State ex rel. Brooks v. Evnen

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
317 Nebraska Reports
STATE EX REL. BROOKS v. EVNEN
Cite as 317 Neb. 581
State of Nebraska ex rel. Catherine Brooks, D.O.,
relator, v. Robert B. Evnen, Secretary of State
of the State of Nebraska, respondent, and
Dr. Andy Robertson et al., intervenors.
State of Nebraska ex rel. Carolyn I. LaGreca,
relator, v. Robert B. Evnen, Secretary of State
of the State of Nebraska, respondent, and
Dr. Andy Robertson et al., intervenors.
___ N.W.3d ___
Filed September 13, 2024. 	Nos. S-24-647, S-24-654.
1. Mandamus: Words and Phrases. Mandamus is a law action and repre-
sents an extraordinary remedy, not a writ of right.
2. Mandamus. Whether to grant a writ of mandamus is within a court’s
discretion.
3. Mandamus: Proof. Mandamus relief is available if the movant can
show (1) a clear right to the relief sought, (2) a corresponding clear duty
to perform the act requested, and (3) that no other plain and adequate
remedy is available in the ordinary course of the law.
4. ____: ____. In a mandamus action, the burden lies on the party seeking
mandamus to show clearly and conclusively that the party is entitled to
the particular thing the relator asks, as respondent is legally obligated
to act.
5. Initiative and Referendum: Justiciable Issues. A preelection challenge
based on the procedural requirements to a voter ballot initiative’s place-
ment on the ballot is ripe for resolution.
6. Initiative and Referendum. Sufficiency of a ballot, including the single
subject requirement, is a procedural requirement suitable for preelection
determination.
7. Declaratory Judgments. An action for declaratory judgment is sui
generis; whether such action is to be treated as one at law or one in
equity is to be determined by the nature of the dispute.
Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
10/14/2026 08:24 AM CDT

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
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STATE EX REL. BROOKS v. EVNEN
Cite as 317 Neb. 581
8. ____. The purpose of a declaratory judgment action is to declare rights,
status, and other legal relations.
9. Declaratory Judgments: Equity. Declaratory and equitable relief are
not appropriate where another equally serviceable remedy has been pro-
vided by law, and such relief is available only in the absence of a full,
adequate, and serviceable remedy.
10. Declaratory Judgments. The appropriateness of a declaratory judgment
is ascertained by the precise relief sought.
11. Constitutional Law: Initiative and Referendum. The right of initia-
tive is precious to the people and one which the courts are zealous to
preserve to the fullest tenable measure of spirit as well as letter.
12. ____: ____. The power of initiative must be liberally construed to pro-
mote the democratic process, and provisions authorizing the initiative
should be construed in such a manner that the legislative power reserved
in the people is effectual.
13. Constitutional Law. A constitution represents the supreme written will
of the people regarding the framework for their government.
14. Constitutional Law: Initiative and Referendum. The people of
Nebraska may amend their Constitution in any way they see fit, pro-
vided the amendments do not violate the federal Constitution or conflict
with federal statutes or treaties.
15. Initiative and Referendum: Appeal and Error. The Nebraska Supreme
Court makes no attempt to judge the wisdom or the desirability of enact-
ing initiative amendments.
16. Constitutional Law: Initiative and Referendum. A purpose of the
language in Neb. Const. art. III, § 2, that “[i]nitiative measures shall
contain only one subject” is to avoid logrolling, which is the practice
of combining dissimilar propositions into one proposed amendment
so that voters must vote for or against the whole package even though
they would have voted differently had the propositions been submitted
separately.
17. Initiative and Referendum. Where the limits of a proposed law, hav-
ing natural and necessary connection with each other, and, together, are
a part of one general subject, the proposal is a single and not a dual
proposition.
18. Constitutional Law: Initiative and Referendum: Intent. The control-
ling consideration in determining the singleness of a subject for pur-
poses of article III, § 2, of the Nebraska Constitution is its singleness
of purpose and relationship of the details to the general subject, not the
strict necessity of any given detail to carry out the general subject. The
general subject is defined by its primary purpose.

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
317 Nebraska Reports
STATE EX REL. BROOKS v. EVNEN
Cite as 317 Neb. 581
Original actions. In No. S-24-647, writ of mandamus denied.
In No. S-24-654, writ of mandamus denied.
Brenna M. Grasz and Adam W. Kauffman, of Keating,
O’Gara, Nedved & Peter, P.C., L.L.O., for relator Catherine
Brooks.
Matthew 	F. 	Heffron, 	Michael 	G. 	McHale, 	and 	Mary
Catherine Martin, of Thomas More Society, for relator Carolyn
I. LaGreca.
Michael T. Hilgers, Attorney General, Eric J. Hamilton, and
Zachary B. Pohlman, for respondent.
Sydney L. Hayes, Kaitlin A. Madsen, and Daniel J. Gutman,
of Law Office of Daniel Gutman, L.L.C., and Paul W. Rodney,
of Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer, L.L.P., pro hac vice, for
intervenors.
Heavican, C.J., Miller-Lerman, Cassel, Stacy, Funke,
Papik, and Freudenberg, JJ.
Miller-Lerman, J.
NATURE OF CASE
In these two consolidated original actions, relators chal-
lenge a ballot initiative that proposes to amend the Nebraska
Constitution to include a right to abortion. Case No. S-24-647
is sometimes referred to as “Brooks,” and case No. S-24-
654 is sometimes referred to as “LaGreca.” A separate case,
State ex rel. Constance v. Evnen, post p. 600, ___ N.W.3d
___ (2024), is not addressed in this opinion. The relators
herein contend, inter alia, that the ballot initiative violates the
single subject rule of Neb. Const. art. III, § 2, and the relators
seek, inter alia, a writ of mandamus ordering the Nebraska
Secretary of State to withhold the initiative from the ballot.
We determine that the ballot initiative does not violate the
single subject rule, and we deny the writs, thereby denying
the relief requested by the relators in both actions. By virtue

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
317 Nebraska Reports
STATE EX REL. BROOKS v. EVNEN
Cite as 317 Neb. 581
of our disposition denying the writs, the alternative writs of
mandamus entered in the two actions are dissolved by opera-
tion of law.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Challenged Initiative.
The relators in these actions challenge the ballot initiative
entitled “Protect the Right to Abortion” (the Initiative) that
would add a new article I, § 31, to the Nebraska Constitution.
The object language shown on the Initiative petition states:
The object of this petition is to:
Amend the Nebraska Constitution to provide all per-
sons the fundamental right to abortion without interfer-
ence from the state or its political subdivisions until fetal
viability, which is the point in pregnancy when, in the
professional judgment of the patient’s health care practi-
tioner, there is a significant likelihood of the fetus’ sus-
tained survival outside the uterus without the application
of extraordinary medical measures; or when needed to
protect the life or health of the pregnant patient.
The text of the proposed constitutional amendment is as
follows:
Article I of the Nebraska Constitution shall be
amended by adding a new section 31 as shown:
All persons shall have a fundamental right to abortion
until fetal viability, or when needed to protect the life or
health of the pregnant patient, without interference from
the state or its political subdivisions. Fetal viability means
the point in pregnancy when, in the professional judgment
of the patient’s treating health care practitioner, there is
a significant likelihood of the fetus’ sustained survival
outside the uterus without the application of extraordinary
medical measures.
The explanatory statement is as follows:
A vote “FOR” will amend the Nebraska Constitution
to provide that all persons shall have a fundamental right
to abortion until fetal viability, or when needed to protect

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
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STATE EX REL. BROOKS v. EVNEN
Cite as 317 Neb. 581
the life or health of the pregnant patient, without inter-
ference from the state or its political subdivisions. Fetal
viability is defined as the point in pregnancy when, in
the professional judgment of the patient’s treating health
care practitioner, there is a significant likelihood of the
fetus’ sustained survival outside the uterus without the
application of extraordinary medical measures.
A vote “AGAINST” will not amend the Nebraska
Constitution in such manner.
Case No. S-24-647: Brooks’ Challenge.
In case No. S-24-647, Catherine Brooks, D.O., filed an
application for leave to commence an original action and a
verified petition for writ of mandamus. An earlier application
had been denied for a deficient verification, but Brooks cured
the deficient verification and the application and the petition
in the present case are positively verified as true and correct.
Brooks challenges the Initiative. We granted leave to com-
mence this original action on August 30, 2024. On September
3, we granted a petition for leave to intervene filed by three
sponsors of the Initiative (the Sponsors). We also ordered
this case to be consolidated with case No. S-24-654 for oral
argument.
The relevant background recited herein is based on the
application, petition, and exhibits to the petition. Brooks, a
registered voter and resident of Lancaster County, is a practic-
ing neonatologist who specializes in treating premature babies.
She and others presented to Robert B. Evnen, Nebraska’s
Secretary of State, various objections to his announcement that
he was certifying two ballot measures, including the Initiative,
for the November 5, 2024, general election ballot. On August
27, the Secretary of State conveyed in writing that he would
take no action on the objections.
Brooks asserts in her petition two causes of action. Brooks’
first cause of action is that the Initiative violates article III, § 2,
of the Nebraska Constitution, which requires, in relevant part,
that “[i]initiative measures shall contain only one subject.”

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317 Nebraska Reports
STATE EX REL. BROOKS v. EVNEN
Cite as 317 Neb. 581
Without being comprehensive, attachments to the petition
identify dissimilar subjects, such as “without interference from
the state or its political subdivisions,” “fetal viability,” and
“[a]ll persons.” In particular, paragraph 24 of Brooks’ petition
reads as follows:
The Initiative violates this [single subject] requirement
by containing multiple proposals that are dissimilar,
unrelated, and separate purposes, including but not lim-
ited to (1) amending the Nebraska Constitution to create
a “fundamental right to abortion” for “[a]ll persons”,
encompassing unrelated propositions of both personal
rights and third party rights, such as (a) a fundamental
right of men, (b) a fundamental right of women, and (c)
a fundamental right of minors (without limit), without
regard to sex or pregnant status; (2) creating separate,
dissimilar and alternative rights to abortion (a) until
“fetal viability” or alternatively (b) for the “life”, or for
“health”, of the pregnant patient; (3) stripping all leg-
islative and regulatory authority from the State and its
political subdivisions from legislating and regulating in
an area of proposed constitutional law; and (4) redefining
the ordinary, legal, and medical meaning, standard, and
application of “fetal viability” in a manner that alters the
right being proposed entirely.
Brooks’ second cause of action is that the language of
the Initiative is misleading and causes voter confusion. The
asserted confusion is identified in paragraph 30 of the petition,
which reads as follows:
The Initiative’s use of (1) unclear, subjective, vague and
confusing terms, including without limitation phrases like
“[a]ll persons”, “health care practitioner”, “significant
likelihood”, “sustained survival”, and “extraordinary med-
ical measures”, and (2) a new and uncommon redefinition
of “fetal viability” containing many of these phrases will
confuse voters, cause voter doubt, and mislead voters,
who will be unable to discern what they are voting for.

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
317 Nebraska Reports
STATE EX REL. BROOKS v. EVNEN
Cite as 317 Neb. 581
In her request for relief, Brooks seeks a writ of mandamus
to compel the Secretary of State to withhold the Initiative
from the ballot because it is legally insufficient and fails
Nebraska’s constitutional requirement for ballot initiatives. In
the alternative, if resolution of this mandamus action occurs
after the general election ballots are certified, Brooks seeks a
writ of mandamus requiring the Secretary of State to abstain
from certifying the election results of the proposed constitu-
tional amendment in the Initiative.
Case No. S-24-654: LaGreca’s Challenge.
Carolyn I. LaGreca filed an application for leave to com-
mence an original action and verified petition for writ of
mandamus and declaratory judgment. Two earlier applications
were denied based on deficient verifications, but the applica-
tion and the petition in the instant case are positively verified
as true and correct. LaGreca challenges the Initiative. Unlike
Brooks in case No. S-24-647, LaGreca did not present her
objections to the Initiative to the Secretary of State before she
filed her application and petition in this court. On August 30,
2024, we granted leave to commence this original action. On
September 3, we granted a petition for leave to intervene filed
by the Sponsors. We also ordered this case to be consolidated
with case No. S-24-647 for oral argument.
LaGreca is a registered voter and resident of Douglas County.
LaGreca asserts in the petition one cause of action—that the
Initiative violates the single subject rule of Neb. Const. art. III,
§ 2. She asserts that the Initiative “contains several subjects
and purposes that are not natural and necessary to each other,”
and she asserts that such subjects and purposes include, but are
not limited to,
(1) a “fundamental right” to abortion until “viability;”
(2) abortion “without interference from the state,” which
conflicts with a “fundamental right” to abortion (as the
United States Supreme Court specifically has recognized
those exact phrases have sharply disparate meanings);

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STATE EX REL. BROOKS v. EVNEN
Cite as 317 Neb. 581
(3) a virtually unlimited right to abortion after “viabil-
ity,” until birth, for undefined “health” reasons; (4) two
conflicting standards for abortion before “viability” — a
“fundamental right” to abortion versus abortion only for
reasons of “life or health;” and (5) opening the viability
determination to a great number of non-physician “health
care practitioners.”
LaGreca further contends that the Initiative “particularly
violates the single subject rule, because it combines dissimilar
propositions into one ballot initiative, which would force vot-
ers to vote for or against the whole package even if they sup-
port only certain of the initiative’s propositions.”
In her request for relief, LaGreca seeks a writ of mandamus
to compel the Secretary of State to deny certification and to
withhold the Initiative from the ballot. In the alternative, if
resolution of this mandamus action occurs after the general
election ballots are certified, LaGreca seeks a writ of manda-
mus requiring the Secretary of State to abstain from certifying
the election results on the Initiative. LaGreca further requests
that this court enter judgment in her favor and issue a declara-
tory judgment pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 25-21,149 to
25-21,164 (Reissue 2016), finding and determining that the
language in the Initiative is “legally insufficient and invalid,
because it violates the single subject clause of Neb. Const.
art. III, § 2.”
Alternative Writs and Secretary
of State’s Responses.
In each case, after we granted leave to file the action, on
August 30, 2024, we issued an alternative writ of mandamus
ordering the Secretary of State to withhold and remove the
Initiative from the ballot or to show cause why a peremptory
writ ordering him to do so should not issue. The Secretary of
State responded in both cases on September 4. In case No.
S-24-647, he stated that he had advised Brooks and others,
as well as the Sponsors, that he would not take a position on

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STATE EX REL. BROOKS v. EVNEN
Cite as 317 Neb. 581
the challenges. In case No. S-24-654, he stated that he had
not been asked to consider LaGreca’s arguments and had not
formed an opinion on them after reviewing the petition filed in
this court. In both responses, the Secretary of State noted that
the Sponsors had intervened in these actions and stated that the
Sponsors would be able to respond to the relators to defend
inclusion of the Initiative on the ballot. The Secretary of State
further stated that he would not submit briefs or participate
in oral argument in these actions. The Secretary of State ulti-
mately stated that his answers showed cause why peremptory
writs should not issue.
The relators have filed briefs in their respective cases, and
the Sponsors have filed a brief in each case. We heard oral
argument by the relators and the Sponsors, and both actions are
now submitted to us.
ISSUES PRESENTED
As noted above, in each action, the relators claim that the
Secretary of State should not have placed the Initiative on
the ballot because it violates the single subject rule. In case
No. S-24-647, Brooks also claims that the Initiative violates a
common-law rule set forth in case law, including Drummond
v. City of Columbus, 136 Neb. 87, 285 N.W. 109 (1939),
which she states precludes “confusing, vague, ambiguous, and
misleading initiative language that will confuse voters, cause
doubt, and undermine the integrity of elections.”
In each action, the relators seek a writ of mandamus ordering
the Secretary of State to remove the Initiative from the ballot.
In case No. S-24-654, LaGreca also seeks a declaratory judg-
ment stating that the Initiative violates the single subject rule.
APPLICABLE STANDARDS
[1,2] Mandamus is a law action and represents an extraordi-
nary remedy, not a writ of right. State ex rel. Wagner v. Evnen,
307 Neb. 142, 948 N.W.2d 244 (2020). Whether to grant a writ
of mandamus is within a court’s discretion. Id.

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STATE EX REL. BROOKS v. EVNEN
Cite as 317 Neb. 581
[3] Mandamus relief is available if the movant can show
(1) a clear right to the relief sought, (2) a corresponding clear
duty to perform the act requested, and (3) that no other plain
and adequate remedy is available in the ordinary course of the
law. Id.
[4] In a mandamus action, the burden lies on the party seek-
ing mandamus to show clearly and conclusively that the party
is entitled to the particular thing the relator asks, as respondent
is legally obligated to act. See State ex rel. Parks v. City of
Omaha, 277 Neb. 919, 766 N.W.2d 134 (2009).
[5,6] We have stated that a preelection challenge based on
the procedural requirements to a voter ballot initiative’s place-
ment on the ballot is ripe for resolution. State ex rel. Wagner
v. Evnen, supra. Sufficiency of a ballot, including the single
subject requirement, is a procedural requirement suitable for
preelection determination. See id.
[7,8] An action for declaratory judgment is sui generis;
whether such action is to be treated as one at law or one in
equity is to be determined by the nature of the dispute. Castillo
v. Libert Land Holdings 4, 316 Neb. 287, 4 N.W.3d 377 (2024).
The purpose of a declaratory judgment action is to declare
rights, status, and other legal relations. § 25-21,149; McKay v.
Bartels, 316 Neb. 235, 3 N.W.3d 920 (2024).
ANALYSIS
All 	relators 	in 	their 	respective 	petitions 	challenge 	the
Initiative based on the single subject rule, and all relators seek
relief in the form of a writ of mandamus. Before considering
these common aspects of the two petitions, we address issues
unique to each petition.
Case No. S-24-647: Brooks’ Claim That the
Initiative Violates a Common-Law Rule
Regarding “Confusing” Language.
In addition to claiming that the Initiative violates the con-
stitutional single subject rule, Brooks claims the Initiative

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STATE EX REL. BROOKS v. EVNEN
Cite as 317 Neb. 581
violates a common-law rule that she contends precludes “con-
fusing, vague, ambiguous, and misleading initiative language
that will confuse voters, cause doubt, and undermine the
integrity of elections.” Brooks cites Drummond v. City of
Columbus, 136 Neb. 87, 285 N.W. 109 (1939), in support of
her contention.
At issue in Drummond was the language of a proposed
municipal initiative, and in that case, this court adopted a
single subject rule for such initiative. This court has applied
Drummond and the concepts set forth therein in other cases
involving municipalities. See, City of North Platte v. Tilgner,
282 Neb. 328, 803 N.W.2d 469 (2011); City of Fremont v.
Kotas, 279 Neb. 720, 781 N.W.2d 456 (2010), abrogated, City
of North Platte v. Tilgner, supra.
The Initiative, however, is not a municipal initiative and
the common-law rule set forth in the cited cases does not
apply. Instead, the Initiative is governed by Neb. Const. art.
III, § 2, including the single subject rule set forth therein.
While this court has cited Drummond and the concepts set
forth therein when analyzing the single subject rule under
Neb. Const. art. III, § 2, the common-law rule does not have
independent application to the Initiative. Instead, the Initiative
is properly analyzed under the single subject rule of Neb.
Const. art. III, § 2, and precedent interpreting and applying
that constitutional provision. Therefore, we do not separately
consider Brooks’ arguments regarding a common-law single
subject rule, and we consider the arguments only to the extent
they are relevant to the single subject rule of Neb. Const. art.
III, § 2.
In this regard, we reiterate the following regarding the
standards set forth in Drummond and similar cases and the
relevance of those standards in the context of the constitutional
single subject rule in Neb. Const. art. III, § 2.
In the plurality opinion in State ex rel. McNally v. Evnen,
307 Neb. 103, 120-21, 948 N.W.2d 463, 477-78 (2020),

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STATE EX REL. BROOKS v. EVNEN
Cite as 317 Neb. 581
which we quote from at length in this opinion, we previously
stated as follows:
In State ex rel. Loontjer v. Gale[, 288 Neb. 973,
853 N.W.2d 494 (2014)], we were considering constitu-
tional amendments proposed by the Legislature and the
separate vote requirement of Neb. Const. art. XVI, § 1,
which governs constitutional amendments proposed by
the Legislature. We referred to Tilgner[, supra], which
described a natural and necessary test for the single vote
requirement set forth in subsection (1) of the quoted lan-
guage regarding municipal ballot measures. We concluded
that the natural and necessary test for the single vote
requirement for municipal ballot measures should also
be used in connection with the separate vote provisions
of Neb. Const. art. XVI, § 1, governing constitutional
amendments proposed by the Legislature.
In State ex rel. Loontjer v. Gale, supra, we recog-
nized that among the reasons for a single subject rule
is that including multiple subjects could confuse voters
and create doubt, but we have not said that confusion
or doubt are separate requirements for a legally insuf-
ficient measure or that they are required elements of the
test to determine whether a measure violates the single
subject requirement. As we noted above, in Christensen
v. Gale, 301 Neb. 19, 917 N.W.2d 145 (2018), we said
that the natural and necessary test described in State ex
rel. Loontjer v. Gale, supra, for the separate vote require-
ment under Neb. Const. art. XVI, § 1, for constitutional
amendments proposed by the Legislature is also an appli-
cable framework to consideration of the single subject
rule for initiatives brought under Neb. Const. art. III,
§ 2. Therefore, the natural and necessary test governs our
single subject analysis in this case.
The natural and necessary test and other standards applicable
to the Initiative in these cases are discussed further below.

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STATE EX REL. BROOKS v. EVNEN
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Case No. S-24-654: LaGreca’s Request
for Declaratory Relief.
In addition to requesting relief in the form of a writ of man-
damus, LaGreca also seeks a declaratory judgment stating that
the Initiative violates the single subject rule.
[9,10] Declaratory and equitable relief are not appropriate
where another equally serviceable remedy has been provided
by law, and such relief is available only in the absence of
a full, adequate, and serviceable remedy. McKay v. Bartels,
316 Neb. 235, 3 N.W.3d 920 (2024). The appropriateness of
a declaratory judgment is ascertained by the precise relief
sought. Id.
The precise declaratory relief LaGreca seeks is a declara-
tion that the Initiative violates the constitutional single subject
rule. As evidenced by LaGreca’s request for a writ of manda-
mus premised on a determination that the Initiative violates
the constitutional single subject rule, an equally serviceable
remedy has been provided by law, and we determine that such
remedy is a full, adequate, and serviceable remedy for what
LaGreca seeks in terms of declaratory relief. We therefore
determine that declaratory relief is not available to LaGreca
in this action. Furthermore, as discussed below, we determine
that the Initiative does not violate the constitutional single
subject rule and that therefore, the declaratory relief requested
would not be appropriate even if it were available.
Cases Nos. S-24-647 and S-24-654: Claim That
the Initiative Violates Single Subject
Rule of Neb. Const. Art. III, § 2;
Applicable Standard Applied.
Each relator claims that the Initiative violates the single sub-
ject rule of Neb. Const. art. III, § 2. We reject their claims. We
begin by setting forth standards regarding art. III, § 2.
[11,12] The people have the power to amend the Nebraska
Constitution and enact statutes by the initiative process pursu-
ant to Neb. Const. art. III, § 2, which provides in part: “The

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STATE EX REL. BROOKS v. EVNEN
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first power reserved by the people is the initiative whereby
laws may be enacted and constitutional amendments adopted
by the people independently of the Legislature.” We have
repeatedly said that the right of initiative is precious to the
people and one which the courts are zealous to preserve to
the fullest tenable measure of spirit as well as letter. State ex
rel. McNally v. Evnen, 307 Neb. 103, 948 N.W.2d 463 (2020)
(plurality opinion); Christensen v. Gale, 301 Neb. 19, 917
N.W.2d 145 (2018); Hargesheimer v. Gale, 294 Neb. 123, 881
N.W.2d 589 (2016); Stewart v. Advanced Gaming Tech., 272
Neb. 471, 723 N.W.2d 65 (2006); State ex rel. Lemon v. Gale,
272 Neb. 295, 721 N.W.2d 347 (2006); Loontjer v. Robinson,
266 Neb. 902, 670 N.W.2d 301 (2003); State ex rel. Stenberg
v. Moore, 258 Neb. 199, 602 N.W.2d 465 (1999). The power
of initiative must be liberally construed to promote the demo-
cratic process, and provisions authorizing the initiative should
be construed in such a manner that the legislative power
reserved in the people is effectual. State ex rel. McNally v.
Evnen, supra; Stewart v. Advanced Gaming Tech., supra.
[13-15] A constitution represents the supreme written will
of the people regarding the framework for their government.
State ex rel. McNally v. Evnen, supra; State ex rel. Johnson
v. Gale, 273 Neb. 889, 734 N.W.2d 290 (2007). The people
of Nebraska may amend their Constitution in any way they
see fit, provided the amendments do not violate the federal
Constitution or conflict with federal statutes or treaties. State
ex rel. McNally v. Evnen, supra; State ex rel. Johnson v. Gale,
supra. This court makes no attempt to judge the wisdom or the
desirability of enacting initiative amendments. Id.
[16] Among other matters related to initiatives, Neb. Const.
art. III, § 2, provides that “[i]nitiative measures shall contain
only one subject.” We have stated that a purpose of this lan-
guage is to avoid logrolling, which is the practice of combin-
ing dissimilar propositions into one proposed amendment so
that voters must vote for or against the whole package even
though they would have voted differently had the propositions

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STATE EX REL. BROOKS v. EVNEN
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been submitted separately. State ex rel. McNally v. Evnen,
supra; Christensen v. Gale, supra.
[17,18] We have followed and continue to follow the natu-
ral and necessary connection test that we have set forth as
follows: Where the limits of a proposed law, having natural
and necessary connection with each other, and, together, are
a part of one general subject, the proposal is a single and not
a dual proposition. Id. The controlling consideration in deter-
mining the singleness of a subject for purposes of article III,
§ 2, of the Nebraska Constitution is its singleness of purpose
and relationship of the details to the general subject, not the
strict necessity of any given detail to carry out the general
subject. State ex rel. McNally v. Evnen, supra; Christensen
v. Gale, supra. The general subject is defined by its primary
purpose. Id.
Brooks generally argues that the Initiative violates the
single subject rule because it “creates multiple rights of vary-
ing favorability and redefines terms in ways that are unrelated
to any primary purpose” and because it “contains propositions
that are not naturally and necessarily connected and are suf-
ficiently separable.” Brief for relator in case No. S-24-647 at
17. Brooks specifically contends that the Initiative (1) creates
rights to abortion both until fetal viability and, alternatively,
when needed to protect life or health; (2) redefines the term
“fetal viability” and alters medical standards and practices;
(3) creates both a personal right of a pregnant woman and
“third-party rights” not based on pregnancy status or sex; (4)
applies to minors without restriction; and (5) creates a right to
abortion and contains a separate regulatory provision to end
government interference with the right. See id.
LaGreca generally argues that while the Initiative has a
general subject of “enshrining a ‘fundamental right’ to abor-
tion before ‘viability,’” the Initiative “also contains multiple
secondary subjects that are not ‘naturally and necessarily’
connected to that general subject.” Brief for relator in case
No. S-24-654 at 30. LaGreca specifically contends that the

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Initiative (1) provides for abortion without interference from
the state, which she contends is a separate subject from cre-
ating a fundamental right to abortion; (2) provides both for
abortion until viability and for health reasons after viability;
(3) creates different rights before viability and after viability;
and (4) allows “a potentially large number” of health care
practitioners to determine viability. See id. at 44.
Each relator generally contends that the Initiative violates
the single subject rule. As the Sponsors note, the Initiative
is “not complex” and the proposed constitutional amendment
contains two sentences, “one of which defines a key term used
in the other.” Brief for intervenors in case No. S-24-647 at 28.
We agree with the contention of the Sponsors and conclude
that the Initiative does not contain multiple subjects that are
not naturally and necessarily connected to the general subject.
As set forth above and repeated here, the text of the consti-
tutional amendment contained in the Initiative is as follows:
Article I of the Nebraska Constitution shall be
amended by adding a new section 31 as shown:
All persons shall have a fundamental right to abortion
until fetal viability, or when needed to protect the life
or health of the pregnant patient, without interference
from the state or its political subdivisions. Fetal viability
means the point in pregnancy when, in the professional
judgment of the patient’s treating health care practitioner,
there is a significant likelihood of the fetus’ sustained
survival outside the uterus without the application of
extraordinary medical measures.
As set forth above, the stated object of the Initiative is to
[a]mend the Nebraska Constitution to provide all per-
sons the fundamental right to abortion without interfer-
ence from the state or its political subdivisions until fetal
viability, which is the point in pregnancy when, in the
professional judgment of the patient’s health care practi-
tioner, there is a significant likelihood of the fetus’ sus-
tained survival outside the uterus without the application

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of extraordinary medical measures; or when needed to
protect the life or health of the pregnant patient.
We view the text of the Initiative as significantly similar to,
and no more complex or broad than, the stated object.
The object statement does not necessarily define the subject
for purposes of single subject analysis. However, it informs
our reading of the proposed constitutional provision. To the
extent the object statement might be too broad to be consid-
ered the proper subject for single subject textual analysis,
it nevertheless confirms that the subject of the Initiative is
creation of a constitutional right to abortion. With that under-
standing, we determine that the parts of the Initiative are all
naturally and necessarily related to that subject.
The relators dissect the two sentences of the Initiative
and examine the words of those sentences to argue that the
Initiative contains multiple separate subjects. However, we
read all parts of the Initiative as setting parameters of the con-
stitutional right that the Initiative seeks to create or as defining
terms that describe the nature and extent of the right.
Much of the relators’ argument is that these limitations,
parameters, and definitions are each separate subjects. We
have stated that in single subject analysis, “[t]he controlling
consideration in determining the singleness of a subject . . . is
its singleness of purpose and relationship of the details to the
general subject, not the strict necessity of any given detail to
carry out the general subject.” State ex rel. McNally v. Evnen,
307 Neb. 103, 119, 948 N.W.2d 463, 477 (2020) (plurality
opinion); Christensen v. Gale, 301 Neb. 19, 917 N.W.2d 145
(2018). Having reviewed the text of the proposed constitu-
tional amendment, we determine that the parts of the Initiative
all relate to the same general subject of creating a constitu-
tional right to abortion. The parts of the Initiative define the
limits and set parameters for that right and define terms for
purposes of the proposed constitutional provision. The fact
that the drafters of the Initiative have made certain choices
regarding the specific limits, parameters, and definitions does

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not mean that each such provision is a separate subject.
Instead, all provisions are directed to the general subject of
creating a specific constitutional right to abortion with certain
chosen limits, parameters, and definitions.
To the extent the relators argue that the provisions of the
Initiative could result in “logrolling,” we have described “log-
rolling” as “the practice of combining dissimilar propositions
into one proposed amendment so that voters must vote for
or against the whole package even though they would have
voted differently had the propositions been submitted sepa-
rately.” State ex rel. McNally v. Evnen, 307 Neb. at 118-19,
948 N.W.2d at 476. The provisions of the Initiative are not
“dissimilar propositions,” and instead, all relate to the general
subject of a right to abortion. We reject the argument that
“logrolling” occurs merely because a specific voter might not
agree with all the specific details while supporting the general
subject. “Logrolling” occurs only when there are dissimilar
provisions, not when the provisions make specific choices
within the context of the general subject.
We note that our decision in this case aligns with a deci-
sion of the Florida Supreme Court issued earlier this year. In
Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. re Abortion, 384 So. 3d 122 (Fla.
2024), that court rejected a challenge to a voter initiative
based on a single subject provision in the Florida Constitution.
The sponsors contended that the initiative addressed a single
subject, “‘limiting government interference with abortion.’”
Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. re Abortion, 384 So. 3d at 129. The
Florida Supreme Court rejected the argument that the initia-
tive embraced two subjects: a right to abortion previability
and a right to abortion when necessary to protect the mother’s
health. It explained that both the viability and health provi-
sions related to the single subject identified by the sponsors. It
also rejected the argument that the initiative violated the single
subject provision merely because some voters might support
some portion of the proposed amendment and oppose others.

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We determine that the Initiative does not include multiple
subjects, and instead we determine that the provisions of the
proposed constitutional amendment are naturally and necessar-
ily related to the general subject. We therefore conclude that
the Initiative does not violate the single subject rule of Neb.
Const. art. III, § 2.
CONCLUSION
We determine that the Initiative seeks to create a constitu-
tional right to abortion and has a singleness of subject, and we
conclude that the Initiative does not violate the single subject
rule of Neb. Const. art. III, § 2. Within the context of the
proposed Initiative, the use of additional words upon which
Brooks and LaGreca rely are not separate subjects but facets
of the singular subject to create a constitutional right to abor-
tion. We therefore conclude that the relators are not entitled to
the writs of mandamus requested in their respective original
actions. We further conclude that LaGreca is not entitled to the
declaratory judgment requested in case No. S-24-654. We deny
the writs of mandamus in each case. By operation of law, the
alternative writs entered in each action are dissolved.
In No. S-24-647, writ of mandamus denied.
In No. S-24-654, writ of mandamus denied.