to “aggravated circumstances,” including
but not limited to “abandonment, torture, chronic abuse, or
sexual abuse.” As we found above, the record supports the
finding that Jamison subjected Jamyia to severe, intentional
physical abuse. That evidence is sufficient to establish each of
IN Re INTeReST OF JAMyIA M. 	975
Cite as 281 Neb. 964

the statutory grounds found by the juvenile court. Therefore,
we find no merit to Jamison’s complaint that the evidence
was insufficient.
(c) Judicial Impropriety
Jamison argues that the juvenile court violated Jamison’s
due process rights because the court failed to conduct the pro-
ceedings in a fair and impartial manner. Jamison argues that
the juvenile court gave the appearance of impropriety when the
court took a motion for visitation during the proceedings under
advisement for a year, interrupted the testimony of Jamison’s
expert witness, indicated the court’s opinion of the medical
expert, and sought additional information during the disposi-
tional phase.
But the record reflects that the juvenile court was unaware
of the visitation motion until the hearings began. The juvenile
court did comment that Jamison’s expert witness was “slick,”
but the record reflects that the juvenile court’s comment was
part of an effort to instruct the witness to answer only the ques-
tions presented rather than elaborating beyond the scope of the
question. And though Jamison argues that the court gave the
appearance of impropriety when it sought additional informa-
tion during the dispositional phase, our review of the record
does not reflect that the court was at all partial during the
presentation of that evidence. Ultimately, because the juvenile
court was the trier of fact, it was not only proper but entirely
necessary for the court to inquire into the facts and make find-
ings regarding the persuasiveness of the witnesses and the
weight of the evidence.
[9] There exists a presumption of judicial impartiality, and
a party alleging that a judge acted with bias or prejudice bears
a heavy burden of overcoming that presumption.13 After con-
sidering Jamison’s arguments and reviewing the record, we
conclude that there is no evidence that the court was biased or
prejudiced, so Jamison has failed to overcome the presumption
of judicial impartiality.
13 See State v. Thomas, 268 Neb. 570, 685 N.W.2d 69 (2004).
976 	281 NeBRASkA RePORTS

3. sHinai’s appeal
[10] Shinai’s replacement brief on appeal does not contain
a separate “assignments of error” section stating the assigned
errors apart from the arguments in her brief. Neb. Ct. R. App.
P. § 2-109(D)(1)(d), (e), and (f) (rev. 2008) requires a separate
section for assignments of error, designated as such by a head-
ing, and also requires that the section be located after a state-
ment of the case and before a list of controlling propositions of
law. Assignments of error consisting of headings or subparts of
argument do not comply with the mandate of § 2-109(D)(1)(e).14
Accordingly, we may proceed as though Shinai failed to file a
brief or, alternatively, may examine the proceedings for plain
error.15 We will consider whether the juvenile court committed
plain error, but only in regard to the dispositional order, because
Shinai did not appeal from the adjudication order. Plain error is
error plainly evident from the record and of such a nature that
to leave it uncorrected would result in damage to the integrity,
reputation, or fairness of the judicial process.16 After reviewing
the relevant parts of the record, we find no plain error pertain-
ing to the dispositional proceedings.
V. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the Court of
Appeals is reversed, and the cause is remanded to the Court
of Appeals with directions to affirm the juvenile court’s order
terminating Shinai’s and Jamison’s parental rights.
reversed and remanded witH directions.
wrigHt, J., not participating.
14 See Gilbert & Martha Hitchcock Found. v. Kountze, 275 Neb. 978, 751
N.W.2d 129 (2008).
15 See City of Gordon v. Montana Feeders, Corp., 273 Neb. 402, 730 N.W.2d
387 (2007).
16 In re Interest of Markice M., 275 Neb. 908, 750 N.W.2d 345 (2008).
IN Re INTeReST OF JAMyIA M. 	977
Cite as 281 Neb. 964