State v. Woolridge-Jones

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
316 Nebraska Reports
STATE v. WOOLRIDGE-JONES
Cite as 316 Neb. 500
State of Nebraska, appellee, v.
Makhi Woolridge-Jones, appellant.
___ N.W.3d ___
Filed May 3, 2024. 	No. S-22-934.
1. Trial: Expert Witnesses: Appeal and Error. An appellate court reviews
a trial court’s ruling to admit or exclude an expert’s testimony for abuse
of discretion.
2. Convictions: Evidence: Appeal and Error. In reviewing a criminal
conviction for a sufficiency of the evidence claim, whether the evidence
is direct, circumstantial, or a combination thereof, the standard is the
same: An appellate court does not resolve conflicts in the evidence, pass
on the credibility of witnesses, or reweigh the evidence; such matters
are for the finder of fact. The relevant question for an appellate court
is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential ele-
ments of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
3. Sentences: Appeal and Error. Absent an abuse of discretion by the trial
court, an appellate court will not disturb a sentence imposed within the
statutory limits.
4. Judgments: Words and Phrases. An abuse of discretion occurs when a
trial court’s decision is based upon reasons that are untenable or unrea-
sonable or if its action is clearly against justice or conscience, reason,
and evidence.
5. Rules of Evidence: Expert Witnesses. Four preliminary questions
must be answered in order to determine whether an expert’s testimony
is admissible: (1) whether the witness qualifies as an expert pursuant
to Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-702 (Reissue 2016); (2) whether the expert’s
testimony is relevant; (3) whether the expert’s testimony will assist the
trier of fact to understand the evidence or determine a controverted
factual issue; and (4) whether the expert’s testimony, even though
relevant and admissible, should be excluded in light of Neb. Rev. Stat.
Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
10/14/2026 08:37 AM CDT

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
316 Nebraska Reports
STATE v. WOOLRIDGE-JONES
Cite as 316 Neb. 500
§ 27-403 (Reissue 2016) because its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice or other considerations.
6. Expert Witnesses. Expert testimony should not be received if it appears
the witness is not in possession of such facts as will enable him or her to
express a reasonably accurate conclusion, as distinguished from a mere
guess or conjecture.
7. Criminal Law: Intent. A trier of fact may infer that the defendant
intended the natural and probable consequences of the defendant’s vol-
untary acts.
8. Sentences: Appeal and Error. Where a sentence imposed within the
statutory limits is alleged on appeal to be excessive, the appellate court
must determine whether a sentencing court abused its discretion in con-
sidering and applying the relevant factors as well as any applicable legal
principles in determining the sentence to be imposed.
9. Sentences. In determining a sentence to be imposed, relevant factors
customarily considered and applied are the defendant’s (1) age, (2) men-
tality, (3) education and experience, (4) social and cultural background,
(5) past criminal record or record of law-abiding conduct, and (6) moti-
vation for the offense, as well as (7) the nature of the offense and (8) the
amount of violence involved in the commission of the crime.
10. ____. The appropriateness of a sentence is necessarily a subjective judg-
ment and includes the sentencing judge’s observation of the defendant’s
demeanor and attitude and all the facts and circumstances surrounding
the defendant’s life.
Appeal from the District Court for Douglas County: James
M. Masteller, Judge. Affirmed.
Thomas C. Riley, Douglas County Public Defender, and
Christine A. Mori for appellant.
Michael T. Hilgers, Attorney General, and Jordan Osborne
for appellee.
Heavican, C.J., Miller-Lerman, Cassel, Stacy, Funke,
Papik, and Freudenberg, JJ.
Papik, J.
Following a jury trial, Makhi Woolridge-Jones was con-
victed of second degree murder, second degree assault, and

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
316 Nebraska Reports
STATE v. WOOLRIDGE-JONES
Cite as 316 Neb. 500
two counts of use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony. The
convictions stem from a shooting at a shopping mall that left
one man dead and one woman injured. It is undisputed that
Woolridge-Jones fired multiple shots, striking the man. On
appeal, Woolridge-Jones assigns that the district court erred
in excluding expert testimony that would have opined that
the initial shot fired by Woolridge-Jones put him in a state of
peritraumatic dissociation. Woolridge-Jones also claims that
the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions and
that his sentences were excessive. We find Woolridge-Jones’
arguments unavailing and affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
1. Charges
At a shopping mall at around noon on Saturday, April 17,
2021, Trequez Swift was shot twice. He died later that day. In
the same incident, Ja’keya Veland sustained gunshot wounds to
her legs, but she survived. Investigators identified Woolridge-
Jones, then 16 years old, as one of two shooters. In an inter-
view with police, Woolridge-Jones admitted to shooting Swift
but claimed Swift had threatened him.
The State ultimately charged Woolridge-Jones with first
degree murder, second degree assault, and two counts of use
of a deadly weapon to commit a felony. The matter proceeded
to a jury trial.
2. Evidence at Trial
(a) Shooting
The jury heard evidence that on the day of the shooting,
Woolridge-Jones went to the mall with his brother and a friend.
Around the same time, Swift, Veland, Steveaun Moten-Roddy,
and Marvell Piggie also arrived at the mall. The encounters
that followed were captured by surveillance videos, and the
parties do not dispute the basic facts or the identities of the key
individuals depicted.

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
316 Nebraska Reports
STATE v. WOOLRIDGE-JONES
Cite as 316 Neb. 500
According to surveillance video viewed by the jury and to
testimony at trial, Swift and Piggie approached Woolridge-
Jones’ group, and an argument ensued. At one point during the
confrontation, Swift turned away, set his shopping bags down,
turned to face Woolridge-Jones again, and appeared to have
his hands near his waist. Veland, who was nearby, testified that
when Swift put his bags down, he turned around “like he was
going to punch the boy.”
At this point, Woolridge-Jones pulled out a handgun, pointed
the gun at Swift, and fired two shots. Swift fell to the floor,
and Woolridge-Jones moved toward Swift and stood over him,
pointing the gun at him. Swift appeared to kick at the gun, and
the clip fell out of the gun and onto the floor. Swift got up and
limped away. Woolridge-Jones picked up the clip, put it back
in the gun, and ran after Swift. In the surveillance footage,
Swift did not appear to be armed, and a nearby witness testi-
fied that a youth matching Woolridge-Jones’ description was
the only one with a gun.
Meanwhile, the sound of gunshots caused bystanders to
flee. Piggie, Moten-Roddy, and Veland ran to a set of escala-
tors. Piggie and Moten-Roddy boarded the ascending escalator
before Veland, who soon stepped past Piggie. Surveillance
footage showed that just before Veland stepped onto the esca-
lator, she appeared to limp and looked down at her feet. She
testified that she looked at her feet because it felt like her
body was “on fire.”
As Piggie, Moten-Roddy, and Veland went up the escala-
tor, Swift ran toward the escalators, followed by Woolridge-
Jones. Woolridge-Jones raised his arm and fired two more
shots toward Swift. Swift fell to the floor at the bottom of the
escalators.
As Swift fell to the floor, Moten-Roddy and Veland arrived
at the top of the escalator. Piggie, only halfway up the escala-
tor, took a handgun out of his jacket and extended his right
arm over the railing, in the direction of Woolridge-Jones, and

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
316 Nebraska Reports
STATE v. WOOLRIDGE-JONES
Cite as 316 Neb. 500
fired shots. When Piggie neared the top of the escalator, he
appeared to stow the gun in his coat.
Swift then limped away from the escalators and collapsed.
He later died at a hospital.
Veland testified that after she exited the mall, she realized
she had been shot and sought medical treatment. It revealed
that her left leg was grazed by a bullet and that a bullet had
lodged in her right lower leg. At the time of trial, the bullet
remained in Veland’s leg.
(b) Forensic Evidence
The forensic pathologist who performed the autopsy on
Swift testified. She opined that Swift’s cause of death was
blood loss due to a combination of two gunshot wounds, one
that entered his left buttocks and one that entered his lower
back or hip area.
The jury heard testimony by a senior forensic technician
and firearm and toolmark examiner with the police depart-
ment. She testified that investigators at the scene recovered
multiple shell casings ejected from two different weapons.
These included two .40-caliber shell casings where Woolridge-
Jones fired his initial shots and two more .40-caliber shell
casings near the escalators, all ejected from the same weapon.
Along the escalators, investigators also recovered three 9-mm
shell casings, which had been ejected from another weapon.
Investigators did not recover any firearms inside the mall
or from Swift; nor did they find the gun Woolridge-Jones
had used.
(c) Woolridge-Jones’ Statements to Police
Police identified Woolridge-Jones as a shooter in the inci-
dent and arrested him at his home the next day. There was
testimony that while exiting the home in custody, Woolridge-
Jones cried and stated, “‘It was an accident. It was an accident.
It was an accident. He pulled a gun on me.’” He also told
officers, “‘I didn’t mean to kill that man.’” After advising

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
316 Nebraska Reports
STATE v. WOOLRIDGE-JONES
Cite as 316 Neb. 500
Woolridge-Jones of his rights, detectives interviewed him.
Portions of the interrogation video were published to the jury.
During the interview, Woolridge-Jones told police that
Swift threatened to follow him out to his car in the parking
lot and shoot him. Woolridge-Jones also claimed Swift threat-
ened to kill him. Woolridge-Jones told the detectives that
he would not let anyone kill his brother and that he would
die before allowing his brother to die. He told investigators
that he kept a gun on him for protection and that he believed
everyone should.
Woolridge-Jones admitted that he shot Swift and made sev-
eral statements about the moments surrounding the shooting.
Woolridge-Jones said he showed Swift the gun and told him
to get back, but Woolridge-Jones said he had to shoot because
Swift started grabbing for something. He similarly stated,
“[Swift] started grabbing something . . . ‘[s]o I shot him.’”
Woolridge-Jones also stated, “‘[Swift] tried to shoot me. I shot
him before he could shoot me.’” Woolridge-Jones admitted
that he fired a total of three or four shots. Woolridge-Jones also
stated that that he tried to aim below Swift’s waist when he
shot. He described the incident as an “out-of-body” experience
and denied following Swift after the initial shots.
(d) Expert Testimony Excluded
(i) Motion in Limine
Prior to trial, the district court sustained the State’s motion
in limine to exclude the trial testimony of licensed psychologist
Colleen Conoley, Ph.D., who had evaluated Woolridge-Jones.
The State expected Conoley to testify about Woolridge-Jones’
state of mind during the shooting. This expectation was based
on Conoley’s testimony and report received as evidence at
an earlier hearing on a motion to transfer the case to juvenile
court. According to that evidence, Conoley opined that because
of past gun-related trauma, when Woolridge-Jones fired the ini-
tial shot at the mall, it put him in a state of “peritraumatic dis-
sociation, with depersonalization and peritraumatic amnesia.”

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
316 Nebraska Reports
STATE v. WOOLRIDGE-JONES
Cite as 316 Neb. 500
The State suggested that Conoley’s testimony was not rel-
evant and that even if relevant, it was not admissible relevant
evidence under Neb. Evid. R. 403, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-403
(Reissue 2016). The State also submitted that Conoley’s tes-
timony was not admissible expert testimony pursuant to Neb.
Evid. R. 702, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-702 (Reissue 2016), because
it would not assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence
or determine a factual issue.
The district court sustained the motion in limine. For pur-
poses of the motion, the district court assumed sufficient
foundation, and it found that Conoley qualified as an expert.
However, the district court determined that Conoley’s testi-
mony would not assist the trier of fact in understanding the
evidence or determining a controverted factual issue.
(ii) Offer of Proof
During trial, Woolridge-Jones made an offer of proof out-
side the presence of the jury, seeking admission of Conoley’s
testimony. The State stipulated that Conoley qualified as an
expert witness, and Conoley testified for purposes of the offer
of proof. Conoley opined that Woolridge-Jones experienced
symptoms of peritraumatic dissociation “in regards to” the
incident at the mall.
Conoley defined peritraumatic dissociation as “disintegra-
tion of information processing” that occurs “at the time of
trauma or immediately surrounding it.” She further explained:
So typically the brain will simultaneously process sen-
sory information, integrates it into a reasonable time — or
temporal processing is what we call it — and integrates
decision-making and information interpretation.
Dissociation means that these processes are no longer
integrated, and so the most common of these symptoms
would be what we refer to as depersonalization and
derealization.
And depersonalization is the phenomenon of either
an 	out-of-body 	experience 	or 	watching 	yourself 	do

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
316 Nebraska Reports
STATE v. WOOLRIDGE-JONES
Cite as 316 Neb. 500
something or distortions and how your body feels or what
it looks like. . . .
Derealization is when the world around them seems
distorted or unreal for some reason as in a cartoon or
things in space aren’t where they should be type of
phenomenon.
Their dissociative symptoms are lapses in temporal
processing, not being able to judge time or things not
happening according to schedule . . . . And the other
would be — and this is a little bit more rare, but a dis-
sociative amnesia type of episode.
When asked to explain “autonomic response as it relates
to peritraumatic dissociation,” Conoley testified that parts of
the brain can function while other parts are unaware of those
functions. According to Conoley, “in times of severe fear,
. . . parts of the brain within the limbic system, specifically
the amygdala, can hijack the rest of the brain and operate on
[their] own.” She elaborated, “[I]t can shut down pathways
to the frontal lobes, which means that there is no access to
decision-making, thought processing, or general awareness
of what the limbic system is doing in certain cases.” In situ-
ations of heightened stress or threat, Conoley continued, the
amygdala “will hyper-focus and put all of the attention on
where it thinks the threat is most likely to come from” and the
brain “will take a tunnel-vision approach where nothing else
is being processed.”
Conoley testified that peritraumatic amnesia is a symptom
of peritraumatic dissociation. She explained that those who
exhibit peritraumatic amnesia would not have the sensation
that they had forgotten something; instead, they would not
know that something happened until they were “confronted
with their memory of events compared to what could be seen
on something like a video.” According to Conoley, this is a
sign that the amygdala and the limbic system were “the only
part[s] of his brain” that were processing information during
the event. Conoley further elaborated that “the brain doesn’t

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
316 Nebraska Reports
STATE v. WOOLRIDGE-JONES
Cite as 316 Neb. 500
put in a placeholder saying, ‘This information is missing.’
It likes to integrate. It likes to have explanations. It pieces
things together.”
Conoley 	identified 	several 	reasons 	why 	she 	believed
Woolridge-Jones had experienced peritraumatic dissociation.
She relied in part on his statements to police that he had an out-
of-body experience. Conoley acknowledged that Woolridge-
Jones also told her he felt like he was still in control during the
shooting; but she testified that this did not negate her conclu-
sion that Woolridge-Jones experienced peritraumatic dissocia-
tion. She specified:
[T]hat tells me two things: One is that his memory is
based on his perception, and so his perception at the
time was that even though he left his body, he felt like
he was in control, and so that is how his brain integrated
that information.
The other thing that [it] tells me is that . . . there wasn’t
any added embellishment or drama, or, you know, he
wasn’t making this more dramatic than it needed to be.
But that would be his perception because you can only
remember what you perceived.
. . . .
. . . He perceived that he was in control, and so his
limbic system was in control, but his thought processing
was not.
Conoley also cited “indications that [Woolridge-Jones] was
missing time, that he didn’t remember pursuing [Swift] or
running anywhere else, and that he was very shocked by the
idea that he would do that because, in his autobiographical
memory, he was defending himself and then running from the
threat.” Conoley further characterized the episode as consist-
ent with peritraumatic amnesia because, rather than forgetting
the entire incident, Woolridge-Jones’ “episode was under 30
seconds” and he lacked “a consolidated memory because his
prefrontal cortex was not encoding [the] information.”

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
316 Nebraska Reports
STATE v. WOOLRIDGE-JONES
Cite as 316 Neb. 500
Conoley testified that “the firing of the gun” was the pre-
cipitating event for the peritraumatic dissociation and that
Woolridge-Jones’ history made him particularly vulnerable
to that state. For example, Conoley cited Woolridge-Jones’
prior history of gun-related trauma. Conoley also noted that
Woolridge-Jones used marijuana chronically from an early
age, making “depersonalization and derealization mechanisms
more likely to occur.”
Conoley 	disclaimed 	diagnosing 	Woolridge-Jones 	with 	a
dissociative disorder or a specific pathology associated with
peritraumatic dissociation. Instead, she diagnosed him with
“unspecified trauma disorder,” because “he does not have
enough symptoms to categorize him as having any type of
dissociative disorder.” She testified that “peritraumatic disso-
ciation is not necessarily pathological in and of itself. It is a
response in the moment to trauma that can happen to anyone.”
Conoley testified that her conclusions were based on her
interview with Woolridge-Jones, the interrogation by police,
surveillance video from the mall, and professional literature
on the subject. As to this latter resource, Conoley recounted
that dissociation had been observed and discussed for over 100
years. More recently, she testified, research found that when
police officers fired a firearm for the first time in the line of
duty, there was a dissociative symptom 90 percent of the time,
the most common symptoms being derealization and deper-
sonalization. Regarding the police interview, Conoley testified
that Woolridge-Jones’ statements to police were the “most
pure version of what he remembers because, after he was
shown the footage, from that point on, his memory became
contaminated because he then knew that something was wrong
with his recount.”
Some 	of 	Conoley’s 	testimony 	pertained 	to 	whether
Woolridge-Jones’ statements to her and to police were exagger-
ated or feigned. Conoley acknowledged that Woolridge-Jones’
statements to her and to police about an out-of-body experi-
ence could be self-serving. But Conoley also testified that

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316 Nebraska Reports
STATE v. WOOLRIDGE-JONES
Cite as 316 Neb. 500
malingering or validity scales were built into the personality
measures she employed with Woolridge-Jones and that “there
was no indication that he was trying to exaggerate or feign any
type of condition.” Conoley continued:
And then also . . . I rereviewed the literature base to
look for ways to assess for malingering and claims of
amnesia because, obviously, there would be a benefit to
[Woolridge-Jones] to have this explained away. And other
than seeing that there would be a benefit, none of the
other factors applied.
There were no indications of exaggeration. He didn’t
report phenomen[a] that were inconsistent with anything
that’s been observed. He didn’t develop any type of
fantasy that was based on what we’ve all seen [o]n TV
where people have multiple personalities or black out
or, you know, it all went red. He didn’t engage in any of
those, I guess, types of behaviors or reports.
Conoley agreed that this was true both in Woolridge-Jones’
police interview and in his interview with Conoley.
At the conclusion of the offer of proof, the district court
excluded Conoley’s testimony pursuant to §§ 27-403 and
27-702. It found that Conoley was qualified as an expert wit-
ness. However, unlike its earlier ruling that assumed foun-
dation, the district court specifically found that there was
not sufficient and proper foundation for her to testify that
Woolridge-Jones’ own act of firing a gun resulted in peritrau-
matic dissociation with depersonalization and peritraumatic
amnesia. And even if foundation was sufficient, Conoley’s
opinion, the district court found, would not assist the jury as
the trier of fact. Further, even if there was marginal relevance
to her opinion, the district court stated it would be excluded
because its probative value was substantially outweighed by
the danger of unfair prejudice.
3. Verdicts and Sentencing
The jury was instructed on the charged offenses. For the
first degree murder charge, this included an instruction on the

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STATE v. WOOLRIDGE-JONES
Cite as 316 Neb. 500
lesser-included offenses of second degree murder and man-
slaughter. As for the charge of second degree assault, the jury
was instructed that the elements required Woolridge-Jones
to have intentionally or knowingly caused bodily injury to
Veland. The jury instructions explained that the homicide and
assault charges were the predicate felonies for the charges
of use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony. They further
directed that when “one attempts to assault a certain person,
but by mistake or inadvertence assaults a different person, the
crime, if any, so committed is the same as though the person
originally intended to be assaulted, had been assaulted.” The
jury was also advised that if Woolridge-Jones acted in self-
defense or defense of another, it must acquit him.
The 	jury 	found 	Woolridge-Jones 	guilty 	of 	the 	lesser-
included offense of second degree murder, second degree
assault, and two counts of use of a deadly weapon to commit
a felony. The district court accepted the verdicts and entered
conviction. It ordered a presentence report, which included
Conoley’s report.
At the sentencing hearing, the district court noted that it
had considered the presentence report and the appropriate
statutory factors, as well as Woolridge-Jones’ age, mentality,
education and experience, social and cultural background,
past criminal record or record of law-abiding conduct, the
motivation for the offense, the nature of the offense, and the
amount of violence involved. The district court recounted
that Woolridge-Jones was 17 years old at sentencing and
that surveillance footage in evidence showed him discharg-
ing a firearm at Swift, pursuing Swift while continuing to
shoot, and shooting Veland in the process. The district court
further noted that Woolridge-Jones had been in the criminal
justice system since the age of 13, serving juvenile probation
between the ages of 14 and 15. The district court observed
that while incarcerated for the current offense, Woolridge-
Jones had incurred seven disciplinary lockdown penalties, six
of them for fighting. The district court also acknowledged

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STATE v. WOOLRIDGE-JONES
Cite as 316 Neb. 500
that testing measures placed Woolridge-Jones in the very high
risk category for community-based supervision and found him
to be at a very high risk to reoffend.
The district court sentenced Woolridge-Jones to 50 to 80
years’ imprisonment for second degree murder and 10 to 20
years’ imprisonment for second degree assault, to be served
concurrently. For each of the two counts of use of a deadly
weapon 	to 	commit 	a 	felony, 	the 	district 	court 	sentenced
Woolridge-Jones to the mandatory minimum 5 to 10 years’
imprisonment, to be served consecutively to each other and to
the sentences imposed for murder and assault.
Woolridge-Jones appeals.
II. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
Woolridge-Jones assigns (1) that the district court erred in
excluding Conoley’s expert opinion testimony; (2) that the
evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions for second
degree murder, second degree assault, and two counts of use of
a deadly weapon to commit a felony; and (3) that the district
court erred in imposing excessive sentences.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
[1] An appellate court reviews a trial court’s ruling to admit
or exclude an expert’s testimony for abuse of discretion. State
v. Braesch, 292 Neb. 930, 874 N.W.2d 874 (2016).
[2] In reviewing a criminal conviction for a sufficiency of
the evidence claim, whether the evidence is direct, circum-
stantial, or a combination thereof, the standard is the same: An
appellate court does not resolve conflicts in the evidence, pass
on the credibility of witnesses, or reweigh the evidence; such
matters are for the finder of fact. State v. Stack, 307 Neb. 773,
950 N.W.2d 611 (2020). The relevant question for an appel-
late court is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact
could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt. Id.

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STATE v. WOOLRIDGE-JONES
Cite as 316 Neb. 500
[3,4] Absent an abuse of discretion by the trial court, an
appellate court will not disturb a sentence imposed within the
statutory limits. State v. Johnson, 308 Neb. 331, 953 N.W.2d
772 (2021). An abuse of discretion occurs when a trial court’s
decision is based upon reasons that are untenable or unreason-
able or if its action is clearly against justice or conscience,
reason, and evidence. Id.
IV. ANALYSIS
1. Expert Testimony
Woolridge-Jones contends that the district court erred in
excluding Conoley’s expert opinion testimony that he experi-
enced an episode of peritraumatic dissociation after firing the
initial shot. We discern no such error.
As they did in the district court, the parties dispute whether
Conoley’s testimony was admissible expert testimony pursuant
to § 27-702. Perhaps, below, the State could have challenged
the admission of Conoley’s expert testimony by invoking
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579,
113 S. Ct. 2786, 125 L. Ed. 2d 469 (1993), and Schafersman v.
Agland Coop, 262 Neb. 215, 631 N.W.2d 862 (2001) (Daubert/
Schafersman). See, e.g., State v. Gleaton, 316 Neb. 114, 3
N.W.3d 334 (2024). Under the Daubert/Schafersman frame-
work, the trial court acts as a gatekeeper to ensure the eviden-
tiary relevance and reliability of an expert’s opinion. Gleaton,
supra. The Daubert/Schafersman framework provides several
nonexclusive factors a trial court may consider in assess-
ing reliability. See Gleaton, supra. Here, the State did not
appear to specifically address those factors before the district
court, and the district court did not rule on reliability grounds.
Likewise on appeal, neither party addresses the reliability of
Conoley’s opinion under Daubert/Schafersman. Accordingly,
we focus our analysis on the issues related to § 27-702 argued
by the parties.
[5] Section 27-702 provides that “[i]f scientific, technical,
or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to

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STATE v. WOOLRIDGE-JONES
Cite as 316 Neb. 500
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a wit-
ness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an
opinion or otherwise.” And we have identified four preliminary
questions that must be answered in order to determine whether
an expert’s testimony is admissible: (1) whether the witness
qualifies as an expert pursuant to § 27-702; (2) whether the
expert’s testimony is relevant; (3) whether the expert’s testi-
mony will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence
or determine a controverted factual issue; and (4) whether
the expert’s testimony, even though relevant and admissible,
should be excluded in light of § 27-403 because its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair preju-
dice or other considerations. See State v. Greer, 312 Neb. 351,
979 N.W.2d 101 (2022).
[6] In addition to the foregoing, we have also recognized
that expert testimony should not be received if it appears the
witness is not in possession of such facts as will enable him
or her to express a reasonably accurate conclusion, as distin-
guished from mere guess or conjecture. Scurlocke v. Hansen,
268 Neb. 548, 684 N.W.2d 565 (2004). Even if an expert pos-
sesses specialized knowledge, his or her testimony is properly
excluded if the record does not support a finding that the expert
had a sufficient foundation for his or her opinion. See id.
In this case, the district court’s ruling after the offer of proof
found that Conoley qualified as an expert under § 27-702, but
it determined that her testimony was inadmissible based on any
one of several other reasons. According to the district court,
there was not sufficient and proper foundation for Conoley to
testify that Woolridge-Jones’ own act of firing a gun resulted
in peritraumatic dissociation. The district court also found
that even if foundation were sufficient, Conoley’s opinion
would not assist the trier of fact. Further, the district court
stated that even if Conoley’s opinion had any relevance, its
probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice.

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On appeal, Woolridge-Jones argues that Conoley’s opinion
would have assisted the trier of fact in determining whether
Woolridge-Jones acted with deliberate and premeditated mal-
ice for purposes of the first degree murder charge, see Neb.
Rev. Stat. § 28-303 (Cum. Supp. 2022), or acted intentionally
for purposes of the lesser-included offense of second degree
murder, see Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-304 (Reissue 2016). Because
Woolridge-Jones was convicted of second degree murder, we
focus on whether Conoley’s testimony would have assisted the
jury in determining whether Woolridge-Jones acted with the
requisite intent to be found guilty of that crime.
Woolridge-Jones argues that Conoley’s opinions that he
experienced depersonalization and derealization would have
been “especially relevant to aid the jury” in determining
whether he acted intentionally. Brief for appellant at 19. We
disagree that the district court abused its discretion by conclud-
ing that Conoley’s opinions concerning depersonalization and
derealization would not have assisted the trier of fact.
On this point, we are guided by State v. Braesch, 292 Neb.
930, 874 N.W.2d 874 (2016). In Braesch, the defendant was
tried for first degree murder. The district court excluded an
expert’s opinion that the defendant’s bipolar disorder limited
his ability to make good decisions and to effectively regulate
his behavior. On appeal, we concluded the expert’s testimony
was properly excluded in part because it would not assist the
trier of fact. We observed that the State had the burden to
prove that the defendant killed another purposely and with
deliberate and premeditated malice. However, the expert’s
opinion could not be applied to the facts of the case because
it did not speak to whether the disorder prevented the defend-
ant from “deliberat[ing] and premeditat[ing] the killing,” as
we defined those terms. Id. at 952, 874 N.W.2d at 890. We
said that the expert’s opinion that the defendant’s “bipolar
. . . disorder limited his ability to effectively regulate his
behavior was too vague to assist the fact finder” in deciding
whether the defendant deliberated or premeditated the killing.

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Id. at 952, 874 N.W.2d at 891. We explained that even if
the defendant’s “decisionmaking” was impaired, the expert’s
testimony did not show how that impairment prevented the
defendant from forming the statutory mental state for first
degree murder. Id.
Similarly, here, we find no abuse of discretion in the dis-
trict court’s conclusion that opinions regarding Woolridge-
Jones’ experiencing depersonalization, derealization, or even
peritraumatic amnesia would not have assisted the jury in
determining whether he acted with the requisite intent to be
convicted of second degree murder. A person commits second
degree murder by causing the death of another person inten-
tionally, but without premeditation. § 28-304. In the context
of a criminal statute, we have said “intentionally” means will-
fully or purposely, and not accidentally or involuntarily. See
State v. Morton, 310 Neb. 355, 966 N.W.2d 57 (2021). As we
have noted, in her testimony, Conoley characterized deper-
sonalization as the phenomenon of an out-of-body experience
or the experience of distortions in how a person’s body feels
or what it looks like. She described derealization as when
things appear distorted or unreal to a person. She asserted
that peritraumatic amnesia involved a lack of memory of brief
periods. She did not, however, offer any explanation as to
how Woolridge-Jones’ experiencing any of these phenomena
would have affected his ability to act willfully or purposely as
opposed to accidentally or involuntarily. On this basis, we find
that the district court did not abuse its discretion in determin-
ing that Conoley’s opinions that Woolridge-Jones experienced
these phenomena would not have aided the jury in deciding
the issue of intent.
Although less of a focus of Woolridge-Jones’ arguments on
appeal, we acknowledge that in the offer of proof, Conoley
also 	offered 	some 	testimony 	regarding 	the 	relationship
between peritraumatic dissociation and the function of the
brain. Specifically, Conoley testified that when a person under-
goes peritraumatic dissociation, “parts of the brain within the

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STATE v. WOOLRIDGE-JONES
Cite as 316 Neb. 500
limbic system, specifically the amygdala, can hijack the rest of
the brain and operate on [their] own.” She further explained,
“[I]t can shut down pathways to the frontal lobes, which
means that there is no access to decision-making, thought
processing, or general awareness of what the limbic system is
doing in certain cases.” For reasons similar to those discussed
above, we find that the district court acted within its discretion
to find that these opinions would not assist the trier of fact.
First, Conoley certainly referred to operation of the “limbic
system” to the exclusion of other parts of the brain, but she
did not offer any explanation to assist lay jurors in deciding
whether “what the limbic system is doing” would be willful or
purposeful, rather than accidental or involuntary. Additionally,
all of the testimony summarized above was framed in terms
of processes that can occur when a person undergoes peritrau-
matic dissociation. This testimony, however, did not provide
the jury with a basis to determine whether Woolridge-Jones
actually experienced these processes in this case.
We recognize that Conoley also opined that while Woolridge-
Jones’ “limbic system was in control, . . . his thought proc-
essing was not.” Although this type of testimony arguably
comes closer to speaking to whether Woolridge-Jones acted
with the requisite intent, it runs into other problems, as we
will explain.
Conoley largely based her opinion that Woolridge-Jones
experienced peritraumatic dissociation after he fired the first
shots on Woolridge-Jones’ account of the incident, particu-
larly his claims that he felt like he was outside of his body
and that he did not remember chasing Swift down after he
fired the initial shots. In State v. Braesch, 292 Neb. 930, 950,
874 N.W.2d 874, 890 (2016), in the course of explaining
that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding
the expert testimony unreliable, we observed that the district
court was “justifiably concerned” that the expert primar-
ily relied on the defendant’s self-reporting of his bipolar
symptoms, when the defendant had an incentive to falsify

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or exaggerate those symptoms. As Conoley herself acknowl-
edged, Woolridge-Jones would have had similar incentives to
minimize his culpability for Swift’s death.
And even if the fact that Conoley relied on Woolridge-
Jones’ self-reporting could be overlooked, we cannot ignore
that Conoley seems to have credited Woolridge-Jones’ self-
report only to the degree that it buttressed her conclusion:
Conoley largely accepted Woolridge-Jones’ account, but she
dismissed his statement in his interview with her that “he
was still in control, but felt like he had left his own body,”
as Woolridge-Jones’ mere perception that he was in control.
According to Conoley, Woolridge-Jones would have perceived
that he was in control because his “limbic system was in
control.” Although Conoley did explain the testing measures
that led her to believe Woolridge-Jones’ overall account, she
did not meaningfully explain why she dismissed his state-
ment that he was in control as mere perception, not reality.
In our view, Conoley’s conclusory explanation for why she
largely based her opinion on Woolridge-Jones’ self-reporting,
but dismissed his self-reporting when it did not support her
conclusion, reveals an absence of adequate foundation for her
opinion regarding Woolridge-Jones’ “control” after the initial
shots were fired. See Scurlocke v. Hansen, 268 Neb. 548, 684
N.W.2d 565 (2004).
Having concluded that the district court did not abuse
its discretion for the reasons discussed above, we need not
address the other grounds for exclusion articulated by the dis-
trict court. See State v. Huston, 298 Neb. 323, 903 N.W.2d 907
(2017) (appellate court is not obligated to engage in analysis
that is not necessary to adjudicate case and controversy before
it). With this evidentiary issue resolved, we turn to Woolridge-
Jones’ remaining assignments of error.
2. Sufficiency of Evidence
Woolridge-Jones assigns that the evidence was not suf-
ficient to support his convictions. His arguments focus on
second degree murder and second degree assault, and we

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understand him to suggest that without sufficient proof of
these underlying felonies, the evidence was also insufficient to
support his convictions for use of a deadly weapon to commit
a felony. See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-1205 (Reissue 2016). We
are unpersuaded.
[7] We begin with Woolridge-Jones’ contention that the
evidence was insufficient to convict him of second degree
murder. As we observed above, § 28-304 provides that a
person commits second degree murder by causing the death
of another person intentionally, but without premeditation.
Again, we have held that in the context of a criminal statute,
“intentionally” means willfully or purposely, and not acciden-
tally or involuntarily. See State v. Morton, 310 Neb. 355, 966
N.W.2d 57 (2021). A trier of fact may infer that the defendant
intended the natural and probable consequences of the defend-
ant’s voluntary acts. Id.
Evidence at trial, primarily surveillance footage and foren-
sic evidence, supported the jury’s finding that Woolridge-
Jones intentionally killed Swift and thereby committed sec-
ond degree murder. According to that evidence, during an
argument with Swift, Woolridge-Jones produced a handgun,
pointed it at Swift, and fired two shots. Swift fell to the
floor, and Woolridge-Jones moved and stood over Swift,
still pointing the gun at him. When the clip fell out of the
gun, Woolridge-Jones picked it up and put it back in. He
then ran after Swift, who had limped away. During this pur-
suit, Woolridge-Jones fired toward Swift twice more. Two of
Woolridge-Jones’ shots hit Swift, killing him. There was no
evidence that Swift was armed. Based on this sequence of
events, the jury could infer that Woolridge-Jones intended the
natural and probable consequences of shooting at Swift mul-
tiple times: Swift’s death.
Woolridge-Jones highlights other evidence, such as his
statements to police that he believed Swift had pulled out
a gun, that he aimed below Swift’s waist, and that he acted
to protect his brother amid threats by Swift. To the extent

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STATE v. WOOLRIDGE-JONES
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Woolridge-Jones argues that the evidence supported at most
a manslaughter conviction, see Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-305(1)
(Reissue 2016), or that his actions were justified by self-
defense or defense of another, see Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 28-1409
and 28-1410 (Reissue 2016), he asks us to make credibility
determinations, reweigh the evidence, and reach our own
conclusion. But that was the jury’s role, not ours. See State v.
Stack, 307 Neb. 773, 950 N.W.2d 611 (2020) (appellate court
does not resolve conflicts in evidence, pass on credibility of
witnesses, or reweigh evidence; such matters are for finder of
fact). Our inquiry is whether, viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to the prosecution, a rational jury could have
found the essential elements of second degree murder beyond
a reasonable doubt and that the evidence did not support the
justification of defense. See id. In finding Woolridge-Jones
guilty of second degree murder, the jury apparently discredited
his version of events. And as recounted above, there was suf-
ficient evidence to support the jury’s finding that Woolridge-
Jones’ actions satisfied the elements of second degree murder
and that he did not act in defense. Woolridge-Jones’ arguments
to the contrary lack merit.
As for second degree assault, Woolridge-Jones makes two
alternative sufficiency of the evidence arguments: first, that
there was insufficient evidence that he shot Veland at all, and
second, that even if he did shoot her, the elements of second
degree assault were not satisfied. We find neither argument
has merit.
First, we are unconvinced by Woolridge-Jones’ conten-
tion that the evidence was insufficient to prove that he shot
Veland. He points out that Veland did not realize she had
been shot until after she left the mall and that a bullet was not
recovered from her leg to link her injuries to Woolridge-Jones’
gun. Woolridge-Jones suggests instead that it was Piggie who
shot Veland. We disagree with Woolridge-Jones and conclude
that the jury rationally could have found that Woolridge-Jones
shot Veland.

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STATE v. WOOLRIDGE-JONES
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There was circumstantial evidence from which a rational
trier of fact could find that shots fired by Woolridge-Jones,
not Piggie, struck Veland and injured her legs before she
reached the escalator. Veland was nearby when Woolridge-
Jones fired his initial shots. Afterward, surveillance footage
viewed by the jury showed Veland fleeing. As she approached
the escalator, she appeared to limp and looked down at her
feet. Veland explained that she did so because it felt like her
body was “on fire.” Shell casings at the scene supported the
theory that only Woolridge-Jones had fired shots at this point.
Although Piggie fired shots from the escalator, by that time,
Veland was several steps above him, and as Piggie fired, he
pointed his gun away from Veland. Shell casings recovered
near the escalator suggested that this was the only time Piggie
discharged his gun and that he could not have shot Veland.
Second, we are also unpersuaded by Woolridge-Jones’ posi-
tion that even if he did shoot Veland, the elements of second
degree assault were not satisfied. Consistent with the jury
instructions here, one of the ways a person can commit second
degree assault is by “[i]ntentionally or knowingly caus[ing]
bodily injury to another person with a dangerous instrument.”
See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-309(1)(a) (Reissue 2016). The jury
was also instructed on the doctrine of transferred intent, that
is, if it found that Woolridge-Jones intended to cause bodily
injury to Swift but injured Veland by mistake, the intent to
injure Swift would function as the intent to injure Veland,
even though she was not Woolridge-Jones’ target. See State
v. Morrow, 237 Neb. 653, 467 N.W.2d 63 (1991) (holding
evidence sufficient to support second degree murder convic-
tion where defendant pointed gun at neck of person with
whom he had exchanged angry words, fired, and missed, but
hit and killed another person). As we have explained, there
was evidence to support the jury’s findings that Woolridge-
Jones intentionally killed Swift without the justification of
self-defense or defense of another and that in the process, he
shot Veland too. Under the doctrine of transferred intent, this

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evidence was sufficient for the jury to find that Woolridge-
Jones intentionally caused bodily injury to Veland with a dan-
gerous instrument.
For these reasons, we conclude that the evidence at trial was
sufficient to support Woolridge-Jones’ convictions for second
degree murder, second degree assault, and use of a deadly
weapon to commit a felony.
3. Excessive Sentences
Finally, Woolridge-Jones assigns that the district court erred
in imposing excessive sentences. He does not dispute that he
was sentenced within statutory limits, but he argues that the
district court erred by failing to account for the mitigating
effects of Woolridge-Jones’ young age, limited education, dif-
ficult upbringing, and brief criminal history. Woolridge-Jones
also emphasizes his mental health struggles and his efforts
toward avoiding future criminal behavior, such as taking
responsibility for the offenses and continuing his education.
[8-10] Where a sentence imposed within the statutory limits
is alleged on appeal to be excessive, the appellate court must
determine whether a sentencing court abused its discretion
in considering and applying the relevant factors as well as
any applicable legal principles in determining the sentence
to be imposed. State v. Stack, 307 Neb. 773, 950 N.W.2d 611
(2020). In determining a sentence to be imposed, relevant fac-
tors customarily considered and applied are the defendant’s
(1) age, (2) mentality, (3) education and experience, (4) social
and cultural background, (5) past criminal record or record
of law-abiding conduct, and (6) motivation for the offense,
as well as (7) the nature of the offense and (8) the amount
of violence involved in the commission of the crime. Id. The
appropriateness of a sentence is necessarily a subjective judg-
ment and includes the sentencing judge’s observation of the
defendant’s demeanor and attitude and all the facts and cir-
cumstances surrounding the defendant’s life. Id.
The record reflects that the district court considered the
factors enumerated above, along with other information in

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the presentence report and statements at the sentencing hear-
ing. Thus, it assessed the mitigating factors proffered by
Woolridge-Jones. But in addition to those mitigating factors,
the district court considered that Woolridge-Jones had con-
tacts with the criminal justice system from a young age; that
in the present case, Woolridge-Jones chased Swift through
a shopping mall while firing shots, hitting both Swift and
Veland; and that evaluations showed a very high risk that
Woolridge-Jones would reoffend. Although the district court
did not specifically address every sentencing factor in sen-
tencing Woolridge-Jones, we have rejected the notion that a
court does not adequately consider sentencing factors when
it does not discuss each one of them during the sentencing
hearing or in its sentencing order. See State v. Blaha, 303
Neb. 415, 929 N.W.2d 494 (2019). Based on our review of
the record and the relevant considerations, we conclude that
the district court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing
Woolridge-Jones.
V. CONCLUSION
We find no merit to Woolridge-Jones’ contentions. We there-
fore affirm.
Affirmed.