Seemann v. Seemann

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
316 Nebraska Reports
SEEMANN v. SEEMANN
Cite as 316 Neb. 671
Clint Seemann, appellee, v.
Lisa Seemann, appellant.
___ N.W.3d ___
Filed May 24, 2024. 	No. S-23-132.
1. Divorce: Child Custody: Property Division: Alimony: Attorney
Fees: Appeal and Error. In a marital dissolution action, an appellate
court reviews the case de novo on the record to determine whether there
has been an abuse of discretion by the trial judge in his or her determi-
nations regarding custody, child support, division of property, alimony,
and attorney fees.
2. Judges: Words and Phrases. A judicial abuse of discretion exists if the
reasons or rulings of a trial judge are clearly untenable, unfairly depriv-
ing a litigant of a substantial right and denying just results in matters
submitted for disposition.
3. Evidence: Appeal and Error. In a review de novo on the record, an
appellate court is required to make independent factual determinations
based upon the record, and the court reaches its own independent con-
clusions with respect to the matters at issue.
4. ____: ____. When evidence is in conflict, the appellate court considers
and may give weight to the fact that the trial court heard and observed
the witnesses and accepted one version of the facts rather than another.
5. Antenuptial Agreements: Property Division. Spouses are able to con-
tract around the general rules of equitable division by using a premari-
tal agreement.
6. Antenuptial Agreements. As a contract, an antenuptial agreement is
governed by the same principles that are applicable to other contracts,
but is subject to the particular statutory requirement that an antenuptial
agreement must be based on fair disclosure.
7. Contracts: Intent. When the terms of a contract are clear, a court may
not resort to rules of construction, and terms are accorded their plain and
ordinary meaning as an ordinary or reasonable person would understand
them. In such a case, a court shall seek to ascertain the intention of the
parties from the plain language of the contract.
Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
10/14/2026 08:35 AM CDT

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
316 Nebraska Reports
SEEMANN v. SEEMANN
Cite as 316 Neb. 671
8. Divorce: Property Division. In a marital dissolution action, the pur-
pose of a property division is to distribute the marital assets equitably
between the parties.
9. ____: ____. In a marital dissolution action, there is no mathematical
formula by which property awards can be precisely determined, but as
a general rule, a spouse should be awarded one-third to one-half of the
marital estate, the polestar being fairness and reasonableness as deter-
mined by the facts of each case.
10. ____: ____. Any given property can constitute a mixture of marital and
nonmarital interests; a portion of an asset can be marital property while
another portion can be separate property. The original value of an asset
may be nonmarital, while all or some portion of the appreciation of that
asset may be marital.
11. ____: ____. Separate property becomes marital property by commin-
gling if it is inextricably mixed with marital property or with the
separate property of the other spouse. If the separate property remains
segregated or is traceable into its product, commingling does not occur.
12. Expert Witnesses. The determination of the weight that should be given
expert testimony is uniquely the province of the fact finder.
13. Alimony: Time. The reasonable duration of an alimony award depends
on the specific facts in a given case, often the amount of time required
to allow the recipient spouse to support himself or herself.
14. Alimony. Alimony should not be used to equalize the incomes of the
parties or to punish one of the parties. Rather, the primary purpose of
alimony is to assist an ex-spouse for a period of time necessary for that
individual to secure his or her own means of support.
15. Alimony: Appeal and Error. In reviewing an alimony award, an appel-
late court does not determine whether it would have awarded the same
amount of alimony as did the trial court, but whether the trial court’s
award is untenable such as to deprive a party of a substantial right or
just result with the ultimate criterion being reasonableness.
16. Divorce: Attorney Fees. In awarding attorney fees in a dissolution
action, a court shall consider the nature of the case, the amount involved
in the controversy, the services actually performed, the results obtained,
the length of time required for preparation and presentation of the case,
the novelty and difficulty of the questions raised, and the customary
charges of the bar for similar services.
Appeal from the District Court for Douglas County: Tressa
M. Alioth, Judge. Affirmed in part, affirmed in part as modi-
fied, and in part reversed and remanded with directions.

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
316 Nebraska Reports
SEEMANN v. SEEMANN
Cite as 316 Neb. 671
John A. McWilliams, Frederick D. Stehlik, and Alexandria
M. Bartels, of Gross, Welch, Marks & Clare, P.C., L.L.O., for
appellant.
Christopher A. Vacanti and William L. Finocchiaro, of
Vacanti Shattuck, for appellee.
Heavican, C.J., Miller-Lerman, Cassel, Stacy, Funke,
Papik, and Freudenberg, JJ.
Miller-Lerman, J.
I. NATURE OF CASE
Lisa Seemann appeals the decree entered by the district
court for Douglas County dissolving her marriage to Clint
Seemann. Lisa challenges various portions of the decree. Her
assignments of error mainly focus on provisions regarding the
classification, valuation, and division of the marital estate, but
she also challenges the awards of alimony and attorney fees
and costs, as well as other orders in the decree. We affirm
the decree of dissolution in part with certain modifications;
we reverse the division of the marital estate as ordered in the
decree and remand the cause with directions to the district
court to equitably divide the marital estate in accordance with
this opinion.
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS
Clint and Lisa were married in 2005. Clint filed a petition
for dissolution of the marriage on February 4, 2021. Prior to
the marriage, the parties executed a premarital agreement.
The parties had three children during the marriage. One of the
children, Aspen Seemann, died in 2016; custody and related
matters concerning the other children were at issue in the dis-
solution proceedings.
After a trial in November 2022, the district court entered
a decree of dissolution on January 30, 2023. The court ruled
on, inter alia, various issues regarding parenting, the applica-
tion of the premarital agreement, and valuation and division
of the marital estate. The court’s rulings and the facts related

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
316 Nebraska Reports
SEEMANN v. SEEMANN
Cite as 316 Neb. 671
thereto are set forth in our analysis below to the extent they
are relevant to the issues raised on appeal.
Lisa appeals the decree of dissolution.
III. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
Lisa claims that the district court erred when it (1) failed to
enforce a provision of the premarital agreement that required
her consent to Clint’s sale of certain shares of stock; (2) failed
to make an equitable division of the appreciation of Clint’s
investment in property gifted to him during the marriage; (3)
failed to make an equitable division of stock that was gifted to
Clint but was commingled in an account that included stock
that was marital property; (4) equally divided all but a portion
of a liquidity access line of credit; (5) failed to consider the
tax effect of assets awarded to her when making an equitable
division of the property; (6) failed to assign a value to carpet
and tile retained by Clint; (7) failed to assign a value for cash
retained in property-owning entities awarded to Clint; (8) gave
equal weight to brokers’ opinions of value and appraisals by
licensed appraisers when valuing certain real estate invest-
ments; (9) failed to assign a value to Clint D. Seemann, P.C.;
(10) overvalued Lisa’s retirement accounts; (11) required Lisa
to make an equalization payment to Clint; (12) failed to award
Lisa alimony in an amount greater than $8,000 per month for
48 months; (13) failed to require Clint to indemnify Lisa for
any tax penalties that may be imposed for tax years prior to
2021; (14) failed to order Clint to pay an amount greater than
$35,000 for Lisa’s attorney fees and costs; (15) ordered Clint
and Lisa to “‘agree’ and ‘mutually agree’” on certain mat-
ters; (16) failed to include a right of first refusal for parenting
time in the parenting plan; and (17) advised Clint and Lisa to
remain in their current roles with respect to certain organiza-
tions they formed during the marriage.
IV. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
[1,2] In a marital dissolution action, an appellate court
reviews the case de novo on the record to determine whether

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
316 Nebraska Reports
SEEMANN v. SEEMANN
Cite as 316 Neb. 671
there has been an abuse of discretion by the trial judge in his
or her determinations regarding custody, child support, divi-
sion of property, alimony, and attorney fees. Parde v. Parde,
313 Neb. 779, 986 N.W.2d 504 (2023). A judicial abuse of
discretion exists if the reasons or rulings of a trial judge are
clearly untenable, unfairly depriving a litigant of a substantial
right and denying just results in matters submitted for disposi-
tion. Id.
[3,4] In a review de novo on the record, an appellate court
is required to make independent factual determinations based
upon the record, and the court reaches its own independent
conclusions with respect to the matters at issue. Radmanesh
v. Radmanesh, 315 Neb. 393, 996 N.W.2d 592 (2023). When
evidence is in conflict, the appellate court considers and may
give weight to the fact that the trial court heard and observed
the witnesses and accepted one version of the facts rather than
another. Id.
V. ANALYSIS
1. Paragraph 7 of the Premarital Agreement
For her first assignment of error, Lisa claims that the district
court erred when it failed to enforce a provision of the premari-
tal agreement that required her written consent to Clint’s sale
of certain shares of stock. Lisa contends that the court should
have given her more than half of the remaining shares so that
she would have half the number of shares that were owned
before the sale. We conclude that the district court made an
equitable division of the remaining shares of stock.
Paragraph 7 of the parties’ premarital agreement provided,
“As of the date of the signing of this agreement neither party
will sell, pledge, mortgage, transfer, dispose of, or otherwise
encumber any of the assets listed in this agreement without
the prior written consent of the other party.” The listed assets
referred to in paragraph 7 was a listing of assets owned by the
respective parties at the time of the marriage that they agreed
would be considered marital property.

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
316 Nebraska Reports
SEEMANN v. SEEMANN
Cite as 316 Neb. 671
Clint’s listing of assets included 26 shares of Berkshire
Hathaway Class A stock that he owned at the time the par-
ties married. During the marriage, in 2008, Clint sold 12 of
the shares. Lisa did not execute a written consent to the sale
of these shares. In the decree of dissolution, the district court
divided the remaining 14 shares evenly between the parties.
The court reasoned that “[b]oth parties were aware of the sale
of [the 12] shares, and both received the benefit of the sale”
because the “shares were sold to pay for indebtedness related
to their home.”
Lisa argues that she should have been awarded 13 of the
remaining 14 shares rather than 7 shares because she had not
executed a written consent to the sale of the 12 shares and
she was therefore entitled to half of the original 26 shares.
She contends that the district court’s reasoning for dividing
the shares equally was effectively a finding that either para-
graph 7 had been waived or the premarital agreement had been
amended solely by the conduct of the parties after the mar-
riage. She argues that neither a waiver nor an amendment of
a premarital agreement may be recognized based solely on the
conduct of the parties. She further argues that any amendment
of the premarital agreement during the marriage would effec-
tively be a postnuptial property agreement, and she contends
that under Devney v. Devney, 295 Neb. 15, 886 N.W.2d 61
(2016), postnuptial property agreements are not authorized by
Nebraska statutes and are void under Nebraska common law
and public policy.
[5-7] Spouses are able to contract around the general rules
of equitable division by using a premarital agreement. Simons
v. Simons, 312 Neb. 136, 978 N.W.2d 121 (2022). Neb. Rev.
Stat. § 42-1004 (Reissue 2016) permits parties to a premarital
agreement to contract with respect to, among other things,
“[t]he rights and obligations of each of the parties in any of
the property of either or both of them whenever and wherever
acquired or located” and “[t]he disposition of property upon
separation, marital dissolution, death, or the occurrence or

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
316 Nebraska Reports
SEEMANN v. SEEMANN
Cite as 316 Neb. 671
nonoccurrence of any other event.” As a contract, an ante-
nuptial agreement is governed by the same principles that are
applicable to other contracts, but is subject to the particular
statutory requirement that an antenuptial agreement must be
based on fair disclosure. Simons v. Simons, supra. When the
terms of a contract are clear, a court may not resort to rules of
construction, and terms are accorded their plain and ordinary
meaning as an ordinary or reasonable person would under-
stand them. In such a case, a court shall seek to ascertain the
intention of the parties from the plain language of the con-
tract. Id.
We do not read the district court in the decree as determin-
ing either that the parties amended the premarital agreement
or that Lisa waived the application of paragraph 7. Instead,
we read the district court as dividing the shares of stock that
remained in the marital estate at the time of divorce. The
district court determined that it was equitable to divide those
shares equally rather than awarding Lisa a greater number of
shares based on her allegation that Clint violated paragraph 7
when he sold some of the shares. We note that the premarital
agreement provides in paragraph 8 that the listed assets “shall
be considered as part of the marital property which shall be
divided equally in the event of death or divorce.” Consistent
with this provision, the district court equally divided the
14 shares that remained in the marital estate at the time of
the divorce.
As Clint notes, the premarital agreement neither provided a
specific remedy for a breach of paragraph 7, nor directed how
any asset sold in violation of the provision should be treated
in a later divorce. Because the premarital agreement did not
provide for such treatment, the premarital agreement did not
override the general requirement that a dissolution court must
make an equitable division of the marital estate.
The 	court 	effectively 	rejected 	Lisa’s 	argument 	that 	an
equitable division of the marital estate required that she be
awarded a greater number of the remaining shares because

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
316 Nebraska Reports
SEEMANN v. SEEMANN
Cite as 316 Neb. 671
Clint had sold shares without her signed consent. The district
court determined the division argued by Lisa was not equitable
because the court found that both Clint and Lisa knew about
the sale of the shares and that both benefited from the sale
because the proceeds were used to pay indebtedness related to
the marital home. The evidence supports these findings, and
the value of the shares that were sold remained in the marital
estate, which the court ultimately divided equally.
We conclude that the district court did not abuse its dis-
cretion when it divided the remaining shares evenly between
the parties rather than awarding a greater number of shares
to Lisa.
2. Division of Marital Estate
[8,9] Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-365 (Reissue 2016) authorizes a
trial court to equitably distribute the marital estate according
to what is fair and reasonable under the circumstances. Parde
v. Parde, 313 Neb. 779, 986 N.W.2d 504 (2023). In a marital
dissolution action, the purpose of a property division is to
distribute the marital assets equitably between the parties. Id.
There is no mathematical formula by which property awards
can be precisely determined, but as a general rule, a spouse
should be awarded one-third to one-half of the marital estate,
the polestar being fairness and reasonableness as determined
by the facts of each case. Id.
Lisa’s next several assignments of error relate to the valu-
ation and division of the marital estate, and she argues that
because of the asserted errors, the court’s division of the mari-
tal estate was inequitable. We review each of Lisa’s specific
assignments of error, and we then consider the effect of any
errors on the overall division of the marital estate.
Certain of the property considered below was gifted to
Clint during the marriage, and Lisa claims that the district
court failed to make an equitable division thereof. Although
she concedes that, pursuant to a provision of the premarital
agreement, the value of such property at the time it was gifted

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
316 Nebraska Reports
SEEMANN v. SEEMANN
Cite as 316 Neb. 671
to Clint was his separate property, she argues that pursuant to
another provision of the premarital agreement, the apprecia-
tion in value of such property after it was gifted to Clint was
a marital asset that must be divided between the parties. Lisa’s
argument in this regard applies to two specific gifts of prop-
erty: (1) a membership interest in a limited liability company
(LLC) that owned two buildings and (2) shares of stock.
The two provisions of the premarital agreement that are
relevant to Lisa’s argument regarding property gifted during
the marriage are paragraphs 5 and 8. Paragraph 5 provides that
the parties
agree that in the event of a divorce, dissolution or annul-
ment of the marriage . . . neither party shall, by reason of
the marriage, acquire or become vested with any interests
or rights whatsoever in or to the other’s party gifted or
inherited property, or any part thereof; and each party
hereby releases, disclaims, relinquishes and waives any
and all rights, statutory or otherwise, inchoate or com-
munity, in and to the other party’s gifted or inherited
property, or any part thereof.
Paragraph 8 provides, in part, “Marital property shall also
include property that results from the efforts of [the parties]
during the marriage.”
(a) 75th and L Street, LLC:
Gifted Property
During the marriage, Clint received various gifts from his
father, including a membership interest in 75th and L Street,
LLC, an entity that owned two commercial real estate proper-
ties. Lisa presented evidence to the effect that as of December
31, 2021, the membership interest had increased in value by
$1,347,666 since Clint was gifted the membership interest
in 2012.
The district court applied paragraph 5 to determine whether
the membership interest in the LLC was Clint’s nonmarital
property. The court rejected Lisa’s argument that the increase

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
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SEEMANN v. SEEMANN
Cite as 316 Neb. 671
in the value of the membership interest was a marital asset
that should be divided equally between the parties. The court
reasoned that Lisa’s claim was contrary to paragraph 5, which
specifically precluded Lisa from receiving “any . . . rights
whatsoever” to assets that Clint received as a gift.
Lisa does not dispute the proposition that the value of the
membership interest at the time it was gifted to Clint is his
separate property pursuant to paragraph 5. But she maintains
that the appreciation in value of the interest should have been
included as marital property and divided between the parties.
She relies on paragraph 8 and argues that her reading of the
premarital agreement is consistent with the “active apprecia-
tion rule” as stated in our decision in Stephens v. Stephens,
297 Neb. 188, 206, 899 N.W.2d 582, 595 (2017).
In Stephens v. Stephens, we described the active appreciation
rule as being that
accrued investment earnings or appreciation of nonmar-
ital assets during the marriage are presumed marital
unless the party seeking the classification of the growth
as nonmarital proves: (1) The growth is readily iden-
tifiable and traceable to the nonmarital portion of the
account and (2) the growth is not due to the active efforts
of either spouse.
297 Neb. at 205-06, 899 N.W.2d at 595. We further stated that
“the burden is on the owning spouse to prove the extent to
which marital contributions did not cause the appreciation or
income” and that “the appreciation or income of a nonmarital
asset during the marriage is marital insofar as it was caused by
the efforts of either spouse or both spouses.” Id.
[10] After Stephens v. Stephens, we have adhered to the
framework that any given property can constitute a mixture of
marital and nonmarital interests; a portion of an asset can be
marital property while another portion can be separate property.
Parde v. Parde, 313 Neb. 779, 986 N.W.2d 504 (2023). The
original value of an asset may be nonmarital, while all or some
portion of the appreciation of that asset may be marital. Id.

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
316 Nebraska Reports
SEEMANN v. SEEMANN
Cite as 316 Neb. 671
Lisa contends that paragraphs 5 and 8 read together incor-
porate the active appreciation rule. Clint argues that the district
court correctly focused on the language of paragraph 5, provid-
ing a party shall not acquire “any . . . rights whatsoever” in
the other party’s gifted property “or any part thereof” and that
such language precludes awarding any of the appreciation of
the gifted property to Lisa.
We agree with Lisa’s reading of the premarital agreement.
Paragraph 8 requires that marital property includes “prop-
erty that results from the efforts of [the parties] during the
marriage.” In Stephens v. Stephens, supra, we set forth the
presumption that appreciation of nonmarital assets during a
marriage is marital property unless a party can show, inter
alia, that such growth was not due to the active efforts of
either spouse. We thus treat appreciation of property during a
marriage as property separate from the value of the underlying
nonmarital asset. The district court read paragraph 5 broadly
to include appreciation or growth in gifted or inherited prop-
erty as a part of the original property. But paragraph 5 must
be read with paragraph 8, which classifies “property that
results from the efforts of [the parties] during the marriage”
as marital property, rather than nonmarital property. We read
the premarital agreement as treating appreciation of an asset
that results from the efforts of the parties during the marriage
as property separate from the original gifted or inherited prop-
erty and classify such appreciation as marital property.
Therefore, under the premarital agreement, as under the
active appreciation rule set forth in Stephens v. Stephens,
supra, the relevant question is whether the growth in the asset
resulted from the efforts of the parties during the marriage.
Applying that understanding of the premarital agreement to
the evidence in the case, we determine that the growth in the
value of the membership interest in the LLC resulted from the
efforts of Clint during the marriage. Clint testified that while
his father retained a 1-percent membership interest in the
LLC after his father gifted a 99-percent membership interest

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SEEMANN v. SEEMANN
Cite as 316 Neb. 671
to Clint in 2012, his father did not participate in the manage-
ment of the properties; instead, Clint managed the commercial
properties owned by the LLC. Clint testified that his manage-
ment included dealing with tenants’ leases and ensuring that
the properties were in good repair. Clint’s efforts contributed
to the appreciation in the value of the LLC since 2012. We
determine that under paragraph 8 of the premarital agreement,
the appreciation in the value of Clint’s membership interest
in the LLC resulted from Clint’s efforts, and that therefore,
the appreciation in value should have been treated as mari-
tal property.
Lisa presented evidence that the increase in the value of
the membership interest was $1,347,666, and Clint did not
present evidence to the contrary. We therefore determine that
given the efforts of the parties, the district court erred when it
failed to include the $1,347,666 appreciation in the value of
the membership interest as property in the marital estate.
(b) Class A Shares in Account 1988:
Gifted Property
In 2012, Clint’s father also gifted 34 shares of Berkshire
Hathaway Class A stock to Clint. The shares were deposited
into an investment account referred to as “Account 1988.” In
2016, Clint converted 1 of the 34 Berkshire Hathaway Class
A stocks to Berkshire Hathaway Class B stocks and trans-
ferred those stocks to the parties’ children and to a founda-
tion created by the parties. The remaining 33 shares were
valued at $14.256 million at the time of the dissolution trial
in November 2022. The district court determined that the 33
shares were Clint’s nonmarital property pursuant to paragraph
5 of the premarital agreement.
Lisa argues that the 33 shares were marital property because
they were commingled in Account 1988 with other shares
that were marital property. She also argues that the shares
were marital property because the entirety of Account 1988
was pledged to secure debt that the court determined to be

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SEEMANN v. SEEMANN
Cite as 316 Neb. 671
marital debt. This debt is discussed further in connection with
the next assignment of error. Lisa alternatively argues, as she
argued regarding the membership interest in the LLC, that at
least the appreciation in the value of the 33 shares should be
included as marital property pursuant to paragraph 8 of the
premarital agreement.
Clint argues that the 33 shares are readily identifiable as
those that were gifted to him and therefore were not com-
mingled with marital assets and that the use of the shares to
secure debt did not change that analysis. He also argues that
appreciation in value of the stock is covered by paragraph 5 of
the premarital agreement and that the language of paragraph 5
precludes Lisa from receiving an interest in property gifted to
Clint. We agree with Clint.
[11] Separate property becomes marital property by commin-
gling if it is inextricably mixed with marital property or with
the separate property of the other spouse. Eis v. Eis, 310 Neb.
243, 965 N.W.2d 19 (2021). If the separate property remains
segregated or is traceable into its product, commingling does
not occur. Id. The burden of proof rests with the party claiming
that the property is nonmarital. Id.
At the time of the divorce, Account 1988 included 47 shares
of Berkshire Hathaway Class A stock. This included the 33
remaining shares of the 34 that were gifted to Clint in 2012
and the 14 remaining shares of the 26 that Clint owned at
the time of the marriage and that, as discussed above, were
designated as marital property in the premarital agreement.
We agree with Clint that the 33 shares that his father gave to
him, and that were therefore his separate property, were not
commingled with the shares in Account 1988 that were mari-
tal property.
Although held in the same investment account, the gifted
shares were not “inextricably mixed with” the shares that
were marital property because the marital and nonmarital
shares were traceable into the account. See id. at 248, 965
N.W.2d at 23. Clint testified that the 34 shares were deposited

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SEEMANN v. SEEMANN
Cite as 316 Neb. 671
into Account 1988 when they were gifted to him in December
2012 and that one of the shares was converted into Class B
stock in 2016, resulting in 33 of the 34 shares remaining in
Account 1988 at the time of the divorce. He further testified
that the 14 separate shares discussed earlier in this opinion
that were marital property were not deposited into Account
1988 until February 2015, after 12 of the original 26 shares
had been sold in 2008. The origin of each of the 47 Berkshire
Hathaway Class A shares in Account 1988 was traceable.
Lisa asserts that because Account 1988 was used as col-
lateral to secure debt that was determined to be partly marital
debt and partly Clint’s separate debt, the shares were comin-
gled. The use of Account 1988 to secure debt does not change
our determination that the origin of each of the Berkshire
Hathaway Class A shares in the account was traceable as either
marital or nonmarital property.
Finally, we reject Lisa’s argument that the appreciation of
the 33 shares since the time they were gifted to Clint should
have been classified as marital property. As we determined
above in connection with the membership interest in the LLC,
under paragraph 8 of the premarital agreement, the increase
in value of gifted property is considered marital property if
such increase in value “results from the efforts of [the parties]
during the marriage.” Lisa generally argues that the increase
in value of the shares resulted from Clint’s efforts during the
marriage, because he made investment decisions that allowed
him to retain the shares rather than selling them.
We determine that such investment decisions do not consti-
tute the sort of “efforts” referred to in the premarital agree-
ment or in our precedent regarding the active appreciation
rule. We have recognized that some assets are more subject
to active appreciation, while others are more subject to pas-
sive appreciation. Parde v. Parde, 313 Neb. 779, 986 N.W.2d
504 (2023). An investment in the stock of a company when
a party to a marriage is not involved in the management or
operation of the underlying company would generally appear

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SEEMANN v. SEEMANN
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to be more subject to passive appreciation vis-a-vis the owner
of such stock. Clint’s testimony regarding the Berkshire
Hathaway Class A shares indicated that his actions regard-
ing the shares were limited to investment decisions such as
whether to sell, convert, or keep the shares. Clint’s testi-
mony shows that he did not undertake efforts to maintain or
increase the value of the underlying investment, but, rather,
that he made the decision to keep the investment.
This evidence may be contrasted with Clint’s testimony
regarding the investment in the membership interest in the
LLC discussed above. The main assets of the LLC were com-
mercial real estate. In Parde v. Parde, supra, we recognized
that it was incorrect to assume all appreciation in real estate
was passive and that whether appreciation in real estate is
active or passive depends on the facts and circumstances of
each case. As discussed above, Clint’s testimony regarding
his investment in the LLC showed that he made efforts to
maintain the underlying properties and leases, which efforts
contributed to the increase in the value of the membership
interest in the LLC during the marriage. These efforts went
beyond merely holding onto the assets. In contrast, Clint’s
evidence regarding the Berkshire Hathaway Class A shares,
including Clint’s testimony and that of his financial advisor,
indicated only that he made decisions to keep the stock and
not that he made efforts to increase the underlying value of
the investment.
We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discre-
tion when it determined that the 33 gifted shares of Berkshire
Hathaway Class A stock that were retained at the time of the
divorce were Clint’s separate property.
(c) Liquidity Access Line: Debt
Lisa next claims that the district court erred when it equally
divided all but a portion of the debt attributable to a liquid-
ity access line of credit (LAL). In March 2014, an LAL was
opened in Clint’s name. The LAL was secured by Account

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1988. At the time of the dissolution trial in November 2022,
the balance on the LAL was $3,728,589. Clint conceded that
$188,411.80 of the balance was his separate debt, but he
asserted that the remaining balance was marital.
The district court generally agreed with Clint’s classifica-
tion of the LAL, and it stated that Lisa’s suggested division
of the marital estate and her testimony had identified the
LAL as marital debt. Because a large portion of the LAL was
related to the purchase of the marital home, the court ordered
the marital home sold and the proceeds used to pay down
the LAL. The court further ordered that Clint was to pay
the $188,411.80 portion of the debt resulting from his sepa-
rate expenses within 30 days after the house proceeds were
applied. The court ordered that the remaining balance after
the house proceeds and Clint’s payment were deducted was to
be paid equally by each party within 30 days after the house
proceeds were applied.
Lisa contends that the equal division of the LAL was an
abuse of discretion for three reasons. First, she argues that
the LAL is “not a ‘debt’” because it was structured such that
Clint had the option to pay or not pay the balance and Clint’s
financial advisor testified that not paying the balance was “a
‘sound strategy.’” Brief for appellant at 36. Second, she argues
that even if the LAL is marital debt, an additional $207,161
that was classified as being related to marital expenses should
have been classified as Clint’s separate expenses. Third, Lisa
argues that even if the LAL is marital debt, the court should
not have divided the balance equally, because fairness and
equity required that Clint should have been allocated a larger
share of the debt.
Regarding Lisa’s argument that the LAL was not true
“debt,” we note that Clint’s financial adviser testified at the
trial and that his testimony regarding not paying back the
loan was more nuanced than Lisa’s assertion that Clint never
needed to pay back the LAL. The financial adviser testi-
fied that not paying back the LAL was a sound strategy “[i]f

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[interest] rates [on the LAL] are super low” and the stock that
serves as collateral for the LAL is “growing through the roof.”
The financial adviser noted, however, that when the LAL is
not being paid back, the interest is being added to the bal-
ance of the LAL. In response to cross-examination by Lisa,
the financial adviser testified, “You can decide to pay it back
if you want at any point in time or you don’t have to.” But
the financial adviser again cautioned that “if you don’t pay
it back, then the loan increases by the interest from the last
month and will continue doing that monthly.”
Based on this testimony, we reject Lisa’s argument that
the LAL was not a true debt. We do not think the financial
adviser’s testimony is properly characterized as suggesting
that Clint was never required to pay back the debt. Instead,
the testimony indicates only that there was not a set timetable
for paying back the debt and that at times, it would make
sound economic sense not to pay down the debt. However,
the financial adviser noted that when the debt was not being
paid, accrued interest was being added to the balance of the
debt. We do not read any of the testimony as indicating that
the LAL would never need to be paid back or that it was not
a true debt.
Lisa also argues that $207,161 of the balance that Clint
and the court classified as marital expenses should have
been considered Clint’s separate expenses. These expenses
included payments totaling $62,327 that Clint made based
on a court order in the present case that required him to pay
Lisa temporary alimony and an advance on her share of the
marital estate and to pay fees to her attorneys. The remaining
$144,834 was for payments on a life insurance policy. Lisa
argues that payments on the life insurance policy should have
been classified as Clint’s separate debt because Clint was
awarded the cash value of the policy as part of his share of
the marital estate.
Clint addresses Lisa’s argument that $144,834 representing
payments for life insurance premiums should be his separate

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expense. He argues that payment of the premiums was an
obligation for the joint benefit of the parties, and he cites his
testimony at the trial to the effect that the policy was a $10
million second-to-die policy covering both Clint and Lisa that
was taken out as part of their estate planning to benefit their
children. He notes that while he was awarded the cash value
in the policy, he was also ordered to be solely responsible
for the premiums going forward. Clint makes no response
to Lisa’s claim that an additional $62,327 was for payments
Clint owed to Lisa and her attorneys pursuant to the court’s
temporary order.
Regarding the debt attributable to life insurance payments,
we determine that the evidence supports Clint’s assertion that
the payments were marital expenses. In addition to Clint’s tes-
timony as set forth above, the evidence regarding portions of
the LAL classified as marital expenses or as Clint’s personal
expenses included a statement of activity in the LAL and an
exhibit prepared by Clint’s attorneys showing his classification
of expenses. This evidence showed, inter alia, six payments
between March 2017 and March 2022 that were described as
life insurance and that totaled $144,834. The payments were
made while the parties were still married and before the policy
was awarded to Clint. Clint gave testimony showing the policy
was part of the parties’ estate planning to benefit the children,
which could reasonably be considered a marital expense. Lisa
does not cite any evidence she presented that would have
shown that when the payments were made, they were solely
for Clint’s benefit. We determine that the district court did not
err when it classified the debt attributable to these life insur-
ance payments as marital expenses.
Regarding payments made pursuant to the court order, the
district court entered an order in this case on March 9, 2021,
in which, inter alia, it ordered Clint to pay Lisa financial sup-
port payments of $9,109 per month, to pay Lisa $25,000 as
an advance payment toward division of the marital estate,
and to pay $10,000 toward Lisa’s attorney fees. The evidence

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regarding the LAL showed three payments of $9,109 each to
Lisa or to the clerk of the district court in March and April
2021, one payment of $25,000 to Lisa in March 2021, and one
payment of $10,000 to a law firm in April 2021. We deter-
mine that because these were obligations Clint owed to Lisa
under the order, these payments totaling $62,327 should have
been considered as Clint’s separate expenses rather than mari-
tal expenses.
The division of the LAL did not factor into the division of
the marital estate per se. Instead, the court ordered the sale
of the marital home and application of the proceeds of the
sale to the LAL. The court further ordered that Clint should
then pay the share of the LAL indebtedness attributable to his
separate expenses and that the remainder of the debt should be
paid equally by the parties. Because the $62,327 paid pursu-
ant to the court order should have been considered as Clint’s
separate expenses rather than marital expenses, we modify
that portion of paragraph 27 on page 14 of the decree that
requires Clint “to pay the $188,411.80 within 30 days of the
house proceeds being applied” to instead require Clint “to
pay the $250,738.80 within 30 days of the house proceeds
being applied.”
(d) Tax Effects
When the district court ordered the parties to pay their
respective shares of the remaining balance of the LAL after the
proceeds from the sale of the marital home were applied and
Clint paid the portion of the balance attributable to his per-
sonal expenses, the court stated that “[b]oth parties are being
awarded sufficient assets to pay his/her share.” Lisa claims
that the district court erred when it failed to consider the tax
effects to which she would be subject if, to pay her share of the
remaining balance, she were required to sell assets that were
awarded to her.
Lisa focuses on two of the largest assets awarded to her—7
shares 	of 	Berkshire 	Hathaway 	stock 	and 	her 	retirement

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accounts—and argues that if she were required to liquidate
these assets to pay her share of the LAL debt, she would be
subject to capital gains tax if she sold the stock and to a tax
penalty if she took early withdrawals from the retirement
accounts. She argues that Clint would not be subject to similar
tax effects, because he was awarded income-producing assets,
including nonmarital assets, that would provide him funds to
pay his share of the LAL debt without incurring the same tax
effects Lisa would incur. Lisa also repeats her assertion that
Clint would not be obligated to pay back the LAL, but we
rejected that argument above and do not consider it further in
connection with this assignment of error.
Clint argues that the assets awarded to him were not liquid
and that he testified at trial that he would incur tax conse-
quences if required to liquidate assets, particularly his shares
of Berkshire Hathaway stock. We agree that both parties poten-
tially would incur tax consequences if required to liquidate
assets. We see no abuse of discretion in the district court’s
alleged failure to account for the tax effects of liquidating
assets when it ordered the parties to pay their respective shares
of the remaining LAL balance.
(e) Carpet and Tile
Lisa claims the district court erred when it failed to include
in the marital estate the value of carpet and tile that was
retained by Clint. During cross-examination by Lisa at the
trial, Clint testified that during the marriage, some tile and
some carpet had been purchased with the intent that it would
be used in finishing the basement of the marital residence. He
testified that the value of the carpet was $75,000 to $80,000.
Clint further testified that the carpet and tile were never put
into the basement and that they were still in his possession at
the time of the dissolution trial.
In the dissolution decree, the district court found that Clint
had “removed his personal items and a few household goods
or miscellaneous property at the time he moved from the

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family residence.” The court further found that Lisa “remained
in the family home and has retained the majority of the par-
ties’ household goods and miscellaneous property.” The court
found that the value of the items in Lisa’s possession was
$25,000. The court ordered that each party be “awarded the
property in their respective possession.” When setting forth
the division of marital assets, the court listed $25,000 of
“Household Furnishings” as being awarded to Lisa, but it
listed no value for household goods, furnishings, or property
being awarded to Clint.
Lisa argues that the court abused its discretion when it
failed to assign a value to the carpet and tile retained by
Clint. We determine that there was evidence to support the
conclusion that Clint retained carpet and tile that had been
purchased for the marital home and that Clint valued it at
$80,000. Because the court assigned Lisa $25,000 for house-
hold furnishings in her possession but assigned no value for
items retained by Clint, we determine that the court abused its
discretion and should have included the $80,000 value of the
carpet and tile shown by the evidence as marital property that
was retained by and awarded to Clint.
(f) Cash in Property-Owning Entities
The district court found that Clint owned “several commer-
cial real estate investments with three other partners” and that
he owned a 25-percent interest in each. The court determined
that these real estate investments consisted of six real proper-
ties, and it valued the investments based on the valuations
for the properties set forth by the parties’ respective experts.
From those valuations, the court deducted Clint’s share of
debt related to each respective property, and it also deducted
a portion of the LAL balance that was borrowed for these
investments. The court valued the “net equity” in these invest-
ments at $576,258 and awarded the investment to Clint at that
amount. Lisa claims that the district court abused its discretion
because it failed to include cash retained in the entities that
owned the properties when it valued the investment.

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Lisa presented testimony by a certified public accoun-
tant who opined regarding various issues related to Clint’s
investments. The accountant’s testimony indicated that the six
commercial real estate properties were owned by Clint and
his fellow investors through four LLCs in which they were
members. The accountant’s testimony also indicated that as
of December 31, 2021, each of the LLCs had a balance of
retained cash in addition to the real property owned by the
LLC. The accountant’s testimony indicated that the total of
Clint’s share of the retained cash in the LLCs was $82,869.75.
Lisa contends that the district court abused its discretion
when it failed to include this retained cash when it valued the
investments awarded to Clint.
Clint notes that the district court found that these invest-
ments should be valued as of the date of the trial in November
2022, rather than the date the dissolution action was filed in
February 2021. He argues that Lisa presented only evidence
of the cash retained in the entities on December 31, 2021,
and that she failed to present evidence of cash retained at the
date of trial, which was the valuation date chosen by the dis-
trict court.
The court chose the date of trial as the date to value the
investments, which choice Lisa does not dispute. Because
there does not appear to be evidence in the record of valua-
tion of cash retained as of the date of trial for valuation pur-
poses, we see no error in the district court’s valuation of the
investments.
(g) Broker’s Opinions and Appraisals
Also related to these real estate investments, Lisa claims
the district court erred when it gave equal weight to the tes-
timony of the parties’ respective experts regarding valuation
of the properties. Each of the parties presented expert testi-
mony regarding the valuation of the six commercial real estate
properties owned by Clint and his fellow investors. Clint’s
expert was a commercial real estate broker. Lisa’s experts

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were licensed appraisers. The district court found both parties’
experts to be credible and noted that they used similar valu-
ation methodologies and arrived at reasonable values for the
properties. The court stated that it was unable to give greater
weight to one valuation over the other, and it therefore took an
average of the two valuations to arrive at the fair market value
for each of the properties.
Lisa argues that it was an abuse of discretion to give the
respective experts equal weight, because her experts were
licensed appraisers and Clint’s expert was not. She asserts that
because the court did not use her experts’ valuation, Clint’s
investment in the properties was undervalued by $49,887.50.
Clint argues in response that his expert’s experience quali-
fied him to opine on the valuation of the properties and
that it was within the district court’s discretion to credit his
expert’s testimony.
[12] In a dissolution proceeding subject to de novo review,
we have said that the determination of the weight that should
be given expert testimony is uniquely the province of the
fact finder. Simons v. Simons, 312 Neb. 136, 978 N.W.2d 121
(2022). We also said that a trial court is not required to accept
any one method of valuation as more accurate than another
accounting procedure and that a trial court’s valuation of an
LLC is reasonable if it has an acceptable basis in fact and
principle. Id.
Under these standards, we determine that the district court’s
valuation of the investments was reasonable. The district court,
as the fact finder, found both parties’ experts to be credible,
and we do not review that credibility determination. We see
no abuse of discretion in the district court’s decision to give
equal weight to the respective experts’ testimonies to arrive at
its valuation for the investments.
(h) Clint D. Seemann, P.C.
Clint testified that he operated as a commercial investment
broker through an entity he owned named “Clint D. Seemann,

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P.C.” (hereinafter P.C.). The accountant who testified for Lisa
valued the P.C. at $27,768, based on cash retained in the
entity less payroll tax obligations, on December 31, 2021.
The district court did not include any valuation for the P.C. in
the division of the marital estate. Lisa claims that the district
court erred when it failed to include the P.C. in the mari-
tal estate.
We conclude there was evidence to support inclusion of
$27,768 as a valuation of the P.C. in the marital estate. We note
that some other marital assets were valued as of December 31,
2021, or some other date besides the date of trial. While the
district court chose to value the investments in commercial
properties discussed above as of the date of trial, it made no
such finding regarding the P.C. We determine upon our de
novo review that the court abused its discretion when it failed
to include in the marital estate the $27,768 value of the P.C.,
for which there was evidence in the record.
(i) Lisa’s Retirement Accounts
Lisa owned two retirement accounts. As evidence, she pre-
sented statements for an individual retirement account (IRA)
and a “simple” IRA that showed values as of October 31,
2022, of $1,389,121.16 and $41,599.82, respectively, for a
total of $1,430,720.98. During cross-examination by Clint,
Lisa responded in the affirmative to questions by Clint’s coun-
sel asking whether she had “borrow[ed] against [her] 401(k)”
and whether she had “borrowed $50,000.” In his proposed
valuation of assets, Clint added a “Loan from IRA” balance
in the amount of $50,000 to the balances of the IRA and the
simple IRA and urged that Lisa’s retirement accounts be val-
ued at $1,480,720. Lisa’s retirement accounts were treated as
marital assets. The district court found in the decree that Lisa
had “a balance of $1,480,720 in her IRA and Simple IRA as
of October 31, 2022,” and it included “Retirement accounts”
valued at $1,480,720 as assets awarded to Lisa in the division
of marital assets.

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Lisa claims that the district court erred when it valued her
retirement accounts at $1,480,720, rather than the $1,430,720.
Lisa points to her evidence that showed the balance in the
accounts on the specified date was $1,430,720. We note that
in the decree, the court referred only to the balance of Lisa’s
retirement accounts as of October 31, 2022, and that it did
not specify that it included $50,000 to represent an amount
Lisa had borrowed. Therefore, it is unclear whether the court
intended to include the loan in the value of the accounts or
whether it was an error based on similarity of the numerals
“3” and “8.” In any event, we find that the evidence shows
the sum of the balances in the IRA and the simple IRA was
$1,430,720. Upon our de novo review, we do not find that
Lisa’s cross-examination testimony that she borrowed $50,000
“against [her] 401(k)” to be sufficiently clear evidence that
$50,000 should be added to the balance that was shown in the
evidence relating to her IRA and simple IRA on the relevant
date. The testimony is not clear regarding when the amount
was borrowed, whether and when it was paid back, or the
purpose or use to which the borrowed funds were applied,
and furthermore, the testimony refers to a “401(k)” rather
than an IRA or simple IRA and to the amount’s being bor-
rowed “against” rather than “from” the account. We determine
that Lisa’s retirement accounts should have been valued at
$1,430,720, as supported by her evidence, and that therefore,
the court erred when it overvalued her retirement accounts
by $50,000.
(j) Equalization Payment
Lisa claims the district court erred when it required her
to make an equalization payment. The court found that the
marital assets awarded to Lisa totaled $4,596,220 and that
the marital assets awarded to Clint totaled $4,552,178. The
court ordered Lisa to pay Clint $22,021 to equalize the mari-
tal estate.
As we determined above, the court erred in failing to
include certain assets in the marital estate and in its valuation

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of assets included in the marital estate. These errors have a
not insignificant impact on the size of the marital estate, the
corresponding division of property awarded to each party, and
the equalization payment, if any. We therefore reverse the
portion of the order directing Lisa to make an equalization
payment to Clint. As noted below, the district court will need
to consider making a new equitable division of the marital
estate, and such division may require a different equalization
payment, if any, by one party or the other.
(k) Resolution
To summarize our review of the valuation of the marital
estate, we determine that the following assets should have been
included in the marital estate: the appreciation and increase
in the value of 75th and L Street, LLC, in the amount of
$1,347,666; carpet and tile valued at $80,000; and Clint D.
Seemann, P.C., valued at $27,768. Each of these assets either
was determined by the district court to be Clint’s nonmarital
property or was shown by the evidence to be retained by Clint.
We also determined that Lisa’s retirement accounts, which
were included in the marital estate and awarded to her, were
overvalued by $50,000 and that they should have been valued
at $1,430,720.
In its order, the district court stated that before the equal-
ization payment, Clint was being awarded marital property
of $4,552,178, Lisa was being awarded marital property of
$4,596,220, and the total marital estate was $9,148,398. If
the district court had treated the appreciation of 75th and L
Street, LLC; the carpet and tile; and Clint D. Seemann, P.C.,
as marital assets awarded to Clint, and if it had properly val-
ued Lisa’s retirement accounts, the total marital estate would
have been $10,553,832.
When the district court ordered Lisa to make an equal-
ization payment to Clint, it effectively determined that the
marital estate, as constituted by the court’s valuation, should
be divided equally between the parties. Our determination

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that the court should have included additional property in
the marital estate and that Lisa’s retirement accounts were
overvalued changes the composition and value of the marital
estate. We therefore reverse the order of property division and
remand the cause to the district court for an equitable division
of the marital estate as it is constituted after the corrections
that we set forth above. The district court should bear in mind
both the proposition that as a general rule, a spouse should be
awarded one-third to one-half of the marital estate, Parde v.
Parde, 313 Neb. 779, 986 N.W.2d 504 (2023), and any provi-
sions of the parties’ premarital agreement regarding division
of the marital property in the event of divorce.
3. Alimony
The district court awarded Lisa alimony of $8,000 per
month for 48 months. Lisa had requested that the court award
her alimony of $10,000 per month for 96 months. The court
stated that Lisa listed her monthly living expenses at $21,518
per month, or $258,216 annually. The court stated that Lisa
would “need to find a way to live on a more realistic monthly
budget or liquidate assets if she so chooses.” The court stated
that since the filing of the dissolution action, Lisa had been
receiving “significant temporary support” that had been “suf-
ficient to cover her monthly living expenses.” The court stated
that since the filing of the dissolution, Lisa “ha[d] made
no strides to become re-employed,” but that it was “now
time for [her] to assist in her own support by re-entering
the workforce.”
Lisa claims that the district court abused its discretion when
it awarded her only $8,000 per month for 48 months, rather
than the amount and duration she had requested. Lisa argues
that the four factors set forth in § 42-365 supported a larger ali-
mony award. Lisa cites Simons v. Simons, 312 Neb. 136, 179,
978 N.W.2d 121, 154 (2022), in which we set forth
four factors that are relevant to alimony: (1) the circum-
stances of the parties, (2) the duration of the marriage,
(3) the history of contributions to the marriage, and (4)

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the ability of the supported party to engage in gainful
employment without interfering with the interests of any
minor children in the custody of each party.
Lisa contends that each of these factors supported a larger
award of alimony to her. She also asserts that the district
court’s statement that she “ha[d] made no strides to become
re-employed” was contrary to the evidence, including her tes-
timony that she had a part-time job and was seeking full-time
employment and that the reason she was previously unem-
ployed was so that she could stay at home with the parties’
youngest child.
[13-15] 	The 	reasonable 	duration 	of 	an 	alimony 	award
depends on the specific facts in a given case, often the amount
of time required to allow the recipient spouse to support him-
self or herself. Karas v. Karas, 314 Neb. 857, 993 N.W.2d 473
(2023). Alimony should not be used to equalize the incomes
of the parties or to punish one of the parties. Rather, the pri-
mary purpose of alimony is to assist an ex-spouse for a period
of time necessary for that individual to secure his or her own
means of support. Id. In reviewing an alimony award, an appel-
late court does not determine whether it would have awarded
the same amount of alimony as did the trial court, but whether
the trial court’s award is untenable such as to deprive a party
of a substantial right or just result with the ultimate criterion
being reasonableness. Id.
We determine that the district court’s award of alimony was
not an abuse of discretion. Whether the district court’s state-
ment that Lisa “ha[d] made no strides to become re-employed”
was supported by the evidence, we read the court’s comments
as setting forth its expectation that going forward, Lisa would
be employed and would contribute to her own support. Based
on this and other factors, including the temporary support Lisa
had been receiving and Lisa’s earning capacity, the district
court determined that alimony of $8,000 per month for 48
months was adequate. Lisa’s argument focuses on the reason
she was not employed—raising a child not of school age—and

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she does not appear to dispute that going forward, her ability
to be employed and to contribute to her own support will be
enhanced. We read the district court’s award of alimony as
properly focused on the amount of time and the amount of
support that would be necessary to allow Lisa to secure her
own means of support going forward.
4. Tax Penalties
Lisa claims the district court erred when it failed to require
Clint to indemnify her for any tax penalties for tax years prior
to 2021. Regarding prior years’ tax returns, the district court
ordered that “[i]f any tax return is amended and any taxes
and penalties are due, [Clint] is responsible for payment of
said taxes and penalties and shall pay and indemnify and hold
[Lisa] harmless therefrom.” Lisa argues that this order was
insufficient because it should have applied to “any” liability
or penalties that may arise for prior tax years and not just to
those arising from an amended return. Brief for appellant at
49 (emphasis omitted). She specifically argues that the order
should have covered liability or penalties arising from an
Internal Revenue Service determination that could result in
additional taxes owed. She notes testimony by the accountant
she called as a witness to the effect that certain tax deductions
taken by Clint in prior years were questionable and may not
withstand scrutiny by the Internal Revenue Service.
We read the district court’s order in this respect to be suf-
ficient to address Lisa’s concerns. The district court made
Clint responsible for “any taxes and penalties” that are due
“[i]f any tax return is amended.” We read this order as broadly
referring to any amendment of a prior tax return, whether
such amendment is initiated by the parties or by an Internal
Revenue Service determination. We find no abuse of discre-
tion in this provision of the decree.
5. Attorney Fees and Costs
In the decree, the district court acknowledged that it had
previously awarded Lisa attorney fees of $10,000, and it

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ordered Clint to pay an additional $25,000 in attorney fees to
Lisa. Lisa claims the award of attorney fees was an abuse of
discretion.
Lisa had requested an award of attorney fees and costs,
and she presented evidence of fees and costs in the amount
of $89,245.39, as well as fees to her accounting expert in the
amount of $17,030. She argues that the district court’s award
of $35,000 was insufficient because time-consuming pretrial
proceedings, including the hiring of experts, were necessi-
tated by Clint’s substantial financial holdings and because the
case involved novel issues. She also argues that the equities
in this case require a greater award to her because the parties
had “vastly inequitable resources available for litigating their
divorce.” Brief for appellant at 52.
[16] In awarding attorney fees in a dissolution action,
a court shall consider the nature of the case, the amount
involved in the controversy, the services actually performed,
the results obtained, the length of time required for prepara-
tion and presentation of the case, the novelty and difficulty
of the questions raised, and the customary charges of the bar
for similar services. Cornwell v. Cornwell, 309 Neb. 156, 959
N.W.2d 243 (2021). While the record demonstrates that this
divorce involved significant pretrial proceedings and involved
complicated, if not novel, issues, the record also shows that
both sides raised issues that contributed to the complexity of
the case. Although the parties possess different resources, the
equities do not necessarily require that Clint needed to pay
all of Lisa’s attorney fees. Given these circumstances and
this reasoning, we cannot say that the district court’s deci-
sion to award fees and costs totaling $35,000 was an abuse
of discretion.
6. Orders to “Agree” and
“Mutually Agree”
Lisa claims that the district court erred when it ordered the
parties to “‘agree’ [and] ‘mutually agree’” on certain matters.

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Brief for appellant at 53. The court determined that the sale
of the marital residence was necessary to pay down signifi-
cant debt. The court ordered that the residence “be placed for
sale by a mutually agreed upon real estate agent at a mutually
agreed upon price.” The court also ordered the parties to share
costs “for the children’s reasonable and agreed upon necessary
expenditures” and for “any reasonable and agreed upon neces-
sary direct expenditures for the minor children.”
Lisa argues that because there was evidence that “financial
disputes were a point of contention during their marriage,”
the court should not have ordered them to agree on these
matters. Id. at 53. She argues that “at the very least, the court
should have provided terms for Clint and Lisa to follow in the
event that they could not reach an agreement.” Id.
Clint argues in response that it is standard and customary
for a court to order parties to mutually agree on certain issues
and that if the parties cannot agree, the remedy is for the par-
ties to present the issue for determination by the court.
The district court was in a better position than an appel-
late court to determine whether the parties could come to
agreement on these issues, and we defer to its discretion on
the matter. As Clint argues, such orders are common and
remedies are available if the parties find themselves unable
to agree. We see no abuse of discretion in the district court’s
orders requiring the parties to agree on certain matters.
7. Right of First Refusal
for Parenting Time
Lisa claims that the district court erred when it failed to
include a right of first refusal for parenting time in the par-
enting plan. The parties participated in mediation to develop
a parenting plan. However, they could not reach agreement
on whether the parenting plan should include a right of first
refusal for parenting time. In the decree of dissolution, the
district court found that “the parties have effectively cooper-
ated when unavailable to care for the children and there is no

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need to include [a right of first refusal] as an Order” or as part
of the parenting plan.
Lisa argues that the court erred when it failed to include a
right of first refusal in the parenting plan because the parties
both agreed that such a practice was in the children’s best
interests. She notes that Clint agreed to the concept and that
he objected only to the “formalization of the right of first
refusal in the parenting plan.” Brief for appellant at 54. Clint
asserts in response that the right of first refusal was unneces-
sary and that he had testified to that effect at the trial.
On this matter, we also defer to the district court’s determi-
nations, because it was in a better position than an appellate
court to determine whether a right of first refusal was neces-
sary and whether the parties could cooperate on these matters.
We see no abuse of discretion in the district court’s decision
not to include a right of first refusal.
8. Issues Related to
Nonparty Entities
Lisa finally claims that the district court erred when it
ordered Clint and her to remain in their current roles within
certain entities they formed during the marriage. After the par-
ties’ son Aspen died from drowning, the parties formed the
Aspen Drake Seemann Foundation, as well as Slash, LLC,
which is owned exclusively by the aforementioned foundation.
Lisa is the president of the foundation, and Clint is a member
of its board. In the decree of dissolution, the court advised
the parties to remain in their current roles with the foundation
and Slash and to honor the intent of the foundation and refrain
from taking action detrimental to the foundation.
Lisa argues that the district court’s orders related to the
foundation and Slash, LLC, were improper because neither
the foundation nor Slash, LLC, is a party to this action and
because the court therefore lacked jurisdiction to mandate that
Clint and Lisa remain in their current roles with the nonparty
entities.

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Clint argues in response that the reasonable interpretation of
the district court’s order is that it does not bind or affect the
foundation or Slash, LLC, in any way and that instead, it con-
cerns only the parties themselves and advises them to remain in
their roles and to honor the intent of the foundation. We agree
with Clint.
Although we agree with Lisa that the district court did not
have authority over these entities, we agree with Clint that the
decree can be read as governing only the behavior and actions
of the parties—Clint and Lisa—with respect to their own and
each other’s roles in the organizations. Given our understand-
ing that the order is directed only as to the behavior of the
parties, we see no abuse of discretion.
VI. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s
decree of dissolution except as indicated below. We deter-
mine that the provision of the decree regarding paying down
the LAL debt should be modified to require Clint to pay
$250,738.80, rather than $188,411.80, after the proceeds of
the sale of the marital home have been applied and before
the parties equally share responsibility for the remaining LAL
debt. We also determine that the marital estate should have
included the increase in the value of Clint’s membership inter-
est in 75th and L Street, LLC, in the amount of $1,347,666;
carpet and tile valued at $80,000; and Clint D. Seemann, P.C.,
valued at $27,768, and that Lisa’s retirement accounts should
have been valued at $1,430,720, rather than $1,480,720. We
therefore modify the marital estate as set forth in the decree
to include these additional marital assets and corrected valua-
tions. We reverse the division of the marital estate as ordered
in the decree, including the order for Lisa to make an equal-
ization payment to Clint, and remand the cause for the dis-
trict court to determine an equitable division of the marital
estate as it is constituted after modification to correct these
noted errors. The district court should bear in mind both the

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proposition that as a general rule, a spouse should be awarded
one-third to one-half of the marital estate, Parde v. Parde, 313
Neb. 779, 986 N.W.2d 504 (2023), and any provisions of the
parties’ premarital agreement regarding division of the marital
property in the event of divorce.
Affirmed in part, affirmed in part
as modified, and in part reversed
and remanded with directions.