Newman v. Liebig

M arietta NewMaN, P ersoNal rePreseNtative of the estate
of adolPh J. liebig , Jr .; P ersoNal rePreseNtative of the
estate of valeria K. liebig ; aNd iN her owN right,
aPPellaNt, v. Paul d. liebig aNd shirley s. liebig ,
husbaNd aNd wife , et al ., aPPellees.
810 N.W.2d 408
Filed October 21, 2011. 	No. S-10-946.
1. Equity: Quiet Title. A quiet title action sounds in equity.
2. Equity: Appeal and Error. On appeal from an equity action, an appellate court
decides factual questions de novo on the record and, as to questions of both
fact and law, is obligated to reach a conclusion independent of the trial court’s
determination.
3. Decedents’ Estates: Trusts: Property: Intent. Where the owner of property
gratuitously transfers it and properly maintains an intention that the transferee
should hold the property in trust but the trust fails, the transferee holds the trust
estate upon a resulting trust for the transferor or his or her estate.
4. Decedents’ Estates: Trusts: Time. Upon the failure of an express trust, the
trustee holds the trust estate upon a resulting trust for the heirs of the testator as
of the date of the failure of the trust.
5. Decedents’ Estates: Trusts. A resulting trust is a species of trust that attaches
to a legal estate acquired by the consent of the parties, not in violation of any
fiduciary duty or trust relation.
6. Limitations of Actions: Trusts. The statute of limitations does not begin to run
in favor of the trustee of a resulting trust until some act by the trustee that is
equivalent to a repudiation of the trust.
7. Limitations of Actions. The time when the statute of limitations commences to
run must be determined on the facts in each case.
8. Limitations of Actions: Trusts: Property. The statute of limitations on a result-
ing trust will begin to run when the trustee repudiates the trust by the assertion of
an adverse claim to or ownership of the trust property.
9. Trusts: Proof: Notice. Repudiation of a trust may be proved either by actual
knowledge or notice thereof, or by open, notorious, and unequivocal facts and
circumstances from which a beneficiary who is not under any recognized dis-
ability would be put on notice that the trust has been repudiated and require the
beneficiary to timely assert his or her equitable rights.
Appeal from the District Court for Platte County: alaN g.
gless, Judge. Affirmed.
George H. Moyer, of Moyer & Moyer, for appellant.
Jeffery T. Peetz and Sara L. Gude, of Woods & Aitken,
L.L.P., for appellees Paul D. Liebig and Shirley S. Liebig.
NeWMAN v. LiebiG 	609
Cite as 282 Neb. 609
Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
11/01/2026 04:44 AM CST

wright, C oNNolly, gerrard, stePhaN, MCC orMaCK, and
M iller-lerMaN, JJ.
gerrard, J.
This appeal involves an allegedly void trust that was exe-
cuted and recorded in 1979 and to which several parcels
of real property were purportedly deeded. The trust terms
provided that it would terminate in 2004, and in 2008, the
trustees of the questioned trust deeded the property to the
trust’s purported beneficiaries. One of the settlor’s children
sued to set aside the trust and both deeds, and to quiet title in
the property to the settlor’s heirs at law. but the district court
determined that her claims were barred by the statute of limi-
tations. The primary question presented in this appeal is when
the applicable statute of limitations began to run. Although
our reasoning differs somewhat from that of the district court,
we find, on our de novo review, that the statute of limitations
for these claims has expired. Therefore, we affirm the district
court’s judgment.
bACkGROUND
Adolph J. Liebig, Jr., and his wife, Valeria k. Liebig, owned
several parcels of real property in Platte County, Nebraska,
either individually or as joint tenants. in 1979, Valeria exe-
cuted a bill of sale purporting to convey her interests in the
property to Adolph, who in turn quitclaimed all of his inter-
est in the real estate to the trustees of the Adolph J. Liebig
Trust (the Liebig Trust). Adolph also recorded a “Declaration
of Trust” in Platte County, containing the terms of the Liebig
Trust. The Liebig Trust, generally described, purported to cre-
ate 100 “Certificates of beneficial interest” “as a convenience,
for distribution,” and the Liebig Trust provided that 25 years
from the date of its creation (which would be March 30, 2004),
it would terminate and the proceeds would be distributed pro
rata to the beneficiaries, i.e., the holders of the 100 certificates,
or units.
Adolph and Valeria also had several children: three sons
(Paul, Greg, and Robert Liebig), and three daughters (Madonna
Mohnsen, Marietta Newman, and Marlene Rickert). When the
610 	282 NebRASkA RePORTS

Liebig Trust was created in 1979, Valeria and Paul were the
trustees to whom the property was originally deeded. One
hundred “units of beneficial interest” were originally issued
to Adolph, but were immediately canceled and reissued to
Adolph and Valeria, 50 units each. Adolph then immediately
canceled his 50 units and reissued them to Paul, Greg, Robert,
and Valeria.
Adolph died in 1980. Marietta and at least one of her sis-
ters each received $7,000 from Valeria that they were told was
their inheritance. They received no real property and were
told that the land would go to Paul, Greg, and Robert under
the Liebig Trust. Over the years, Valeria canceled and reis-
sued her units of beneficial interest to Paul, Greg, and Robert
in equal amounts until, by 1985, Paul, Greg, and Robert each
purported to hold one-third of the units. Valeria died in 2006.
Paul and his wife, Shirley Liebig, became the trustees of the
Liebig Trust.
in the meantime, Paul had been farming the property under
a 50-50 crop share oral lease, at first leasing from Adolph, then
from Valeria, then from the trust. Paul’s son eventually moved
into the residence on the property, paying $100 per month in
rent in addition to making repairs and helping Paul. Although
the farm records were not complete, tax records and Farm
Service Agency records entered into evidence established that
Valeria and Paul, acting as trustees of the Liebig Trust, were
paying the taxes on the property and accepting government
payments for farm activities. Paul described, in some detail,
how he operated the property as cropland and pastureland: for
instance, how he planted and rotated crops and grasses, how
his son was repairing and planning to reshingle the house, and
how he and his son maintained the fences and power company
rights-of-way.
in February 2008, Paul and Shirley, purporting to act as
the trustees of the Liebig Trust, deeded the real estate to Paul,
Greg, and Robert as tenants in common. in June, Paul and
Shirley filed for and later obtained an order from the county
court approving their administration of the Liebig Trust and a
final accounting, finding that the Liebig Trust had terminated
NeWMAN v. LiebiG 	611
Cite as 282 Neb. 609

and been wound up, and terminating their administration of the
Liebig Trust.
Marietta, in her individual capacity and as personal rep-
resentative of Adolph’s and Valeria’s estates, sued all of her
other siblings and their spouses in district court, seeking a
decree that would, among other things, set aside Adolph’s
1979 “Declaration of Trust” and quitclaim deed to the trust-
ees and Paul and Shirley’s 2008 trustees’ deed to Paul, Greg,
and Robert, and would quiet title in the property to all six
of Adolph’s children. Marietta alleged that the Liebig Trust
was defective and void; so, because the Liebig Trust failed,
the property purportedly deeded to the Liebig Trust actually
remained Adolph’s property and passed to his heirs at law
when he died. Marietta also alleged that a particular parcel of
the property had been Valeria’s homestead and that her interest
in that particular parcel had not been properly conveyed to the
Liebig Trust.
Paul and Shirley answered Marietta’s complaint, denying
her claim that the Liebig Trust was void. As relevant, they
also alleged as an affirmative defense that Marietta’s com-
plaint was barred by the applicable statutes of limitations.
The matter proceeded to a bench trial, after which the district
court determined that Marietta’s complaint was barred by the
statute of limitations. The court reasoned that the statute of
limitations began to run on April 18, 1979, when Adolph’s
“Declaration of Trust” and quitclaim deed had been recorded
in Platte County, or, at the latest, the date of Adolph’s
death in 1980. So, the court found, whether a 4-year or 10-
year statute of limitations was applied, Marietta’s complaint
was untimely filed. The court dismissed the complaint, and
Marietta appeals.
ASSiGNMeNTS OF eRROR
Marietta assigns, as consolidated and restated, that the dis-
trict court erred in (1) concluding that the statute of limitations
had run on her claim for relief, (2) concluding that her suit was
one to declare the Liebig Trust void, (3) failing to set aside the
2008 trustees’ deed of distribution, and (4) failing to quiet title
in the property.
612 	282 NebRASkA RePORTS

STANDARD OF ReVieW
[1,2] A quiet title action sounds in equity.1 On appeal from
an equity action, an appellate court decides factual questions
de novo on the record and, as to questions of both fact and
law, is obligated to reach a conclusion independent of the trial
court’s determination.2
ANALySiS
validity of trust
The basis of Marietta’s argument on appeal is that the Liebig
Trust was invalid. With that much, we agree. The Liebig Trust
in this case is substantially indistinguishable from a “family
trust” that we have declared, on several occasions, to be void
because the trust instrument does not adequately identify the
beneficiaries.3 We are not persuaded by the appellees’ argu-
ment that Nebraska’s 2003 adoption of the Nebraska Uniform
Trust Code4 affects that conclusion. The appellees argue that
under § 30-3828(a)(3), creation of a trust requires a “definite
beneficiary,” but that pursuant to § 30-3828(b), “[a] beneficiary
is definite if the beneficiary can be ascertained now or in the
future, subject to any applicable rule against perpetuities.” The
appellees assert that the beneficiaries of the Liebig Trust are
ascertainable by reference to the “beneficial interests” and
trustees’ records.
but § 30-3828(a)(3) did not change the law upon which our
conclusions in First Nat. Bank v. Schroeder,5 First Nat. Bank v.
Daggett,6 and Schlatz v. Bahensky7 were based. in fact, Schlatz
was decided several years after § 30-3828 was adopted. And
1 Ottaco Acceptance, Inc. v. Larkin, 273 Neb. 765, 733 N.W.2d 539 (2007).
2 County of Sarpy v. City of Papillion, 277 Neb. 829, 765 N.W.2d 456
(2009).
3 See, Schlatz v. Bahensky, 280 Neb. 180, 785 N.W.2d 825 (2010); First Nat.
Bank v. Daggett, 242 Neb. 734, 497 N.W.2d 358 (1993); First Nat. Bank v.
Schroeder, 222 Neb. 330, 383 N.W.2d 755 (1986).
4 Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 30-3801 to 30-38,110 (Reissue 2008).
5 Schroeder, supra note 3.
6 Daggett, supra note 3.
7 Schlatz, supra note 3.
NeWMAN v. LiebiG 	613
Cite as 282 Neb. 609

§ 30-3828(a)(3) is simply a codification of the common-law
rule of the Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 112,8 which states
that a trust is not created unless there is a beneficiary “who is
definitely ascertained at the time of the creation of the trust or
definitely ascertainable within the period of the rule against
perpetuities.” in Schroeder, we relied upon § 112, and the com-
ment to the relevant section of the Uniform Trust Code makes
clear that the language of § 30-3828 was intended to adopt the
Restatement’s definite beneficiary requirement.9
And that requirement is not met here, because no benefi-
ciary is designated by the trust instrument. The Restatement
explains, for example, that a disposition fails if it identifies
its beneficiaries as “the persons named in a memorandum to
be found on his death in his safe-deposit box.”10 Similarly, in
Daggett, we explained that a trust identical to the Liebig Trust
failed because it
fails, on its face, to adequately designate its beneficiaries.
The trust, like the trust in Schroeder,[11] merely provides a
method of ascertaining who owns the certificates of bene-
ficial interest. However, nothing in the trust instrument
itself indicates how possession and ownership shall occur.
The trust provisions do not indicate who is to receive the
certificates, nor do they give the trustees the power to
make that determination. As was the case in Schroeder,
the trust must fail.12
The same is true here, and § 30-3828(b)’s provision that a
“beneficiary is definite if the beneficiary can be ascertained
now or in the future” did not change the common-law rule that
the beneficiary must be ascertainable from the trust instrument.
Contrary to the appellees’ suggestion, the trustees’ records
of who held “Certificates of beneficial interest” are not trust
8 Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 112 at 243 (1959).
9 See Unif. Trust Code § 402, comment, 7C U.L.A. 481 (2006).
10 Restatement, supra note 8, § 122, comment e. at 259.
11 Schroeder, supra note 3.
12 Daggett, supra note 3, 242 Neb. at 740, 497 N.W.2d at 363 (emphasis in
original).
614 	282 NebRASkA RePORTS

instruments.13 in short, the law has not changed since our deci-
sions in Schroeder, Daggett, and Schlatz.14 So, our conclusion
is also the same: the Liebig Trust is void.
trigger for statute of liMitatioNs
Next, Marietta contends that the statute of limitations that
applies here is the 10-year statute of limitations applicable to
quiet title actions, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-202 (Reissue 2008).15
With that much, we also agree: As will be explained below,
although the validity of the Liebig Trust underlies Marietta’s
arguments, the present controversy concerns title to the prop-
erty that Adolph failed to effectively transfer to the failed
Liebig Trust.16
Marietta also argues that the district court erred in finding
that the statute of limitations began to run in 1979 or 1980.
She contends that the Liebig Trust’s failure produced a result-
ing trust and that the statute of limitations did not begin to run
against the trustees until they repudiated the resulting trust.
And again, we agree, as will be explained in more detail below.
but where we part ways with Marietta is when she concludes
that the resulting trust was not repudiated until the 2008 trust-
ees’ deed to Paul, Greg, and Robert. We find, on our de novo
review of the record, that the resulting trust was effectively
repudiated well before then, by the actions of the trustees. but
explaining that conclusion will require a more comprehensive
examination of the underlying legal principles.
[3,4] To begin with, Marietta is correct in suggesting that the
property at issue here was held by the trustees of the Liebig
Trust—Paul and Valeria, and Shirley after Valeria’s death—in
a resulting trust for Adolph and, after his death, his heirs.
We have explained that where the owner of property gratu-
itously transfers it and properly maintains an intention that
13 See cases cited supra note 3.
14 See id.
15 See, Olsen v. Olsen, 265 Neb. 299, 657 N.W.2d 1 (2003); Wait v. Cornette,
259 Neb. 850, 612 N.W.2d 905 (2000); Nemaha Nat. Resources Dist. v.
Neeman, 210 Neb. 442, 315 N.W.2d 619 (1982).
16 See, Wait, supra note 15; Neeman, supra note 15; Fleury v. Chrisman, 200
Neb. 584, 264 N.W.2d 839 (1978).
NeWMAN v. LiebiG 	615
Cite as 282 Neb. 609

the transferee should hold the property in trust but the trust
fails, the transferee holds the trust estate upon a resulting trust
for the transferor or his or her estate.17 “‘The great weight of
authority supports the view that upon the failure of an express
trust as in this case, the trustee holds the trust estate upon a
resulting trust for the heirs of the testator as of the date of the
failure of the trust.’”18
This was why, in our recent decision in Schlatz, we explained
that the failure of a trust effectively identical to the Liebig
Trust produced a resulting trust in favor of the settlor.19 in this
case, the resulting trust arose in favor of Adolph, as the settlor,
then his heirs at law after his death. (The record establishes
some dispute over whether Adolph’s estate would have passed
by intestacy or a 1975 will, the validity of which is disputed
in a separate proceeding. For purposes of this opinion, we
assume that the estate would have passed to Marietta, at least
in part, by the rules of intestacy, and we do not comment on the
enforceability of the will.)
[5-7] A resulting trust is a species of trust that attaches to a
legal estate acquired by the consent of the parties, not in vio-
lation of any fiduciary duty or trust relation.20 And the statute
of limitations does not begin to run in favor of the trustee of
a resulting trust until some act by the trustee that is equivalent
to a repudiation of the trust.21 We have repeatedly held that
“[t]he statute of limitations does not begin to run in the case of
a resulting trust until the trustee clearly repudiates his trust”22
and that the time when the statute of limitations commences to
run must be determined on the facts in each case.23
17 Applegate v. Brown, 168 Neb. 190, 95 N.W.2d 341 (1959). See, also,
Schlatz, supra note 3.
18 Applegate, supra note 17, 168 Neb. at 203, 95 N.W.2d at 349.
19 See Schlatz, supra note 3.
20 Hanson v. Hanson, 78 Neb. 584, 111 N.W. 368 (1907).
21 See id.
22 Jirka v. Prior, 196 Neb. 416, 422, 243 N.W.2d 754, 759 (1976). Accord,
Wait, supra note 15; Fleury, supra note 16.
23 See, Fleury, supra note 16; Jirka, supra note 22.
616 	282 NebRASkA RePORTS

So, for instance, the statute of limitations has been held not
to run in cases where the resulting trustee did not expressly
repudiate the resulting trust and the resulting trustee’s use of
the property was concurrent with that of the resulting trust
beneficiaries.24 For example, in Hanson v. Hanson,25 we held
that the trustee of a resulting trust had not repudiated the trust
while his occupancy of the land was consistent with his obliga-
tion to the partnership for whom he held the land in trust. it
was only when the trustee sued his partner in ejectment that his
repudiation of the resulting trust was clear.26 in Jirka v. Prior,27
the trustees held and operated agricultural land in a resulting
trust for a partnership, and their operation of the farming busi-
ness was consistent with the resulting trust; the repudiation
did not occur until the trustees sold the property without the
consent of their partners. And, in Wait v. Cornette,28 the holder
of a life estate in a sum of trust money became the trustee of
a resulting trust, in favor of the remainder beneficiaries, when
she purchased real property with the money. but her possession
of the land was consistent with her duties as resulting trustee
until she repudiated the resulting trust by transferring the prop-
erty, instead of holding it with the intention of transferring it to
the beneficiaries upon her death.29
faCts establishiNg rePudiatioN
of resultiNg trust
it is upon authority such as Jirka and Wait that Marietta
relies in contending that the resulting trust in this case was
not repudiated until the 2008 trustees’ deed to Paul, Greg,
and Robert. but a transfer of property is not the only way in
24 See, Wait, supra note 15; Jirka, supra note 22; Windle v. Kelly, 135 Neb.
143, 280 N.W. 445 (1938); Hanson, supra note 20. See, also, Wiseman v.
Guernsey, 107 Neb. 647, 187 N.W. 55 (1922).
25 See Hanson, supra note 20.
26 See id.
27 See Jirka, supra note 22.
28 Wait, supra note 15.
29 See id.
NeWMAN v. LiebiG 	617
Cite as 282 Neb. 609

which a trust can be repudiated. in Dewey v. Dewey,30 a result-
ing trust was created when several owners of a parcel of real
property agreed to convey their interests to one of the owners
for the purpose of obtaining a loan to disencumber the property
of mortgages and tax liens. After that, the property was to be
returned back to the original owners. The person to whom the
property was conveyed was then the trustee of a resulting trust
in favor of the other owners.31
but the resulting trustee never returned the property. instead,
he and his wife began improving it. They spent money build-
ing a new home and installing farm equipment and fixtures.
They farmed the land under the government soil conservation
program in their own names and kept the proceeds. They con-
toured and improved the land for crops, paid the mortgage,
and paid all the taxes. They leased the land for oil and gas,
recorded the leases, and kept the rentals they received.32
[8,9] On appeal from a judgment quieting title in the trustee,
we considered whether the trustee’s actions operated to repudi-
ate the resulting trust. We said:
Concededly, defendants never did give the interested
plaintiffs and codefendants actual formal notice that they
claimed title to the land or had repudiated the trust, but
defendants were not required to do so because, contrary
to plaintiffs’ and codefendants’ contention, they and their
predecessors at all times had notice and knowledge of
defendant’s repudiation from all the attending open, noto-
rious, and unequivocal facts and circumstances heretofore
recited. Concededly, they had severally visited defendants
on the land upon numerous occasions . . . . They then
and there saw the improvements and knew that defend-
ants were paying no rentals and were taking the income
and profits, but they made no demand for an accounting
thereof. They knew that defendants were contracting with
regard to the land as owners and were making the great
expenditures for improvements and otherwise aforesaid
30 Dewey v. Dewey, 163 Neb. 296, 79 N.W.2d 578 (1956).
31 See id.
32 See id.
618 	282 NebRASkA RePORTS

. . . . However, they never reimbursed or offered to reim-
burse defendants for any of them, and none of plaintiffs
or codefendants or their predecessors ever claimed any
interest whatever in the land or made any demand what-
ever for any accounting or reconveyance until . . . some
19 years after [the transfer of the property].33
We noted the rule, explained above, that the statute of limita-
tions on a resulting trust will begin to run when the trustee
repudiates the trust by the assertion of an adverse claim to or
ownership of the trust property. And, we explained, repudia-
tion of a trust “may be proved either by actual knowledge or
notice thereof, or by open, notorious, and unequivocal facts
and circumstances from which a beneficiary who is not under
any recognized disability would be put on notice that the trust
has been repudiated and require him to timely assert his equi-
table rights.”34 Nor was it pertinent that the trustees were also
entitled to a share of the property, because, we said:
“Where one tenant in common enters upon the whole
estate, substantially improves it beyond that ordinarily
proper for the full enjoyment or use of the estate as a
tenant in common, takes all the rents and profits, pays all
the taxes, makes it his home and openly claims the whole
for more than the period of the statute of limitations, an
ouster of his cotenants will be presumed although not
otherwise proved.”35
in sum, based on those facts, we affirmed the trial court’s con-
clusion that the quiet title action was time barred.36
Comparable facts are found in this case. The record estab-
lishes beyond dispute that Paul and Valeria, and later Paul and
Shirley, had been using the property as cropland and pasture-
land for cattle, paying the expenses for the property, improving
the property, accepting rent and other income for the property,
and generally operating it in a manner that was irreconcilably
33 Id. at 303-04, 79 N.W.2d at 583.
34 Id. at 305, 79 N.W.2d at 583.
35 Id. at 307-08, 79 N.W.2d at 585. Cf. Maxwell v. Hamel, 138 Neb. 49, 292
N.W. 38 (1940).
36 See Dewey, supra note 30.
NeWMAN v. LiebiG 	619
Cite as 282 Neb. 609

inconsistent with a resulting trust in favor of Adolph’s heirs.
For nearly 30 years after Adolph’s death, the resulting trustees
made no attempt to convey the property to the beneficiaries
of the resulting trust, pay them any of the property’s income,
or require them to share in the expenses. in short, their pos-
session and operation of the property was openly, notoriously,
and unequivocally hostile to the implicit terms of the result-
ing trust.
it is important to distinguish between the purported benefi-
ciaries of the Liebig Trust and the alleged beneficiaries of the
resulting trust. Marietta asserts (correctly) that the benefici-
aries of the resulting trust are Adolph’s heirs at law, whom she
alleges are Adolph’s intestate beneficiaries. but at that point,
the express terms of the Liebig Trust and the implicit terms
of the resulting trust were contradictory. And in managing the
property according to what they believed to be the terms of
the Liebig Trust, the trustees were clearly acting contrary to
the resulting trust. No reasonable person aware of the manner
in which the property was being managed would believe that
it was being managed with the interests of all six of Adolph’s
children in mind, but that is precisely what the resulting trust
alleged by Marietta would have required.
Marietta does not dispute these facts. in fact, she contends
that Paul and Valeria did not administer the Liebig Trust prop-
erty pursuant to its terms or “as true fiduciaries.”37 Marietta
asserts, and the record supports, that cattle supposedly belong-
ing to the Liebig Trust were sold to pay for Valeria’s funeral,
that supposed Liebig Trust assets were used to pay Valeria’s
personal expenses, and that Valeria was treated as the “real
beneficiary” of the Liebig Trust.38 Marietta’s purpose in recit-
ing these facts seems to be to impugn Paul and Valeria’s
administration of the Liebig Trust, but this evidence is not
particularly helpful to her cause. Paul and Valeria’s supposed
mismanagement of the Liebig Trust assets is also inconsistent
with the resulting trust created by the failure of the Liebig
Trust, and helps establish that the resulting trust was repudiated
37 brief for appellant at 12.
38 Id. at 13.
620 	282 NebRASkA RePORTS

by the conduct of its trustees no later than (and probably well
before) 1997, making Marietta’s 2008 complaint untimely pur-
suant to § 25-202.
Marietta suggested at oral argument that the trustees’ man-
agement of the property was permissive—in essence, she con-
tended that all of the siblings were comfortable with the prop-
erty’s being managed essentially for Valeria’s benefit, so long
as Valeria was alive. Marietta seems to be suggesting that her
failure to assert any rights under the resulting trust was know-
ing and deliberate, because neither she nor her siblings wanted
to interfere with Valeria’s support. Of course, a knowing failure
to assert a legal right does not toll a statute of limitations—to
the contrary, it is exactly the circumstance against which a stat-
ute of limitations is intended to provide a defense. but more
significantly, the record in this case affirmatively contradicts
Marietta’s argument.
While Marietta may have believed that the property was
being managed consistent with the terms of the Liebig Trust,
it was repudiation of the resulting trust, not the Liebig Trust,
that started the statute of limitations running on her claims.
And as noted above, the requirements of the Liebig Trust and
the resulting trust were quite different. Whether or not Valeria
was treated as the “real beneficiary” of the Liebig Trust,39 it is
apparent that Marietta was not treated as a beneficiary of any
trust—either the Liebig Trust or, more importantly, a resulting
trust. The record is clear that Marietta did not investigate the
validity of the Liebig Trust or her right to any of the property
under a resulting trust until the fall of 2007. The conduct of
the trustees gave Marietta clear notice that the property was
not being managed for her benefit pursuant to any resulting
trust—but she did not pursue any claim based on the resulting
trust until at least 10 years later. Therefore, her claims are time
barred by the statute of limitations.
M arietta’s reMaiNiNg arguMeNts
For that reason, we find Marietta’s assignments of error
to be either without merit or mooted by our conclusion with
39 Id.
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Cite as 282 Neb. 609

respect to the statute of limitations. Marietta argues, in addi-
tion, that one particular deed to the Liebig Trust was defective,
even if the Liebig Trust itself was effective, because it con-
veyed the homestead of a married person and was not properly
signed by both Adolph and Valeria.40 This fact does not change
our conclusion; if true, it would simply be another reason that
its conveyance to the Liebig Trust was void and does not affect
our statute of limitations analysis.
And finally, Marietta argues that the trial court’s judgment
was “odd,” because it did not quiet title in anyone, nor did it
dispose of certain state and federal tax liens which were not
discussed above because they were not pertinent to our analy-
sis.41 “An action to quiet title,” she argues, “should end with a
decree quieting title in somebody.”42 but Marietta filed a com-
plaint seeking to quiet title, and her complaint was time barred.
The defendants to her complaint did not expressly ask for title
to be quieted in any of them, nor have they appealed from the
court’s failure to do so. Contrary to Marietta’s suggestion, we
do not find it odd that the trial court did not grant relief that
was not requested, nor is there any basis to reverse a court’s
failure to grant particular relief when the only parties poten-
tially aggrieved by it have asked that the judgment be affirmed.
We find no merit to Marietta’s final argument.
CONCLUSiON
Our de novo review of the record establishes that the 10-year
statute of limitations began to run on Marietta’s claim no later
than 1997, by which time the resulting trustees’ repudiation
of the resulting trust was clearly established. Marietta’s 2008
complaint was time barred. We affirm the judgment of the dis-
trict court.
affirMed.
heaviCaN, C.J., participating on briefs.
40 See Christensen v. Arant, 218 Neb. 625, 358 N.W.2d 200 (1984).
41 brief for appellant at 27.
42 Id.
622 	282 NebRASkA RePORTS