State v. Eagle Bull

STATE v . EAGLE BULL 	369
Cite as 285 Neb. 369
She argues that some similar cases involving nonminorities
resulted in more lenient sanctions. We do not note in our dis-
ciplinary opinions the race of the attorney under discipline,
because that is not relevant. As discussed above, disbarment
is frequently the sanction in any case involving misappro-
priation of client funds, failure to cooperate with Counsel for
Discipline, and lying during a disciplinary investigation. This
is true regardless of an attorney’s gender, race, ethnicity, or
religion. Comparing Crawford’s conduct to other attorneys
disciplined by this court, we conclude that disbarment is the
appropriate sanction.
VI. CONCLUSION
It is the judgment of this court that Crawford should be
and hereby is disbarred from the practice of law in the State
of Nebraska, effective immediately. Crawford is directed to
comply with Neb. Ct. R. § 3-316, and upon failure to do so,
she shall be subject to punishment for contempt of this court.
Crawford is directed to pay costs and expenses in accordance
with Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 7-114 and 7-115 (Reissue 2012) and
Neb. Ct. R. § 3-323(B). We overrule the miscellaneous motions
made by Crawford’s attorney at oral arguments.
Judgment of disbarment.
state of nebraska, appellee, v.
autumn eagle bull, appellant.
827 N.W.2d 466
Filed March 1, 2013. 	No. S-11-1072.
1. Criminal Law: Convictions: Evidence: Appeal and Error. In reviewing a suf-
ficiency of the evidence claim, whether the evidence is direct, circumstantial,
or a combination thereof, the standard is the same: An appellate court does not
resolve conflicts in the evidence, pass on the credibility of witnesses, or reweigh
the evidence; such matters are for the finder of fact. The relevant question for an
appellate court is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable
to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential ele-
ments of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
2. Criminal Law: Directed Verdict. In a criminal case, a court can direct a ver-
dict only when there is a complete failure of evidence to establish an essential
Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
11/01/2026 04:39 AM CST

370 	285 NEBRASKA REPORTS
element of the crime charged or the evidence is so doubtful in character, lack-
ing probative value, that a finding of guilt based on such evidence cannot
be sustained.
3. Directed Verdict. If there is any evidence which will sustain a finding for the
party against whom a motion for directed verdict is made, the case may not be
decided as a matter of law, and a verdict may not be directed.
4. Trial: Presumptions. Triers of fact may apply to the subject before them that
general knowledge which any person must be presumed to have.
5. Appeal and Error. An alleged error must be both specifically assigned and spe-
cifically argued in the brief of the party asserting the error to be considered by an
appellate court.
6. Jury Instructions: Appeal and Error. The failure to object to instructions after
they have been submitted to counsel for review will preclude raising an objec-
tion on appeal, unless there is a plain error indicative of a probable miscarriage
of justice.
Appeal from the District Court for Sheridan County, travis
p. o’gorman, Judge, on appeal thereto from the County Court
for Sheridan County, C harles plantz, Judge. Judgment of
District Court affirmed.
Michael T. Varn for appellant.
Jon Bruning, Attorney General, Carrie A. Thober, and James
D. Smith for appellee.
heaviCan, C.J., Wright, C onnolly, stephan, mCC ormaCk,
and miller-lerman, JJ.
stephan, J.
Autumn Eagle Bull was convicted in the Sheridan County
Court of misdemeanor child abuse as the result of an incident
in which she left her three children unattended in her home.
The Sheridan County District Court affirmed her conviction.
She appeals, contending the evidence at trial was insufficient to
support a conviction for the charged offense. We affirm.
FACTS
On April 19, 2011, Eagle Bull was living in Gordon,
Nebraska, with three of her children: Rayhan C., who was 10
years old and in the fourth grade; Toby C., who was almost
8 years old and in the second grade; and Petra P., who was 6
weeks old.

STATE v . EAGLE BULL 	371
Cite as 285 Neb. 369
At approximately 5 p.m., Toby telephoned her grandfather,
who lived in Pine Ridge, South Dakota, and told him she
needed an adult to accompany her to a school event that eve-
ning. The grandfather was concerned because Toby seemed
excited and nervous, and he thought someone should go to
Eagle Bull’s home. At some point between 5 and 5:30 p.m., the
grandfather called his wife, Lynnell Eagle Bull (Lynnell), at
her workplace in Pine Ridge to tell her about Toby’s call.
Lynnell called Susan Kaplan, who lived across the street
from Eagle Bull and sometimes stayed with Eagle Bull’s chil-
dren. Lynnell asked Kaplan to check on the children. Lynnell
then drove to Gordon and arrived at Eagle Bull’s home 35 or
40 minutes later. When Lynnell arrived, Toby was in the front
yard riding her bike and Eagle Bull’s car was in the drive-
way. Lynnell entered the home and found Eagle Bull, Kaplan,
Rayhan, and Petra.
Lynnell asked Eagle Bull whether she had left the children
alone. Eagle Bull said she had not, but when asked, she did not
identify any adult who had been with them. Lynnell noticed
that Eagle Bull was “kind of swaying” and smelled of alcohol.
Lynnell called the police, and when an officer arrived, Lynnell
insisted that Eagle Bull be arrested. Lynnell admitted that she
and Eagle Bull did not get along well. Although the children
wanted to stay in Gordon with Eagle Bull, Lynnell took them
home with her that night.
Approximately 2 weeks prior to April 19, 2011, Petra had
been hospitalized for 2 or 3 days with a respiratory disorder.
Petra was discharged without any medication, but Eagle Bull
was given a “breathing machine” to treat Petra at home “when
she needed it.”
Kaplan testified that after Lynnell called her, she went to
Eagle Bull’s home and found the children home with no adult
in the house. The two older children were sitting on the couch,
and the baby, Petra, was awake and lying on the couch by her
siblings. About 30 minutes after Kaplan arrived, Eagle Bull
came home. Lynnell arrived within 5 or 10 minutes, and she
and Eagle Bull argued.
Officer Clay Heath of the Gordon Police Department was
dispatched to the Eagle Bull residence at 6:50 p.m. He met

372 	285 NEBRASKA REPORTS
Lynnell on the porch and followed her into the house. He
described both Eagle Bull and Lynnell as “emotional,” and
he testified that it “appeared that they had been arguing.”
He talked with Eagle Bull and observed that her speech was
slurred, her eyes were bloodshot and watery, she smelled of
alcohol, and she was having trouble standing. Eagle Bull sub-
mitted to a preliminary breath test administered by Heath at the
home. The test indicated she was intoxicated.
Eagle Bull told Heath she left the residence about 5 p.m.
She said that she was driving around and drinking with friends
and that their car got stuck on a dirt road. She assured Heath
that someone had been watching her children. Eagle Bull
initially said Kaplan was watching them, but when Heath
told her Kaplan was not present until 6 p.m., Eagle Bull said
Mindy Janis, her roommate at the time, had been watching
the children.
Heath walked through the house with Eagle Bull. He saw
that there was food in the cupboards and refrigerator; that
the house was clean; and that the children appeared healthy,
clean, and appropriately clothed. He saw no dangerous con-
ditions in the home, such as loose wires or firearms, and
testified that he had no concerns with the children’s environ-
ment. Ultimately, however, he issued a citation to Eagle Bull
for child neglect because she left baby Petra for “one hour
unattended.”
Janis testified that she was living with Eagle Bull on April
19, 2011. On that day, Janis went to work at 11 a.m. and
returned home about 6:30 p.m. Janis said Eagle Bull had not
asked her to babysit the children, but did call her at approxi-
mately 3 p.m. and asked whether Janis could go and open the
house for the children. Janis told Eagle Bull that she could not
leave work. She did not open the house. Janis did not know
how the children got into the home on April 19.
Eagle Bull was charged with misdemeanor child abuse and
tried by a jury. After the State presented its evidence, Eagle
Bull moved for a directed verdict, arguing the State failed to
present sufficient evidence to prove the charge against her. Her
motion was overruled. Eagle Bull presented no evidence and
then renewed her motion for directed verdict, which was again

STATE v . EAGLE BULL 	373
Cite as 285 Neb. 369
overruled. The jury returned a verdict of guilty, and the county
court sentenced Eagle Bull to 30 days in jail. She appealed
to the district court, which affirmed the conviction and sen-
tence. The district court reasoned the evidence was sufficient
to establish that Eagle Bull acted negligently, because she left
the children home alone for a period of more than 1 hour while
she went drinking with friends. And it found the evidence was
sufficient to support a finding that she denied Petra neces-
sary care under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-707(1)(c) (Cum. Supp.
2010), because
[Eagle Bull] left unattended her 45 day old, 10 year
old and eight year old children with no supervision for
at least one hour. The 45 day old child was two weeks
removed from a hospital stay for RSV. Although the child
was no longer on medication, a breathing machine was in
the home in the event breathing trouble recurred. A rea-
sonable jury could conclude that the infant was not being
watched over or provided for during this period of time
sufficient for conviction.
In reaching this conclusion, the district court relied on the
dictionary definition of “care” as “‘to pay attention to, watch
over, take care of; look after; provide for.’” It concluded that
there was “no question” that Eagle Bull did not “‘pay atten-
tion to, watch over, take care of or look after’” her children
while she was away from home. It concluded that because
the evidence was sufficient to show a denial of necessary
care under § 28-707(1)(c), it did not have to resolve whether
the evidence was also sufficient to show endangerment under
§ 28-707(1)(a).
Eagle Bull perfected this timely appeal, which we moved
to our docket on our own motion pursuant to our statutory
authority to regulate the caseloads of the appellate courts of
this state.1
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
Eagle Bull assigns, restated, that the district court erred in
concluding (1) that the county court did not err in overruling
1 See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 24-1106(3) (Reissue 2008).

374 	285 NEBRASKA REPORTS
her motion for directed verdict and (2) that the evidence was
sufficient to support her conviction.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
[1] 	In 	reviewing 	a 	sufficiency 	of 	the 	evidence 	claim,
whether the evidence is direct, circumstantial, or a combina-
tion thereof, the standard is the same: An appellate court does
not resolve conflicts in the evidence, pass on the credibility of
witnesses, or reweigh the evidence; such matters are for the
finder of fact.2 The relevant question for an appellate court is
whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favor-
able to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have
found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reason-
able doubt.3
[2,3] In a criminal case, a court can direct a verdict only
when there is a complete failure of evidence to establish an
essential element of the crime charged or the evidence is so
doubtful in character, lacking probative value, that a finding
of guilt based on such evidence cannot be sustained.4 If there
is any evidence which will sustain a finding for the party
against whom a motion for directed verdict is made, the case
may not be decided as a matter of law, and a verdict may not
be directed.5
ANALYSIS
Eagle Bull’s assignments of error have merit only if no
rational trier of fact could have found on the evidence pre-
sented by the State that the essential elements of the crime
she was charged with were met.6 We therefore must examine
both the charge against her and the evidence presented by
the State.
2 State v. Kitt, 284 Neb. 611, 823 N.W.2d 175 (2012); State v. Freemont, 284
Neb. 179, 817 N.W.2d 277 (2012).
3 Id.
4 State v. Segura, 265 Neb. 903, 660 N.W.2d 512 (2003); State v. Canady,
263 Neb. 552, 641 N.W.2d 43 (2002).
5 Id.
6 See, State v. Kitt, supra note 2; State v. Freemont, supra note 2; State v.
Segura, supra note 4; State v. Canady, supra note 4.

STATE v . EAGLE BULL 	375
Cite as 285 Neb. 369
Eagle Bull was charged with negligent child abuse pursuant
to § 28-707(1), which provides:
A person commits child abuse if he or she knowingly,
intentionally, or negligently causes or permits a minor
child to be:
(a) Placed in a situation that endangers his or her life or
physical or mental health; [or]
. . . .
(c) 	Deprived 	of 	necessary 	food, 	clothing, 	shelter,
or care.
Because the offense was alleged to have been committed neg-
ligently and there was no allegation that it resulted in serious
bodily injury or death, the charge against Eagle Bull was a
Class I misdemeanor punishable by a jail sentence of up to 1
year, a fine of up to $1,000, or both.7 The jury was instructed
that it could find Eagle Bull guilty if it found beyond a rea-
sonable doubt she violated either subsection (1)(a) or (1)(c) of
§ 28-707 and that it was required to find her not guilty if the
State failed to prove the elements of both subsections. Eagle
Bull was thus charged in alternative ways with committing
the act of negligent child abuse. The jury could convict if it
found there was sufficient evidence of either, and thus the
judgment of conviction must be affirmed if the evidence is
sufficient to support either of the State’s alternative theories
of guilt.
In analyzing whether there is sufficient evidence in the
record to support the conviction, we view the evidence in
the light most favorable to the State.8 The district court rea-
soned the evidence was sufficient to support a finding that
the children, and in particular Petra, were denied necessary
care under § 28-707(1)(c) because Eagle Bull did not “‘watch
over, take care of or look after’” them while she was absent
from the home. We begin our analysis by reviewing this
determination.
Section 28-707(1)(c) criminalizes the failure to provide nec-
essary care. We addressed the meaning of necessary as used
7 § 28-707(3); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-106(1) (Reissue 2008).
8 State v. Kitt, supra note 2; State v. Freemont, supra note 2.

376 	285 NEBRASKA REPORTS
in § 28-707(1)(c) in State v. Crowdell.9 In that case, we held
the term “necessary” was not vague, because its “ordinary
meaning . . . supplies a constitutionally sufficient standard.”10
We specifically noted that the dictionary definition of “neces-
sary” is
“items (as of food, clothing, shelter, medical care, equip-
ment or furnishing) that cannot be done without: things
that must be had (as for the preservation and reasonable
enjoyment of life [and items] that cannot be done without:
that must be done or had: absolutely required.”11
We also cited with approval cases from other jurisdictions find-
ing that the term “necessary” used in similar statutes “‘relates
to [a] minimum standard’” of the quality of care.12 Thus, under
Crowdell, the State had the burden to show that Petra was
denied some aspect of care that she reasonably could not do
without as a result of Eagle Bull’s actions.
The evidence, in particular Janis’ testimony, supports a
reasonable inference that Eagle Bull left her children, who
were 10 years old, almost 8 years old, and 6 weeks old, unat-
tended from 3 p.m. until she returned to her home at approxi-
mately 6:30 p.m. There was thus a 31⁄2-hour time period during
which the children were subject to no direct adult supervision.
Although a 10-year-old and an 8-year-old are not inherently
unable to provide necessary care for themselves for a certain
amount of time, their ability to so provide necessarily cor-
relates at least to some degree with the amount of time they
are unsupervised.
[4] And here, the older children were not simply left alone,
but were left in charge of a 6-week-old infant. Triers of fact
may apply to the subject before them that general knowledge
9 State v. Crowdell, 234 Neb. 469, 451 N.W.2d 695 (1990).
10 Id. at 479, 451 N.W.2d at 702.
11 Id. at 477, 451 N.W.2d at 701, citing Webster’s Third New International
Dictionary, Unabridged 1510-11 (1981).
12 Id. at 478, 451 N.W.2d at 701, citing Caby v. State, 249 Ga. 32, 287 S.E.2d
200 (1982); State v. Joyce, 361 So. 2d 406 (Fla. 1978); and State v. Brown,
52 Wash. 2d 92, 323 P.2d 239 (1958).

STATE v . EAGLE BULL 	377
Cite as 285 Neb. 369
which any person must be presumed to have.13 It is within the
general knowledge of triers of fact that infants necessarily
require regular, special care in the form of supervision, diaper
changing, and feeding. Although there is no specific evidence
as to whether the elder siblings were capable of providing this
care to Petra, a reasonable juror could properly infer from the
totality of the circumstances that they were not.
The evidence also supports a reasonable inference that Petra
required additional specialized care, because she had recently
been hospitalized for a respiratory disorder and was discharged
with a breathing machine to be used as needed. A rational trier
of fact could conclude the infant’s 8- and 10-year-old sib-
lings were not capable of determining when the infant would
need the breathing machine or of utilizing the machine if the
need arose.
Moreover, from the fact that the 8-year-old called her grand-
father in another state when she needed an adult, a rational
trier of fact could reasonably infer that Eagle Bull was not
only absent but was also unreachable by her children. Eagle
Bull’s admission to Heath that she had been out drinking with
friends and her inebriated state upon her eventual return home
further support a reasonable inference that she would have
been of little assistance to the children in an emergency even if
they had been able to reach her. And although a trusted neigh-
bor lived directly across the street, it is clear that the neighbor
was unaware that the children were unsupervised until she
was advised by Lynnell. Thus, a finder of fact could reason-
ably conclude that Eagle Bull left her children unattended and
without any means of contacting her or a nearby responsible
adult if the need arose.
Based upon all of these facts, a rational finder of fact apply-
ing common knowledge could have concluded that Eagle Bull
denied Petra necessary care. Because we conclude that the
evidence, when viewed in a light most favorable to the State,
13 McIntosh v. Omaha Public Schools, 249 Neb. 529, 544 N.W.2d 502
(1996), overruled on other grounds, Bronsen v. Dawes County, 272 Neb.
320, 722 N.W.2d 17 (2006), and abrogated on other grounds, Heins v.
Webster County, 250 Neb. 750, 552 N.W.2d 51 (1996).

378 	285 NEBRASKA REPORTS
is sufficient to support a verdict that Eagle Bull was guilty of
negligent child abuse as defined by § 28-707(1)(c), we need
not determine whether it was also sufficient to support a guilty
verdict under § 28-707(1)(a).
[5,6] For the sake of completeness, we note that Eagle Bull
argues that the county court should not have instructed the jury
on the alternative means of committing negligent child abuse,
because there was insufficient evidence to support either alter-
native means. However, Eagle Bull did not object to the jury
instruction before it was given and did not assign error with
respect to the giving of the instruction in either her appeal to
the district court or the current appeal to this court. An alleged
error must be both specifically assigned and specifically argued
in the brief of the party asserting the error to be considered by
an appellate court.14 The failure to object to instructions after
they have been submitted to counsel for review will preclude
raising an objection on appeal, unless there is a plain error
indicative of a probable miscarriage of justice.15 We find no
such error here.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed, we conclude the district court sit-
ting as an intermediate appellate court correctly concluded that
the county court did not err in denying Eagle Bull’s motion for
directed verdict and that the evidence was sufficient to sup-
port her conviction. We therefore affirm the judgment of the
district court.
affirmed.
Cassel, J., not participating.
14 State v. McGhee, 280 Neb. 558, 787 N.W.2d 700 (2010); State v. Thompson,
278 Neb. 320, 770 N.W.2d 598 (2009).
15 State v. Sanders, 269 Neb. 895, 697 N.W.2d 657 (2005).