State ex rel. Counsel for Dis. v. Shirk

CONCLUSION
The district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied
Parks’ motion to transfer, because the juvenile court does not
have jurisdiction over a person who has reached the age of
majority. The mere fact that Parks was a juvenile at the time
of the offenses does not automatically give him the right to be
tried as a juvenile. Furthermore, because Parks pled no contest
to a registrable offense under SORA, the plain language of the
statute requires Parks to register as a sex offender.
A ffirmed.
StAte of NebrASkA ex rel . C ouNSel for diSCipliNe of
the NebrASkA Supreme C ourt, relAtor , v.
Jeremy r. Shirk , AlSo kNowN AS Jeremy
muCkey-Shirk , reSpoNdeNt.
803 N.W.2d 518
Filed September 30, 2011. 	No. S-11-319.
Original action. Judgment of public reprimand.
heAviCAN, 	C.J., 	wright, 	C oNNolly, 	gerrArd, 	StephAN,
mCC ormACk , and miller-lermAN, JJ.
per C uriAm.
INTRODUCTION
Respondent, 	Jeremy 	R. 	Shirk, 	also 	known 	as 	Jeremy
Muckey-Shirk, was admitted to the practice of law in the State
of Nebraska on June 16, 2010, and in the State of Iowa on
September 25, 2009. At all times relevant hereto, respondent
was engaged in the private practice of law in Douglas County
in Omaha, Nebraska. On April 19, 2011, formal charges were
filed against respondent. The formal charges set forth one
count and included the charge that respondent violated Neb.
Ct. R. of Prof. Cond. § 3-508.4(a) through (d) (misconduct).
The formal charges also allege respondent violated his oath
of office as an attorney licensed to practice law in the State
of Nebraska, as provided by Neb. Rev. Stat. § 7-104 (Reissue
460 	282 NebRASkA RePORTS
Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
11/01/2026 04:43 AM CST

2007), by violating Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 28-915.01 (Reissue
2008) and 64-105 (Reissue 2009).
Respondent filed an answer to the formal charges on May 19,
2011. A referee was appointed on June 9, and on June 17, the
referee filed a notice of scheduled hearing, set for July 20.
On July 18, 2011, respondent filed a conditional admis-
sion under Neb. Ct. R. § 3-313, in which he knowingly did
not challenge or contest the truth of the allegations that he
violated § 3-508.4(a) through (d) and waived all proceedings
against him in connection therewith in exchange for a public
reprimand. Upon due consideration, the court approves the
conditional admission and orders that respondent be publicly
reprimanded.
FACTS
In summary, the formal charges alleged as follows: In April
2008, respondent was hired by then-attorney kim erwin-Loncke
during respondent’s second year of law school to work as a law
clerk in her firm. Respondent continued to work in that posi-
tion through graduation, after which he became an associate
in the firm. Respondent continued to work as an attorney for
erwin-Loncke through September 2010.
beginning in January 2010, erwin-Loncke began to work
fewer hours in the office, apparently due to a severe disrup-
tion in her nonwork life. According to the allegations, erwin-
Loncke began to miss hearings and appointments. In May,
erwin-Loncke was hospitalized for a period of time as a result
of stress.
Upon erwin-Loncke’s return to the office, the operations
of the firm improved for approximately a week. Then, how-
ever, erwin-Loncke again began to spend less time at work
and less time supervising the office and employees, includ-
ing respondent.
As the only other attorney in the office, respondent became
responsible for more of the workload of the firm. erwin-
Loncke began directing respondent to sign pleadings in her
name in her absence. She also authorized respondent to sign
her name on checks. On at least two occasions, respondent
not only signed erwin-Loncke’s name to a pleading, but then
STATe ex ReL. COUNSeL FOR DIS. v. ShIRk 	461
Cite as 282 Neb. 460

also notarized that signature using his notary stamp. These
documents were filed with the courts of Douglas County.
Additionally, on July 23, 2010, allegedly with the permission
of erwin-Loncke, respondent wrote a check on the “Loncke
Law Office IOLTA account,” signing erwin-Loncke’s name
and paying himself $500.
ANALYSIS
Section 3-313 of the disciplinary rules provides in perti-
nent part:
(b) At any time after the Clerk has entered a Formal
Charge against a Respondent on the docket of the Court,
the Respondent may file with the Clerk a conditional
admission of the Formal Charge in exchange for a stated
form of consent judgment of discipline as to all or part of
the Formal Charge pending against him or her as deter-
mined to be appropriate by the Counsel for Discipline
or any member appointed to prosecute on behalf of the
Counsel for Discipline; such conditional admission is
subject to approval by the Court. The conditional admis-
sion shall include a written statement that the Respondent
knowingly admits or knowingly does not challenge or
contest the truth of the matter or matters conditionally
admitted and waives all proceedings against him or her in
connection therewith. If a tendered conditional admission
is not finally approved as above provided, it may not be
used as evidence against the Respondent in any way.
Pursuant to § 3-313, we find that respondent knowingly
did not challenge or contest the truth of the essential relevant
facts outlined in the formal charges and knowingly admits
that he violated § 3-508.4(a) through (d). We further find that
respondent waives all proceedings against him in connection
herewith. Upon due consideration, and in view of respondent’s
relative inexperience at the time of his misconduct, the court
approves the conditional admission and enters the orders as
indicated below.
CONCLUSION
based on the conditional admission of respondent, the recom-
mendation of the Counsel for Discipline, and our independent
462 	282 NebRASkA RePORTS

review of the record, we find by clear and convincing evidence
that respondent has violated § 3-508.4(a) through (d) and his
oath as an attorney, § 7-104, and that respondent should be and
hereby is publicly reprimanded. Respondent is directed to pay
costs and expenses in accordance with Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 7-114
and 7-115 (Reissue 2007) and Neb. Ct. R. §§ 3-310(P) and
3-323(b) within 60 days after an order imposing costs and
expenses, if any, is entered by the court.
JudgmeNt of publiC reprimANd.
STATe ex ReL. COUNSeL FOR DIS. v. ShIRk 	463
Cite as 282 Neb. 460