State v. Becker

State of NebraSka , appellee , v.
JoNathaN S. becker , appellaNt.
804 N.W.2d 27
Filed September 30, 2011. 	No. S-11-041.
1. Statutes: Appeal and Error. Statutory interpretation is a question of law that an
appellate court resolves independently of the court below.
2. Sentences. Whether a defendant is entitled to credit for time served is a question
of law.
3. Statutes: Legislature: Intent. When construing a statute, courts look to give
effect to the legislative intent of the enactment.
4. Statutes. Courts generally give words in a statute their ordinary meaning.
5. Sentences: Words and Phrases. Under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 83-1,106(1) (Reissue
2008), “in custody” means judicially imposed confinement in a governmental
facility authorized for detention, control, or supervision of a defendant before,
during, or after trial on a criminal charge.
6. Sentences. Under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 83-4,145 (Reissue 1999), credit is given for
time actually served in an incarceration work camp program.
7. Probation and Parole: Sentences. Under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2268 (Reissue
2008), if a court finds that a probationer violated a condition of his probation, the
court may revoke the probation and impose on the offender such new sentence as
might have been imposed originally for the crime of which he was convicted.
8. Homicide: Motor Vehicles: Licenses and Permits: Revocation: Time. While
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-306 (Cum. Supp. 2002) requires a license revocation regard-
less of whether the defendant is sentenced to probation or incarceration, the
court may, in some cases, also do so as a condition of probation for a period of
5 years.
9. Probation and Parole. Under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2262(2)(r) (Cum. Supp.
2004), the court may attach any condition reasonably related to the rehabilitation
of the offender to his or her probation.
10. Sentences: Legislature: Licenses and Permits: Revocation. The Legislature has
not given credit for prior license revocations.
Appeal from the District Court for Douglas County: thomaS
a. otepka, Judge. Sentence vacated, and cause remanded for
resentencing.
Thomas C. Riley, Douglas County Public Defender, Kelly
M. Steenbock, and Timothy P. Burns for appellant.
Jon Bruning, Attorney General, and George R. Love for
appellee.
heavicaN, 	c.J., 	Wright, 	coNNolly, 	gerrard, 	StephaN,
mccormack, and miller-lermaN, JJ.
STATe v. BeCKeR 	449
Cite as 282 Neb. 449
Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
11/01/2026 04:43 AM CST

coNNolly, J.
In 2005, Jonathan S. Becker pleaded guilty to one count of
motor vehicle homicide. The court sentenced him to 5 years
of probation, which included a requirement that Becker par-
ticipate in a “work ethic camp.” The court also revoked his
driver’s license for 5 years as a condition of probation. Becker
later violated his probation, and the court revoked it. The
court then sentenced Becker to 5 years in prison. At the same
time, the court again revoked Becker’s license, this time for
15 years. This appeal presents two questions: whether Becker
will receive credit for time served at a work ethic camp; and
whether he will receive credit for his previous license revoca-
tion. We conclude that Becker should receive credit for the
time served at the work ethic camp but reject his argument that
he should receive credit for the time his license was revoked
while he was on probation.
BACKGROUND
In 2004, Becker, while intoxicated, crashed his vehicle into
a concrete sign. His passenger died from injuries caused by the
accident. The State charged Becker with one count of motor
vehicle homicide.1 Becker pleaded guilty to the charge, and
the court sentenced Becker to 5 years of probation. One of the
conditions of Becker’s probation was that he successfully com-
plete a program at a work ethic camp. The court also imposed a
condition that Becker not drive and revoked his driver’s license
for 5 years from the date of sentencing.
Although Becker successfully completed his 125-day term
at the work ethic camp, he eventually violated his probation
by testing positive for alcohol, missing drug-testing dates,
skipping Alcoholics Anonymous 	meetings, 	and 	failing 	to
attend mental health counseling. Becker admitted to violating
his probation.
After Becker had admitted his probation violation, the court
sentenced Becker to 5 years in prison. The court gave Becker
credit for 128 days he had served in jail, but did not give
him credit for the 125 days served in the work ethic camp.
1 See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-306 (Cum. Supp. 2002).
450 	282 NeBRASKA RePORTS

The court also revoked Becker’s driver’s license for 15 years.
The court gave no credit for the revocation that was a part of
Becker’s probation.
ASSIGNMeNTS OF eRROR
Becker assigns that the court erred in:
(1) refusing to grant Becker credit for the 125 days he spent
at the work ethic camp; and
(2) refusing to give Becker credit for the 5 years that his
license was previously suspended.
STANDARD OF ReVIeW
[1,2] Statutory interpretation is a question of law that we
resolve independently of the court below.2 Whether a defendant
is entitled to credit for time served is also a question of law.3
ANALYSIS
credit for time Served at the
Work ethic camp
Becker first argues that the court erred when it did not give
him credit for the 125 days he spent at the work ethic camp.
The State agrees and concedes that the court erred. We agree.
[3,4] When construing a statute, we look to give effect to the
legislative intent of the enactment.4 In doing so, we generally
give words in a statute their ordinary meaning.5
[5] Neb. Rev. Stat. § 83-1,106(1) (Reissue 2008) states that
“[c]redit against the maximum term and any minimum term
shall be given to an offender for the time spent in custody . . .
as a result of the conduct on which such a charge is based.”
We have previously defined “in custody” to mean judicially
imposed confinement in a governmental facility authorized for
detention, control, or supervision of a defendant before, dur-
ing, or after trial on a criminal charge.6 Under this definition,
2 See State v. Mena-Rivera, 280 Neb. 948, 791 N.W.2d 613 (2010).
3 State v. Alford, 278 Neb. 818, 774 N.W.2d 394 (2009).
4 See Mena-Rivera, supra note 2.
5 See id.
6 State v. Jordan, 240 Neb. 919, 485 N.W.2d 198 (1992).
STATe v. BeCKeR 	451
Cite as 282 Neb. 449

Becker was “in custody”; as part of his sentence, the court had
ordered him to a facility run by the Department of Correctional
Services for detention and supervision.7
[6] Moreover, the Legislature has explicitly stated that
inmates are to get credit for time they spend in work camps.
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 83-4,145 (Reissue 1999), which authorizes a
court to sentence one who has failed to complete a work camp
program to any sentence the court could have initially imposed,
states that “[c]redit shall be given for time actually served in
the incarceration work camp program.”
The court erred in not awarding Becker credit for the time
he spent at the work ethic camp. The court should have allowed
Becker credit for the 125 days he served at the camp.
credit for the driver’S liceNSe revocatioN
Becker next argues that the court erred in revoking his
license for an additional 15 years without granting him credit
for the 5 years that his license was revoked as part of his pro-
bation. Becker argues that if the court does not give him credit
for these 5 years, the total length of his revocation will be 20
years, which exceeds the statutory limit.8
[7] Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2268(1) (Reissue 2008) states that
if a court finds that a probationer violated a condition of his
probation, the court “may revoke the probation and impose on
the offender such new sentence as might have been imposed
originally for the crime of which he was convicted.”
[8,9] While § 28-306 requires a license revocation regard-
less of whether the defendant is sentenced to probation or
incarceration, the court may, in some cases, also do so as a
condition of probation for a period of 5 years.9 Under Neb.
Rev. Stat. § 29-2262(2)(r) (Cum. Supp. 2004), the court may
attach any condition “reasonably related to the rehabilitation of
the offender” to his or her probation. We have previously held
that revoking a driver’s license and ordering a defendant not
7 See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 83-4,142 (Reissue 1999).
8 See § 28-306.
9 See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2263 (Reissue 2008).
452 	282 NeBRASKA RePORTS

to drive were reasonably related to a defendant’s rehabilitation
after his conviction for driving under the influence.10 Similarly,
it could be viewed as reasonably related to the rehabilitation
of a defendant who killed his passenger while driving drunk.
The court’s order makes clear that it imposed the revocation
because it thought that the revocation was related to Becker’s
rehabilitation. Because the court’s order of revocation was a
condition of Becker’s probation, the court could revoke his
probation and impose a new sentence under § 29-2268. And
at the time that the court initially sentenced Becker, § 28-306
provided that a convicted defendant’s license could be revoked
for anywhere from 60 days to 15 years. Applying the plain lan-
guage of § 29-2268, the court had authority to revoke Becker’s
license for 15 years.
[10] Becker argues that the court should have given him
credit for his previous license revocation. But we note that
the statute allowing a court to revoke probation and impose
a new sentence, § 29-2268, makes no provision for awarding
credit. Further, Becker has not directed us to any other statute
that would award credit and we have not found one either.
Apparently, unlike for time served in custody,11 the Legislature
has not given credit for prior license revocations. As we
pointed out in State v. Nelson,12 “[t]he Legislature has demon-
strated that it can and will specify when credit should be given
for similarly imposed restrictions.” It has not done so here.
Summing up, the court imposed Becker’s license revocation
as a condition of his probation. When Becker violated his pro-
bation, the court was free to revoke that probation and impose
any sentence it could have initially imposed. This includes the
15-year license revocation under § 28-306.
CONCLUSION
The court should have given Becker credit for the time he
spent at the work ethic camp. But he is not entitled to credit for
10 See State v. Seaman, 237 Neb. 916, 468 N.W.2d 121 (1991).
11 See § 83-1,106(1).
12 State v. Nelson, 276 Neb. 997, 1003, 759 N.W.2d 260, 266 (2009). See,
also, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 60-6,197.05 (Reissue 2010).
STATe v. BeCKeR 	453
Cite as 282 Neb. 449

his license revocation. We vacate the sentence and remand the
cause for resentencing.
SeNteNce vacated, aNd cauSe
remaNded for reSeNteNciNg.
State of NebraSka , appellee , v.
Jerad N. parkS, appellaNt.
803 N.W.2d 761
Filed September 30, 2011. 	No. S-11-092.
1. Criminal Law: Courts: Juvenile Courts: Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error. A
trial court’s denial of a motion to transfer a pending criminal proceeding to the
juvenile court is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.
2. Statutes: Appeal and Error. Statutory interpretation presents a question of law,
for which an appellate court has an obligation to reach an independent conclusion
irrespective of the determination made by the court below.
3. Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error. Jurisdictional questions can be raised by the
Nebraska Supreme Court sua sponte.
4. ____: ____. A jurisdictional question which does not involve a factual dispute is
determined by an appellate court as a matter of law.
5. Criminal Law: Courts: Juvenile Courts: Jurisdiction. Under Neb. Rev. Stat.
§ 43-247 (Reissue 2008), when a juvenile has been charged with a felony, the
district court and the juvenile court have concurrent jurisdiction.
6. Juvenile Courts: Jurisdiction. The juvenile court’s jurisdiction over any indi-
vidual adjudged to be within the provisions of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-247 (Reissue
2008) shall continue until the individual reaches the age of majority or the court
otherwise discharges the individual from its jurisdiction.
7. Juvenile Courts: Words and Phrases. For purposes of the Nebraska Juvenile
Code, “age of majority” means 19 years of age and “juvenile” means any person
under the age of 18.
8. Statutes. Absent a statutory indication to the contrary, words in a statute will be
given their ordinary meaning.
9. Statutes: Appeal and Error. An appellate court will not read anything plain,
direct, or unambiguous out of a statute.
10. Statutes. A court must attempt to give effect to all parts of a statute, and if it
can be avoided, no word, clause, or sentence will be rejected as superfluous
or meaningless.
11. ____. A court must place on a statute a reasonable construction which best
achieves the statute’s purpose, rather than a construction which would defeat
that purpose.
12. Statutes: Intent: Appeal and Error. In construing a statute, an appellate court
looks to the statutory objective to be accomplished, the evils and mischiefs sought
to be remedied, and the purpose to be served.
454 	282 NeBRASKA RePORTS