State ex rel. Counsel for Dis. v. Campbell

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
318 Nebraska Reports
STATE EX REL. COUNSEL FOR DIS. v. CAMPBELL
Cite as 318 Neb. 23
State of Nebraska ex rel. Counsel for Discipline
of the Nebraska Supreme Court, relator,
v. Thomas O. Campbell, respondent.
___ N.W.3d ___
Filed November 8, 2024. 	No. S-23-983.
1. Disciplinary Proceedings: States: Proof. In a reciprocal discipline
proceeding, a judicial determination of attorney misconduct in one
jurisdiction is generally conclusive proof of guilt and is not subject to
relitigation in the second jurisdiction.
2. Disciplinary Proceedings. In imposing attorney discipline, the Nebraska
Supreme Court evaluates each case in light of its particular facts and
circumstances.
Original action. Judgment of disbarment.
Jarrod S. Boitnott, Assistant Counsel for Discipline, for
relator.
Clarence E. Mock, of Johnson & Mock, P.C., L.L.O., for
respondent.
Heavican, C.J., Miller-Lerman, Cassel, Stacy, Funke,
Papik, and Freudenberg, JJ.
Per Curiam.
The U.S. District Court for the District of Nebraska issued
an order revoking the respondent’s license to practice law
before it. The relator, the Counsel for Discipline of the
Nebraska Supreme Court (Counsel for Discipline), has filed
a motion for reciprocal discipline of the respondent pursuant
to Neb. Ct. R. § 3-321. We decline the respondent’s request
Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
10/14/2026 08:17 AM CDT

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
318 Nebraska Reports
STATE EX REL. COUNSEL FOR DIS. v. CAMPBELL
Cite as 318 Neb. 23
that we appoint a referee to further develop the factual record.
We sustain the motion for reciprocal discipline and order
disbarment.
FACTS
The respondent, Thomas O. Campbell, was admitted to
the practice of law in the State of Nebraska on September
20, 2011.
In August 2023, the U.S. District Court for the District of
Nebraska accepted a plea agreement in which the respondent
pled guilty to willfully filing a false tax return, a felony. The
federal court found that the respondent was represented by
counsel; that the plea was knowing, intelligent, and volun-
tary; and that a factual basis existed for the plea. Pursuant to
the plea agreement, the respondent admitted that he submit-
ted tax returns from 2014 to 2018 that understated the gross
receipts of his law office. He admitted that he falsely sub-
scribed to his 2014 through 2018 tax returns willfully, with
the specific intent to violate the law. He agreed to pay all
restitution ordered by the federal court and to comply with all
Internal Revenue Service requirements related to any remain-
ing tax deficiency.
Subsequently, the federal court entered a notice and order
to show cause in which the respondent was “granted 60 days
. . . to show cause why he should not be disbarred,” pursuant
to a federal court rule. The respondent did not respond to the
order to show cause. On November 17, 2023, the federal court
issued an order disbarring the respondent from practicing law
in that court.
The federal court later sentenced the respondent to 12 months
and 1 day in federal prison, followed by 1 year of supervised
release. The federal court also imposed a fine of $10,000 and
ordered the respondent to pay restitution of $407,665, both of
which the respondent later paid.
Meanwhile, the relator filed the instant motion for recipro-
cal discipline in this court pursuant to § 3-321. We entered

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
318 Nebraska Reports
STATE EX REL. COUNSEL FOR DIS. v. CAMPBELL
Cite as 318 Neb. 23
an order to show cause why we “should or should not enter
an order imposing the identical discipline, or greater or lesser
discipline, as the Court deems appropriate.” Both the relator
and the respondent responded to the order to show cause.
The relator’s response to our order to show cause recom-
mended disbarment. According to the relator, the factual basis
for the plea in the underlying criminal case supports a recip-
rocal finding by this court that the respondent committed the
following violations of the Nebraska Rules of Professional
Conduct: (1) Misconduct—violating or attempting to violate
the Nebraska Rules of Professional Conduct, see Neb. Ct. R.
of Prof. Cond. § 3-508.4(a) (rev. 2016); (2) Misconduct—
committing a criminal act that reflects adversely on the law-
yer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other
respects, see § 3-508.4(b); and (3) Misconduct—engaging in
conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresenta-
tion, see § 3-508.4(c).
In the respondent’s response to the order to show cause, he
requested a referee to examine the issue of discipline. Rather
than appointing a referee at that stage as requested by the
respondent, we permitted the parties to supplement the record
on the issue of discipline. Both the relator and the respondent
submitted exhibits.
Included in the relator’s exhibits are two private repri-
mands issued to the respondent by the Committee on Inquiry
of the Fourth Judicial District on May 27, 2015, and July 15,
2020, respectively. These reprimands were based on miscon-
duct under rules relating to candor toward a tribunal; con-
duct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation;
competence; communications; truthfulness in statements to
others; conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice;
and violation or attempted violation of the rules of profes-
sional conduct.
As for the respondent’s evidence, he provided exhibits
showing that after first working as an associate attorney at
a law firm for 3 years, he established his own practice in

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
318 Nebraska Reports
STATE EX REL. COUNSEL FOR DIS. v. CAMPBELL
Cite as 318 Neb. 23
2014. According to the respondent’s affidavit, because of the
demands imposed by a very busy law practice, he lacked “time
to address the business side of [his] practice.” He acknowl-
edged that he “should have reached out for assistance related
to [his] bookkeeping and taxes,” which he did in 2019. An affi-
davit by the respondent’s counsel explained that the respondent
initially informed his counsel that he wanted to show cause
in the federal court why he should not be disbarred, but his
counsel advised him against it because “it would not serve [the
respondent’s] interests in the criminal case.” The respondent
also included letters of support from clients, local counsel, and
other associates in his community and abroad, all addressed to
the federal court.
On January 30, 2024, by stipulation and joint motion of the
parties, we suspended the respondent until final disposition of
this proceeding.
ANALYSIS
Hearing.
The respondent argues that before we proceed to the issue of
discipline, he is entitled to a hearing by a referee. We are not
persuaded that such a hearing is warranted here.
The respondent asserts that Neb. Ct. R. §§ 3-309 (rev. 2011)
and 3-310 (rev. 2023), which pertain to attorney discipline pro-
ceedings initiated by formal charges, provide the appropriate
procedure in a reciprocal discipline proceeding under § 3-321.
Because § 3-321 “does not provide for the appropriate pro-
cedure in a reciprocal discipline case,” he alleges, it must be
considered and construed together with §§ 3-309 and 3-310.
Brief for respondent at 10. Those rules require a hearing
before a referee under certain circumstances. See § 3-310(J)
and (K) (requiring hearing before referee when answer raises
issue of fact or at this court’s discretion when answer raises
issue of law). The respondent claims that if a hearing before
a referee is not offered in reciprocal discipline cases, attor-
neys subject to reciprocal discipline proceedings will not be

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
318 Nebraska Reports
STATE EX REL. COUNSEL FOR DIS. v. CAMPBELL
Cite as 318 Neb. 23
afforded the full panoply of procedural protections offered in
formal discipline actions.
We do not read our rules to require a hearing before a ref-
eree in all reciprocal discipline cases, nor do we read § 3-321
to be completely silent on reciprocal discipline procedure.
As noted above, § 3-310, which sometimes requires a hear-
ing before a referee, contemplates procedural steps that begin
with the filing of formal charges by the Counsel for Discipline
against the respondent. By contrast, the procedure in § 3-321
does not begin with a formal charge, does not mention a hear-
ing in front of a referee, and does not incorporate procedure
laid out in other rules. It provides, “Upon receipt by the Court
of appropriate notice that a member has been disciplined in
another jurisdiction, the Court may enter an order imposing the
identical discipline, or greater or lesser discipline as the Court
deems appropriate[.]” § 3-321. We read § 3-321 to allow this
court to proceed directly from a motion for reciprocal disci-
pline to the imposition of discipline, with no referee hearing
in between.
We are not convinced by the respondent’s assertion that
this reading of our rules deprives attorneys in reciprocal
discipline cases of necessary procedural protections. Under
certain circumstances, we have required a hearing by a referee
before deciding the issue of reciprocal discipline. In State ex
rel. NSBA v. Dineen, 235 Neb. 363, 365, 455 N.W.2d 178,
180 (1990), we addressed “whether the court, upon receiving
notice of discipline from another state, shall proceed forth-
with to impose identical sanctions here, or whether due proc-
ess requires something further.” The respondent in Dineen
alleged that he was denied due process in the other state’s
disbarment proceeding.
We observed in Dineen that “[a] lawyer is entitled to due
process of law in a disciplinary proceeding.” 235 Neb. at 365,
455 N.W.2d at 180, citing In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 88 S.
Ct. 1222, 20 L. Ed. 2d 117 (1968), and State ex rel. NSBA v.
Kirshen, 232 Neb. 445, 441 N.W.2d 161 (1989). We went on:

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
318 Nebraska Reports
STATE EX REL. COUNSEL FOR DIS. v. CAMPBELL
Cite as 318 Neb. 23
In the context of reciprocal attorney disciplinary pro-
ceedings, it is generally held that a judicial determination
of attorney misconduct in one state is conclusive proof
of guilt and is not subject to relitigation in the second
state. However, the judicial determination of misconduct
need not be accepted as conclusive proof of guilt if the
attorney demonstrates to the court in the second state that
the procedure in the first state was so lacking in notice
or opportunity to be heard as to constitute a depriva-
tion of due process or that there was such an infirmity
of proof establishing the misconduct as to give rise to
the clear conviction that the final finding of the court in
the first state as to the attorney’s misconduct cannot be
accepted. Even if the judicial determination of miscon-
duct is accepted as conclusive proof of guilt, this does not
necessarily mean that the attorney must be disbarred or
suspended in the second state. The second state is entitled
to make an independent assessment of the facts and an
independent determination of the attorney’s fitness to
practice law in that state and of what disciplinary action
is appropriate to protect the interests of the state.
State ex rel. NSBA v. Dineen, 235 Neb. at 366, 455 N.W.2d
at 180.
Applying 	the 	principles 	above, 	we 	concluded 	that 	the
respondent in Dineen was entitled to a hearing before a referee
to determine (1) whether due process had been denied in the
other state’s proceeding, (2) whether that proceeding showed
proof of misconduct, (3) whether the respondent’s miscon-
duct rendered him unfit to practice law in Nebraska, and (4)
whether the discipline to be imposed in Nebraska should be
more or less than the other state’s.
We are not convinced that in this case, Dineen requires a
hearing before a referee. The primary issue in Dineen was
whether it would violate the respondent’s right to due process
if this court immediately imposed the identical discipline that
was imposed in another state when the respondent contended

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
318 Nebraska Reports
STATE EX REL. COUNSEL FOR DIS. v. CAMPBELL
Cite as 318 Neb. 23
that his right to due process had been violated and that mis-
conduct had not been proved in the other state’s proceeding.
We concluded it would. We determined that the judicial deter-
mination of misconduct in the other state was not conclusive
proof of guilt if the attorney demonstrated that there was a
deprivation of due process or a lack of adequate proof of
misconduct in the other state’s proceeding. A hearing before
a referee was thus necessary so that the respondent had an
opportunity to demonstrate that either he was deprived of due
process or there was a lack of adequate proof of misconduct
in the other state’s proceeding. In contrast, the respondent in
this case does not allege, much less show, that he was deprived
of due process in the federal court. Nor does he argue that the
proof of misconduct in the federal court was lacking.
The respondent does assert that as in Dineen, a referee
should receive evidence, evaluate his fitness to practice law in
Nebraska, and recommend what, if any, discipline to impose.
He argues that if additional proceedings before a referee are
not held, no person will have the opportunity to hear in-person
testimony of a mitigating nature. We disagree such proceed-
ings are necessary here. We gave both parties the opportunity
to supplement the record as to the appropriate discipline that
should be imposed, and we do not view the record before us as
insufficient. We are aware of nothing that requires a proceed-
ing before a referee to determine the appropriate discipline in
this case.
Discipline.
[1] Having determined that a hearing before a referee is not
necessary here, we continue to the matter of discipline. Recall
that in a reciprocal discipline proceeding, a judicial determi-
nation of attorney misconduct in one jurisdiction is generally
conclusive proof of guilt and is not subject to relitigation in
the second jurisdiction. State ex rel. Counsel for Dis. v. Panick,
311 Neb. 627, 973 N.W.2d 710 (2022). See, also, State ex rel.
NSBA v. Dineen, 235 Neb. 363, 455 N.W.2d 178 (1990). The
federal court made such a determination of misconduct here.

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
318 Nebraska Reports
STATE EX REL. COUNSEL FOR DIS. v. CAMPBELL
Cite as 318 Neb. 23
[2] Neb. Ct. R. § 3-304 of the disciplinary rules provides
that the following may be considered as discipline for attorney
misconduct:
(A) Misconduct shall be grounds for:
(1) Disbarment by the Court; or
(2) Suspension by the Court; or
(3) Probation by the Court in lieu of or subsequent to
suspension, on such terms as the Court may designate; or
(4) Censure and reprimand by the Court; or
(5) Temporary suspension by the Court; or
(6) Private reprimand by the Committee on Inquiry or
Disciplinary Review Board.
(B) The Court may, in its discretion, impose one or more
of the disciplinary sanctions set forth above.
Section 3-321 of the disciplinary rules provides, in part:
(A) Upon being disciplined in another jurisdiction, a
member shall promptly inform the Counsel for Discipline
of the discipline imposed. Upon receipt by the Court of
appropriate notice that a member has been disciplined in
another jurisdiction, the Court may enter an order impos-
ing the identical discipline, or greater or lesser discipline
as the Court deems appropriate, or, in its discretion, sus-
pend the member pending the imposition of final disci-
pline in such other jurisdiction.
In imposing attorney discipline, we evaluate each case in light
of its particular facts and circumstances. State ex rel. Counsel
for Dis. v. Panick, supra.
The respondent suggests that the appropriate discipline is 3
years’ suspension plus probation, consistent with State ex rel.
Counsel for Dis. v. Trembly, 300 Neb. 195, 912 N.W.2d 764
(2018). The respondent in Trembly pled guilty to filing a false
tax return, was sentenced to a term of probation with home
restriction, and was ordered to pay restitution of $110,374.58.
The Counsel for Discipline filed formal charges in Trembly,
essentially alleging the same rule violations alleged in this
case. In Trembly, we ultimately determined that the respondent

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
318 Nebraska Reports
STATE EX REL. COUNSEL FOR DIS. v. CAMPBELL
Cite as 318 Neb. 23
had committed an offense of moral turpitude requiring a sanc-
tion sufficient to maintain the public’s confidence in the bar
and to deter the same actions in other attorneys. We acknowl-
edged that the respondent’s felony conviction was an aggravat-
ing circumstance; but we noted that he was still fit to practice
law, that no clients were harmed, and that numerous mitigating
factors warranted leniency, including an absence of previous
disciplinary history and the fact that the violation was isolated
and not part of a pattern of misconduct.
We agree with the respondent that our opinion in Trembly
is instructive, but it is the distinctions from this case that we
find most informative. Unlike the respondent in Trembly, the
respondent in this case admitted to underreporting income on
his tax returns over a 5-year period. His actions resulted in a
prison term and an order of restitution much greater than the
restitution ordered in Trembly. Moreover, unlike the respondent
in Trembly, the respondent in this case had a previous disci-
plinary history. Given these differences, we do not agree that
the same discipline imposed in Trembly is appropriate here.
Upon due consideration of the record in this case, we con-
clude, like the federal court, that disbarment is appropriate.
Therefore, we sustain the motion for reciprocal discipline
and disbar the respondent from the practice of law, effective
immediately.
CONCLUSION
It is the judgment of this court that the respondent be dis-
barred from the practice of law in the State of Nebraska effec-
tive immediately. The respondent is directed to comply with
Neb. Ct. R. § 3-316 (rev. 2014), and upon failure to do so, he
shall be subject to punishment for contempt of this court. The
respondent is further directed to pay costs and expenses in
accordance with Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 7-114 and 7-115 (Reissue
2022), as well as § 3-310(P) and Neb. Ct. R. § 3-323(B) of the
disciplinary rules, within 60 days after an order imposing costs
and expenses, if any, is entered by the court.
Judgment of disbarment.