State v. Policky

612 	285 NEBRASKA REPORTS
the dispute, inasmuch as a state “‘generally has a “manifest
interest” in providing its residents with a convenient forum for
redressing injuries inflicted by out-of-state actors.’”38 Although
Michigan may also have an interest in a fair and efficient reso-
lution of this controversy, its interest does not outweigh that
of Nebraska.
Considering all relevant factors, we conclude that Nebraska’s
exercise of specific personal jurisdiction over Planet Bingo in
this action would not offend notions of fair play and substan-
tial justice.
CONCLUSION
Based upon our independent review of the complaint and
affidavits, viewed in a light most favorable to Video King,
we conclude that the district court for Douglas County has
specific personal jurisdiction over Planet Bingo and that it
erred in granting Planet Bingo’s motion to dismiss. Further, we
find that Nebraska’s exercise of specific personal jurisdiction
over Planet Bingo in this action would not offend notions of
fair play and substantial justice. Accordingly, we reverse, and
remand for further proceedings.
R eveRsed and Remanded foR
fuRtheR pRoceedings.
milleR-leRman, J., participating on briefs.
38 Id. at 659, 742 N.W.2d at 745.
state of nebRaska, appellee, v.
Joe J. policky, appellant.
828 N.W.2d 163
Filed March 29, 2013. 	No. S-12-533.
1. Judgments: Appeal and Error. On questions of law, an appellate court has an
obligation to reach independent conclusions irrespective of the decision made by
the court below.
2. Sentences: Appeal and Error. An appellate court will not disturb a sen-
tence imposed within the statutory limits absent an abuse of discretion by the
trial court.
Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
11/01/2026 04:40 AM CST

STATE v. POLICKY 	613
Cite as 285 Neb. 612
3. Motor Vehicles: Licenses and Permits: Revocation: Sentences. A sentence to a
15-year period of license revocation is mandatory for all persons who commit the
offense of driving while their licenses are revoked.
4. Sentences. Generally, it is within a trial court’s discretion to direct that sentences
imposed for separate crimes be served either concurrently or consecutively.
5. Prior Convictions: Motor Vehicles: Sentences. Motorists committing multiple
violations should not expect a sanction equivalent to that imposed on a motorist
committing a unitary violation.
6. Statutes: Judicial Construction: Legislature: Presumptions: Intent. When
judicial interpretation of a statute has not evoked a legislative amendment, it is
presumed that the Legislature has acquiesced in the court’s interpretation.
Appeal 	from 	the 	District 	Court 	for 	Lancaster 	County:
stephanie f. stacy, Judge. Affirmed.
Dennis R. Keefe, Lancaster County Public Defender, and
Shawn Elliott for appellant.
Jon Bruning, Attorney General, and George R. Love for
appellee.
heavican, c.J., WRight, connolly, stephan, mccoRmack,
milleR-leRman, and cassel, JJ.
mccoRmack, J.
NATURE OF CASE
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 60-6,197.06 (Reissue 2010) states that
when a defendant has been found guilty of operating a motor
vehicle while his or her operator’s license has been revoked,
the court shall, as part of the judgment of conviction, revoke
the operator’s license “for a period of fifteen years from the
date ordered by the court.” Section 60-6,197.06 provides fur-
ther that “[s]uch revocation and order shall be administered
upon sentencing, upon final judgment of any appeal or review,
or upon the date that any probation is revoked.” The defend-
ant asserts that under the plain language of § 60-6,197.06, the
court cannot order commencement of the 15-year revocation
for any date other than the date of sentencing, the date of
final judgment upon appeal or review, or the date any proba-
tion is revoked. According to the defendant, a court cannot
order a 15-year license revocation to be consecutive to the
unexpired period of revocation under which the defendant

614 	285 NEBRASKA REPORTS
committed the offense of driving with a revoked license.
We disagree.
BACKGROUND
In 2003, Joe J. Policky was convicted of driving under the
influence, third offense. He was sentenced to a 15-year license
revocation, which began on August 29, 2003, and is to con-
tinue until August 29, 2018. On August 25, 2011, Policky was
found operating a motor vehicle. This led to the current charge
and conviction of driving during revocation, first offense.
Policky pleaded no contest, and pursuant to § 60-6,197.06, the
court ordered that Policky’s license be revoked for 15 years
consecutive to the revocation that is due to come to an end in
August 2018. Policky appeals the sentence.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
Policky assigns that the trial court erred in ordering that
the 15-year license revocation sentence be consecutive to the
15-year license revocation previously imposed against him.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
[1] The issue raised by Policky’s assignment of error pre-
sents a question of law, in connection with which an appellate
court has an obligation to reach independent conclusions irre-
spective of the decision made by the court below.1
[2] An appellate court will not disturb a sentence imposed
within the statutory limits absent an abuse of discretion by the
trial court.2
ANALYSIS
[3,4] A sentence to a 15-year period of license revoca-
tion is mandatory for all persons who commit the offense
of driving while their licenses are revoked.3 And, generally,
it is within a trial court’s discretion to direct that sentences
imposed for separate crimes be served either concurrently
1 See State v. McBride, 252 Neb. 866, 567 N.W.2d 136 (1997).
2 State v. Castillas, ante p. 174, 826 N.W.2d 255 (2013).
3 State v. Hense, 276 Neb. 313, 753 N.W.2d 832 (2008).

STATE v. POLICKY 	615
Cite as 285 Neb. 612
or consecutively.4 Policky argues that the plain language of
§ 60-6,197.06, however, serves to limit the trial court’s discre-
tion. He asserts that the trial court erred as a matter of law in
ordering his mandatory 15-year license revocation to be con-
secutive to the 15-year license revocation imposed for a prior
offense. We affirm the sentence.
Section 60-6,197.06 states in relevant part:
[T]he court shall, as part of the judgment of conviction,
revoke the operator’s license of such person for a period
of fifteen years from the date ordered by the court and
shall issue an order pursuant to section 60-6,197.01. Such
revocation and order shall be administered upon sentenc-
ing, upon final judgment of any appeal or review, or upon
the date that any probation is revoked.
Policky focuses both on the phrase “from the date ordered
by the court” and on the last sentence stating that the revoca-
tion “shall be administered upon sentencing.” According to
Policky, this last sentence limits “the date ordered by the court”
to either the date of the sentencing order, the date of the final
judgment after appeal of that order, or the date that any proba-
tion is revoked.
This court and the Nebraska Court of Appeals have sev-
eral times addressed the phrase “from the date ordered by the
court” and concluded it plainly means the revocation period
shall commence from whatever date the court, in its sound
discretion, indicates in the sentencing order.5 Our courts have
explained that the phrase “ordered by the court” directly fol-
lows and modifies the word “date.”6 And the verb “ordered”
in this context has an entirely different meaning from the noun
“order,” which is the document imposing the sentence.7 Thus,
4 See State v. Thomas, 268 Neb. 570, 685 N.W.2d 69 (2004).
5 See, State v. Fuller, 278 Neb. 585, 772 N.W.2d 868 (2009); State v.
Nelson, 276 Neb. 997, 759 N.W.2d 260 (2009); State v. Richardson, 17
Neb. App. 388, 763 N.W.2d 420 (2008); State v. Lankford, 17 Neb. App.
123, 756 N.W.2d 739 (2008).
6 See, State v. Fuller, supra note 5; State v. Lankford, supra note 5.
7 See id.

616 	285 NEBRASKA REPORTS
the date the revocation period is to begin is not necessarily the
date the sentencing order is issued.8
In State v. Fuller,9 we accordingly rejected the defendant’s
argument that the court could not order his 15-year license
suspension to start when he was released from confinement
for multiple related and unrelated offenses. We explained,
“Obviously, some drivers may not be in a position to drive until
they have served their sentence of incarceration. Therefore, the
court is given the discretion to determine when the license
revocation . . . is to begin . . . .”10 In State v. Heckman,11 we
stated with regard to a similar statute that “[t]he only sensible
result is that a penalty of suspending a motor vehicle opera-
tor’s license be applied to individuals who have the ability
to drive.”
[5] Other courts have similarly noted that motorists whose
operators’ licenses have “been suspended in one matter and
revoked in another” are not generally considered entitled to
serve the penalties concurrently.12 Motorists committing mul-
tiple violations should not expect a sanction equivalent to
that imposed on a motorist committing a unitary violation.13
We agree that a mandatory rule that the revocation period for
driving with a revoked license be concurrent to the preexisting
period of revocation would provide little incentive for motor-
ists not to drive with revoked licenses.
We have never directly addressed an argument that the last
sentence of § 60-6,197.06—that “[s]uch revocation and order
shall be administered upon sentencing, upon final judgment
of any appeal or review, or upon the date that any proba-
tion is revoked”—constrains the trial court’s discretion to
order when the mandatory 15-year license revocation period
8 See id.
9 State v. Fuller, supra note 5.
10 Id. at 590, 772 N.W.2d at 871.
11 State v. Heckman, 239 Neb. 25, 30, 473 N.W.2d 416, 420 (1991).
12 60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 428 at 480 (2012).
13 See Alabama Dept. of Public Safety v. Barbour, 5 So. 3d 601 (Ala. Civ.
App. 2008).

STATE v. POLICKY 	617
Cite as 285 Neb. 612
shall begin. But we observe that this “shall be administered”
sentence was part of the relevant statutes when our courts
determined that the period of revocation need not necessarily
begin the same date as the sentencing order and may instead
commence upon whatever date the court, in its sound discre-
tion, directs.14
In Fuller, we implicitly rejected Policky’s argument by
affirming a revocation period ordered to commence when the
defendant was released from prison.15 Such commencement of
revocation did not correspond to the date of sentencing, the
date of the final judgment of any appeal or review, or to the
date that any probation is revoked.
To the extent that the “shall be administered” sentence of
§ 60-6,197.06 could be read as ambiguous or in conflict with
the rest of the statute, it must be construed in harmony with
the entire statute and its intent.16 When words of a particular
clause, taken literally, would plainly contradict other clauses
of the same statute, or lead to some manifest absurdity or
to some consequences which we see plainly could not have
been intended, or to result manifestly against the general
term, scope, and purpose of the law, then we may apply the
rules of construction to ascertain the meaning and intent of
the lawgiver, and bring the whole statute into harmony if
possible.17 As explained, the clear intent of the “from the
date ordered by the court” language is to allow trial courts
discretion in determining when the period of revocation
shall begin.
The last sentence of § 60-6,197.06 immediately follows the
phrase, “the court shall . . . revoke . . . for a period . . . from
the date ordered by the court,” and refers directly back to
“[s]uch revocation and order . . . .” We expressly conclude now
what we implicitly concluded in Fuller: This last sentence of
14 See cases cited supra note 5.
15 See State v. Fuller, supra note 5.
16 See Anthony, Inc. v. City of Omaha, 283 Neb. 868, 813 N.W.2d 467
(2012).
17 Id.

618 	285 NEBRASKA REPORTS
§ 60-6,197.06 was not intended to limit the trial court’s discre-
tion in crafting “[s]uch revocation and order . . . .”
[6] Our interpretation is consistent with sound public policy
and the trial court’s general discretion to order sentences con-
secutively or concurrently. Furthermore, the Legislature has
not amended § 60-6,197.06 since our decision in Fuller. When
judicial interpretation of a statute has not evoked a legislative
amendment, it is presumed that the Legislature has acquiesced
in the court’s interpretation.18
Policky believes § 60-6,197.06 mandates that the trial court
sentence him to a 15-year license revocation running concur-
rently with the 15-year license revocation in effect when he
committed the crime of driving with a revoked license and
continuing until 2018. We find no merit to this contention.
Because his license was already revoked, if the court had
ordered the 15-year license revocation in issue to run from the
date of sentencing, a significant part of that revocation period
would be meaningless. The trial court did not abuse its discre-
tion in the date that it chose for Policky’s 15-year revocation
period to commence.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the lower court’s
judgment.
affiRmed.
18 Sheldon-Zimbelman v. Bryan Memorial Hosp., 258 Neb. 568, 604 N.W.2d
396 (2000).