State v. Jimenez

factors in its award of attorney fees, and its finding is not
clearly untenable. We therefore find that the district court
did not abuse its discretion in the amount of attorney fees it
awarded. This assignment of error is without merit.
(c) Expert Witness Testimony
Finally, Prime Home Care argues that the trial court erred in
admitting the expert testimony of a lexicographer. Prime Home
Care alleges that this testimony was not helpful to the fact finder
and did not have sufficient foundation. The expert witness testi-
fied as to the descriptiveness of the name “Compassionate Care
Hospice.” Because we did not decide whether “Compassionate
Care Hospice” was merely descriptive, but concentrated our
analysis on whether it had acquired secondary meaning, we
need not address this assignment of error.
VI. CONCLUSION
We find that the name “Compassionate Care Hospice”
acquired secondary meaning as related to Prime Home Care’s
hospice services. We further find that the district court did
not err in granting an injunction and attorney fees to Prime
Home Care. Finally, we find that Prime Home Care’s assign-
ment of error on cross-appeal regarding attorney fees is with-
out merit.
A ffirmed.
Wright, J., not participating in the decision.
STaTE v. JImENEz 	95
Cite as 283 Neb. 95
StAte of NebrASkA, Appellee , v.
timothy d. JimeNez , AppellANt.
808 N.W.2d 352
Filed January 20, 2012. 	No. S-11-303.
1. Statutes: Appeal and Error. Statutory interpretation presents a question of law,
for which an appellate court has an obligation to reach an independent conclusion
irrespective of the determination made by the court below.
2. Extradition and Detainer: Words and Phrases. a detainer is a notification
filed with the institution in which an individual is serving a sentence, advising
the prisoner that he or she is wanted to face criminal charges pending in another
jurisdiction.
Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
11/01/2026 04:43 AM CST

3. Extradition and Detainer. a detainer for a prisoner who has been convicted but
not sentenced does not relate to an untried indictment, information, or complaint
and thus does not trigger the procedural requirements of article III of the inter-
state agreement on Detainers.
4. Appeal and Error. an appellate court is not obligated to engage in an analysis
that is not necessary to adjudicate the case and controversy before it.
appeal from the District Court for Cheyenne County: derek
C. Weimer, Judge. affirmed.
Donald J.B. miller, of matzke, mattoon & miller, L.L.C.,
L.L.O., for appellant.
Jon Bruning, attorney General, George R. Love, and Jordan
m. Osborne, Senior Certified Law Student, for appellee.
heAviCAN, 	C.J., 	C oNNolly, 	StephAN, 	mCC ormACk , 	and
miller-lermAN, JJ.
StephAN, J.
article 	III 	of 	the 	interstate 	agreement 	on 	Detainers
(agreement)1 prescribes the procedure by which a prisoner
against whom a detainer has been lodged may demand a
speedy disposition of outstanding charges.2 This procedure may
be utilized where there is pending in a party state “any untried
indictment, information or complaint on the basis of which
a detainer has been lodged against [a] prisoner” incarcerated
in another party state.3 The issue presented in this appeal is
whether a detainer for a person who has been convicted of
a criminal offense but not sentenced falls within this provi-
sion. We conclude that the district court for Cheyenne County
did not err in determining that such a detainer does not fall
within this provision of the agreement, and we therefore affirm
its judgment.
1 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-759 (Reissue 2008). See 18 U.S.C. app. 2, § 2
(2006).
2 State v. Reed, 266 Neb. 641, 668 N.W.2d 245 (2003).
3 § 29-759.
96 	283 NEBRaSka REPORTS

BaCkGROUND
Timothy D. Jimenez was charged with possession of meth-
amphetamine, a Class IV felony, and was further alleged to
be a habitual criminal. On march 9, 2010, pursuant to a plea
agreement, he pled guilty to the possession charge and the
State dismissed the habitual criminal allegation. The matter
was set for sentencing on april 27.
Prior to the sentencing hearing, Jimenez was arrested in
Colorado. He failed to appear on april 27, 2010, and the
Cheyenne County attorney’s office obtained a bench war-
rant for his arrest. at some point thereafter, a detainer was
placed on Jimenez in Colorado by the Cheyenne County
sheriff’s office.
On February 22, 2011, Jimenez filed a request for final dis-
position in Cheyenne County. He alleged that he was serving
a term of imprisonment in Colorado and that as a result of the
detainer, he was unable to access all of the Colorado institu-
tion’s educational and treatment alternatives. He asked to be
brought before the Nebraska court for final disposition or for
an order directing the State of Nebraska to release the detainer.
The State filed an objection to the request.
On march 3, 2011, Jimenez filed a motion asking the court
to order the Cheyenne County attorney’s office to produce an
“Inmate Status Certificate” from the official who had custody
of Jimenez, in accordance with § 29-759. Jimenez alleged that
he had reason to believe that the certificate was in the custody
of the Cheyenne County attorney, the sheriff, or other law
enforcement agency.
In an order dated march 25, 2011, the Cheyenne County
District Court determined that the agreement did not apply,
because Jimenez had no untried matters pending in Nebraska.
The court found that Jimenez had been convicted of the
offense when his plea was accepted and that therefore, guilt
had been established beyond a reasonable doubt. The only
remaining matter was the imposition of the sentence. The
court denied Jimenez’ motion for a court order and request
for final disposition, and Jimenez appealed. We granted the
State’s petition to bypass pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. § 24-1106
(Reissue 2008).
STaTE v. JImENEz 	97
Cite as 283 Neb. 95

aSSIGNmENT OF ERROR
Jimenez asserts, summarized, that the district court erred in
determining he was not eligible to invoke the agreement to
obtain a final disposition of his Nebraska conviction.
STaNDaRD OF REVIEW
[1] Statutory interpretation presents a question of law, for
which an appellate court has an obligation to reach an indepen-
dent conclusion irrespective of the determination made by the
court below.4
aNaLYSIS
[2] The agreement is a congressionally sanctioned interstate
compact to which Nebraska is a contracting party.5 It is codi-
fied in § 29-759. The agreement does not define “detainer,”
but we have stated that a detainer is a notification filed with
the institution in which an individual is serving a sentence,
advising the prisoner that he or she is wanted to face criminal
charges pending in another jurisdiction.6
article I of the agreement provides in part:
[C]harges outstanding against a prisoner, detainers based
on untried indictments, informations or complaints, and
difficulties in securing speedy trial of persons already
incarcerated in other jurisdictions, produce uncertain-
ties which obstruct programs of prisoner treatment and
rehabilitation. accordingly, it is the policy of the party
states and the purpose of this agreement to encourage
the expeditious and orderly disposition of such charges
and determination of the proper status of any and all
detainers based on untried indictments, informations or
complaints.7
The agreement states throughout that it applies to detainers
filed in connection with “any untried indictment, information
or complaint.”8 article III(a) of the agreement states:
4 State v. Parks, 282 Neb. 454, 803 N.W.2d 761 (2011).
5 See State v. Rieger, 270 Neb. 904, 708 N.W.2d 630 (2006).
6 Reed, supra note 2.
7 § 29-759.
8 Id.
98 	283 NEBRaSka REPORTS

Whenever a person has entered upon a term of impris-
onment in a penal or correctional institution of a party
state, and whenever during the continuance of the term
of imprisonment there is pending in any other party state
any untried indictment, information or complaint on the
basis of which a detainer has been lodged against the
prisoner, he shall be brought to trial within one hundred
eighty days . . . .9
In article III(d), the agreement also provides:
any request for final disposition made by a prisoner pur-
suant to paragraph (a) hereof shall operate as a request for
final disposition of all untried indictments, informations
or complaints on the basis of which detainers have been
lodged against the prisoner from the state to whose pros-
ecuting official the request for final disposition is specifi-
cally directed. . . . If trial is not had on any indictment,
information or complaint contemplated hereby prior to the
return of the prisoner to the original place of imprison-
ment, such indictment, information or complaint shall not
be of any further force or effect, and the court shall enter
an order dismissing the same with prejudice.10
The issue in the case at bar is whether the phrase “untried
indictments, informations or complaints” applies to Jimenez’
Nebraska case, in which he has been convicted but not sen-
tenced. although we have not previously considered the mean-
ing of this phrase in this or similar contexts, other courts have
done so.
In Carchman v. Nash,11 the U.S. Supreme Court considered
whether a detainer based upon a probation violation fell within
the language of the agreement. In concluding that it did not,
the Court reasoned that “[t]he most natural interpretation of
the words ‘indictment,’ ‘information,’ and ‘complaint’ is that
they refer to documents charging an individual with having
9 Id.
10 Id.
11 Carchman v. Nash, 473 U.S. 716, 105 S. Ct. 3401, 87 L. Ed. 2d 516
(1985).
STaTE v. JImENEz 	99
Cite as 283 Neb. 95

committed a criminal offense.”12 The Court stated that its inter-
pretation is “reinforced by the adjective ‘untried,’ which would
seem to refer to matters that can be brought to full trial, and
by art. III’s requirement that a prisoner who requests final dis-
position of the indictment, information, or complaint ‘shall be
brought to trial within 180 days.’”13 The Court concluded that
this interpretation was consistent with the legislative history of
the agreement.
Other courts have interpreted the language of the agreement
in a similar manner. For example, in State v. Barefield,14
the Washington 	Supreme 	Court 	applied 	the 	reasoning 	of
Carchman and stated, “Neither the history nor the purposes
of the [agreement] indicate that it ought to be applied to sen-
tencing detainers.” a New mexico appellate court in State v.
Sparks15 also cited Carchman in support of its conclusion that
“a request for the disposition of an outstanding sentencing
is not cognizable under the [agreement].” The court deter-
mined that “sentencing, like probation revocation, does not fall
within the plain meaning of an ‘untried indictment, informa-
tion or complaint’” and that therefore, the provisions of the
agreement did not apply.16 The court reasoned that use of the
adjective “untried” supported a conclusion that the agreement
does not apply when a defendant has been convicted but not
sentenced.17
In Moody v. Corsentino,18 the Colorado Supreme Court
held that the agreement did not apply to a prisoner’s request
to be sentenced in an action in which he had been convicted.
The court reasoned that while indictments, informations, and
complaints are all documents that institute charges against a
12 Id. at 724.
13 Id. (emphasis in original).
14 State v. Barefield, 110 Wash. 2d 728, 733, 756 P.2d 731, 734 (1988) (en
banc).
15 State v. Sparks, 104 N.m. 62, 64, 716 P.2d 253, 255 (N.m. app. 1986).
16 Id. at 65, 716 P.2d at 256.
17 Id.
18 Moody v. Corsentino, 843 P.2d 1355 (Colo. 1993).
100 	283 NEBRaSka REPORTS

person, “the sentencing process merely finalizes the disposition
of charges that have already been tried,” and that therefore,
the language of the agreement suggests that it does not extend
to sentencing detainers.19 The court concluded, “[a] detainer
placing a hold on a prisoner based on an unresolved sentencing
determination in another jurisdiction arising from charges for
which the prisoner has already been convicted does not trigger
the procedural requirements” of the agreement.20 Other courts
are in accord.21
Jimenez urges that we follow two cases which reached con-
clusions contrary to the authorities discussed above. In Hall v.
State of Fla.,22 the court held that the phrase “untried indict-
ment, information or complaint,” as used in the agreement,
encompassed sentencing. The court relied on cases in which the
U.S. Supreme Court and other federal courts held that a trial
includes sentencing for purposes of the Sixth amendment.23
and in Tinghitella v. State of Cal.,24 the court concluded that the
terms “trial” and “final disposition” as used in the agreement
“encompass sentencing,” meaning the agreement “imposes an
obligation on California to sentence a Texas prisoner in timely
fashion where California has secured the conviction of the
prisoner in California but he has not been sentenced before his
incarceration in Texas on a Texas conviction.”
We are not persuaded by these cases. as the court noted
in Barefield,25 the holding of Tinghitella is arguably dicta
because the defendant had not complied with the agreement’s
requirements. and the reasoning and conclusion of Tinghitella
19 Id. at 1370.
20 Id. at 1372.
21 See, People v. Castoe, 86 Cal. app. 3d 484, 150 Cal. Rptr. 237 (1978);
People v Barnes, 93 mich. app. 509, 287 N.W.2d 282 (1979); People v.
Randolph, 85 misc. 2d 1022, 381 N.Y.S.2d 192 (N.Y. Crim. 1976); State
v. Barnes, 14 Ohio app. 3d 351, 471 N.E.2d 514 (1984).
22 Hall v. State of Fla., 678 F. Supp. 858 (m.D. Fla. 1987).
23 Id.
24 Tinghitella v. State of Cal., 718 F.2d 308, 311 (9th Cir. 1983).
25 Barefield, supra note 14.
STaTE v. JImENEz 	101
Cite as 283 Neb. 95

were 	called 	into 	question 	by 	the 	subsequent 	decision 	in
Carchman.26
Other courts have taken the position that “trial,” as used
in the agreement, does not include sentencing. In U.S. v.
Coffman,27 the court disagreed with Tinghitella, and held
that “‘trial’ does not include sentencing for purposes of the
[agreement’s] anti-shuttling provisions.” The court agreed with
the Tinghitella court’s determination that the use of “final dis-
position” in the agreement includes sentencing, but determined
that the agreement “differentiates between the trial phase of
a proceeding and all post-trial procedures, including sentenc-
ing.”28 It is true that in Nebraska, the judgment in a criminal
case is the sentence.29 But it does not logically follow that
a pending sentencing renders an indictment, information, or
complaint “untried.”
[3] We therefore hold that a detainer for a prisoner who has
been convicted but not sentenced does not relate to an “untried
indictment, information or complaint” and thus does not trig-
ger the procedural requirements of the agreement. The district
court did not err in concluding that the agreement does not
apply to Jimenez and in denying his motion for a court order
and request for final disposition.
[4] Jimenez also argues that the district court erred in not
ordering the State of Nebraska to request an “Inmate Status
Certificate” from the Colorado Department of Corrections.
Having determined that the agreement does not apply to the
pending Nebraska proceedings, it is unnecessary for us to
address this issue. an appellate court is not obligated to engage
in an analysis that is not necessary to adjudicate the case and
controversy before it.30
26 Id.
27 U.S. v. Coffman, 905 F.2d 330, 331 (10th Cir. 1990).
28 Id. at 332.
29 State v. Yos-Chiguil, 278 Neb. 591, 772 N.W.2d 574 (2009).
30 Law Offices of Ronald J. Palagi v. Howard, 275 Neb. 334, 747 N.W.2d 1
(2008).
102 	283 NEBRaSka REPORTS

CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed, the judgment of the district court
is affirmed.
A ffirmed.
Wright and gerrArd, JJ., not participating.
STaTE v. JImENEz 	103
Cite as 283 Neb. 95