State v. Sprunger

State of NebraSka , appellee , v.
beNjamiN j. SpruNger , appellaNt.
811 N.W.2d 235
Filed March 23, 2012. 	No. S-11-100.
1. Constitutional Law: Search and Seizure: Motions to Suppress: Appeal and
Error. In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress based on a
claimed violation of the Fourth Amendment, an appellate court applies a two-part
standard of review. Regarding historical facts, an appellate court reviews the trial
court’s findings for clear error. But whether those facts trigger or violate Fourth
Amendment protections is a question of law that an appellate court reviews inde-
pendently of the trial court’s determination.
2. Search and Seizure. Application of the good faith exception to the exclusionary
rule is a question of law.
3. Constitutional Law: Search Warrants: Probable Cause. The execution of a
search warrant without probable cause is unreasonable and violates the Fourth
Amendment.
4. Search Warrants: Affidavits: Probable Cause. A search warrant, to be valid,
must be supported by an affidavit that establishes probable cause.
5. Search Warrants: Probable Cause: Words and Phrases. Probable cause suf-
ficient to justify issuance of a search warrant means a fair probability that contra-
band or evidence of a crime will be found.
6. Search Warrants: Probable Cause: Proof: Time. Proof of probable cause
justifying issuance of a search warrant generally must consist of facts so closely
related to the time of issuance of the warrant as to justify a finding of probable
cause at the time.
7. Search Warrants: Affidavits: Probable Cause: Appeal and Error. In review-
ing the strength of an affidavit submitted as a basis for finding probable cause to
issue a search warrant, an appellate court applies a “totality of the circumstances”
test. The question is whether, under the totality of the circumstances illustrated
by the affidavit, the issuing magistrate had a substantial basis for finding that the
affidavit established probable cause.
8. Search Warrants: Affidavits: Evidence: Appeal and Error. In evaluating the
sufficiency of an affidavit used to obtain a search warrant, an appellate court is
restricted to consideration of the information and circumstances contained within
the four corners of the affidavit, and evidence that emerges after the warrant is
issued has no bearing on whether the warrant was validly issued. An appellate
court’s review is guided by the principle that sufficient information must be
presented to the magistrate to allow that official to determine probable cause; his
action cannot be a mere ratification of the bare conclusions of others.
9. Search Warrants: Probable Cause. The requirement of particularity for a search
warrant is closely related to the requirement of probable cause.
10. Search Warrants. A purpose of the particularity requirement for a search warrant
is to prevent the issuance of warrants on loose, vague, or doubtful bases of fact.
11. Search Warrants: Probable Cause: Proof. To establish probable cause for the
issuance of a search warrant, it must be probable that (1) the described items
STATe v. SPRuNgeR 	531
Cite as 283 Neb. 531
Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
11/01/2026 04:42 AM CST

are connected with criminal activity and (2) they are to be found in the place to
be searched.
12. Constitutional Law: Search and Seizure. A general search for evidence of any
crime is unconstitutional.
13. ____: ____. That a Fourth Amendment violation occurred does not necessarily
mean that the exclusionary rule applies.
14. Search Warrants: Affidavits: Police Officers and Sheriffs: Evidence: Search
and Seizure. The good faith exception provides that even in the absence of a
valid affidavit to support a search warrant, evidence seized under the warrant
need not be suppressed when police officers act in objectively reasonable good
faith in reliance upon the warrant.
15. Motions to Suppress: Search Warrants: Affidavits: Police Officers and
Sheriffs: Evidence. evidence suppression is appropriate if one of four circum-
stances exists: (1) The magistrate or judge in issuing the warrant was misled by
information in an affidavit that the affiant knew was false or would have known
was false except for his reckless disregard for the truth; (2) the issuing magistrate
wholly abandoned his judicial role; (3) the supporting affidavit was so lacking
in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely
unreasonable; or (4) the warrant is so facially deficient that the executing officer
cannot reasonably presume it to be valid.
16. Search and Seizure: Police Officers and Sheriffs. The good faith inquiry is
confined to the objectively ascertainable question whether a reasonably well-
trained officer would have known that the search was illegal despite a magis-
trate’s authorization.
17. Police Officers and Sheriffs: Presumptions. Officers are assumed to have a
reasonable knowledge of what the law prohibits.
18. Search Warrants: Affidavits: Police Officers and Sheriffs: Appeal and Error.
In assessing the good faith of an officer’s conducting a search under a warrant,
an appellate court must look to the totality of the circumstances surrounding the
issuance of the warrant, including information not contained within the four cor-
ners of the affidavit.
19. Search Warrants: Affidavits: Police Officers and Sheriffs: Probable Cause:
Appeal and Error. When evaluating whether a warrant was based on an affidavit
so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence
entirely unreasonable, an appellate court should address whether the officer, con-
sidered as a police officer with a reasonable knowledge of what the law prohibits,
acted in objectively reasonable good faith in relying on the warrant.
20. Search Warrants: Probable Cause: Evidence. A magistrate’s signature cannot
render reasonable an objectively unreasonable failure to support a warrant appli-
cation with evidence necessary to demonstrate probable cause.
Appeal from the District Court for Sarpy County: max kelch,
Judge. Reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
Jason e. Troia, of Dornan, Lustgarten & Troia, P.C., L.L.O.,
for appellant.
532 	283 NeBRASkA RePORTS

Jon Bruning, Attorney general, erin e. Tangeman, and
James D. Smith for appellee.
heavicaN, 	c.j., 	coNNolly, 	StephaN, 	mccormack , 	and
miller-lermaN, jj.
coNNolly, j.
The State charged Benjamin J. Sprunger with 20 counts of
possessing child pornography. After a bench trial, a court con-
victed him of four of those counts. The court sentenced him to
18 months of probation on each conviction, with the terms to
run concurrently. Sprunger appeals; he challenges the search
that uncovered the images and the sufficiency of the evidence
to support the convictions. We conclude that the affidavit for
the warrant failed to establish probable cause. Further, we also
conclude that the officers’ belief that the information contained
in the affidavit had created probable cause was not objectively
reasonable. We reverse, and remand for proceedings consistent
with this opinion.
BACkgROuND
On July 25, 2009, the Washington County, Nebraska, sher-
iff’s office received a complaint of credit card fraud from a
man in Blair, Nebraska. The man reported that about 2 weeks
earlier, someone had used his bank debit/check card with-
out his authorization to purchase computer equipment from a
California company.
The deputies contacted the California company, and the
company confirmed the purchase on the man’s card. The com-
puter equipment was sent to an address in New Jersey. The
deputies later learned, however, that the Internet protocol (IP)
address used to make the purchase belonged to Sprunger at his
apartment in gretna, Nebraska.
Deputies from Washington and Sarpy Counties then went
to Sprunger’s apartment for a “knock-and-talk.” There, they
questioned Sprunger about the purchase. Sprunger denied any
knowledge of the purchase. The deputies, however, observed
several computers and other computer equipment in his apart-
ment. When the deputies asked if he would allow them to take
STATe v. SPRuNgeR 	533
Cite as 283 Neb. 531

the computers, Sprunger denied permission and told them that
they would need a warrant to take his computers.
In talking with Sprunger, the deputies learned that Sprunger
worked at a bank data processing center, where he had access
to account information. In addition, they also learned that
Sprunger was going to school to become a computer technician
and, thus, was likely well versed in computers.
The deputies left and applied for a search warrant. Their
supporting affidavit recounted the facts that we have set out.
On October 29, 2009, the county court issued a warrant
to seize “[a]ny and all computer equipment” at Sprunger’s
apartment.
The deputies later returned to execute the warrant. While
they were executing the warrant, the deputies learned addi-
tional facts that led them to request a second search warrant.
When the deputies told Sprunger that they were there to take
his computers, Sprunger asked if he could delete some files
before the deputies took his computers. The deputies denied
him permission. Then, one deputy asked Sprunger if he had
any child pornography on his computers. When Sprunger said
he did not, the deputy told Sprunger that if there was no child
pornography on the computers, Sprunger had nothing to worry
about. A few days later, a lawyer representing Sprunger called
the deputies. The lawyer asked about the child pornography
case the deputies were working on. The lawyer stated that
Sprunger had told him “his computers had been taken to look
for Child Pornography.”
using these additional facts—Sprunger’s request to delete
some files and the call from his attorney—the deputies applied
for a second search warrant. On November 5, 2009, the county
court granted a second warrant. It authorized a search of the
computers for evidence of child pornography.
The deputies did not uncover any evidence of the credit card
crime. But they did find what they believed to be child pornog-
raphy. The State charged Sprunger with 20 counts of posses-
sion of child pornography.1
1 See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-813.01 (Cum. Supp. 2010).
534 	283 NeBRASkA RePORTS

Sprunger moved to suppress the results of the search war-
rants. Regarding the first warrant, Sprunger challenged the
information as stale because 3 months had passed between
the alleged fraud and the application for the warrant. Sprunger
claimed that the affidavit did not state why the deputies
believed evidence would still be on his computers. Sprunger
also claimed that the deputies were required to explain the sig-
nificance of an IP address and had failed to do so. Regarding
the second warrant, Sprunger claimed the affidavit simply did
not establish probable cause.
The court issued a separate order for each search warrant.
The court concluded that probable cause supported the first
warrant. It rejected Sprunger’s argument that the 3-month
window between the alleged fraud and the application for the
search warrant rendered the information stale. The court rea-
soned that the information would still have been on the comput-
ers unless Sprunger had deleted it. Further, the court reasoned
that finding the user’s physical address from the computer’s IP
address would take time. The court thus ruled that the informa-
tion was not stale. The court also rejected Sprunger’s argument
that the deputies were required to explain the significance of
an IP address. The court ruled that because “computers are
now prevalent in our society,” it could take judicial notice of
the significance of an IP address. In sum, the court rejected
Sprunger’s arguments challenging the warrant and found that
probable cause supported it.
The court also overruled Sprunger’s motion to suppress the
second search. The court agreed that probable cause did not
support the warrant for the child pornography search. But the
court concluded that the good faith exception2 saved the search.
The court determined that there would be little deterrent effect
from excluding the evidence because Sprunger had not alleged
maliciousness or intentional misconduct. The court recognized
that the inquiry into good faith must be conducted from the
vantage point of the officer. The court concluded that the possi-
bility that Sprunger’s attorney called the deputies about a child
2 See, United States v. Leon, 468 u.S. 897, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 82 L. ed. 2d
677 (1984); State v. Nuss, 279 Neb. 648, 781 N.W.2d 60 (2010).
STATe v. SPRuNgeR 	535
Cite as 283 Neb. 531

pornography investigation because Sprunger had mentioned
having child pornography on his computer to his attorney was
reasonable enough to allow the deputies to rely on the warrant
in good faith.
The court found Sprunger guilty of four counts of possess-
ing child pornography. The court sentenced Sprunger to four
concurrent 18-month terms of probation.
ASSIgNMeNTS OF eRROR
Sprunger assigns, restated, that the district court erred as
follows:
(1) in denying Sprunger’s motions to suppress the fruits of
the searches; and
(2) in concluding that there was sufficient evidence to con-
vict Sprunger beyond a reasonable doubt.
STANDARD OF ReVIeW
[1,2] In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to sup-
press based on a claimed violation of the Fourth Amendment,
we apply a two-part standard of review.3 Regarding histori-
cal facts, we review the trial court’s findings for clear error.4
But whether those facts trigger or violate Fourth Amendment
protections is a question of law that we review independently
of the trial court’s determination.5 Further, application of the
good faith exception to the exclusionary rule is a question
of law.6
ANALYSIS
[3-8] Sprunger challenges the validity of the search warrant
that uncovered the images. We begin with some general propo-
sitions of law that relate to search warrants.
The Fourth Amendment to the u.S. Constitution guar-
antees “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
3 State v. Borst, 281 Neb. 217, 795 N.W.2d 262 (2011).
4 Id.
5 Id.
6 See, e.g., U.S. v. Nolan, 199 F.3d 1180 (10th Cir. 1999); Marshall v. State,
415 Md. 399, 2 A.3d 360 (2010).
536 	283 NeBRASkA RePORTS

searches and seizures . . . ,” and further provides that
“no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.” . . . The execution of a search warrant without
probable cause is unreasonable and violates [the Fourth
Amendment]. Accordingly, a search warrant, to be valid,
must be supported by an affidavit [that] establishes prob-
able cause. Probable cause sufficient to justify issuance of
a search warrant means a fair probability that contraband
or evidence of a crime will be found. Proof of probable
cause justifying issuance of a search warrant generally
must consist of facts so closely related to the time of
issuance of the warrant as to justify a finding of probable
cause at the time. In reviewing the strength of an affidavit
submitted as a basis for finding probable cause to issue
a search warrant, an appellate court applies a “totality of
the circumstances” test. The question is whether, under
the totality of the circumstances illustrated by the affida-
vit, the issuing magistrate had a substantial basis for find-
ing that the affidavit established probable cause.
In evaluating the sufficiency of an affidavit used to
obtain a search warrant, an appellate court is restricted
to consideration of the information and circumstances
contained within the four corners of the affidavit, and
evidence [that] emerges after the warrant is issued has
no bearing on whether the warrant was validly issued. .
. . Our review is guided by the principle that “[s]ufficient
information must be presented to the magistrate to allow
that official to determine probable cause; his action
cannot be a mere ratification of the bare conclusions
of others.”7
As litigated by the parties in this court, the search that
uncovered the images depends on either the second warrant
itself or the officers’ good faith reliance on it. The State does
not contend that the officers happened upon (or would have
happened upon) the child pornography while searching for
7 Nuss, supra note 2, 279 Neb. at 652-54, 781 N.W.2d 65-66.
STATe v. SPRuNgeR 	537
Cite as 283 Neb. 531

evidence of the credit card fraud. So, this case turns on whether
probable cause supported the second warrant authorizing the
search for child pornography or, if probable cause did not sup-
port the warrant, whether the officers’ reliance on the warrant
was objectively reasonable.
The district court concluded that probable cause did not
support the second search warrant. Nonetheless, the court
denied Sprunger’s motion to suppress, based upon the good
faith exception to the exclusionary rule found in United States
v. Leon.8 On appeal, the State argues that probable cause sup-
ported the warrant but, if not, exclusion of the evidence is inap-
propriate because of the Leon good faith exception. Sprunger
argues that not only was the warrant lacking probable cause, it
was lacking probable cause to such a degree that reliance on
the warrant was not objectively reasonable, and so exclusion
is appropriate.
probable cauSe
The State contends that two facts contained in the affidavit
for the second warrant establish probable cause: (1) Sprunger’s
request to delete files when the deputies came to seize his com-
puters and (2) Sprunger’s lawyer’s call to the sheriff’s office in
the days after the deputies executed the first warrant.
The district court concluded that there were two possible
explanations—both of which the court considered “reason-
able”—for the call from Sprunger’s lawyer. First, that Sprunger
had told his attorney what a deputy had said and that his attor-
ney called based on this fact. Second, that Sprunger had admit-
ted to his lawyer he had child pornography on his computers
and that the lawyer unwittingly alerted the deputies to this fact.
We interpret the district court’s order as concluding that there
was no probable cause because the State did not present any
evidence to show that Sprunger had admitted to his lawyer that
he had child pornography on his computers. We agree.
The fact that Sprunger’s lawyer called the deputies about
their investigation does not establish that Sprunger had admit-
ted to possessing child pornography. First, believing that a
8 See Leon, supra note 2.
538 	283 NeBRASkA RePORTS

lawyer would unwittingly suggest to investigators that a client
may have committed a crime without knowing the reason for
their investigation requires a leap of faith; the lawyer would
have to be living in a mental darkroom. But more important,
a deputy had told Sprunger that he “should have nothing to
worry about” if no child pornography was found on his com-
puters. unsurprisingly, Sprunger then talked to a lawyer, as a
reasonable person would do after law enforcement had seized
that person’s property. The lawyer likely would have inquired
about what the deputies said and did during the search. And
the lawyer would have reasonably interpreted the one deputy’s
statement to mean that Sprunger was under investigation for
possessing child pornography. So the attorney’s inquiry did
not establish probable cause. It merely reflected the deputy’s
statement. We conclude that Sprunger’s attorney’s call to the
deputies does not add to a finding of probable cause to search
for child pornography.
This leaves only Sprunger’s request that he be allowed
to delete some files before the deputies took his computers
away. But because this fact alone does not create probable
cause for finding any particular evidence on the computers, it
is insufficient.
The Fourth Amendment contains a particularity require-
ment, stating that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon prob-
able cause . . . and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” (emphasis
supplied.) The Founding Fathers’ abhorrence of the english
king’s use of general warrants—which allowed royal officials
to engage in general exploratory rummaging in a person’s
belongings9—was the impetus for the adoption of the Fourth
Amendment.10 Simply put, the Fourth Amendment prohibits
“fishing expeditions.”
9 79 C.J.S. Searches § 229 n.11 (2006).
10 See, e.g., Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 u.S. 731, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 179 L. ed.
2d 1149 (2011); Virginia v. Moore, 553 u.S. 164, 128 S. Ct. 1598, 170 L.
ed. 2d 559 (2008); United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 u.S. 259, 110
S. Ct. 1056, 108 L. ed. 2d 222 (1990). See, also, Samantha Trepel, Digital
Searches, General Warrants, and the Case for the Courts, 10 Yale J.L. &
Tech. 120 (2007).
STATe v. SPRuNgeR 	539
Cite as 283 Neb. 531

[9-11] The requirement of particularity for a search war-
rant is closely related to the requirement of probable cause.11
A “purpose [of] the particularity requirement . . . is to prevent
‘the issuance of warrants on loose, vague or doubtful bases
of fact.’”12 This case illustrates this connection. To establish
probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant, it must
be probable that (1) the described items are connected with
criminal activity and (2) they are to be found in the place to
be searched.13 Based only on the fact that Sprunger wanted to
delete some files, the deputies could never say with particular-
ity what it was that they wanted to seize. They had no idea
what files Sprunger might have wanted to delete. How could
the deputies have had probable cause to believe that what they
were looking for would be found on his computers when they
did not even know what they were looking for?
[12] To allow a search based only on the fact that Sprunger
wanted to hide something would sanction the type of general
exploratory rummaging the Founders wished to prohibit. As
we have stated before, “‘[a] general search for evidence of any
crime,’” such as the one that would be issued based solely on
this fact, is unconstitutional.14
It is true that the fact Sprunger asked to delete some files
might have raised a suspicion. But this suspicion did not
amount to a fair probability that child pornography would be
found on his computers. Based solely on this fact, the depu-
ties would have no idea what would be found. Their search
would have amounted to a rummaging through a treasure
trove of information. “‘[T]he modern development of the per-
sonal computer and its ability to store and intermingle a huge
array of one’s personal papers in a single place increases law
enforcement’s ability to conduct a wide-ranging search into
11 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth
Amendment § 4.6(a) (4th ed. 2004).
12 Id. at 606, quoting Go-Bart Co. v. United States, 282 u.S. 344, 51 S. Ct.
153, 75 L. ed. 374 (1931).
13 2 LaFave, supra note 11.
14 State v. Thomas, 240 Neb. 545, 561, 483 N.W.2d 527, 538 (1992).
540 	283 NeBRASkA RePORTS

a person’s private affairs.’”15 It thus makes the particularity
and probable cause requirements all the more important. To
sanction a search based solely on Sprunger’s request to delete
some unknown files would trivialize the protections of the
Fourth Amendment.
Summed up, the call from Sprunger’s attorney to the depu-
ties established nothing more than that the deputy had made
an offhand remark that led Sprunger to believe he was being
investigated for child pornography. And Sprunger’s desire to
delete some files does not mean that any particular evidence
would be found. Taken together, there was no probable cause
to support the warrant.
Accordingly, we agree with Sprunger and with the district
court that the affidavit did not establish probable cause. We
now consider whether the officers’ reliance on the warrant was
objectively reasonable.
good faith
[13] That a Fourth Amendment violation occurred does
not necessarily mean that the exclusionary rule applies.16 The
Fourth Amendment contains no provision expressly precluding
the use of evidence obtained in violation of its commands.17
The u.S. Supreme Court has held that for the exclusionary
rule to apply, the benefits of its deterrence must outweigh
its costs.18
[14,15] Recognizing that the benefits of deterrence often do
not outweigh the social costs of exclusion, the u.S. Supreme
Court created the good faith exception19 to the exclusionary
15 Mink v. Knox, 613 F.3d 995, 1010 (10th Cir. 2010), quoting U.S. v. Otero,
563 F.3d 1127 (10th Cir. 2009).
16 Herring v. United States, 555 u.S. 135, 129 S. Ct. 695, 172 L. ed. 2d 496
(2009).
17 Arizona v. Evans, 514 u.S. 1, 115 S. Ct. 1185, 131 L. ed. 2d 34 (1995).
18 See, e.g., Herring, supra note 16.
19 See, Davis v. United States, 564 u.S. 229, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 180 L. ed. 2d
285 (2011); Herring, supra note 16; Evans, supra note 17; Illinois v. Krull,
480 u.S. 340, 107 S. Ct. 1160, 94 L. ed. 2d 364 (1987); Massachusetts v.
Sheppard, 468 u.S. 981, 104 S. Ct. 3424, 82 L. ed. 2d 737 (1984); Leon,
supra note 2.
STATe v. SPRuNgeR 	541
Cite as 283 Neb. 531

rule. The good faith exception provides that even in the absence
of a valid affidavit to support a search warrant, evidence seized
under the warrant need not be suppressed when police offi-
cers act in objectively reasonable good faith in reliance upon
the warrant.20 Nevertheless, evidence suppression will still be
appropriate if one of four circumstances exist: (1) the magis-
trate or judge in issuing the warrant was misled by information
in an affidavit that the affiant knew was false or would have
known was false except for his reckless disregard for the truth;
(2) the issuing magistrate wholly abandoned his judicial role;
(3) the supporting affidavit was so lacking in indicia of prob-
able cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely
unreasonable; or (4) the warrant is so facially deficient that the
executing officer cannot reasonably presume it to be valid.21
Here, Sprunger argues that the affidavit was so lacking in
indicia of probable cause as to render the deputies’ belief in its
existence unreasonable.
[16,17] The “good-faith inquiry is confined to the objec-
tively ascertainable question whether a reasonably well-trained
officer would have known that the search was illegal despite a
magistrate’s authorization.”22 Officers are assumed to “have a
reasonable knowledge of what the law prohibits.”23
[18,19] In assessing the good faith of an officer’s conducting
a search under a warrant, an appellate court must look to the
totality of the circumstances surrounding the issuance of the
warrant, including information not contained within the four
corners of the affidavit.24 When evaluating whether the war-
rant was based on an affidavit so lacking in indicia of probable
cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unrea-
sonable, an appellate court should address whether the officer,
20 Nuss, supra note 2; State v. Tompkins, 272 Neb. 547, 723 N.W.2d 344
(2006), modified on denial of rehearing 272 Neb. 865, 727 N.W.2d 423
(2007).
21 See Leon, supra note 2. Accord Nuss, supra note 2.
22 Leon, supra note 2, 468 u.S. at 922 n.23.
23 Id., 468 u.S. at 919 n.20.
24 State v. Edmonson, 257 Neb. 468, 598 N.W.2d 450 (1999).
542 	283 NeBRASkA RePORTS

considered as a police officer with a reasonable knowledge of
what the law prohibits, acted in objectively reasonable good
faith in relying on the warrant.25
We have already explained why the facts in the affidavit do
not establish probable cause. Summed up, the only reasonable
explanation for the attorney’s call to the deputies was that the
deputies had led Sprunger to believe they were taking his com-
puters to search for child pornography. This establishes nothing
more than what the deputies said to Sprunger; it did not show
that Sprunger had admitted to possessing child pornography
on his computers. Similarly, Sprunger’s request to delete some
files does not create probable cause either, because it does not
create a likelihood of finding any particular evidence on the
computers. We believe that a reasonably trained officer should
know that “‘a general search for evidence of any crime’” is
unsupported by probable cause.26
Moreover, not only would a reasonable officer know that a
general search warrant was illegal, a reasonable officer would
also know that telling a person that he had “nothing to worry
about” if he had no child pornography on his computer would
lead that person to believe he was being investigated for child
pornography. The deputy had effectively planted the idea in
Sprunger’s head. given this, we do not see how the deputies
could have objectively relied on the warrant. The deputies
knew—or certainly should have known—that the only fact
showing any connection to child pornography was of their
own making.
[20] Here, “the evidence offered in the warrant applica-
tion [was] so deficient as to preclude reasonable belief in the
existence of probable cause.”27 And “a magistrate’s signature
cannot render reasonable an objectively unreasonable failure to
support a warrant application with evidence necessary to dem-
onstrate probable cause.”28
25 See id.
26 See Thomas, supra note 14, 240 Neb. at 561, 483 N.W.2d at 538.
27 See U.S. v. Doyle, 650 F.3d 460, 473 (4th Cir. 2011).
28 Id. at 476.
STATe v. SPRuNgeR 	543
Cite as 283 Neb. 531

In this case, excluding the evidence serves the deterrence
aim of the exclusionary rule by forbidding the use of evidence
obtained through an obvious Fourth Amendment violation.
Conversely, to ignore such a blatant lack of probable cause
would set a low bar for future police conduct.29
We conclude that the deputies’ reliance on the warrant was
not reasonable and thus did not bring it within the Leon good
faith exception to the exclusionary rule. The court erred in
overruling Sprunger’s second motion to suppress.
CONCLuSION
We conclude that probable cause did not support the warrant
to search Sprunger’s computers for child pornography. We also
conclude that it was lacking probable cause to such a degree
that reliance on the warrant was not objectively reasonable.
Accordingly, the court should have suppressed fruits of the
search. We reverse, and remand for proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
reverSed aNd remaNded for
further proceediNgS.
Wright, j., not participating.
29 See State v. Gorup, 279 Neb. 841, 782 N.W.2d 16 (2010).
edWard m. Smalley, appellee aNd croSS-appellaNt, v.
NebraSka departmeNt of health aNd humaN
ServiceS, appellaNt aNd croSS-appellee .
811 N.W.2d 246
Filed March 23, 2012. 	No. S-11-151.
1. Judgments: Appeal and Error. The trial court’s factual findings in a bench
trial of an action at law have the effect of a jury verdict and will not be set aside
unless clearly erroneous.
2. Administrative Law: Statutes: Appeal and Error. To the extent that the mean-
ing and interpretation of statutes and regulations are involved, questions of law
are presented, in connection with which an appellate court has an obligation
to reach an independent conclusion irrespective of the decision made by the
court below.
544 	283 NeBRASkA RePORTS