Aguilar v. Valdez-Mendoza

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
318 Nebraska Reports
AGUILAR v. VALDEZ-MENDOZA
Cite as 318 Neb. 402
Lizette Aguilar, appellee, v.
Ana Valdez-Mendoza, appellant.
___ N.W.3d ___
Filed January 31, 2025. 	No. S-24-286.
1. Statutes: Appeal and Error. Statutory interpretation is a question of
law that an appellate court resolves independently of the trial court.
2. Statutes: Appeal and Error: Words and Phrases. When terms in a
statute are not specifically defined by the statute, principles of statutory
interpretation generally require an appellate court to give such terms
their plain and ordinary meaning.
3. Appeal and Error: Words and Phrases. Appellate courts often turn to
dictionaries to ascertain a word’s plain and ordinary meaning.
4. Statutes: Legislature: Words and Phrases. It is a fundamental canon
of statutory construction that words generally should be interpreted
as taking their ordinary meaning at the time the Legislature enacted
the statute.
5. Statutes: Legislature: Presumptions. In enacting a statute, the
Legislature is presumed to know the general condition surrounding
the subject matter of the legislative enactment, and it is presumed to
know and contemplate the legal effect that accompanies the language it
employs to make effective the legislation.
6. Protection Orders: Words and Phrases. “Affinity” under Neb. Rev.
Stat. § 42-903(3) (Cum. Supp. 2024) means the relationship that arises
as a result of the marriage contract between one spouse and the blood
relations of the other, in contradistinction from consanguinity or rela-
tionship by blood.
Appeal from the District Court for Madison County, James
G. Kube, Judge. Reversed and vacated.
Timothy P. Matas, of Stratton, DeLay, Doele, Carlson,
Buettner & Stover, for appellant.
Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
10/14/2026 08:14 AM CDT

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
318 Nebraska Reports
AGUILAR v. VALDEZ-MENDOZA
Cite as 318 Neb. 402
No appearance by appellee.
Funke, C.J., Miller-Lerman, Cassel, Stacy, Papik, and
Freudenberg, JJ.
Freudenberg, J.
INTRODUCTION
Lizette Aguilar petitioned for a domestic abuse protection
order pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-924 (Cum. Supp. 2024)
against her daughter’s stepmother, Ana Valdez-Mendoza. The
district court issued an ex parte protection order, which the
court affirmed following a hearing. Valdez-Mendoza appeals,
arguing that the court erred in overruling her motion to dis-
miss and affirming the protection order, because it erroneously
concluded that Aguilar and Valdez-Mendoza were related by
“affinity” under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-903 (Cum. Supp. 2024).
Aguilar did not file a response.
We conclude that the district court erred in concluding that
the parties were related by “affinity.”
BACKGROUND
In February 2024, Aguilar petitioned for a domestic abuse
protection order pursuant to § 42-924 against Valdez-Mendoza.
In her petition, Aguilar wrote that Valdez-Mendoza was related
to her as her “[d]aughter’s [s]tepmother.” Valdez-Mendoza is
married to Aguilar’s “ex,” Fernando Mendoza. Aguilar and
Mendoza have a 12-year-old daughter.
Aguilar’s petition alleged that about a week prior, Aguilar
had visited Mendoza’s house to drop their daughter off with
Mendoza. 	When 	Aguilar 	arrived, 	Mendoza 	and 	Valdez-
Mendoza 	came 	outside 	the 	house 	and Aguilar 	talked 	to
Mendoza about their daughter. Soon thereafter, Valdez-Mendoza
pushed Aguilar, causing Aguilar to fall to the ground. Valdez-
Mendoza proceeded to repeatedly punch Aguilar. Mendoza
“got ahold” of Aguilar, and Valdez-Mendoza told Mendoza
to “‘[l]et go’” of Aguilar, saying to him, “‘I’ve got this.’”

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
318 Nebraska Reports
AGUILAR v. VALDEZ-MENDOZA
Cite as 318 Neb. 402
Valdez-Mendoza and Mendoza continued to punch and kick
Aguilar. Aguilar yelled for Mendoza to get off of her, and
Valdez-Mendoza repeatedly grabbed Aguilar’s hair and “tr[ied]
to slam [Aguilar’s] head into the concrete.” Aguilar tried cov-
ering her head because she was afraid of its hitting the cement
and of thus being killed.
After the attack, which lasted several minutes, Valdez-
Mendoza and Mendoza went inside the house. Aguilar told a
neighbor to call the 911 emergency dispatch service, and she
was eventually taken to a hospital.
Based on Aguilar’s allegations, the district court issued
an ex parte domestic abuse protection order, effective for 1
year. Valdez-Mendoza subsequently requested a hearing on
the matter.
At the hearing, Valdez-Mendoza appeared with counsel and
Aguilar appeared pro se. Valdez-Mendoza moved to dismiss
the petition, arguing that domestic abuse protection orders
are available only to parties specified by § 42-903(3) (defin-
ing “[f]amily or household members”). Valdez-Mendoza con-
tended that her relationship to Aguilar through being Aguilar’s
daughter’s stepmother is not covered by § 42-903(3). In
response to counsel’s argument, Aguilar stated that she sought
the protection order to protect herself when she picks up and
drops off her daughter every 2 weeks at Mendoza’s home.
The district court overruled Valdez-Mendoza’s motion to
dismiss. The court found that Valdez-Mendoza and Aguilar had
a relation by “affinity” under § 42-903(3) that was sufficient
to proceed on the matter. The court reasoned that Aguilar and
Valdez-Mendoza had a “relationship by marriage” because
Aguilar is related to her daughter and the daughter’s father
married Valdez-Mendoza. The court acknowledged that the
relationship is “distant” but thought that the statutory phrase
“‘related by affinity’ is loose enough” for the relationship to
qualify under § 42-903(3).
Valdez-Mendoza did not dispute Aguilar’s factual allega-
tions about the altercation. Aguilar testified that Mendoza

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
318 Nebraska Reports
AGUILAR v. VALDEZ-MENDOZA
Cite as 318 Neb. 402
is her daughter’s father and is married to Valdez-Mendoza.
Aguilar denied ever residing with, being blood-related to,
being in-laws with, or having a dating relationship with
Valdez-Mendoza.
At the close of evidence, Valdez-Mendoza renewed her
motion to dismiss, which the court overruled. The court entered
an order affirming its ex parte domestic abuse protection order.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
Valdez-Mendoza assigns the district court erred in finding
that she and Aguilar were related by affinity, causing them to
be family or household members as defined in § 42-903(3).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
[1] Statutory interpretation is a question of law that an
appellate court resolves independently of the trial court. 1
ANALYSIS
The sole issue before us is whether Aguilar and Valdez-
Mendoza were “related by . . . affinity” to constitute “[f]amily or
household members” under § 42-903(3). Under the Protection
from Domestic Abuse Act, 2 § 42-924(1) provides that “[a]ny
victim of domestic abuse” may seek a domestic abuse pro-
tection order. 3 In the context of a court’s deciding whether
to affirm or rescind the initial ex parte protection order, we
have held that whether domestic abuse occurred is a threshold
issue, and absent abuse as defined by § 42-903(1), a protec-
tion order may not remain in effect. 4 “Abuse” is statutorily
defined as the occurrence of one or more of the following
1 Mullins v. Box Butte County, 317 Neb. 937, 13 N.W.3d 67 (2024).
2 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-901 et seq. (Reissue 2016 & Cum. Supp. 2024).
3 See Garrison v. Otto, 311 Neb. 94, 970 N.W.2d 495 (2022).
4 Id. See, also, Robert M. on behalf of Bella O. v. Danielle O., 303 Neb.
268, 928 N.W.2d 407 (2019) (citing § 42-924).

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
318 Nebraska Reports
AGUILAR v. VALDEZ-MENDOZA
Cite as 318 Neb. 402
acts between “family or household members”: (1) attempting
to cause or intentionally and knowingly causing bodily injury
with or without a dangerous instrument; (2) placing, by means
of credible threat, another person in fear of bodily injury; or
(3) engaging in sexual contact or sexual penetration without
consent. 5 Section 42-903(3) provides in part:
Family or household members includes spouses or former
spouses, children, persons who are presently residing
together or who have resided together in the past, persons
who have a child in common whether or not they have
been married or have lived together at any time, other
persons related by consanguinity or affinity, and persons
who are presently involved in a dating relationship with
each other or who have been involved in a dating rela-
tionship with each other.
(Emphasis supplied.)
The statute plainly uses the word “includes” before listing
multiple different relationships. 6 As we have noted in a recent
string of cases, traditionally, the word “include” in a statute
connotes that the provided list of components is not exhaus-
tive and that there may be other items includable, though not
specifically enumerated. 7 However, the meaning of “includes”
5 § 42-903(1).
6 § 42-903(3).
7 See, State v. Webb, 311 Neb. 694, 974 N.W.2d 317 (2022); State v.
Knight, 311 Neb. 485, 973 N.W.2d 356 (2022); State v. Hofmann, 310
Neb. 609, 967 N.W.2d 435 (2021); Lewis v. MBC Constr. Co., 309 Neb.
726, 962 N.W.2d 359 (2021); In re Interest of Seth C., 307 Neb. 862,
951 N.W.2d 135 (2020); State v. Jedlicka, 305 Neb. 52, 938 N.W.2d 854
(2020); Stephens v. Stephens, 297 Neb. 188, 899 N.W.2d 582 (2017). See,
also, Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305, 130 S. Ct. 2278, 176 L. Ed. 2d
1047 (2010) (recognizing “include” can signal list is illustrative rather
than exhaustive). Cf. Didier v. Ash Grove Cement Co., 272 Neb. 28, 718
N.W.2d 484 (2006). See, generally, Bryan A. Garner, A Dictionary of
Modern Legal Usage 431, 432 (2d ed. 1995) (discussing drafters’ use of
“including” and “including but not limited to”).

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
318 Nebraska Reports
AGUILAR v. VALDEZ-MENDOZA
Cite as 318 Neb. 402
depends on the context in which it is used. 8 We disagree with
our dissenting colleagues that, in the context of § 42-903(3),
the use of “includes” provides sufficient clarity such that the
scope of “[f]amily or household members” is properly before
us. Moreover, even if we were to determine that “includes” in
the context of § 42-903(3) indicates the list is not exhaustive,
we are not persuaded that Aguilar and Valdez-Mendoza’s rela-
tionship would fit within the meaning of “[f]amily or house-
hold members” as the dissenting opinion contends.
In this case, the parties presented no other arguments at
the time of the hearing that their relationship otherwise sat-
isfied the meaning of “[f]amily or household members” in
the absence of the district court’s finding of affinity under
§ 42-903(3) and treated the statute’s list as exhaustive. An
appellate court will not consider an issue on appeal that was
not presented to or passed upon by the trial court. 9 In addition,
Aguilar has not participated in this appeal. Therefore, we do
not consider whether the list of relationships in § 42-903(3)
is exhaustive or whether alternative grounds exist to establish
the necessary “[f]amily or household member” element of
proof in this case.
The Protection from Domestic Abuse Act does not define
“affinity,” nor have we previously interpreted the term within
this context. Therefore, to determine whether Aguilar and
Valdez-Mendoza were “[f]amily or household members” under
§ 42-903(3), we must ascertain the definition of “affinity”
within the statutory phrase “other persons related by consan-
guinity or affinity.”
8 See Black’s Law Dictionary 763 (6th ed. 1990) (“[t]erm may, according
to context, express an enlargement”). See, also, Webster’s New Collegiate
Dictionary 576 (8th ed. 1981) (defining “include” as “to take in or
comprise”); Ballentine’s Law Dictionary 601 (3d ed. 1969) (defining
“include” as “[t]o comprise” and “including” as “term of enlargement
rather than limitation”).
9 State v. Thomas, 303 Neb. 964, 932 N.W.2d 713 (2019); Hargesheimer v.
Gale, 294 Neb. 123, 881 N.W.2d 589 (2016).

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
318 Nebraska Reports
AGUILAR v. VALDEZ-MENDOZA
Cite as 318 Neb. 402
[2-4] When terms in a statute are not specifically defined by
the statute, our principles of statutory interpretation generally
require us to give such terms their plain and ordinary mean-
ing. 10 Appellate courts often turn to dictionaries to ascertain
a word’s plain and ordinary meaning. 11 It is a fundamental
canon of statutory construction that words generally should
be interpreted as taking their ordinary meaning at the time the
Legislature enacted the statute. 12
The phrase “other persons related by consanguinity or affin-
ity” was added to § 42-903(3) in 1986. 13 Relevant here, at
that time, the plain meaning of “affinity” included a “rela-
tionship by marriage,” “kinship,” and “likeness based on
relationship or causal connection.” 14 Similarly, Black’s Law
Dictionary’s definitions for “affinity” included (1) “[a] close
agreement; relation; spiritual relation or attraction held to exist
between certain persons”; (2) “[r]elation which one spouse[,]
because of marriage[,] has to blood relatives of the other”; and
(3) “[t]he connection existing, in consequence of marriage,
between each of the married persons and the kindred of the
other.” 15 The “doctrine of affinity” originated from the notion
that “marriage makes husband and wife one,” which results in
“[t]he husband[‘s] ha[ving] the same relation, by affinity, to
his wife’s blood relatives as she has to them by consanguinity
and vice versa.” 16
[5] 	These 	definitions 	of 	“affinity” 	coincide 	with 	the
definition we provided in another context. In Zimmerer v.
10 Brown v. State, 315 Neb. 336, 996 N.W.2d 56 (2023).
11 Fountain II v. Douglas Cty. Bd. of Equal., 315 Neb. 633, 999 N.W.2d 135
(2024).
12 Id.
13 See 1986 Neb. Laws, L.B. 448, § 1.
14 Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary, supra note 8 at 20.
15 Black’s Law Dictionary 54 (5th ed. 1979).
16 Id.

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
318 Nebraska Reports
AGUILAR v. VALDEZ-MENDOZA
Cite as 318 Neb. 402
Prudential Ins. Co., 17 we defined “affinity” as used in Neb.
Rev. Stat. § 24-315 (1943) (now codified at Neb. Rev.
Stat. § 24-739 (Reissue 2016)), which pertains to circum-
stances where judges would be disqualified from presiding
over certain cases. In that context, we defined “affinity” as
“the relationship which arises as a result of the marriage
contract between one spouse and the blood relations of the
other, in contradistinction from consanguinity or relation-
ship by blood.” 18 Notably, we provided this definition before
the Legislature amended § 42-903(3) to include relation by
“affinity.” In enacting a statute, the Legislature is presumed
to know the general condition surrounding the subject matter
of the legislative enactment, and it is presumed to know and
contemplate the legal effect that accompanies the language it
employs to make effective the legislation. 19
[6] For the above reasons, we apply our definition from
Zimmerer and conclude that under § 42-903(3), “affinity”
means “the relationship which arises as a result of the mar-
riage contract between one spouse and the blood relations of
the other, in contradistinction from consanguinity or relation-
ship by blood.” 20
Under this definition, we cannot conclude that Aguilar
and Valdez-Mendoza were related by “affinity” to have con-
stituted “[f]amily or household members” as contemplated
in § 42-903(3). Through her marriage to Mendoza, Valdez-
Mendoza is related by affinity to Mendoza’s biological daugh-
ter. However, that affinity does not extend to Aguilar herself,
who is not related by consanguinity to Mendoza. Accordingly,
17 Zimmerer v. Prudential Ins. Co., 150 Neb. 351, 34 N.W.2d 750 (1948).
18 Id. at 353, 34 N.W.2d at 751. See, also, Spracklin v. Spracklin, 21 Neb.
App. 271, 837 N.W.2d 826 (2013).
19 State v. Brennauer, 314 Neb. 782, 993 N.W.2d 305 (2023).
20 Zimmerer v. Prudential Ins. Co., supra note 17, 150 Neb. at 353, 34
N.W.2d at 751.

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
318 Nebraska Reports
AGUILAR v. VALDEZ-MENDOZA
Cite as 318 Neb. 402
the district court erred in concluding that Aguilar and Valdez-
Mendoza were related by affinity.
CONCLUSION
Under the Protection from Domestic Abuse Act, Aguilar
and Valdez-Mendoza were not related by affinity. Accordingly,
we reverse the decision of the district court and vacate the
protection order.
Reversed and vacated.
Cassel, J., dissenting.
While I agree that the relationship between Aguilar and
Valdez-Mendoza was not one of affinity, I disagree that it does
not fit within the definition of “[f]amily or household mem-
bers” in Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-903(3) (Cum. Supp. 2024). For
that reason, I respectfully dissent.
Both Aguilar and Valdez-Mendoza were related to Aguilar’s
daughter—Aguilar as her mother (i.e., by consanguinity) and
Valdez-Mendoza as her stepmother (i.e., by affinity). However,
Aguilar and Valdez-Mendoza were not directly related to each
other by either consanguinity or affinity.
But affinity is only one permissible way of establishing the
necessary relationship. Section 42-903(3), in pertinent part,
states:
Family or household members includes spouses or for-
mer spouses, children, persons who are presently resid-
ing together or who have resided together in the past,
persons who have a child in common whether or not they
have been married or have lived together at any time,
other persons related by consanguinity or affinity, and
persons who are presently involved in a dating relation-
ship with each other or who have been involved in a dat-
ing relationship with each other.
(Emphasis supplied.)
The word “includes” is significant. As used in a statute, it
connotes that the provided list of components is not exhaustive

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
318 Nebraska Reports
AGUILAR v. VALDEZ-MENDOZA
Cite as 318 Neb. 402
and that there are other items includable that are not specifi-
cally enumerated. 1
The 	word 	“family” 	is 	not 	specifically 	defined 	in 	the
Protection from Domestic Abuse Act 2; thus, I look to its plain
and ordinary meaning. 3 A legal dictionary provides several
definitions: “1. A group of persons connected by blood, by
affinity, or by law, esp. within two or three generations. 2. A
group consisting of parents and their children. 3. By extension,
a group of people who live together and usu. have a shared
commitment to a domestic relationship.” 4 The same source
defines “blended family” as “combined families of persons
with children from earlier marriages or relationships.” 5
Section 42-903(3)’s list makes it clear that “family” is not
limited to the three definitions in the legal dictionary. Former
spouses, persons who have resided together in the past, and
persons who are presently involved in a dating relationship
with each other or who have been involved in a dating relation-
ship with each other would not fall within the three definitions
of “family” in the legal dictionary. But they are included in
the statutory list. By including them within that definition, the
Legislature broadened the traditional, ordinary definition.
In adopting the Protection from Domestic Abuse Act, the
Legislature intended to “lessen and reduce the trauma of
domestic abuse.” 6 When the trauma is inflicted by a stepparent
against a biological parent, its significance does not diminish.
1 See, State v. Webb, 311 Neb. 694, 974 N.W.2d 317 (2022); State v. Knight,
311 Neb. 485, 973 N.W.2d 356 (2022); State v. Hofmann, 310 Neb. 609,
967 N.W.2d 435 (2021).
2 See Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 42-901 to 42-931 (Reissue 2016 & Cum. Supp.
2024).
3 See In re Estate of McCormick, 317 Neb. 960, 12 N.W.3d 802 (2024)
(statutory interpretation begins with text, and text is to be given its plain
and ordinary meaning).
4 Black’s Law Dictionary 747 (11th ed. 2019).
5 Id.
6 § 42-902.

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
318 Nebraska Reports
AGUILAR v. VALDEZ-MENDOZA
Cite as 318 Neb. 402
The 	fundamental 	objective 	of 	statutory 	interpretation
is to ascertain and carry out the Legislature’s intent. 7 The
Legislature’s 	definition 	recognizes 	evolving 	societal 	val-
ues concerning family structure. I cannot believe that the
Legislature intended to exclude under § 42-903(3) the relation-
ship between a biological parent and a stepparent from that of
“[f]amily or household members.”
The majority focuses on the district court’s reliance on
“affinity.” This misses the forest for the trees. We have long
held that a correct result will not be set aside merely because
the lower court applied the wrong reasoning in reaching that
result. 8 While the relationship between Aguilar and Valdez-
Mendoza was not one of “affinity,” it was one included in
the 	meaning 	of 	“[f]amily 	or 	household 	members” 	under
§ 42-903(3). That was enough.
Neither Aguilar’s default on appeal nor the protection order’s
looming expiration justifies setting it aside. I would affirm the
judgment of the district court.
In light of the reading of § 42-903(3) given by this court’s
majority, the Legislature may wish to amend that section
to specifically address relationships like that of Aguilar and
Valdez-Mendoza.
Miller-Lerman, J., joins in this dissent.
7 In re Estate of McCormick, supra note 3.
8 See, e.g., State v. Devers, 313 Neb. 866, 986 N.W.2d 747 (2023).