Dugan v. Sorensen

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
319 Nebraska Reports
DUGAN v. SORENSEN
Cite as 319 Neb. 326
William C. Dugan, appellee, v.
Steve Sorensen, appellant.
___ N.W.3d ___
Filed June 27, 2025. 	No. S-24-716.
1. Protection Orders: Appeal and Error. The grant or denial of a protec-
tion order is reviewed de novo on the record. In such de novo review, an
appellate court reaches conclusions independent of the factual findings
of the trial court. However, where the credible evidence is in conflict
on a material issue of fact, the appellate court considers and may give
weight to the circumstances that the trial judge heard and observed the
witnesses and accepted one version of the facts rather than another.
2. Statutes: Appeal and Error. Statutory interpretation is a question of
law that an appellate court resolves independently of the trial court.
3. Protection Orders. A show cause hearing in protection order proceed-
ings is a contested factual hearing, in which the issues before the court
are whether the facts stated in the sworn application are true.
4. Protection Orders: Injunction: Proof. A protection order is analogous
to an injunction, and a party seeking an injunction must establish by
a preponderance of the evidence every controverted fact necessary to
entitle that party to relief.
5. Protection Orders: Proof. The petitioner at a show cause hearing
following an ex parte protection order has the burden to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence the truth of the facts supporting a pro-
tection order. Once that burden is met, the burden shifts to the respond-
ent to show cause as to why the protection order should not remain
in effect.
6. Protection Orders: Evidence. In harassment protection order cases,
when assessing whether the evidence establishes a course of conduct
that seriously terrifies, threatens, or intimidates a specific person, the
evidence should be assessed on the basis of what a reasonable person
under the circumstances would experience. The inquiry is whether a
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www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
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DUGAN v. SORENSEN
Cite as 319 Neb. 326
reasonable person would be seriously terrified, threatened, or intimi-
dated by the conduct at issue.
7. Protection Orders: Proof. In harassment protection order cases, the
petitioner at a show cause hearing must prove the following material
elements by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) the respondent know-
ingly and willfully engaged in a course of conduct directed at the peti-
tioner that seriously terrified, threatened, or intimidated the petitioner;
(2) a reasonable person under the circumstances would have been seri-
ously terrified, threatened, or intimidated by the respondent’s conduct;
and (3) the respondent’s conduct served no legitimate purpose.
8. ____: ____. In harassment protection order cases, a petitioner must
prove at least two separate acts of harassment to establish a course
of conduct within the meaning of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-311.02(2)(b)
(Reissue 2016).
9. Protection Orders: Time. Under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-311.02(2)(b)
(Reissue 2016), repeated acts of harassment need not be separated by
any particular interval of time.
10. Protection Orders: Evidence: Time. Whether the evidence shows one
continuous act of harassment or a series of separate acts of harassment
is a determination to be made by the finder of fact based on all the facts
and circumstances. There is no mechanical test to apply in making this
determination, but evidence of breaks in the conduct, whether temporal
or spatial, can be relevant to the analysis.
11. Protection Orders: Evidence: Time: Intent. Depending on the facts
and circumstances, a series of acts of harassment can occur on the same
day, at the same general location, and within minutes of one another,
so long as the credible evidence shows a sufficient spatial or temporal
break allowing the respondent to pause, reflect, and form the intent to
engage in another act of harassment.
Appeal from the District Court for Douglas County: Horacio
J. Wheelock, Judge. Affirmed.
Caitlin R. Lovell, of Johnson & Mock, P.C., L.L.O., for
appellant.
Mark F. Jacobs, of Bressman, Hoffman, Jacobs & Quandt,
P.C., L.L.O., for appellee.
Funke, 	C.J., 	Miller-Lerman, 	Cassel, 	Stacy, 	Papik,
Freudenberg, and Bergevin, JJ.

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DUGAN v. SORENSEN
Cite as 319 Neb. 326
Stacy, J.
After issuing an ex parte harassment protection order in
favor of William C. Dugan (William) against Steve Sorensen,
the district court conducted a show cause hearing and ordered
the protection order to continue in effect. Steve appeals, argu-
ing that the evidence was insufficient to show a “[c]ourse of
conduct” 1 and that the court erred in rejecting his justification
defense. Finding no merit to his assigned errors, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
William and Natalie Dugan, now known as Natalie Sorensen,
divorced in 2012. The decree, entered in Dodge County,
awarded them joint legal custody of their two minor children
and gave Natalie physical custody, subject to William’s regular
parenting time. In 2019, Natalie married Steve. At all relevant
times, Natalie and Steve resided with the minor children in
Valley, Nebraska. William continued to reside in Dodge County.
On July 22, 2024, William filed a petition and affidavit seek-
ing a harassment protection order against Steve in the district
court for Douglas County.
1. Petition and Affidavit
William’s petition and affidavit stated that on June 13, 2024,
while he was picking up his children from Natalie’s home,
Steve “blindsided” him in the driveway, knocking him down
and “banging [his] head into the pavement in front of [his]
children.” After the assault, William returned to his car and
called police.
William averred that while he and his children were inside
his car waiting for police to arrive, Steve approached and
started hitting the car window, “threatening me asking if I
‘want to go again’ and if I ‘want to get the shit beat out of me
again.’” When police arrived, they conducted interviews and
reviewed a neighbor’s security camera footage. William’s affi-
davit stated that his version of events “matched the footage.”
1 See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-311.02(2)(b) (Reissue 2016).

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DUGAN v. SORENSEN
Cite as 319 Neb. 326
William also averred that later that same day, when Natalie
and Steve came to pick up the children at the conclusion
of William’s parenting time, a verbal argument ensued and
escalated into yelling and name calling, and Natalie spun her
vehicle’s tires, “leaving 20 foot sections of rubber marks on the
drive.” William’s affidavit described Steve as “unhinged” and
expressed concern that without a protection order, there was
danger William would “get blindsided every time I pick my
kids up or any time I’m at their sporting events.”
The court granted William an ex parte harassment protec-
tion order against Steve, and Steve filed a request for a show
cause hearing.
2. Show Cause Hearing
Both parties appeared with counsel for the show cause hear-
ing. The court received several exhibits, including William’s
petition and the neighbor’s security video footage. Four wit-
nesses testified, including William, Natalie, Steve, and the
older child of William and Natalie.
(a) William’s Testimony
William testified that on June 13, 2024, he was scheduled
to pick up his children for several hours of parenting time
beginning at 5 p.m. When he arrived at Natalie and Steve’s
house shortly after 5 p.m., only the younger child was home,
so William and that child waited in his car for the older child
to return home.
Around 5:30 p.m., Natalie and Steve arrived home in sepa-
rate vehicles. The older child was a passenger in Natalie’s
vehicle. Steve pulled his vehicle into the driveway first and
asked William to move his car, which he did. Natalie then
pulled into the driveway and parked, and William approached
her vehicle, motioning for her to roll the window down.
William testified that he told Natalie, “pickup time was 5:00,
not 5:30,” and that she started “flipping [him] off” and “hitting
the windows with her hands,” after which she “jumped out of

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DUGAN v. SORENSEN
Cite as 319 Neb. 326
the car, slammed the door, got in my face, and started scream-
ing.” William expressly denied making any physical contact
with Natalie during this encounter.
William said that while Natalie was yelling, Steve ran
up and “blindsided” him from behind, knocking him to the
ground. Steve then jumped on William and “slammed” his
head into the ground “three or four times.” William testified
that after he was able to get up, he went to his car and called
police. He also moved his car from the driveway to the street
so it would be “in a public space” while he and his children
waited inside the car for police to arrive.
According to William, Steve then approached William’s
car in the street and “slammed his hands against my driver’s
window telling me to get out of the car, he wanted to finish
what we started.” Steve also paced around the car, yelling at
William. William testified that he felt threatened and intimi-
dated by this conduct.
William testified that once police arrived and completed
an investigation, Steve was cited for assault. William was not
cited. William offered security camera footage from the neigh-
bor’s camera, which included audio, and it was received into
evidence and played for the court.
The security camera footage is approximately 1 hour long,
and it depicts events from a vantage point directly across the
street from Natalie and Steve’s house. The audio is somewhat
garbled, so specific comments are difficult to discern. The
footage depicts William approaching Natalie’s parked car as
she is getting out, and the two can be heard arguing. It then
shows Steve running up behind William, knocking him to the
ground, and pushing him into the pavement repeatedly. After
the physical altercation, Steve, William, and Natalie continue
to argue in the driveway for several more minutes. William
can then be seen moving his car from the driveway and park-
ing it in the street, along the curb. Several minutes later, Steve
is seen approaching William’s car and yelling something as he
hits the driver’s-side window while William and his children

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DUGAN v. SORENSEN
Cite as 319 Neb. 326
sit inside. Police arrive thereafter and can be seen talking with
people at the scene.
William testified that later that same evening, at the conclu-
sion of his parenting time, Natalie came to pick up the children
and Steve was with her. William said he felt “intimidated” by
this encounter, but his testimony did not explain why.
William also testified that after the events of June 13, 2024,
he felt threatened when Steve “appeared at any events for the
children” where William was also present, including at pub-
lic soccer games and private soccer team meetings. William
admitted that Steve had attended the children’s activities before
the events of June 13, but he testified that in a separate con-
tempt proceeding in Dodge County, the judge had ordered
Steve “not to approach” William at the children’s activities.
William testified that despite this order, Steve had approached
him at the children’s activities, prompting William to move
away. William testified that when Steve approaches him at the
children’s activities, he feels “like he’s trying to intimidate me
. . . he’s trying to threaten me.” William told the court that he
did not feel safe when Steve was around and that he wanted
a protection order so he would not feel threatened when he
picked up his children or attended their events.
(b) Natalie’s Testimony
Natalie testified that June 13, 2024, she messaged William
at 4:30 p.m. to tell him their older child had an appointment
that lasted longer than expected and that they were running
late. At approximately 5:15 p.m., the child phoned William to
say they were driving home and to explain why they were run-
ning late. During that call, Natalie said she overheard William
yelling and calling her derogatory names. When they arrived
home, she saw William pacing, “like . . . a caged animal,”
outside his vehicle. She told the child, “‘I am so sorry. We’re
walking into a shit storm and hold on tight, baby, because this
is going to be a big one.’”

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DUGAN v. SORENSEN
Cite as 319 Neb. 326
Natalie said that after she parked her vehicle, William
approached, yelling at her to get out of the car. Natalie testified
that when she stepped out of the vehicle, William pushed the
vehicle’s door into her legs twice and then pushed her with his
left arm. According to Natalie, she said, “‘Don’t ever fucking
touch me again,’” and then she saw Steve “coming to stop the
whole situation.” Natalie did not describe the physical assault
in any detail, but she testified that after the “initial altercation,”
she and William continued to argue outside his car.
Natalie also testified, over William’s objection, that in her
opinion, William was a violent person who had been abusive
during their marriage. William expressly denied all allegations
of domestic abuse.
(c) Steve’s Testimony
Steve testified that when he arrived home, William was
pacing in their driveway. He said William angrily approached
Steve’s vehicle and demanded to know where Natalie and the
older child were. Steve asked William to move his car, which
William did. After Steve pulled his vehicle into the garage, he
saw Natalie’s vehicle pull into the driveway.
Steve testified that he saw William approach Natalie’s vehi-
cle and push the vehicle’s door into her leg. He also said he
saw William push Natalie with his left hand, forcing her to
step backward. Steve said that he was aware Natalie had expe-
rienced “domestic violence issues” with William and that when
he heard Natalie say, “‘Don’t fucking push me ever again,’”
he thought William seemed “out of control.” Steve said he
thought it was “necessary to intervene to end the confronta-
tion,” so he used “the least amount of physical contact to elim-
inate and neutralize the situation.” Steve testified that once he
“pushed [William] down,” he thought the altercation was over
and expected William to leave, but he did not.
Steve admitted that once police arrived and investigated
the incident, he was charged with assault. He testified that the
criminal charge was still pending at the time of the protection
order hearing.

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319 Nebraska Reports
DUGAN v. SORENSEN
Cite as 319 Neb. 326
(d) Child’s Testimony
William and Natalie’s older child, who was 15 years old at
the time of the hearing, also testified. He said that while his
mother was driving him home, he phoned his father to say
they were running late. The child said his father seemed to
take the news well and was “calm” on the phone, but he also
testified that his father seemed “kind of upset” with his mother
because he thought it was her fault they were running late. The
child did not recall his father’s saying anything “mean” about
his mother during the call or calling her derogatory names.
The child testified that when they arrived home, his father
was pacing in the driveway. After his mother parked the vehi-
cle, his father approached and his parents began arguing. The
child heard his mother say, “‘Don’t touch me,’” after which he
saw her take a few steps backward. He then saw Steve “tackle”
his father. The child said he “was really worried for every-
body” and did not want anyone to get hurt.
The child testified that after Steve tackled the child’s father,
the two got up and “[things] settled down a little bit.” The child
got into his father’s car with his sister while it was still parked
in the driveway. He said the adults were arguing outside the car
and he was worried it was “going to get physical again.” His
father then moved his car into the street, and they waited there
for police to arrive.
On cross-examination, the son testified that he never actu-
ally saw his father touch his mother during the incident. He
said he was honest with police and told them the same thing
after they arrived.
3. Court’s Rulings
At the conclusion of William’s testimony, Steve moved to
dismiss the ex parte protection order. He argued the evidence
failed to establish a “course of conduct” 2 sufficient to support
2 Id. (defining “[c]ourse of conduct” as “pattern of conduct composed
of a series of actions of a period of time, however short, evidencing a
continuity of purpose”).

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DUGAN v. SORENSEN
Cite as 319 Neb. 326
a harassment protection order. The court denied the motion,
stating that the security video footage showed “a pattern of
conduct at least for your motion.”
At the conclusion of all the evidence, Steve again moved
to dismiss the ex parte protection order, arguing that he had
“two defenses.” First, he argued that he was “justified in his
use of force” because he saw “[William] assaulting and bat-
tering [Natalie].” Second, he argued that William had not met
his burden of proving a course of conduct sufficient to support
a harassment protection order, because the evidence showed
“one altercation,” rather than a series of acts. Alternatively,
Steve suggested the protection order was unnecessary because
there was “a no contact order already in Dodge County.”
William disagreed with Steve that the evidence showed just
one act of harassment. William argued, “There was the initial
aggression, followed by continued aggression, followed by
coming to my home, followed by further contact through the
children’s events.” He also argued that the protection order was
necessary because the order in Dodge County merely prevented
Steve from being present during parenting time exchanges,
but did not adequately address other contact between William
and Steve.
The court announced its ruling from the bench and made its
findings on the record, stating:
I reviewed the video at least three times, maybe four . . .
five times, actually. . . .
. . . [I]t’s very sad . . . . [Steve] perceives that [William]
touched [Natalie], and at that point, proceeded to tackle
him, proceeded to tackle William . . . and bash his head
into the street a couple of times, three I counted. And
at that point, [William] retreated to his vehicle with his
children and verbal attacks were continued by [Steve] and
[Natalie].
. . . .
[William] says he never touched [Natalie], and [Steve]
said he saw [William] touch [Natalie]. At the end of the

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DUGAN v. SORENSEN
Cite as 319 Neb. 326
day, I didn’t see a touch. I find William . . . more credible
than [Steve].
. . . [T]he petition and affidavit to obtain harassment
protection order will be affirmed.
The court memorialized its ruling in an order entered the
same day. It affirmed the harassment protection issued on July
22, 2024, and directed it to remain in effect for 1 year from
that date.
Steve filed a timely notice of appeal, which we moved to
our docket on our own motion.
II. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
Steve assigns that the district court erred in two respects:
(1) affirming the ex parte protection order when there was
insufficient evidence to establish a course of conduct and (2)
“implicitly finding Steve’s use of force against [William] was
not justified.”
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
[1] The grant or denial of a protection order is reviewed
de novo on the record. 3 In such de novo review, an appellate
court reaches conclusions independent of the factual findings
of the trial court. 4 However, where the credible evidence is in
conflict on a material issue of fact, the appellate court consid-
ers and may give weight to the circumstances that the trial
judge heard and observed the witnesses and accepted one ver-
sion of the facts rather than another. 5
[2] Statutory interpretation is a question of law that an
appellate court resolves independently of the trial court. 6
3 Diedra T. v. Justina R., 313 Neb. 417, 984 N.W.2d 312 (2023).
4 Id.
5 Id.
6 Aguilar v. Valdez-Mendoza, 318 Neb. 402, 16 N.W.3d 130 (2025).

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DUGAN v. SORENSEN
Cite as 319 Neb. 326
IV. ANALYSIS
Before addressing the assignments of error, we briefly
review the law that governs show cause hearings in protection
order cases generally, after which we review the factors that
must be established to issue or affirm a harassment protec-
tion order.
[3-5] A show cause hearing in protection order proceedings
is a contested factual hearing, in which the issues before the
court are whether the facts stated in the sworn application are
true. 7 A protection order is analogous to an injunction, and a
party seeking an injunction must establish by a preponderance
of the evidence every controverted fact necessary to entitle
that party to relief. 8 As such, the petitioner at a show cause
hearing following an ex parte order has the burden to prove by
a preponderance of the evidence the truth of the facts support-
ing a protection order. 9 Once that burden is met, the burden
shifts to the respondent to show cause as to why the protection
order should not remain in effect. 10
When the protection order in this case was issued and
affirmed, harassment protection orders were governed by Neb.
Rev. Stat. § 28-311.09 (Cum. Supp. 2024), which provided in
relevant part:
(1) Any victim who has been harassed as defined by
section 28-311.02 may file a petition and affidavit for a
harassment protection order as provided in subsection
(3) of this section. Upon the filing of such a petition
and affidavit in support thereof, the court may issue a
harassment protection order without bond enjoining the
respondent from (a) imposing any restraint upon the per-
son or liberty of the petitioner, (b) harassing, threatening,
7 Diedra T., supra note 3.
8 Id.
9 Id.
10 Id.

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DUGAN v. SORENSEN
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assaulting, molesting, attacking, or otherwise disturbing
the peace of the petitioner, or (c) telephoning, contact-
ing, or otherwise communicating with the petitioner. The
harassment protection order shall specify to whom relief
under this section was granted.
(2) The petition for a harassment protection order shall
state the events and dates or approximate dates of acts
constituting the alleged harassment, including the most
recent and most severe incident or incidents.
Section 28-311.02(2)(a), in turn, defines “[h]arass” to mean “to
engage in a knowing and willful course of conduct directed at
a specific person which seriously terrifies, threatens, or intimi-
dates the person and which serves no legitimate purpose.” And
§ 28-311.02(2)(b) defines “[c]ourse of conduct” to mean:
[A] pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts over a
period of time, however short, evidencing a continuity of
purpose, including a series of acts of following, detaining,
restraining the personal liberty of, or stalking the person
or telephoning, contacting, or otherwise communicating
with the person.
[6] We have applied an objective construction to the harass-
ment protection order statutes, explaining that “the victim’s
experience resulting from the perpetrator’s conduct should be
assessed on an objective basis.” 11 In other words, when assess-
ing whether the evidence establishes a course of conduct that
seriously terrifies, threatens, or intimidates a specific person,
the evidence should “‘be assessed on the basis of what a rea-
sonable person under the circumstances would experience.’” 12
Thus, the inquiry is “whether a reasonable person would be
seriously terrified, threatened, or intimidated by the conduct
at issue.” 13
11 Hawkins v. Delgado, 308 Neb. 301, 306, 953 N.W.2d 765, 769 (2021).
12 Diedra T., supra note 3, 313 Neb. at 424, 984 N.W.2d at 319.
13 Id.

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DUGAN v. SORENSEN
Cite as 319 Neb. 326
[7] Given the statutory text governing harassment protec-
tion orders and our cases construing it, the petitioner at a show
cause hearing must prove the following material elements by a
preponderance of the evidence: (1) the respondent knowingly
and willfully engaged in a course of conduct directed at the
petitioner that seriously terrified, threatened, or intimidated
the petitioner; (2) a reasonable person under the circumstances
would have been seriously terrified, threatened, or intimidated
by the respondent’s conduct; and (3) the respondent’s conduct
served no legitimate purpose.
With these legal principles in mind, we turn to the assign-
ments of error on appeal.
1. Course of Conduct
Steve’s primary argument on appeal is that William “did not
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Steve engaged
in a knowing and willful course of conduct within the scope of
harassment protection order statutes.” 14 Summarized, the par-
ties disagree about whether the evidence adduced at the hear-
ing proved one continuous act of harassment or instead proved
a series of separate acts. Because the parties focus heavily on
the events of June 13, 2024, we do too.
Steve argues that the events of June 13, 2024, showed a
single “physical altercation” and that William “adduced no
additional proof of any harassment before or after the physical
altercation, which is required to prove the course of conduct
which forms the basis for a harassment protection order.” 15
Steve suggests that William is trying to “conjure a course of
conduct by parsing out the singular, brief driveway confronta-
tion into a series of separate acts.” 16 Relying on the Nebraska
Court of Appeals opinion in Knopik v. Hahn, 17 Steve contends
14 Brief for appellant at 16.
15 Id. at 12.
16 Id. at 16.
17 Knopik v. Hahn, 25 Neb. App. 157, 902 N.W.2d 716 (2017).

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DUGAN v. SORENSEN
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that “one isolated incident over the span of 10 to 20 min-
utes on one particular day [does] not amount to a course of
conduct.” 18
William, on the other hand, argues the facts here are dis-
tinguishable from those considered in Knopik. He contends
the evidence proved multiple separate acts of harassment,
and he points to the court’s express finding that the video
showed multiple separate acts. William argues the physical
assault in the driveway, and the verbal threats of more violence
after William “retreated to his car,” 19 present separate acts of
harassment.
The Legislature has not articulated a specific legal standard
to apply in harassment protection order cases when deciding
whether the evidence shows a single continuous act or a series
of acts. But Nebraska appellate courts have addressed similar
issues in two published opinions, one dealing with harass-
ment protections orders and one dealing with domestic abuse
protection orders. Although neither case directly addressed
how courts should determine whether the evidence shows one
continuous act of harassment or a series of separate acts, the
reasoning from those cases is relevant here, so we discuss it in
the sections that follow.
(a) Relevant Cases
(i) Knopik v. Hahn
In Knopik, the petitioners sought a harassment protection
order against a neighbor based on a confrontation that occurred
while the neighbor was walking his dog past the petitioners’
home. The neighbor’s dog was on a leash, and the petition-
ers’ dog was not. When the petitioners’ dog approached and
began sniffing the neighbor’s dog, the neighbor began yelling
aggressively and called one of the petitioners a derogatory
name. The neighbor also threatened to file a lawsuit against
18 Brief for appellant at 15.
19 Brief for appellee at 7.

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the petitioners “for not having the dog on a leash.” 20 When one
of the petitioners joked that the neighbor should have his cats
on a leash, the neighbor “charged across the driveway toward
[that petitioner], grabbed [him] by the sweatshirt, and punched
him in the chest three times.” 21 The entire confrontation lasted
between 10 to 20 minutes, and the petitioners testified that
the neighbor’s conduct caused them to fear for their safety.
The trial court issued the harassment protection order, and the
Court of Appeals reversed.
In doing so, the Court of Appeals discussed two potential
shortcomings in the evidence. First, it noted the confrontation
“occurred within a span of 10 to 20 minutes on one particular
day” and there was “[n]o evidence of harassment prior to or
after [that] confrontation.” 22 The Court of Appeals suggested
the trial court had “split this singular, short-term incident into
separate acts.” 23 But it also noted that the statutory definition
of “‘[c]ourse of conduct’” under § 28-311.02(2)(b) refers to
a series of acts over a period of time, “‘however short,’” 24
and ultimately, the Court of Appeals did not reverse based on
insufficient evidence of a course of conduct.
Instead, it reversed based on a determination that the neigh-
bor’s conduct did not amount to harassment as defined by the
statute. The Court of Appeals reasoned that “[a]lthough [the
neighbor’s] actions reflect a perhaps exaggerated response to
an unrestrained dog, they do not constitute the type of stalking
offense necessary to support issuance of a harassment protec-
tion order.” 25 Concluding there was insufficient evidence to
support issuance of a harassment protection order, it reversed,
and remanded with directions to vacate the protection order.
20 Knopik, supra note 17, 25 Neb. App. at 159, 902 N.W.2d at 719.
21 Id. at 160, 902 N.W.2d at 719.
22 Id. at 163, 902 N.W.2d at 721.
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 Id. at 164, 902 N.W.2d at 721-22.

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(ii) Robert M. on behalf of
Bella O. v. Danielle O.
In Robert M. on behalf of Bella O., 26 this court considered
whether the evidence established a “pattern of conduct” suf-
ficient to support a domestic abuse protection order. 27 In that
case, a father petitioned for a domestic abuse protection order
on behalf of his minor child, alleging the child was present
when her mother went on a violent rampage at a duplex and,
over the course of approximately 20 minutes, assaulted two
relatives and damaged multiple items of personal property.
The district court issued an ex parte domestic abuse protec-
tion order and affirmed it after a show cause hearing. On
appeal, the mother argued that the evidence did not establish
a “‘pattern of conduct’” because it arose out of “a single
incident.” 28
We agreed that a “pattern of conduct” necessarily requires
proof of “multiple acts” and therefore “cannot be demonstrated
by a single act,” 29 but we disagreed that the evidence showed a
single act. We emphasized that during the 20-minute rampage,
the mother “directed violent and aggressive behavior at mul-
tiple victims in multiple locations in the duplex and she also
broke a door frame and damaged other property.” 30 We con-
cluded this “series of actions at the duplex [was] sufficient to
26 Robert M. on behalf of Bella O. v. Danielle O., 303 Neb. 268, 928 N.W.2d
407 (2019).
27 See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-903(1)(b) (Cum. Supp. 2024) (defining “credible
threat” under Protection from Domestic Abuse Act to mean “a verbal or
written threat . . . or a threat implied by a pattern of conduct . . . made
by a person with the apparent ability to carry out the threat so as to cause
the person who is the target of the threat to reasonably fear for his or her
safety or the safety of his or her family”).
28 Robert M. on behalf of Bella O., supra note 26, 303 Neb. at 277, 928
N.W.2d at 414.
29 Id.
30 Id. at 277-78, 928 N.W.2d at 415.

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amount to a pattern of conduct,” 31 and we ultimately affirmed
issuance of the protection order.
In Robert M. on behalf of Bella O., we expressly distin-
guished Knopik, reasoning that the holding in Knopik ulti-
mately turned on a determination that the neighbor’s conduct
did not amount to harassment. We therefore did “not read
Knopik to have turned on whether the neighbor engaged in a
single [act] or multiple acts.” 32
Despite this limitation, Knopik has been cited in several
Court of Appeals’ unpublished memorandum opinions for the
general proposition that a course of conduct within the mean-
ing of § 28-311.02(2)(b) requires “several separate occasions”
of harassment. 33 And since Steve argues that the holding in
Knopik required the district court here to view the events of
June 13, 2024, as a single continuous incident, rather than
“split this singular, short-term incident into separate acts,” 34
we take this opportunity to more directly address that aspect
of Knopik.
(iii) Limiting Knopik
To the extent Knopik purported to focus the “course of
conduct” inquiry on whether there was more than one “inci-
dent” or “occasion” involving the parties, it was imprecise.
We are aware that some states’ harassment statutes incorporate
31 Id. at 278, 928 N.W.2d at 415.
32 Id.
33 Lethcoe v. Lethcoe, A-24-072, 2024 WL 4889336 at *10 (Neb. App.
Nov. 26, 2024) (selected for posting to court website). Accord, Larsen
v. Ference, A-24-036, 2024 WL 4274448 (Neb. App. Sept. 24, 2024)
(selected for posting to court website); Kaufman v. Kaufman, A-23-963,
A-23-964, 2024 WL 3664483 (Neb. App. Aug. 6, 2024) (selected for
posting to court website). But see Erickson v. Swensen, A-22-935, 2023
WL 5257937 at *5 (Neb. App. Aug. 8, 2023) (selected for posting to court
website) (noting possibility that “series of acts” of harassment can occur
during “a single incident lasting approximately 25 minutes”).
34 Knopik, supra note 17, 25 Neb. App. at 163, 902 N.W.2d at 721.

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the term “separate occasions” into the statutory definition, 35
but Nebraska’s statute does not. As stated, Nebraska defines
“[c]ourse of conduct” to mean “a pattern of conduct composed
of a series of acts over a period of time, however short, evi-
dencing a continuity of purpose.” 36 To the extent Knopik can be
read to suggest that separate acts of harassment cannot occur
during a single “incident” or “occasion,” it is disapproved.
Moreover, Knopik should not be read to suggest that a physi-
cal assault, or the threat of a physical assault, cannot be an
act of harassment that seriously terrifies, threatens, or intimi-
dates a person. It is true that the stated intent of the stalking
and harassment statutes is “to enact laws dealing with stalk-
ing offenses which will protect victims from being willfully
harassed, intentionally terrified, threatened, or intimidated.” 37
But the harassment protection statutes also expressly authorize
protection orders to enjoin “threatening, assaulting, molest-
ing, [or] attacking” 38 and thus plainly contemplate that acts
of harassment can involve this conduct. To the extent Knopik
can be read to imply that a physical assault is not the type of
conduct for which the harassment protection order statutes can
provide relief, it is disapproved.
Because neither Knopik nor Robert M. on behalf of Bella
O. directly addressed how to prove “[c]ourse of conduct” for
purposes of § 28-311.02(2)(b), we turn to that issue now.
(b) Proving “Course of Conduct”
As stated, § 28-311.02(2)(b) defines “[c]ourse of conduct” to
mean “a pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts over
35 See, e.g., State v. Kintz, 169 Wash. 2d 537, 551, 238 P.3d 470, 477 (2010)
(noting that Washington’s stalking statute requires person to “intentionally
and repeatedly harass[]” or “repeatedly follow[]” another and defines
“‘repeatedly’” to mean “‘two or more separate occasions’”).
36 § 28-311.02(2)(b) (emphasis supplied).
37 § 28-311.02(1).
38 § 28-311.09(1).

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a period of time, however short, evidencing a continuity of
purpose,” but it does not further define “pattern of conduct” or
“series of acts.” We therefore give both phrases their plain and
ordinary meaning. 39
[8] Other courts construing the plain meaning of similar
statutory language have held that it requires evidence of at
least two acts of harassment. 40 This is consistent with our
statement in Robert M. on behalf of Bella O. that “a pattern
of conduct cannot be demonstrated by a single act.” 41 We
now expressly hold that in harassment protection order cases,
a petitioner must prove at least two separate acts of harass-
ment to establish a course of conduct within the meaning of
§ 28-311.02(2)(b).
Having clarified that a course of conduct requires proof of
at least two separate acts of harassment, we turn to the parties’
arguments about whether the evidence in this case established
39 Hawk v. Hawk, ante p. 120, 129, ___ N.W.3d ___, ___ (2025) (“[s]tatutory
interpretation begins with the text, and the text is to be given its plain and
ordinary meaning”).
40 See, e.g., Martinez v. Estes, 258 Ariz. 354, ¶ 8, 557 P.3d 788, 791 (Ariz.
App. 2024) (holding “‘[a] series of acts means at least two events’” and
requires repeated acts of harassing conduct directed at same person);
Daoang v. Perry, 155 Haw. 157, 165, 557 P.3d 886, 894 (2024) (holding
“a single act does not constitute a ‘course of conduct’” sufficient to meet
statutory definition of harassment); Garcia v. Soto, 337 So. 3d 355, 360
(Fla. App. 2022) (holding two or more acts of harassment are required to
prove “‘“pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts over a period
of time, however short,”’” but “‘[t]wo or more acts that are part of
one continuous course of conduct are legally insufficient to qualify as
separate instances of harassment’”); Levy v. Jacobs, 69 So. 3d 403, 405
(Fla. App. 2011) (holding that two attacks occurring 5 minutes apart on
same premises were “two incidents of violence” because they occurred in
different locations and evidence showed “a sufficient temporal break to
allow [respondent] time to pause, reflect, and form a new intent before the
second attack”).
41 Robert M. on behalf of Bella O., supra note 26, 303 Neb. at 277, 928
N.W.2d at 414.

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one continuous act or instead established at least two acts of
harassment.
Steve does not dispute that a physical assault can be an act
of harassment, but he argues that the events of June 13, 2024,
involved a “brief driveway confrontation,” 42 and, therefore, it
must be viewed as a single act. William argues that even if the
confrontation was brief, it involved separate and distinct acts
of harassment. To the extent Steve posits that a brief confron-
tation cannot give rise to a course of conduct involving more
than one act of harassment, we disagree.
[9] Some states’ statutes require that acts of harassment
must be separated by a defined period of time or must occur
within a defined timeframe, 43 but Nebraska’s statute does not.
When construing statutes, courts strive, if possible, to give
effect to all parts of a statute such that no sentence, clause, or
word is rendered meaningless. 44 Construing § 28-311.02(2)(b),
we must give effect to the phrase “over a period of time, no
matter how short.” Because this phrase modifies both “pattern
of conduct” and “series of acts,” it would be inconsistent with
the plain meaning of this phrase to require that repeated acts
of harassment be separated by any particular interval of time.
Under Nebraska’s statutory scheme, it is possible for multiple
acts of harassment to occur within a short period of time.
[10] Ultimately, whether the evidence shows one continu-
ous act of harassment or a series of separate acts of harass-
ment is a determination to be made by the finder of fact based
42 Brief for appellant at 16.
43 See, e.g., Ark. Code Annot. § 5-71-229(d)(1)(A) (LexisNexis Supp. 2009)
(defining “‘[c]ourse of conduct’” to mean “pattern of conduct composed
of two (2) or more acts separated by at least thirty-six (36) hours, but
occurring within one (1) year”); Minn. Stat. § 609.749, subd. 5(b) (2024)
(defining “‘stalking’” to require “two or more acts within a five-year
period”).
44 In re Guardianship of Eliza W., 304 Neb. 995, 938 N.W.2d 307 (2020).

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on all the facts and circumstances. 45 There is no mechanical
test to apply in making this determination, 46 but evidence of
breaks in the conduct, whether temporal or spatial, can be rel-
evant to the analysis.
For instance, in Levy v. Jacobs, 47 the Florida Court of
Appeals considered whether the evidence in a protection order
appeal showed one continuous assault or multiple assaults.
Florida statutes authorize protection orders for stalking 48 and
for “‘[r]epeat violence,’” 49 and define repeat violence as “two
incidents of violence or stalking committed by the respond-
ent, one of which must have been within 6 months of the
filing of the petition.” 50 The parties in Levy lived in the same
condominium building and got into an argument outside the
building entrance, during which the victim was punched in
the chest. He went into the building to talk with the desk clerk
about calling police, and, about 5 minutes later, the attacker
entered the building, yelling and cursing, and grabbed the vic-
tim by the neck, threw him to the floor, and threatened to hit
him if he stood up. Based on these events, the victim obtained
a repeat violence protection order. The attacker appealed,
45 See, e.g., Nicholson v. State, 963 N.E.2d 1096, 1103 (Ind. 2012) (holding
that absent explicit timeframe established by stalking statute, course of
conduct can occur “over a matter of minutes or years” and it is for trier
of fact to determine whether evidence shows repeated or continuing
harassment); Kintz, supra note 35, 169 Wash. 2d at 553, 238 P.3d at 478
(holding fact finder determines whether evidence showed two or more
“separate occasions” of following or harassing within meaning of stalking
statute).
46 See State v. Richardson, 633 N.W.2d 879, 888 (Minn. App. 2001)
(stating “[t]he determination of whether multiple offenses constitute a
single behavioral act is not, however, a mechanical test, but requires an
examination of all the facts and circumstances”).
47 Levy, supra note 40.
48 See Fla. Stat. Ann. § 784.0485 (West Cum. Supp. 2025).
49 See Fla. Stat. Ann. § 784.046 (West 2017).
50 § 784.046(1)(b).

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arguing the evidence showed only a single violent incident.
The appellate court disagreed and affirmed the protection
order, reasoning:
Although the two attacks occurred on the same premises,
the first occurred outside the building and the second
occurred inside the building. . . . [I]n addition to occur-
ring in different locations, there was a temporal break of
approximately five minutes between the incidents. This
was a sufficient temporal break to allow [the attacker]
time to pause, reflect, and form a new intent before the
second attack. 51
The Vermont Supreme Court applied similar reasoning in
Beatty v. Keough. 52 In Beatty, the petitioner and respondent
worked in the same building. They had a verbal confrontation
inside the building during which the respondent forcefully
pressed her hand against the petitioner’s face. The petitioner
then left the building and walked out to his vehicle, and the
respondent followed him, yelling and spitting in his direction.
The trial court issued an antistalking protection order, and
the supreme court reversed, concluding the evidence did not
show a course of conduct sufficient to support an antistalking
protection order under a statute requiring evidence of “‘two
or more acts over period of time, however short.’” 53 The
court reasoned:
As a general matter, the question of whether there are
“two or more acts” presents a question of fact for the trial
court to resolve, considering all of the circumstances. In
this case, however, we conclude, as a matter of law, that
the evidence shows only a single continuing incident.
While the parties’ confrontation began in one area and
51 Levy, supra note 50, 69 So. 3d at 405.
52 Beatty v. Keough, 217 Vt. 134, 287 A.3d 54 (2022).
53 Id. at 136, 287 A.3d at 56. See Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 5131(1) (Cum.
Supp. 2015).

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continued into a different area, there was no break in
the conduct. Plaintiff testified, and the court found, that
after striking plaintiff, defendant followed him out of the
work building to the parking lot. She continued to yell
at him while she followed him, and she then spit at him.
We find it clear, as a matter of law, given the sequence
of events testified to by plaintiff, that the spitting and the
striking were part of a single escalating episode, not two
sufficiently distinct events. Thus, because the evidence
here is insufficient to show “two or more acts over a
period of time, however short,” we must reverse the trial
court’s decision. 54
[11] These cases illustrate that, depending on the facts and
circumstances, a series of acts of harassment can occur on the
same day, at the same general location, and within minutes
of one another, so long as the credible evidence shows a suf-
ficient spatial or temporal break allowing the respondent to
pause, reflect, and form the intent to engage in another act of
harassment. 55
Applying these considerations here, our de novo review of
the record convinces us that William proved at least two acts
of harassment. In conducting that review, we consider that
the trial court found William’s testimony to be more credible.
William’s testimony about the assault in the driveway was
corroborated by the security camera footage, which shows that
Steve tackled William from behind, threw him to the ground,
and pushed him into the pavement multiple times. William
testified that he felt threatened by this attack, and we conclude
that a reasonable person would also have felt threatened by
such conduct.
54 Id. at 142, 287 A.3d at 60.
55 See, also, Annot., 14 A.L.R.7th Art. 4, § 2 at 183 (2016) (collecting
cases and observing that civil stalking statutes generally require course of
conduct consisting of two or more acts, but “[m]ultiple contacts can occur
on a single day . . . as long as they are sufficiently distinct”).

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The footage also corroborates William’s testimony that
after the attack in the driveway, he got up and eventually
retreated to his car to call police. William then backed his car
out of the driveway and parked in the street to wait for police
to arrive. Several minutes later, Steve approached William’s
car in the street, hit the driver’s-side window, and made ver-
bal threats to “finish what we started.” William testified that
he felt threatened and intimidated by this conduct, and we
conclude that a reasonable person would feel the same, espe-
cially after being physically attacked in the driveway.
On this record, the spatial and temporal break in Steve’s
conduct between the physical assault that occurred in the drive-
way and the verbal threat that occurred several minutes later in
the street was sufficient to allow Steve to pause, reflect, and
form the intent to engage in another act of harassment. Because
we conclude this evidence established at least two separate acts
of harassment, there is no need to consider whether the evi-
dence also established other acts of harassment. An appellate
court is not obligated to engage in analysis that is not needed
to adjudicate the controversy before it. 56
The district court did not err in determining there was suf-
ficient evidence of a course of conduct to warrant a harassment
protection order.
2. Justification
In his second assignment of error, Steve argues he was
legally justified in using force against William because he
believed it was “necessary to protect his wife.” 57 He contends
that his conduct was justified under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-1410
(Reissue 2016), and thus, it “cannot form the basis for a
harassment protection order.” 58
56 In re Estate of Harchelroad, 318 Neb. 573, 18 N.W.3d 103 (2025).
57 Brief for appellant at 14.
58 Id.

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We have not previously addressed whether claims of jus-
tification, whether based on self-defense under Neb. Rev.
Stat. § 28-1409 (Reissue 2016) or defense of others under
§ 28-1410, have any proper application in harassment protec-
tion order proceedings. In his appellate brief, Steve offers
no statutory or case law support for his contention that a
viable defense of justification precludes issuance of a harass-
ment protection order under Nebraska law, and we are aware
of none.
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-1416 (Reissue 2016) provides that justi-
fication is an affirmative defense in criminal prosecutions, and
it also states that justification “shall be available in any civil
action for assault and battery or intentional wrongful death,
and, where applicable, shall be a bar to recovery.” But civil
protection order proceedings are not mentioned in § 28-1416,
and thus, they do not fall within any of the categories of civil
action where the Legislature has expressly made justification
an available defense.
At oral argument before this court, Steve suggested that
even if Nebraska’s justification statutes are not expressly
available in civil protection orders under § 28-1416, a viable
claim of justification may nevertheless be relevant to deter-
mining whether the conduct at issue satisfies the statutory
definition of “[h]arass,” which includes a requirement that
the conduct “serves no legitimate purpose.” 59 We express no
opinion on Steve’s alternative legal theory because it was not
one he presented to the district court. Before the district court,
Steve argued the justification statutes provided him with a
complete defense; he did not argue the court should consider
his justification claim when determining whether his conduct
served no legitimate purpose. As a general matter, appellate
courts will not consider an argument or theory raised for the
first time on appeal. 60
59 § 28-311.02(2)(a).
60 Saylor v. State, 315 Neb. 285, 995 N.W.2d 192 (2023).

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On this record, the district court did not err in impliedly
rejecting Steve’s justification defense.
V. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the
district court.
Affirmed.