Dylan H. v. Brooke C.

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
317 Nebraska Reports
DYLAN H. v. BROOKE C.
Cite as 317 Neb. 264
Dylan H., plaintiff and third-party plaintiff,
appellee, v. Brooke C., defendant and
third-party defendant, appellant, and
Brandon B., third-party defendant,
intervenor-appellant.
___ N.W.3d ___
Filed July 26, 2024. 	No. S-23-673.
1. Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error. A jurisdictional question which does
not involve a factual dispute is determined by an appellate court as a
matter of law.
2. ____: ____. Before reaching the legal issues presented for review, it is
the duty of an appellate court to determine whether it has jurisdiction
over the matter before it.
3. Statutes: Appeal and Error. The right of appeal in Nebraska is purely
statutory, and unless a statute provides for an appeal, such right does
not exist.
4. Actions: Judgments: Parties: Appeal and Error. When “an action”
presents more than one “claim for relief” or involves multiple parties,
and the court enters an order that adjudicates fewer than all the claims
or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties, Neb. Rev. Stat.
§ 25-1315(1) (Reissue 2016) is implicated, and to become appealable,
the order must comply with the requirements of certification of an
appeal in § 25-1315(1).
5. Actions: Words and Phrases. For purposes of determining whether
a case presents more than one “claim for relief” under Neb. Rev. Stat.
§ 25-1315(1) (Reissue 2016), the term is not synonymous with an issue
or theory of recovery, but is instead the equivalent of a cause of action.
6. Actions: Parties: Final Orders: Appeal and Error. Where Neb. Rev.
Stat. § 25-1315 (Reissue 2016) is implicated, one may bring an appeal
pursuant to such section only when (1) multiple causes of action or
multiple parties are present, (2) the court enters a “final order” within
the meaning of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1902 (Cum. Supp. 2022) as to one
Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
10/14/2026 08:29 AM CDT

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
317 Nebraska Reports
DYLAN H. v. BROOKE C.
Cite as 317 Neb. 264
or more but fewer than all of the causes of action or parties, and (3) the
trial court expressly directs the entry of such final order and expressly
determines that there is no just reason for delay of an immediate appeal.
7. Claims: Parties: Final Orders: Appeal and Error. In cases where
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1315(1) (Reissue 2016) is implicated, and no more
specific statute governs the appeal, an order resolving fewer than all
claims against all parties is not final and appealable if it lacks proper
§ 25-1315 certification. This is so even if the order otherwise satisfies
one of the final order categories in Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1902(1) (Cum.
Supp. 2022).
Appeal from the District Court for Nemaha County, Julie D.
Smith, Judge. Appeal dismissed.
Angelo M. Ligouri, of Ligouri Law Office, for appellants.
Ryan K. McIntosh, of Brandt, Horan, Hallstrom & Stilmock,
for appellee.
Heavican, C.J., Miller-Lerman, Cassel, Stacy, Funke,
Papik, and Freudenberg, JJ.
Miller-Lerman, J.
NATURE OF CASE
Dylan H. initiated a proceeding against Brooke C., the
natural mother of P.C., a minor child, to establish paternity.
Brooke’s partner, Brandon B., intervened based on his allega-
tion that because he had signed a notarized acknowledgment
of paternity, he was P.C.’s father. Thereafter, Dylan filed a
verified third-party complaint in this action under Neb. Rev.
Stat. § 43-1409 (Reissue 2016) against Brooke and Brandon
to disestablish Brandon’s paternity on the basis of fraud and
material mistake of fact. The district court for Nemaha County
bifurcated the matters and conducted an evidentiary hearing
limited to Dylan’s disestablishment claim. Based on the evi-
dence, the district court found fraud and material mistake of
fact and disestablished Brandon’s paternity; it later denied a
motion for new trial. Brooke and Brandon purport to appeal
the May 15, 2023, order that set aside the acknowledgment

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
317 Nebraska Reports
DYLAN H. v. BROOKE C.
Cite as 317 Neb. 264
of paternity and ordered Brandon’s paternity disestablished,
as well as the August 5, 2023, order that denied a new trial.
Because Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1315 (Reissue 2016), governing
multiple parties and multiple claims, dictates that the orders are
not appealable, we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Brooke is the natural mother of P.C., born in February 2021.
In September 2021, Dylan, through counsel, sent a letter to
Brooke requesting establishment of paternity. Around 8 days
later, Brooke, Brooke’s ex-husband, and Brandon executed a
notarized acknowledgment of paternity purporting to estab-
lish Brandon as the father of P.C. Brandon testified that when
he executed the notarized acknowledgment of paternity, he
believed that P.C. was his biological daughter and that Brooke
had represented to him that he was her only sexual partner
during the time of conception.
Although we ultimately dismiss this appeal, the procedural
history and the parties’ claims are relevant in our analysis, and
we set them forth below, as relevant.
Dylan’s Complaint to Establish Paternity and
Third-Party Complaint to Disestablish
Paternity in Brandon.
In December 2021, Dylan filed a complaint in the district
court to establish paternity, custody, and support pursuant to
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-1411.01 (Cum. Supp. 2022). He also
moved for genetic testing. Brooke filed an answer in which
she generally denied Dylan’s allegations of paternity without
explicitly denying that he was the biological father. Brandon
moved for leave to intervene, alleging that he and Brooke
had signed a notarized acknowledgment of paternity, that he
and Brooke had been in a relationship and were engaged to
be married, and that he has been P.C.’s father and has main-
tained a loving and supportive parenting relationship. The
court allowed Brandon to intervene. Brooke’s ex-husband is
not directly involved in these proceedings.

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
317 Nebraska Reports
DYLAN H. v. BROOKE C.
Cite as 317 Neb. 264
An initial motion for genetic testing filed by Dylan was
overruled by the court, under the reasoning that it could not
order genetic testing without first setting aside Brandon’s
paternity acknowledgment. See Tyler F. v. Sara P., 306 Neb.
397, 945 N.W.2d 502 (2020). Subsequently, Dylan moved
for leave to file a third-party complaint against Brooke and
Brandon to seek disestablishment of Brandon’s paternity. The
court sustained Dylan’s motion, notwithstanding objections
by Brooke and Brandon based on the notarized acknowl-
edgment of paternity and their reliance on Neb. Rev. Stat.
§ 43-1412.01 (Reissue 2016). The district court determined
that § 43-1409 applied because of its explicit provisions for
challenging a notarized acknowledgment based on fraud or
material mistake of fact. Brooke and Brandon moved to dis-
miss the third-party complaint, and the motion was overruled.
Motion for Genetic Testing and First Appeal.
Because it would relate to the disestablishment claim, the
district court granted Dylan’s successive motion for genetic
testing as a matter of discovery under Neb. Ct. R. Disc.
§ 6-335. Brooke and Brandon appealed the order for genetic
testing to the Nebraska Court of Appeals, which determined
in case No. A-22-690 that the appeal was not filed within 30
days of the order and that genetic testing is not dispositive of
the proceedings and does not affect a substantial right of the
appellants. The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal.
DNA testing results from Dylan and Brandon showed that
Dylan is P.C.’s biological father.
Trial on Third-Party Complaint to
Disestablish Brandon’s Paternity.
The district court bifurcated the complaint to establish
paternity in Dylan from the third-party complaint to dises-
tablish paternity in Brandon and set the issue of disestablish-
ment for trial. Brooke and Brandon filed several unsuccess-
ful motions that, among other things, sought to appoint a

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
317 Nebraska Reports
DYLAN H. v. BROOKE C.
Cite as 317 Neb. 264
guardian ad litem pursuant to § 43-1412.01 and dismiss the
action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Following a trial, the district court set aside the notarized
acknowledgment of paternity on the basis of fraud, as well
as the corresponding basis of material mistake of fact, and
disestablished Brandon’s paternity. In its order, the district
court summarized the facts as follows: Brooke, the mother
of P.C., and Brandon, a third-party, conspired to execute an
acknowledgment of paternity in order to prevent the biological
father, Dylan, from exercising his parental rights. Brooke and
Brandon filed a motion for new trial that was denied.
Subsequent Proceedings in the District Court.
Dylan was subsequently awarded 1½ hours of parenting
time with P.C. every Saturday and therapeutic parenting time
of no less than one appointment every 2 weeks. The district
court noted that because paternity is not yet established in
Dylan, P.C. would not be informed at this time that Dylan is
her father.
The district court later entered an order that awarded Dylan
attorney fees. The order detailed “numerous tactics through-
out this case” by Brooke and Brandon “which have served to
cause significant delays” and found that their first appeal and
various other motions were “frivolous” and “filed in bad faith
and/or filed for the purpose of delay.”
Brooke and Brandon purported to appeal.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
According to the notice of appeal, Brooke and Brandon
challenge the order that disestablished Brandon’s paternity and
the order denying their motion for new trial related thereto.
Brooke and Brandon also assign errors related to various inci-
dental rulings by the district court not entirely identified in
their notice of appeal and, in view of our ruling dismissing the
appeal, are not subject to consideration.

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
317 Nebraska Reports
DYLAN H. v. BROOKE C.
Cite as 317 Neb. 264
STANDARDS OF REVIEW
[1] A jurisdictional question which does not involve a fac-
tual dispute is determined by an appellate court as a matter of
law. Johnson v. Vosberg, 316 Neb. 658, 6 N.W.3d 216 (2024).
ANALYSIS
Brooke and Brandon appeal from the order that disestab-
lished Brandon’s paternity of P.C. and from the order that
denied their motion for new trial. These orders did not resolve
all claims encompassed by the pleadings, which also included,
inter alia, Dylan’s action to establish paternity, custody, and
support. The single action in the district court presented more
than one claim for relief and involved multiple parties, and
the district court’s orders adjudicated fewer than all of the
claims. Therefore, we determine that § 25-1315(1) is impli-
cated in this case and that its jurisdictional requirements were
not met in this appeal. As explained below, we are without
jurisdiction to decide the merits of this appeal, and we dismiss
this appeal.
Appellate Jurisdiction.
[2,3] Before reaching the legal issues presented for review,
it is the duty of an appellate court to determine whether it
has jurisdiction over the matter before it. Clason v. LOL
Investments, 316 Neb. 91, 3 N.W.3d 94 (2024). The right of
appeal in Nebraska is purely statutory, and unless a statute
provides for an appeal, such right does not exist. Johnson v.
Vosberg, supra.
[4] Through Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1912 (Cum. Supp. 2022),
the Legislature has authorized appeals from judgments and
decrees rendered, as well as final orders, made by the dis-
trict court. Id. Additionally, when “an action” presents more
than one “claim for relief” or involves multiple parties, and
the court enters an order that adjudicates fewer than all the
claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the par-
ties, § 25-1315(1) is implicated, and to become appealable,

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
317 Nebraska Reports
DYLAN H. v. BROOKE C.
Cite as 317 Neb. 264
the order must comply with the requirements of certification
of an appeal in § 25-1315(1). See Johnson v. Vosberg, supra.
Section 25-1315(1) provides:
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an
action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or
third-party claim, or when multiple parties are involved,
the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to
one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties
only upon an express determination that there is no just
reason for delay and upon an express direction for the
entry of judgment. In the absence of such determina-
tion and direction, any order or other form of decision,
however designated, which adjudicates fewer than all
the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all
the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the
claims or parties, and the order or other form of deci-
sion is subject to revision at any time before the entry of
judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and
liabilities of all the parties.
[5] For purposes of determining whether a case presents
more than one “claim for relief” under § 25-1315(1), we have
said the term is not synonymous with an “issue” or “theory of
recovery,” but is instead the equivalent of a “cause of action.”
Mann v. Mann, 312 Neb. 275, 286, 978 N.W.2d 606, 615
(2022) (internal quotation marks omitted). Because of this
construction, our cases sometimes use the phrases “claim for
relief” and “cause of action” interchangeably when analyzing
whether § 25-1315 is implicated. Id.
Section 25-1315 attempts to strike a balance between the
undesirability of piecemeal appeals and the potential need for
making review available at a time that best serves the needs of
the parties. See Mann v. Mann, supra. Certification of a final
judgment must be reserved for the “unusual case” in which
the costs and risks of multiplying the number of proceedings
and of overcrowding the appellate docket are outbalanced by
the pressing needs of the litigants for an early and separate

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
317 Nebraska Reports
DYLAN H. v. BROOKE C.
Cite as 317 Neb. 264
judgment as to some claims or parties. TDP Phase One v.
The Club at the Yard, 307 Neb. 795, 950 N.W.2d 640 (2020);
Rafert v. Meyer, 298 Neb. 461, 905 N.W.2d 30 (2017).
Without entry of a final judgment under § 25-1315(1),
orders adjudicating fewer than all claims against all parties are
not final and are “subject to revision at any time before the
entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights
and liabilities of all the parties.” Mann v. Mann, supra; Boyd v.
Cook, 298 Neb. 819, 906 N.W.2d 31 (2018).
Implication of § 25-1315 and
Lack of Appellate Jurisdiction.
In the present case, there were multiple parties and multiple
claims for relief, including establishment of Dylan’s paternity
and disestablishment of Brandon’s paternity. Only the dises-
tablishment claim has been ruled on. Indeed, several journal
entries contained in the record confirm this. An entry on
August 4, 2023, states, “[T]rial . . . held on the bifurcated issue
of the disestablishment of paternity only.” (Emphasis omitted.)
Section 25-1315(1) is implicated in this case.
[6] We have held that where § 25-1315 is implicated,
one may bring an appeal pursuant to such section only
when (1) multiple causes of action or multiple parties
are present, (2) the court enters a “final order” within the
meaning of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1902 (Reissue 2016) as
to one or more but fewer than all of the causes of action
or parties, and (3) the trial court expressly directs the
entry of such final order and expressly determines that
there is no just reason for delay of an immediate appeal.
State on behalf of Marcelo K. & Rycki K. v. Ricky K., 300 Neb.
179, 183, 912 N.W.2d 747, 750 (2018). The trial court’s express
determination is sometimes referred to as “certification.”
[7] Elsewhere, we have stated:
[I]n cases where § 25-1315(1) is implicated, and no more
specific statute governs the appeal, an order resolving
fewer than all claims against all parties is not final and

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
317 Nebraska Reports
DYLAN H. v. BROOKE C.
Cite as 317 Neb. 264
appealable if it lacks proper § 25-1315 certification. This
is so even if the order otherwise satisfies one of the final
order categories in § 25-1902(1).
Mann v. Mann, 312 Neb. 275, 292, 978 N.W.2d 606, 618
(2022).
Here, the paternity case and disestablishment case have been
joined into a single case in the district court, and § 25-1315(1)
is implicated. Under similar circumstances, where there is
no certification under § 25-1315(1), we have dismissed the
case for lack of appellate jurisdiction. See State on behalf
of Marcelo K. & Rycki K. v. Ricky K., supra. Cf. Tyler F.
v. Sara P., 306 Neb. 397, 945 N.W.2d 502 (2020) (exercis-
ing appellate jurisdiction over two separate actions and two
separate appeals, which, taken together, involved paternity and
disestablishment).
The district court did not purport to enter a final judgment
in this case, and the appellate record contains no § 25-1315
certification of any order. The orders that were purportedly
appealed from ruled only on Dylan’s third-party complaint
to disestablish Brandon’s paternity and not on the cause of
action framed by Dylan’s complaint to establish paternity.
Where, as here, the language of § 25-1315(1) is implicated,
we must apply the requirements of that section in order to
find a final, appealable order. The requirements have not been
met, and we lack jurisdiction.
CONCLUSION
Because Brooke and Brandon appealed from orders deemed
to be nonfinal under § 25-1315, we lack jurisdiction over the
appeal. Accordingly, we must dismiss the appeal.
Appeal dismissed.