Saint Joseph Tower Assisted Living v. Royce

- 830 -
Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
320 Nebraska Reports
SAINT JOSEPH TOWER ASSISTED LIVING v. ROYCE
Cite as 320 Neb. 830
Saint Joseph Tower Assisted Living Community,
appellee, v. Jayne Royce, appellant.
___ N.W.3d ___
Filed February 13, 2026. 	No. S-24-904.
1. Moot Question: Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error. Because mootness is
a justiciability doctrine that operates to prevent courts from exercising
jurisdiction, an appellate court reviews mootness determinations under
the same standard of review as other jurisdictional questions.
2. Judgments: Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error. When a jurisdictional
question does not involve a factual dispute, its determination is a matter
of law, which requires an appellate court to reach a conclusion indepen-
dent of the decisions made by lower courts.
3. Moot Question: Words and Phrases. A case is moot if the facts under-
lying the dispute have changed, such that the issues presented are no
longer alive.
4. Moot Question. The central question in a mootness analysis is whether
changes in circumstances that prevailed at the beginning of litigation
have forestalled any occasion for meaningful relief.
5. Moot Question: Appeal and Error. The public interest exception to the
mootness debate requires an appellate court to consider (1) the public
or private nature of the question presented, (2) the desirability of an
authoritative adjudication for guidance of public officials, and (3) the
likelihood of recurrence of the same or a similar problem.
Appeal from the District Court for Douglas County, Peter
C. Bataillon, Judge, on appeal thereto from the County Court
for Douglas County, Beau G. Finley, Judge. Appeal dismissed.
Caitlin Cedfeldt and James Drawz, of Legal Aid of Nebraska,
for appellant.
Mary M. Schott, of Evans & Dixon, L.L.C., for appellee.
Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
10/18/2026 12:58 AM CDT

- 831 -
Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
320 Nebraska Reports
SAINT JOSEPH TOWER ASSISTED LIVING v. ROYCE
Cite as 320 Neb. 830
Funke, 	C.J., 	Cassel, 	Stacy, 	Papik, 	Freudenberg,
Bergevin, and Vaughn, JJ.
Funke, C.J.
Jayne Royce appeals the order of the district court for
Douglas County that affirmed the decision of the county
court for Douglas County ruling in favor of Saint Joseph
Tower Assisted Living Community (Saint Joseph) on its com-
plaint for restitution of real property pursuant to the Uniform
Residential Landlord and Tenant Act (URLTA). 1 We deter-
mine that because a writ of restitution was issued and Royce
was removed from the property, no meaningful relief may be
given and this appeal is moot. We reject Royce’s arguments
that the public interest exception applies, and we dismiss this
appeal as moot.
BACKGROUND
In May 2023, pursuant to a lease, Royce began residing in
an apartment in a building owned by Saint Joseph. The lease
incorporated provisions of a resident handbook and required
the resident to, among other things, keep the premises “safe,
clean and sanitary” and the apartment “tidy and free of clutter.”
First and Second Notices and First
Complaint for Restitution
On August 31, 2023, Saint Joseph and Royce executed a
“Negotiated Risk Agreement” (NRA) that documented Saint
Joseph’s concern that because of unpacked boxes that were
“stacked everywhere,” Royce was not meeting her obliga-
tion to keep the apartment tidy and free of clutter. The NRA
included the following notice: “If [Royce] does not adequately
clean up and clear out her apartment in the next two weeks
a 30-day notice for discharge will be issued.” On October 9,
Saint Joseph provided Royce a letter stating that her apartment
1 Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 76-1401 to 76-1449 (Reissue 2018, Cum. Supp. 2024 &
Supp. 2025).

- 832 -
Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
320 Nebraska Reports
SAINT JOSEPH TOWER ASSISTED LIVING v. ROYCE
Cite as 320 Neb. 830
was “still not cleaned to meet safety standards” and that
because she had failed to abide by expectations set forth in
the resident handbook, “a 30-day discharge notice [was] being
issued” and she was “required to vacate the property . . . on or
before November 8, 2023.”
On January 17, 2024, Saint Joseph filed a complaint for res-
titution against Royce in the county court. Saint Joseph alleged
in the complaint that Royce had failed to vacate the apartment
in compliance with the notice Saint Joseph had given. A trial
was held in the county court on February 8, and that same
day, the county court dismissed Saint Joseph’s complaint with
prejudice. The journal entry and order filed in the county court
stated that the court had granted a motion to dismiss made by
Royce during closing arguments. The journal entry and order
further stated that the dismissal was “[b]ased on evidence
submitted at [t]rial” but did not set forth specific findings or
further explain the reason for the dismissal.
Third Notice and Second
Complaint for Restitution
On February 9, 2024, the day after the county court dis-
missed Saint Joseph’s first complaint for restitution, Saint
Joseph provided a letter to Royce stating that her lease was
being terminated. The letter referred to the allegations of vio-
lations of the lease set forth in the October 9, 2023, notice
and stated that the violations had been “continuous” since
June 2023. The letter further stated that a visual inspection of
Royce’s apartment on February 2, 2024, “confirmed the apart-
ment continue[d] in a cluttered, overcrowded, unclean[], and
unsafe state” that “continue[d] to materially and negatively
affect health and safety” in violation of the lease and the
resident handbook. The letter stated that “a 14-day discharge
notice [was] being issued” and that Royce was “required to
vacate the property on or before February 23, 2024.”
On February 26, 2024, Saint Joseph filed a new complaint for
restitution in the county court. The caption of the complaint

- 833 -
Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
320 Nebraska Reports
SAINT JOSEPH TOWER ASSISTED LIVING v. ROYCE
Cite as 320 Neb. 830
referred to the action set forth in the complaint as an “Action
for Possession” and referred to “Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-1401 et
seq. and Neb. Rev. Stats. § 76-1421 and § 76-1441.”
County Court’s Order
After a trial, the county court filed an order on April 10,
2024, ruling in favor of Saint Joseph on its complaint for
restitution. The court rejected Royce’s argument that Saint
Joseph’s complaint should be dismissed because Saint Joseph
failed to comply with § 76-1441(1)(a), which requires a com-
plaint for restitution to contain “the specific statutory author-
ity under which possession is sought.” The court stated that
“both parties [had] used the same statutory authority to argue
their respective positions,” and the court identified § 76-1431
as one of the statutes upon which both parties had relied. The
court reasoned that Royce could not claim that she did not
know the legal authority for Saint Joseph’s arguments, and
the court found that Saint Joseph’s failure to cite § 76-1431 in
its complaint “was a scrivener’s error due to inadvertence and
harmless in ultimate effect.”
The county court found that the NRA executed on August 31,
2023, satisfied the statutory notice requirements of § 76-1431(1)
by giving Royce notice she had 14 days to remedy the issues
cited or a 30-day notice ending the tenancy would be issued.
The county court also found that Saint Joseph’s letter dated
February 9, 2024, gave Royce a 14-day written notice of Saint
Joseph’s intent to terminate the lease and that the letter “com-
plied with the statutory notice requirements in . . . § 76-1431(1)
and was enforceable.”
The 	county 	court 	rejected 	Royce’s 	argument 	that 	the
February 9, 2024, notice was waived when Saint Joseph
accepted rent from Royce in December 2023 and January
2024. The court stated the argument was without merit con-
sidering the nature of the breach of the lease, as well as the
language of §§ 76-1431 and 76-1433. The court also rejected
Royce’s argument that res judicata barred a finding against

- 834 -
Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
320 Nebraska Reports
SAINT JOSEPH TOWER ASSISTED LIVING v. ROYCE
Cite as 320 Neb. 830
her on the present complaint because of the court’s dismissal
of the first complaint on February 8. The court reasoned that
its ruling on the first complaint was “without applicability to
the present situation as this matter involves a different time
period, a different factual scenario, and a different effective
provision” of § 76-1431(1).
Turning to Saint Joseph’s evidence of Royce’s noncompli-
ance, the county court found that “the cluttered condition
of [Royce’s] apartment and its significantly constricted pas-
sageways present a fire and safety risk” and “could materially
affect the health and safety of those near this apartment” and
that therefore, Royce had failed to keep her apartment clean
and safe as required by the lease, the resident handbook, and
Nebraska law. The county court specified that Royce was in
violation of § 76-1421. The county court further found that
Saint Joseph “had just cause to terminate” the lease, that Royce
had “failed and refused to comply with the notice and vacate
the apartment,” and that Royce’s possession of the apartment
was unlawful. The court therefore entered judgment in favor of
Saint Joseph on its complaint for restitution.
Notice of Appeal, Supersedeas Bond,
Order for Restitution, and Eviction
On April 10, 2024, Royce filed a notice of intent to appeal
the county court’s judgment to the district court. That same
day, the county court filed an order setting a supersedeas
bond of $4,000 to be paid within 3 business days and order-
ing Royce to pay an additional $4,000 per month during
the appeal.
On April 18, 2024, Saint Joseph filed a motion for writ
of restitution in the district court. Saint Joseph alleged that
Royce had not posted the supersedeas bond within the 3 days
set by the county court, and it therefore requested that a writ
of restitution be issued. On April 24, the district court filed an
order for restitution of premises in which it cited § 76-1447
as providing that an appeal stays the execution of a writ of

- 835 -
Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
320 Nebraska Reports
SAINT JOSEPH TOWER ASSISTED LIVING v. ROYCE
Cite as 320 Neb. 830
restitution but only so long as the party appealing deposits
an appeal bond. The district court found that Royce had not
posted the bond, and it therefore ordered that a writ of res-
titution be issued. A writ of restitution was issued directing
the Douglas County sheriff to remove Royce from the apart-
ment, and on May 3, the sheriff’s office made a filing in the
district court reporting that the eviction had been completed
on May 1.
Appeal to District Court
On June 24, 2024, Royce filed a statement of errors in the
district court. Royce asserted, restated and renumbered, that
the county court erred by (1) failing to dismiss Saint Joseph’s
complaint for failing to comply with the pleading requirements
of § 76-1441(1)(a); (2) granting restitution when Saint Joseph
had waived its right to enforce the NRA through the February
9, 2024, notice when it had accepted rent from Royce in
December 2023 and January 2024; (3) failing to dismiss Saint
Joseph’s complaint based on res judicata and the county court’s
disposition of Saint Joseph’s first complaint for restitution; and
(4) setting a supersedeas bond of $4,000 plus an additional
$4,000 per month, contrary to § 76-1447.
On July 1, 2024, the district court held a hearing on Royce’s
appeal. The court also heard arguments on a motion Saint
Joseph had filed that same day in which, among other things,
it urged the district court to dismiss the appeal as moot. Saint
Joseph asserted that because Royce and her possessions had
been out of the apartment since May, there was no relief that
could be granted by the district court. Saint Joseph cited our
decision in NP Dodge Mgmt. Co. v. Holcomb 2 to argue that
the appeal was moot and that the public interest exception to
mootness did not apply. At the end of the July 1 hearing, the
district court stated it would take the matter under advisement
and issue a written opinion.
2 NP Dodge Mgmt. Co. v. Holcomb, 314 Neb. 748, 993 N.W.2d 105 (2023).

- 836 -
Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
320 Nebraska Reports
SAINT JOSEPH TOWER ASSISTED LIVING v. ROYCE
Cite as 320 Neb. 830
District Court’s Order
On November 6, 2024, the district court entered an order
in which it rejected Royce’s claims of error and affirmed the
county court’s judgment of restitution. Regarding Royce’s
claim that Saint Joseph’s complaint failed to comply with the
pleading requirements of § 76-1441(1)(a), the district court
determined that Saint Joseph had set forth facts that were suf-
ficient to meet the requirements of the statute.
Regarding Royce’s claim that Saint Joseph had waived
its right to enforce the NRA through the February 9, 2024,
notice, the district court stated that the evidence showed that
Saint Joseph had collected monthly rents from Royce after
the first notice and that the acceptance of rent constituted a
waiver of Saint Joseph’s complaint for restitution based on
the first notice. However, the district court further stated the
evidence showed that conditions that violated the lease still
existed when Saint Joseph gave the notice on February 9, and
the court determined that while Saint Joseph’s acceptance of
rent in December 2023 and January 2024 waived its right to
restitution based on the first notice, the acceptance of rent
did not waive Saint Joseph’s right to restitution based on the
February 9 notice.
Regarding Royce’s claim that Saint Joseph’s complaint
should have been dismissed based on res judicata and the
county court’s dismissal of Saint Joseph’s first complaint,
the district court stated that res judicata did not apply because
when the county court dismissed the first complaint, it made
no finding regarding whether Royce had violated the lease or
had remedied any violation.
Regarding Royce’s claim that the supersedeas bond was set
at an amount contrary to § 76-1447, the district court deter-
mined that the bond set by the county court as an initial bond
of $4,000 and monthly payments of $4,000 was improper
because the evidence showed that when the complaint was
filed, Royce owed $2,829 and her monthly rent was $943.
The district court cited § 76-1447 as providing that the bond

- 837 -
Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
320 Nebraska Reports
SAINT JOSEPH TOWER ASSISTED LIVING v. ROYCE
Cite as 320 Neb. 830
be set at “‘the amount of judgment and costs’” and requiring
payment of, “‘on a monthly basis, an amount equal to the
monthly rent called for by the rental agreement at the time
the complaint was filed.’” The court stated that the initial
bond and the monthly payment amounts should have been set
at $2,829 and $943, respectively. The district court, however,
concluded that the supersedeas bond issue was moot because
Royce had moved out of the apartment and there was nothing
the district court could do to remedy the county court’s error
in setting the bond.
Royce appeals the district court’s order affirming the county
court’s order.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
Royce assigns that the district court erred in determining
that the county court did not err in rejecting Royce’s argu-
ments that (1) Saint Joseph’s complaint failed to comply with
the pleading requirements of § 76-1441(1)(a), (2) Saint Joseph
waived its right to terminate her lease when it accepted rent
from her after the first notice period had ended, and (3) res
judicata barred litigation related to the current notice because
the issue of waiver had been decided against Saint Joseph in
the first action. Royce also assigns that the district court erred
in determining that the issue related to the supersedeas bond
imposed by the county court was moot and that the public
interest exception did not apply.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
[1,2] Because mootness is a justiciability doctrine that oper-
ates to prevent courts from exercising jurisdiction, an appel-
late court reviews mootness determinations under the same
standard of review as other jurisdictional questions. 3 When a
jurisdictional question does not involve a factual dispute, its
determination is a matter of law, which requires an appellate
3 Id.

- 838 -
Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
320 Nebraska Reports
SAINT JOSEPH TOWER ASSISTED LIVING v. ROYCE
Cite as 320 Neb. 830
court to reach a conclusion independent of the decisions made
by lower courts. 4
ANALYSIS
The district court determined that the supersedeas bond
issue was moot because Royce had moved out of the apart-
ment and there was no relief the district court could give
to remedy the county court’s error in setting the bond at an
amount higher than what was warranted by the evidence and
§ 76-1447. We agree with the district court’s determination
that because Royce had been evicted and had moved out of
the apartment, the supersedeas bond issue was moot. However,
we further determine that the mootness analysis extends to all
issues on appeal and that the entire appeal is moot.
[3,4] In NP Dodge Mgmt. Co. v. Holcomb, the county
court had entered judgment in favor of a landlord in eviction
proceedings brought under the URLTA, and the district court
affirmed the county court’s judgment on appeal. 5 On appeal
to this court, we considered whether the case was moot given
that a writ of restitution had been executed and the tenant
had been removed from the apartment. We stated the proposi-
tions that a case is moot if the facts underlying the dispute
have changed, such that the issues presented are no longer
alive, and that the central question in a mootness analysis is
whether changes in circumstances that prevailed at the begin-
ning of litigation have forestalled any occasion for meaning-
ful relief. 6 We further cited with favor the proposition from
another state supreme court that a moot case exists where a
judgment rendered by the court will have no practical legal
effect upon an existing controversy because an intervening
4 Id.
5 Id.
6 Id. (citing Nebuda v. Dodge Cty. Sch. Dist. 0062, 290 Neb. 740, 861
N.W.2d 742 (2015)).

- 839 -
Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
320 Nebraska Reports
SAINT JOSEPH TOWER ASSISTED LIVING v. ROYCE
Cite as 320 Neb. 830
event renders any grant of effectual relief impossible for the
reviewing court. 7
Applying these standards, we determined in NP Dodge
Mgmt. Co. v. Holcomb that the case was moot. We reasoned
that there was no meaningful relief we could provide to rem-
edy any errors pertaining to the tenant’s attempt to stay in her
apartment pending appeal because the tenant had been removed
from her apartment prior to the completion of the appellate
process, and we reasoned that even if we were to find error
in that removal, there was nothing we could do at that time
that would allow the tenant to stay in her apartment pending
appeal. 8 We further reasoned that an action under the URLTA
determines only “who is entitled to immediate possession,” and
the tenant offered no reason that she would be entitled to pos-
session of the apartment at the time of the appeal. 9
[5] We then considered in NP Dodge Mgmt. Co. v. Holcomb
whether the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine
applied. We stated that the public interest exception to the
mootness doctrine requires us to consider (1) the public or pri-
vate nature of the question presented, (2) the desirability of an
authoritative adjudication for guidance of public officials, and
(3) the likelihood of recurrence of the same or a similar prob-
lem. 10 We further cited the proposition that even if a problem
is likely to recur, it is generally inappropriate for an appellate
court to review a moot case that does not evade review as a
result of a transitory setting. 11 Applying these standards, we
rejected 	the 	tenant’s 	arguments 	that 	the 	public 	interest
7 NP Dodge Mgmt. Co. v. Holcomb, supra note 2 (citing Sloan v. Friends of
Hunley, Inc., 369 S.C. 20, 630 S.E.2d 474 (2006)).
8 See NP Dodge Mgmt. Co. v. Holcomb, supra note 2.
9 Id. at 753-54, 993 N.W.2d at 110.
10 NP Dodge Mgmt. Co. v. Holcomb, supra note 2 (citing Rath v. City of
Sutton, 267 Neb. 265, 673 N.W.2d 869 (2004)).
11 NP Dodge Mgmt. Co. v. Holcomb, supra note 2 (citing Beachy v. Becerra,
259 Neb. 299, 609 N.W.2d 648 (2000)).

- 840 -
Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
320 Nebraska Reports
SAINT JOSEPH TOWER ASSISTED LIVING v. ROYCE
Cite as 320 Neb. 830
exception to the mootness doctrine applied, and we reasoned
that under the URLTA, “there are means by which a tenant can
stay enforcement of a writ of restitution pending appeal” 12 and
that issues raised on appeal were “bound up with the peculiar
procedural history of this particular case.” 13 We also rejected
the tenant’s arguments based on a separate exception to the
mootness doctrine, the collateral consequences exception, and
we reasoned that the collateral consequences exception does
not apply outside the criminal context. 14
Like the tenant in NP Dodge Mgmt. Co. v. Holcomb, Royce
was evicted from her apartment after the county court entered
its order and before the district court decided her appeal. In
arguing the mootness issue in this appeal, Royce does not
assert that there is relief we can provide at this time to enforce
a current right to possession of the apartment; instead, she
argues that issues in this appeal fall within the public inter-
est exception to the mootness doctrine. Therefore, we deter-
mine that based on our reasoning in NP Dodge Mgmt. Co. v.
Holcomb, the present appeal is moot, and we consider Royce’s
arguments regarding the public interest exception.
Royce argues that the public interest exception applies in
this case because this appeal presents “public question[s]” 15
and “there is a need for guidance for public officials because
there is a likelihood of future recurrence.” 16 She also argues
that “cases governed by URLTA usually evade an appellate
court’s review.” 17 Royce further makes arguments relating
to the consequences of her eviction—like the arguments we
rejected in NP Dodge Mgmt. Co. v. Holcomb—as arguments
for applying the collateral consequences exception.
12 Id. at 755, 993 N.W.2d at 111.
13 Id. at 756, 993 N.W.2d at 112.
14 See NP Dodge Mgmt. Co. v. Holcomb, supra note 2.
15 Brief for appellant at 28.
16 Id. at 28-29.
17 Id. at 27.

- 841 -
Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
320 Nebraska Reports
SAINT JOSEPH TOWER ASSISTED LIVING v. ROYCE
Cite as 320 Neb. 830
We reject Royce’s public interest exception arguments for
the reasons we rejected similar arguments in NP Dodge Mgmt.
Co. v. Holcomb. The issues raised in Royce’s assignments of
error regarding the pleading requirements of § 76-1441(1)(a),
waiver under § 76-1433 of the right to terminate a lease, and
res judicata arise from the peculiar procedural history of this
case and are issues that could be reviewed on appeal when a
tenant successfully stays enforcement of a writ of restitution
under the URLTA.
Based on similar reasoning and the precedent of NP Dodge
Mgmt. Co. v. Holcomb, we also reject Royce’s public inter-
est arguments as they relate to the supersedeas bond issue.
Regarding the bond issue, Royce may have a better argument
that the issue evades appellate review because the county
court’s setting an excessive bond prevented her from using
the method provided in the URLTA to stay a writ of restitu-
tion pending the appeal. However, in NP Dodge Mgmt. Co. v.
Holcomb, the tenant raised a similar argument regarding her
allegations that the county court violated § 76-1447 by issu-
ing a writ of restitution prior to setting the appeal bond and
without first serving her notice that the writ would be issued.
We determined the issues did not warrant review under the
public interest exception because they were “bound up with
the peculiar procedural history” of the case, 18 and we found
it unlikely the issues would recur because we “doubt that
future courts will fail to set an appeal bond when asked or
that future litigants will fail to avail themselves of all legal
avenues to avoid an impending eviction.” 19
We decline to apply the public interest exception to the
supersedeas bond issue in this case because we do not see a
need for guidance, and we find it unlikely that the issue will
recur. Royce states that the county court “set[] the supersedeas
18 NP Dodge Mgmt. Co. v. Holcomb, supra note 2, 314 Neb. at 756, 993
N.W.2d at 112.
19 Id. at 757, 993 N.W.2d at 112.

- 842 -
Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
320 Nebraska Reports
SAINT JOSEPH TOWER ASSISTED LIVING v. ROYCE
Cite as 320 Neb. 830
bond at over four times the monthly rental obligation.” 20
Although the district court determined that the supersedeas
bond issue was moot because it could provide no relief, the
district court nevertheless addressed the propriety of the bond
and agreed with Royce that the county court had set the bond at
an amount higher than “‘the amount of judgment and costs,’”
as authorized under the language of § 76-1447, and that the
county court required additional monthly payments that were
higher than “an amount equal to the monthly rent called for by
the rental agreement at the time the complaint was filed,” as
authorized under the language of § 76-1447. Saint Joseph did
not cross-appeal and does not take issue with this determina-
tion by the district court. In its brief, Saint Joseph argues that
guidance is not needed because § 76-1447 is clear and this
case is “just one case in which the County Court may have
set a Supersedeas Bond too high.” 21 The parties and the dis-
trict court appear to agree that the county court set the bond
in this case above the amount authorized by § 76-1447, and
the language of § 76-1447 appears to give clear guidance on
the amount at which a bond should be set. Therefore, as we
reasoned in NP Dodge Mgmt. Co. v. Holcomb, we do not think
the alleged error in setting the supersedeas bond in this case
is likely to recur, and we do not see a need for appellate court
guidance on the requirements set forth in § 76-1447. We there-
fore decline to apply the public interest exception to consider
the supersedeas bond issue.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, we determine that the issues
in this appeal are moot, and we decline to apply the public
interest exception to consider any of the issues on appeal. We
therefore dismiss the appeal.
Appeal dismissed.
20 Brief for appellant at 36.
21 Brief for appellee at 21.