Butler Cty. Sch. Dist. v. Freeholder Petitioners

with directions to vacate its decision. We also direct the Court
of Appeals to reverse the decision of the district court which
affirmed the revocation order and to remand the cause to the
district court with instructions to the district court to vacate its
order and dismiss Sherman’s action in district court.
R eveRsed and Remanded with diRections.
butler Cty. SCh. diSt. v. freeholder petitionerS 	903
Cite as 283 neb. 903
ButleR county school distRict 12-0502, also known
as east ButleR P uBlic school distRict, a Political
suBdivision of the state of neBRaska , aPPellant,
and BRenda coufal , an individual Resident
taxPayeR of ButleR county school distRict
12-0502, also known as east ButleR
P uBlic school distRict, aPPellee , v.
fReeholdeR P etitioneRs 1 thRough 10:
feRn Jansa et al ., aPPellees.
814 n.W.2d 724
filed May 25, 2012. 	no. S-11-562.
1. Standing: Jurisdiction: Parties. Standing is a jurisdictional component of a
party’s case.
2. Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error. An appellate court reviews de novo jurisdic-
tional determinations that do not involve a factual dispute.
3. Statutes: Appeal and Error. Statutory interpretation presents a question of law
that an appellate court independently reviews.
4. Standing: Jurisdiction. Standing relates to a court’s power, that is, jurisdiction,
to address issues presented and serves to identify those disputes that are appropri-
ately resolved through the judicial process.
5. ____: ____. Standing requires that a litigant have a personal stake in the outcome
of a controversy that warrants invocation of a court’s jurisdiction and justifies
exercise of the court’s remedial powers on the litigant’s behalf.
6. Standing: Claims: Parties: Proof. to have standing, a litigant must assert its
own rights and interests and demonstrate an injury in fact, which is concrete in
both a qualitative and temporal sense. the alleged injury in fact must be distinct
and palpable, as opposed to merely abstract, and the alleged harm must be actual
or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.
7. Standing. to have standing, a party must have some legal or equitable right, title,
or interest in the subject of the controversy.
8. Actions: Standing: Proof. Standing requires that the injury can be fairly traced
to the challenged action and is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision.
Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
11/01/2026 04:42 AM CST

9. Statutes: Appeal and Error. An appellate court gives statutory language its plain
and ordinary meaning.
10. Statutes: Legislature: Intent: Appeal and Error. in discerning the meaning of a
statute, an appellate court gives effect to the purpose and intent of the legislature
as ascertained from the entire language of a statute considered in its plain, ordi-
nary, and popular sense.
11. ____: ____: ____: ____. When possible, an appellate court determines the legis-
lative intent from the language of the statute itself.
12. Statutes: Appeal and Error. in construing statutory language, an appellate court
attempts to give effect to all parts of a statute and avoid rejecting as superfluous
or meaningless any word, clause, or sentence.
13. ____: ____. An appellate court will not read into a statute a meaning that is
not there.
Appeal 	from 	the 	district 	Court 	for 	Saunders 	County:
maRy c. gilBRide, Judge. reversed and remanded for fur-
ther proceedings.
rex r. Schultze, derek A. Aldridge, and dyana Wolkenhauer,
of 	perry, 	Guthery, 	haase 	& 	Gessford, 	p.C., 	l.l.o., 	for
appellant.
Maureen freeman-Caddy, of bromm, lindahl, freeman-
Caddy & lausterer, for appellees fern Jansa et al.
heavican, c.J., wRight, connolly, stePhan, mccoRmack ,
and milleR-leRman, JJ.
connolly, J.
SuMMAry
butler County School district 12-0502, also known as east
butler public School district (east butler), appeals from the
district court’s order dismissing its appeal from an order of the
Saunders County freeholder board (the board). the board’s
order granted the appellee property owners’ petitions to move
their property from prague public School district (prague
district) to Wahoo public School district (Wahoo district).
the appellees had petitioned for the move while a dissolution
and merger petition involving the same territory was pending
before the State Committee for the reorganization of School
districts (reorganization Committee). At the reorganization
Committee, the school boards of east butler and the prague
district petitioned to dissolve their separate districts and merge
904 	283 nebrASkA reportS

them into a single school district. the appellees’ property
would be a part of this newly merged district.
After the reorganization Committee approved the merger
but before it became effective, the board granted the appel-
lees’ petitions to move their property to the Wahoo district.
east butler appealed that decision to the district court. it
argued that the board lacked jurisdiction to consider the
appellees’ petitions while east butler’s merger petition was
pending. but the court concluded that under neb. rev. Stat.
§ 79-458(5) (reissue 2008), the appeal was untimely. it also
determined that east butler lacked standing to challenge the
board’s order.
We reverse. We conclude that because east butler had a
valid merger petition that involved the same property pending
at the time of the appellees’ freeholder petitions, it had suffi-
cient interest in the matter to invoke the court’s jurisdiction. in
addition, we conclude that its appeal was timely. We therefore
remand the cause for further proceedings.
bACkGround
the district court summarized the facts as follows:
• on April 13, 2010, east butler and the prague district filed
a petition and plan for dissolution and merger with the
reorganization Committee.
• on April 20, 2010, the appellees filed freeholder petitions
with the board seeking to remove property owned by them
from the prague district and move it to the Wahoo district.
• on May 14, 2010, the reorganization Committee approved
the dissolution and merger and entered an order merging east
butler and the prague district. this order did not become
effective immediately.
• on May 17, 2010, the board granted the appellees’ petitions
to move their property into the Wahoo district.
• on June 10, 2010, the merger of east butler and the prague
district became effective.
• on July 1, 2010, east butler appealed to the district court.
in the appeal, east butler sought vacation or reversal of
the board’s order. it alleged that the board lacked jurisdic-
tion because the reorganization Committee had exclusive
butler Cty. SCh. diSt. v. freeholder petitionerS 	905
Cite as 283 neb. 903

jurisdiction 	over 	the 	matter 	or 	that 	the 	reorganization
Committee had prior jurisdiction to act under the prior juris-
diction rule.
the district court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdic-
tion. it found that east butler had not complied with § 79-458(5)
when that section was read in pari materia with neb. rev. Stat.
§ 23-136 (reissue 2007). Section 79-458(5) permits a party to
appeal from an action of a freeholder board in the same man-
ner that a party can appeal from a county board’s allowance or
disallowance of a claim. the court read § 79-458(5) to require
a party to comply with the time limit to appeal under § 23-136,
which governs appeals from a county board’s allowance of a
claim. because east butler did not appeal within the 10 days
specified for appeals under § 23-136, the court determined that
it did not acquire jurisdiction over the appeal. in addition, cit-
ing case law holding that a school district cannot maintain an
action to challenge its boundaries,1 the court found that east
butler lacked standing.
ASSiGnMentS of error
east butler assigns that the district court erred in concluding
that (1) it lacked standing and (2) its appeal was untimely.
StAndArd of reVieW
[1-3] Standing is a jurisdictional component of a party’s
case.2 We review de novo jurisdictional determinations that do
not involve a factual dispute.3 And statutory interpretation pre-
sents a question of law that we independently review.4
1 See, In re Plummer Freeholder Petition, 229 neb. 520, 428 n.W.2d 163
(1988); School Dist. No. 46 v. City of Bellevue, 224 neb. 543, 400 n.W.2d
229 (1987); In re Hilbers Property Freehold Transfer, 211 neb. 268, 318
n.W.2d 265 (1982); Board of Education v. Winne, 177 neb. 431, 129
n.W.2d 255 (1964).
2 Brook Valley Ltd. Part. v. Mutual of Omaha Bank, 281 neb. 455, 797
n.W.2d 748 (2011).
3 Field Club v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Omaha, ante p. 847, 814 n.W.2d
102 (2012).
4 See Project Extra Mile v. Nebraska Liquor Control Comm., ante p. 379,
810 n.W.2d 149 (2012).
906 	283 nebrASkA reportS

AnAlySiS
east ButleR does have standing
east butler asserts that the district court erred in conclud-
ing that it did not have standing. relying on several of our
cases holding that a school district cannot maintain an action
to challenge its boundaries,5 the district court held that east
butler lacked standing. We conclude that east butler does have
standing because the facts of this case—the authorized petition
that was pending before the reorganization Committee—dis-
tinguish it.
[4-8] Standing relates to a court’s power, that is, jurisdic-
tion, to address issues presented and serves to identify those
disputes that are appropriately resolved through the judicial
process.6 Standing requires that a litigant have a personal stake
in the outcome of a controversy that warrants invocation of a
court’s jurisdiction and justifies exercise of the court’s remedial
powers on the litigant’s behalf.7 to have standing, a litigant
must assert its own rights and interests8 and demonstrate an
injury in fact, which is concrete in both a qualitative and tem-
poral sense.9 the alleged injury in fact must be distinct and
palpable, as opposed to merely abstract, and the alleged harm
must be actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical. A
party must have some legal or equitable right, title, or interest
in the subject of the controversy.10 finally, standing requires
that the injury can be fairly traced to the challenged action and
is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision.11
5 See, In re Plummer Freeholder Petition, supra note 1; School Dist. No.
46, supra note 1; In re Hilbers Property Freehold Transfer, supra note 1;
Winne, supra note 1.
6 Latham v. Schwerdtfeger, 282 neb. 121, 802 n.W.2d 66 (2011).
7 Id.
8 Id.
9 See Frenchman-Cambridge Irr. Dist. v. Dept. of Nat. Res., 281 neb. 992,
801 n.W.2d 253 (2011).
10 See Brook Valley Ltd. Part., supra note 2.
11 See Central Neb. Pub. Power Dist. v. North Platte NRD, 280 neb. 533,
788 n.W.2d 252 (2010).
butler Cty. SCh. diSt. v. freeholder petitionerS 	907
Cite as 283 neb. 903

in addressing standing, the district court correctly noted
that we have long held that school districts may not bring an
action to challenge their boundaries.12 We have often reasoned,
at least in part, that the governing statutes did not authorize
such actions. yet in other cases, we have reasoned that school
districts, as political subdivisions of the state, have no interest
in their territorial integrity13; changes to their borders do not
constitute “injuries” sufficient to confer standing.
but this case presents facts that are different from our prior
cases, and we believe that these differences dictate a different
result. here, the school districts had already presented a plan
for merger to the reorganization Committee before the appel-
lees petitioned the board to move their property to a different
district. neb. rev. Stat. § 79-415 (reissue 2008) permits the
school districts to do this. Given this statutory authorization,
our prior cases’ rationales no longer apply. the statutes do
allow east butler to initiate changes to its boundaries. And
it cannot be seriously contended that east butler does not
have an interest that could be harmed in its plan before the
reorganization Committee.
to not allow a school district the opportunity to challenge
actions that could threaten its plan before the reorganization
Committee would negate the power given to the school district
by the legislature. the plan that the school district expended
time and money in developing could be destroyed by a gradual
chipping away of freeholder petitions. if a school district may
initiate changes in its boundaries, there is no reason its hands
should be tied in fending off a postpetition dismantling of
its plan.
Simply stated, if the legislature saw fit to allow a school
district to initiate changes in its boundaries, surely it intended
that this be done in an orderly fashion. to not allow the school
12 See, e.g., In re Plummer Freeholder Petition, supra note 1; Cowles v.
School Dist., 23 neb. 655, 37 n.W. 493 (1888). See, also, School Dist. v.
School Dist., 55 neb. 716, 76 n.W. 420 (1898).
13 See, e.g., In re Hilbers Property Freehold Transfer, supra note 1; Winne,
supra note 1; Halstead v. Rozmiarek, 167 neb. 652, 94 n.W.2d 37
(1959).
908 	283 nebrASkA reportS

districts to challenge subsequent freeholder petitions would
invite chaos. the reorganization Committee should not have
to base its decision on whether to grant a merger petition on a
factual basis that is constantly changing, as would be the case
if subsequent freeholder petitions could remove property from
the area under consideration. We conclude that east butler
has an interest in a proposed plan before the reorganization
Committee sufficient to afford it standing.
the aPPeal was timely
the board rendered its decision on May 17, 2010, and east
butler appealed to the district court on July 1. As mentioned
previously, the district court concluded that east butler had
not complied with § 79-458(5), which governs appeals from a
freeholder board.
the relevant portions of § 79-458(5) read as follows:
Appeals may be taken from the action of such board or,
when such board fails to act on the petition, on or before
August 1 following the filing of the petition, to the dis-
trict court of the county in which the land is located on
or before August 10 following the filing of the petition, in
the same manner as appeals are now taken from the action
of the county board in the allowance or disallowance of
claims against the county.
the court determined that the relevant time limits for
appeals under § 79-458(5) were those that applied to appeals
from a county board’s allowance or disallowance of a claim.
under neb. rev. Stat. § 23-135(4) (reissue 2007), if a county
board disallows a claim, a party has 20 days to appeal. under
§ 23-136, if the county board allows a claim, a party has 10
days to appeal. the court concluded that the August 10 date
under § 79-458(5) was not intended to alter the time limits
imposed under § 23-135(4) or § 23-136.
Applying the district court’s rationale to the facts, the dis-
trict court reasoned that because the board had allowed the
petitions, appeals had to be brought within 10 days of the deci-
sion, which was rendered on May 17, 2010. east butler did not
appeal until July 1, which was clearly outside the 10 days the
district court concluded was the time for appeals.
butler Cty. SCh. diSt. v. freeholder petitionerS 	909
Cite as 283 neb. 903

We have not previously decided the proper timeframe within
which to appeal a decision from a freeholder board. east butler
argues that if the appeal is from a freeholder board’s decision
or its failure to act on or before August 1, the party has until
August 10 to appeal. of course, the appellees view it differ-
ently. they argue that the court correctly determined that a
party has only 10 or 20 days to appeal, depending on whether
the freeholder board granted or denied the petition. According
to the appellees, August 10 is the “drop-dead deadline,”14
although how a “drop-dead deadline” relates to the 10- or 20-
day deadline is left unexplained. but from our reading of the
statute, we conclude that east butler’s appeal was timely.
[9-13] We begin with familiar canons of statutory construc-
tion. We give statutory language its plain and ordinary mean-
ing.15 And in discerning the meaning of a statute, we give effect
to the purpose and intent of the legislature as ascertained from
the entire language of a statute considered in its plain, ordinary,
and popular sense.16 When possible, we determine the legisla-
tive intent from the language of the statute itself.17 in constru-
ing statutory language, we attempt to give effect to all parts of
a statute and avoid rejecting as superfluous or meaningless any
word, clause, or sentence.18 likewise, we will not read into a
statute a meaning that is not there.19
in a case involving somewhat similar statutory language,
we held that the time limit under the disputed statute was
not altered by the time limits under §§ 23-135 and 23-136.20
14 brief for appellees at 15.
15 Village of Hallam v. L.G. Barcus & Sons, 281 neb. 516, 798 n.W.2d 109
(2011).
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 City of North Platte v. Tilgner, 282 neb. 328, 803 n.W.2d 469 (2011).
19 Cargill Meat Solutions v. Colfax Cty. Bd. of Equal., 281 neb. 93, 798
n.W.2d 823 (2011).
20 Knoefler Honey Farms v. County of Sherman, 193 neb. 95, 225 n.W.2d
855 (1975), overruled in part on other grounds, United Way of the
Midlands v. Douglas County Board of Equalization, 199 neb. 323, 259
n.W.2d 270 (1977).
910 	283 nebrASkA reportS

At that time, the statute for appeals from a county board of
equalization provided that “‘[a]ppeals may be taken . . . to
the district court within forty-five days after adjournment
of the board, in the same manner as appeals are now taken
from the action of the county board in the allowance or disal-
lowance of claims . . . .’”21 then, as now, claims against the
county had to be appealed within 10 or 20 days, depending
on whether the county allowed or disallowed the claim. in
Knoefler Honey Farms v. County of Sherman,22 we concluded
that the statutes relating to appeals from a county—§§ 23-135
and 23-136—did not alter the necessary time limit for appeals
from a county board of equalization. the timeframe was con-
trolled by the text of the statute, which provided for a period
of 45 days after the adjournment of the board. Applying
this reasoning to § 79-458(5), we conclude that appeals
must be filed by August 10, not within 10 or 20 days of the
board’s decision.
the appellees, however, correctly point out that 2 years after
Knoefler Honey Farms was decided, we overruled it in part
in United Way of the Midlands v. Douglas County Board of
Equalization.23 but the appellees fail to realize that we limited
our disapproval of Knoefler Honey Farms to an issue irrel-
evant to this appeal. in Knoefler Honey Farms, our language
had indicated that a party had to file everything necessary to
perfect the appeal within the statutory time limit of 45 days,
including the notice of appeal, the appeal bond, and the tran-
script from the proceedings. our decision in United Way of the
Midlands made clear that the party was not required to file
the transcript within the time limit for perfecting an appeal.
We overruled Knoefler Honey Farms only to the extent that it
was inconsistent with that holding. the reasoning of Knoefler
Honey Farms that the 10- or 20-day periods under § 23-135 or
§ 23-136 did not alter the 45-day period was not affected by
United Way of the Midlands.
21 See Knoefler Honey Farms, supra note 20, 193 neb. at 97-98, 225 n.W.2d
at 857.
22 Knoefler Honey Farms, supra note 20.
23 United Way of the Midlands, supra note 20.
butler Cty. SCh. diSt. v. freeholder petitionerS 	911
Cite as 283 neb. 903

furthermore, the district court’s reading of § 79-458(5)
would in large part negate the language “on or before August
10.” if a party had to appeal within 10 or 20 days, it is by no
means clear what, if anything, the August 10 date would mean.
the appellees’ contention that a party must appeal within 10
or 20 days but that August 10 is a “drop-dead deadline” would
confuse litigants as to when to appeal; there would be two
deadlines—a deadline of 10 or 20 days and then a separate
“drop-dead deadline.” in contrast, reading the statute to require
a party to appeal by August 10 any decision establishes an eas-
ily administrable rule. We adopt that reading.
finally, to the extent that the statute can be considered
ambiguous, the legislative history supports our reading of the
statute. the committee statement for an introduced bill that was
later made a part of the 2008 amendment to § 79-458 states,
“Appeals would need to be filed on or before August 10, instead
of within 20 days of the action of the board or of november 1
if the board fails to take action.”24 the legislative history con-
firms that our reading of the statutory text is correct.
the board rendered its decision on May 17, 2010. east
butler filed its appeal on July 1. this was before the August 10
deadline. the appeal was timely.
ConCluSion
We conclude that the district court erred in concluding
that east butler lacked standing. We also conclude that east
butler’s appeal was timely filed. We reverse, and remand for
further proceedings.
R eveRsed and Remanded foR
fuRtheR PRoceedings.
24 Statement of purpose, l.b. 977, Committee on education, 100th leg., 2d
Sess. (feb. 4, 2008) (emphasis supplied).
912 	283 nebrASkA reportS