State ex rel. Hilgers v. Weber

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STATE EX REL. HILGERS v. WEBER
Cite as 322 Neb. 227
State ex rel. Michael T. Hilgers, in his official
capacity as Attorney General of the State of
Nebraska, relator, v. Brodey Weber et al.,
together as the Lincoln City Council, and
Soulinne Phan, Lincoln city clerk, respondents.
___ N.W.3d ___
Filed September 9, 2026. 	No. S-26-706.
1. Mandamus: Words and Phrases. Mandamus is an extraordinary rem-
edy, not a writ of right, issued to compel the performance of a purely
ministerial act or duty, imposed by law upon an inferior tribunal, cor-
poration, board, or person where (1) the relator has a clear right to the
relief sought, (2) there is a corresponding clear duty existing on the part
of the respondent to perform the act, and (3) there is no other plain and
adequate remedy in the course of the law.
2. Mandamus: Proof. In a mandamus action, the party seeking mandamus
has the burden of proof and must show clearly and conclusively that
such party is entitled to the particular thing the relator asks and that the
respondent is legally obligated to act.
3. Mandamus. Whether to grant a writ of mandamus is within a court’s
discretion.
4. Constitutional Law: Intent. Constitutional provisions are self-executing
when there is a manifest intention that they should go into immediate
effect, and no ancillary legislation is necessary to the enjoyment of a
right given, or the enforcement of a duty imposed.
5. Constitutional Law. That a right granted by a constitutional provi-
sion may be better or further protected by supplementary legislation
does not of itself prevent the provision in question from being self-
executing; nor does the self-executing character of the constitutional
provision necessarily preclude legislation for the better protection of
the right secured.
6. Constitutional Law: Time. The timing requirement set forth in Neb.
Const. art. XI, § 4, is self-executing.
Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
10/18/2026 12:34 AM CDT

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STATE EX REL. HILGERS v. WEBER
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7. Mandamus: Public Officers and Employees. A duty imposed by
law which may be enforced by writ of mandamus must be one which
the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust,
or station.
8. Mandamus. The general rule is that an act or duty is ministerial
only if there is an absolute duty to perform in a specified manner
upon the existence of certain facts. A duty or act is ministerial when
there is no room for the exercise of discretion, official or otherwise, the
performance being required by direct and positive command of the law.
9. ____. To warrant the issuance of a peremptory writ of mandamus to
compel the performance of a legal duty to act, (1) the duty must be
imposed by law, (2) the duty must still exist at the time the writ is
applied for, and (3) the duty must be clear.
10. Statutes: Words and Phrases. In the context of statutory construction,
appellate courts have recognized that the word “shall” is considered
mandatory and inconsistent with the idea of discretion.
11. Statutes. No universal test distinguishes mandatory from directory
statutory provisions. Broadly, provisions that relate to the essence of the
thing to be done are mandatory while provisions for which compliance
is a matter of convenience rather than substance are directory.
12. Constitutional Law: Municipal Corporations: Voting: Time. The
timing requirement in Neb. Const. art. XI, § 4, is a self-executing
provision that imposes a mandatory duty upon the city council or gov-
erning authorities to submit the proposed charter amendment to a vote
of the qualified electors at the next general or special election not held
within 30 days after such petition is filed.
13. Constitutional Law: Statutes. The rules of statutory interpretation
apply to constitutional interpretation as well.
14. Constitutional Law: Courts. As in statutory interpretation, the con-
struction of constitutional provisions requires the Nebraska Supreme
Court to apply basic tenets of interpretation.
15. Constitutional Law: Intent. Constitutional provisions are not open
to construction as a matter of course; construction is appropriate only
when it has been demonstrated that the meaning of the provision is not
clear and that construction is necessary.
16. Constitutional Law: Courts: Intent. If the meaning is clear, the
Nebraska Supreme Court gives a constitutional provision the meaning
that laypersons would obviously understand it to convey.
17. Constitutional Law: Voting: Time: Words and Phrases. In the con-
text of Neb. Const. art. XI, § 4, “next general . . . election” means the
next regular election, one that is recurring automatically as to time.

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STATE EX REL. HILGERS v. WEBER
Cite as 322 Neb. 227
18. Constitutional Law. A constitution represents the supreme written will
of the people regarding the framework for their government.
Original action. Peremptory writ of mandamus issued.
Michael T. Hilgers, Attorney General, Cody S. Barnett,
Zachary B. Pohlman, and Lincoln J. Korell for relator.
Yohance L. Christie, Lincoln City Attorney, Margaret M.
Blatchford, and Nicholas T. Bussey for respondents.
Cassel, 	Stacy, 	Papik, 	Freudenberg, 	Bergevin, 	and
Vaughn, JJ., and Pirtle, Judge.
Per Curiam.
INTRODUCTION
A citizen group submitted three initiative petitions to amend
the Lincoln City Charter. Anticipating that the city of Lincoln,
Nebraska, would decline to submit the charter amendments to
the voters at the November 2026 statewide general election,
the Nebraska Attorney General asked this court for peremp-
tory writs of mandamus directing the city council and city
clerk (Respondents) to submit the charter amendments at that
election. The city attorney then advised that the city council
planned to place the charter amendments on the ballot at the
May 2027 city general election pursuant to state law.
In deciding whether to grant the Attorney General’s request,
we must determine which election is “the next general . . .
election” under Neb. Const. art. XI, § 4. The Attorney General
contends that it is the next statewide general election in
November 2026. Respondents claim it is the next city general
election in May 2027. We agree with the Attorney General
and conclude that in this case, “the next general . . . election”
under article XI, § 4, is the next statewide general election in
November 2026. Accordingly, we grant the petition and issue
a peremptory writ of mandamus, commanding Respondents
to submit the proposed charter amendments to a vote of

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STATE EX REL. HILGERS v. WEBER
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the qualified electors at the next general election held on
November 3, 2026.
BACKGROUND
Petitions for Charter Amendment
Good Government Lincoln, a Nebraska ballot question com-
mittee, submitted three petitions to amend the Lincoln City
Charter. The first petition (the “Term Limits Petition”) had the
stated purpose “to provide term limits for members of the city
council.” The second petition (the “Rescheduling Petition”)
had the stated purpose “to increase participation in city elec-
tions by aligning city elections with statewide elections.” The
third petition (the “Extraterritorial Voters Petition”) had the
stated purpose “of allowing all citizens residing in an area gov-
erned by the City of Lincoln to vote in its elections.”
On August 5, 2026, Good Government Lincoln submit-
ted copies of the proposed amendments to the city clerk “to
initiate circulation of petitions to place the three proposed
charter amendments on the statewide general election ballot.”
After the petitions were circulated and signatures were gath-
ered, the signed petitions were submitted to the city clerk on
August 19.
On 	August 	25, 	2026, 	the 	Lancaster 	County 	Election
Commissioner certified that the Term Limits Petition had met
the signature threshold for a charter amendment petition, and
on August 26, the commissioner certified that the Rescheduling
Petition had met the signature threshold. On August 27, the city
attorney issued a statement regarding the petitions in which he
stated that Good Government Lincoln had “missed the dead-
line for the City Council’s process to allow inclusion on the
November 3rd ballot” and that the “City Council will place the
Charter amendments on the next general election ballot (May
2027) pursuant to state law.” On August 28, the election com-
missioner certified that the Extraterritorial Voters Petition had
also met the signature threshold.

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STATE EX REL. HILGERS v. WEBER
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Attorney General Involvement
A state senator asked the Attorney General whether,
“[u]nder existing state law, if a petition to amend a
home-rule charter satisfies the signature and timeline
requirements of Neb. Const. art. XI, section 4, does the
home-rule city have any discretion to impose additional
procedural requirements or processes that could keep such
petition off the ballot for the next election not within 30
days of when the petition was submitted?”
On August 24, 2026, the Attorney General issued a formal
opinion to the senator.
In the opinion, the Attorney General concluded that “[w]here
petitions are submitted, and the requisite signatures certified, in
advance of 30 days before the November general election, the
City has a ministerial duty to submit them for the ballot for
such election.” The Attorney General explained that “[t]he City
has no discretion to implement any procedure that would delay
the proposals for a subsequent election.”
On August 25, 2026, the Attorney General sent a letter to
Respondents in which he inquired about
whether the Lincoln City Council and City Clerk plan to
submit to the Lancaster County Election Commissioner,
by the statutory deadline on September 1, the three
charter-amendment petitions recently submitted to the City
for inclusion on the general election ballot in November
2026, so long as the Commissioner certifies that each
contains the requisite signatures.
The letter advised Respondents that “[f]ailing to submit a
compliant petition for the November election would violate
a direct constitutional command and constitute a derelic-
tion of duty by members of the City Council and the City
Clerk.” The letter asked for Respondents’ response by 5 p.m.
on Thursday, August 27, 2026. The letter explained that the
Attorney General would consider a failure to respond by
the deadline as “an answer in the negative” and advised that
“immediate legal action” would be considered “[i]f the City

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STATE EX REL. HILGERS v. WEBER
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Council and City Clerk do not agree to obey their constitu-
tional duty.” Respondents did not respond to the Attorney
General’s inquiry.
On August 27, 2026, the Attorney General, in his official
capacity, filed an emergency application for leave to com-
mence an original action in this court for writs of mandamus.
In a verified petition, the Attorney General sought peremp-
tory writs of mandamus requiring Respondents to submit and
certify to the election commissioner by September 1 proposed
Lincoln City Charter amendments that satisfied the constitu-
tional requirements for inclusion on the general election ballot
in November 2026.
The verified petition alleged that Neb. Const. art. XI, § 4,
demands that when municipal officials receive a petition with
the requisite number of signatures, the “council or governing
authorities shall submit the same to a vote of the qualified elec-
tors at the next general or special election not held within thirty
days after such petition is filed.”
On August 28, 2026, the Attorney General moved to supple-
ment the verified petition for writs of mandamus. The motion
claimed that after the Attorney General filed its emergency
application at 5:44 p.m. on August 27, Respondents issued
a press release at 6:09 p.m. that same day, which confirmed
that Respondents did not intend to submit the three petitions
at issue to the election commissioner for inclusion on the
November 2026 general election ballot.
Alternative Writ and Response
On August 28, 2026, we granted the Attorney General leave
to docket an original action in this court and accepted the sup-
plemental verified petition for writs of mandamus. The same
day, we issued an alternative writ of mandamus to Respondents.
The writ stated, in part:
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED
that Respondents shall forthwith submit and certify
the “Term Limits for Members of the City Council”

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STATE EX REL. HILGERS v. WEBER
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Petition, the “Increase Participation in City Elections by
Holding City Elections in Conjunction with Statewide
Elections” Petition, and the “Allow all Citizens who are
Residents of an Area Governed by the City of Lincoln
to 	Vote 	in 	its 	Elections” 	Petition 	to 	the 	Lancaster
County Election Commissioner for certification for the
November 3, 2026, General Election Ballot, or show
cause by Answer to this Court on or before 9:00 p.m.
on Monday, August 31, 2026, why a peremptory writ
commanding Respondents to do so should not issue, and
then and there return this writ.
On August 31, 2026, Respondents filed their answer to our
order to show cause why a peremptory writ should not issue.
Respondents argued that the Attorney General had no clear
right to the relief sought because the petitions were submit-
ted too late for them to complete all the steps necessary and
allowed by law to submit the proposed charter amendments
to the election commissioner by the September 1 statutory
deadline under 2026 Neb. Laws, L.B. 1075 (operative July 18,
2026; amending Neb. Rev. Stat. § 32-559(2)(a) (Cum. Supp.
2024)), to be included on the ballot for the November 3 elec-
tion. Respondents asserted that to certify the proposed charter
amendments for placement on the ballot, they were required
to act by passing a resolution and were required to meet cer-
tain requirements under Nebraska’s Open Meetings Act 1 and
municipal law, including the Lincoln Mun. Code, ch. 2.04, and
City of Lincoln Executive Order No. 19107, Administrative
Regulation 1-1, § C.1. (Apr. 19, 1977).
Respondents also argued that there was no clear duty for
them to submit and certify the proposed charter amendments
for the November 2026 election because the “next general
. . . election” under Neb. Const. art. XI, § 4, clearly meant
the next City general election in May 2027. They argued that
article XI, § 4, allowed, but did not require, them to hold a
1 Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 84-1407 to 84-1414 (Reissue 2024).

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STATE EX REL. HILGERS v. WEBER
Cite as 322 Neb. 227
special election, and that therefore, they had no clear duty to
call a special election and submit the proposed charter amend-
ments at a special election.
Respondents further noted that article XI, § 4, gave them
the right, when submitting a charter amendment proposed by
voters, to present and submit “any alternative article or sec-
tion” for the choice of the voters. They argued that in addition
to the time necessary to submit the charter amendments pro-
posed by the petitions, they would also need time to prepare,
adopt, and submit such alternatives. They further argued that
issuance of the writ would “prohibit [them] from any meaning-
ful opportunity to exercise [their] constitutionally-granted right
to perform discretionary legislative functions to consider and
present alternative amendments.”
Respondents finally contended that the issuance of a peremp-
tory writ requiring them to submit the proposed charter amend-
ments for the November 2026 election would require them to
“upend [their] regular and routine operations,” by requiring
them to “hold emergency meetings or suspend the normal
rules.” They cited authority that issuance of a writ should be
denied “where the issuance of a writ would disturb official
action, or create disorder or confusion.” 2
After receiving the parties’ pleadings, we ordered the parties
to submit simultaneous supplemental briefing. The briefs were
to address (1) the understanding of the term “next general or
special election” when article XI, § 4, was adopted in 1912; (2)
the relevance, if any, of State v. Schroeder 3 to the proper con-
struction of the phrase “next general . . . election” in article XI,
§ 4; and (3) if “next general . . . election” is construed to mean
the next statewide general election or the next city general elec-
tion, whether any current provision of the Election Act 4 would
2 See State ex rel. Goetz v. Lundak, 199 Neb. 585, 594, 260 N.W.2d 589,
594 (1977).
3 State v. Schroeder, 79 Neb. 759, 113 N.W.192 (1907).
4 Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 32-101 to 32-1552 (Reissue 2016, Cum. Supp. 2024 &
Supp. 2025).

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STATE EX REL. HILGERS v. WEBER
Cite as 322 Neb. 227
be rendered unconstitutional as applied. The parties filed such
briefs, and this matter was submitted without oral argument.
Mandamus Legal Standards
[1-3] Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy, not a writ of
right, issued to compel the performance of a purely ministerial
act or duty, imposed by law upon an inferior tribunal, corpora-
tion, board, or person where (1) the relator has a clear right to
the relief sought, (2) there is a corresponding clear duty exist-
ing on the part of the respondent to perform the act, and (3)
there is no other plain and adequate remedy in the course of the
law. 5 In a mandamus action, the party seeking mandamus has
the burden of proof and must show clearly and conclusively
that such party is entitled to the particular thing the relator asks
and that the respondent is legally obligated to act. 6 Whether to
grant a writ of mandamus is within a court’s discretion. 7
ANALYSIS
The portion of Neb. Const. art. XI, § 4, that is relevant to
this case provides:
Such charter so ratified and adopted may be amended,
or a charter convention called, by a proposal therefor
made by the law-making body of such city or by the
qualified electors in number not less than five per cent
of the next preceding gubernatorial vote in such city, by
petition filed with the council or governing authorities.
The council or governing authorities shall submit the
same to a vote of the qualified electors at the next gen-
eral or special election not held within thirty days after
such petition is filed. In submitting any such charter or
charter amendments, any alternative article or section
5 State ex rel. Spung v. Evnen, 317 Neb. 800, 12 N.W.3d 229 (2024).
6 Id.
7 Id.

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STATE EX REL. HILGERS v. WEBER
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may be presented for the choice of the voters and may be
voted on separately without prejudice to others.
(Emphases supplied.)
Based on the showing that the Attorney General must
make to warrant the issuance of a writ of mandamus, we first
address the Attorney General’s authority to bring this action.
Next, we consider whether article XI, § 4, imposes a self-
executing ministerial duty. Then, we determine the proper
interpretation of article XI, § 4, based on the positions of
the parties. Finally, we exercise our discretion in issuing a
peremptory writ of mandamus.
Attorney General’s Authority
The Attorney General asserts that he has authority to bring
this original mandamus action to protect the public interests
of the State of Nebraska. 8 He notes that under Neb. Rev. Stat.
§ 84-203 (Reissue 2024), the Attorney General “is authorized
to appear for the state and prosecute and defend, in any court[,]
any cause or matter, civil or criminal, in which the state may
be a party or interested.” He maintains that as the “‘chief
law officer of the state,’” 9 the Attorney General has a duty to
“uphold the Constitution” and protect the rights of Nebraskans
announced therein, 10 and the common-law authority to “‘exer-
cise all such power and authority as public interests may from
time to time require.’” 11
We agree that the Attorney General is a proper party to bring
this mandamus action because of the authority granted under
8 See, State, ex rel. Johnson, v. Tilley, 137 Neb. 173, 288 N.W.521 (1939)
(issuing peremptory writ sought by Attorney General); State, ex rel.
Johnson, v. Goble, 136 Neb. 242, 285 N.W.569 (1939) (same).
9 State ex rel. Meyer v. Peters, 188 Neb. 817, 820, 199 N.W.2d 738, 740
(1972).
10 Id. at 821, 199 N.W.2d at 741.
11 Id. at 820, 199 N.W.2d at 740.

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STATE EX REL. HILGERS v. WEBER
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§ 84-203. The state is interested in enforcing constitutional and
statutory ministerial duties of the city officials in this case. 12
Self-Executing Ministerial Duty
[4,5] We first recognize that constitutional provisions are
self-executing when there is a manifest intention that they
should go into immediate effect, and no ancillary legisla-
tion is necessary to the enjoyment of a right given, or the
enforcement of a duty imposed. 13 That a right granted by a
constitutional provision may be better or further protected
by supplementary legislation does not of itself prevent the
provision in question from being self-executing; nor does the
self-executing character of the constitutional provision nec-
essarily preclude legislation for the better protection of the
right secured. 14
[6] The timing requirement set forth in Neb. Const. art. XI,
§ 4, is self-executing. The mandate is clear: “The council or
governing authorities shall submit the [issue] to a vote . . . at
the next general or special election not held within thirty
days after such petition is filed.” 15 No ancillary legislation
is necessary to effectuate the 30-day timeline. Neither party
disputes the self-executing nature of this timing requirement.
They concede that a proposed charter amendment satisfying
the signature requirement must be submitted to the voters at
the next general or special election, so long as that election
is not within 30 days of its filing with the council or govern-
ing authorities.
12 See State, ex rel. Sorensen, v. Ak-Sar-Ben Exposition Co., 121 Neb. 248,
236 N.W. 736 (1931) (violations of law are public wrongs that state may
prevent). See, also, State, ex rel. Hall, v. Ure, 99 Neb. 486, 156 N.W. 1053
(1916) (holding action may have more than one proper party).
13 Wilfong v. Omaha & C. B. Street R. Co., 129 Neb. 600, 262 N.W. 537
(1935).
14 Id.
15 Neb. Const. art. XI, § 4.

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STATE EX REL. HILGERS v. WEBER
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[7-9] Moreover, as the parties do not dispute, the self-
executing timing requirement is a ministerial duty. Mandamus
is available to enforce the performance of ministerial duties
of a public official but is not available if the duties are quasi-
judicial or discretionary. 16 A duty imposed by law which may
be enforced by writ of mandamus must be one which the law
specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust,
or station. 17 The general rule is that an act or duty is ministe-
rial only if there is an absolute duty to perform in a specified
manner upon the existence of certain facts. 18 A duty or act is
ministerial when there is no room for the exercise of discre-
tion, official or otherwise, the performance being required by
direct and positive command of the law. 19 A ministerial duty
is not dependent upon a public officer’s judgment or discre-
tion—it is performed under the conditions specified in obedi-
ence to the mandate of legal authority, without regard for the
exercise of the officer’s judgment upon the propriety of the act
being done. 20 To warrant the issuance of a peremptory writ of
mandamus to compel the performance of a legal duty to act,
(1) the duty must be imposed by law, (2) the duty must still
exist at the time the writ is applied for, and (3) the duty must
be clear. 21
[10,11] In the context of statutory construction, we have
recognized that the word “shall” is considered mandatory and
inconsistent with the idea of discretion. 22 No universal test
distinguishes mandatory from directory statutory provisions. 23
Broadly, provisions that relate to the essence of the thing to be
16 Burbank v. Evnen, 321 Neb. 65, 32 N.W.3d 612 (2026).
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 American Exch. Bank v. Topp, 321 Neb. 409, 35 N.W.3d 411 (2026).
23 D.I. v. Gibson, 291 Neb. 554, 867 N.W.2d 284 (2015).

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done are mandatory while provisions for which compliance is
a matter of convenience rather than substance are directory. 24
Put another way, we have been reluctant to deem provisions
mandatory if something less than strict compliance would not
interfere with the law’s fundamental purpose. 25
[12] The timing requirement in article XI, § 4, relates to
the essence of the thing to be done—the timing of the submis-
sion of the issue to voters. The timing requirement is a self-
executing provision that imposes a mandatory duty upon the
city council or governing authorities to submit the proposed
charter amendment to a vote of the qualified electors at the
next general or special election not held within 30 days after
such petition is filed.
Respondents contend that the timing requirement estab-
lishes a “floor” by which proposed charter amendments can-
not be submitted to voters because the next election would be
too soon, rather than a deadline for proposed charter amend-
ments to be submitted to voters. Respondents also contend
that because “[i]n submitting any . . . charter amendments,
any alternative article or section may be presented for the
choice of the voters,” 26 the city council has discretionary
authority to present alternative articles or sections alongside
the charter petition amendments for the voters to choose from.
This right of the city council is discretionary, and the city
council is free to exercise that right. However, Respondents
go further; they assert that the 30-day timing requirement can-
not be a deadline because they need time to consider submit-
ting such alternatives.
But Respondents’ contentions are not inconsistent with a
reading of a mandatory deadline. Although we agree that the
timing requirement does create a “floor” as Respondents con-
tend, it also creates a positive deadline that must be met.
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Neb. Const. art. XI, §4.

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Accordingly, we must next address whether Respondents’
ministerial duty to submit the issue to voters at the “next gen-
eral . . . election” 27 includes the statewide general election in
November 2026 as the Attorney General contends.
“General” Is “Regular”
[13-16] The rules of statutory interpretation apply to consti-
tutional interpretation as well. 28 As in statutory interpretation,
the construction of constitutional provisions requires us to
apply basic tenets of interpretation. 29 Constitutional provisions
are not open to construction as a matter of course; construc-
tion is appropriate only when it has been demonstrated that the
meaning of the provision is not clear and that construction is
necessary. 30 If the meaning is clear, we give a constitutional
provision the meaning that laypersons would obviously under-
stand it to convey. 31
In 1910, close in time to the Legislature’s proposal of article
XI, § 4, the term “general election” meant:
(1) One at which the officers to be elected are such as
belong to the general government,—that is, the general
and central political organization of the whole state: as
distinguished from an election of officers for a particular
locality only. (2) One held for the selection of an officer
after the expiration of the full term of the former officer;
thus distinguished from a special election, which is one
held to supply a vacancy in office occurring before the
expiration of the full term for which the incumbent was
elected [or] [a]n election for a particular emergency; out
of the regular course . . . . 32
27 Id.
28 Conroy v. Keith Cty. Bd. of Equal., 288 Neb. 196, 846 N.W.2d 634 (2014).
29 Id.
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 Black’s Law Dictionary 416 (2d ed. 1910).

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The definition of “regular election” is also relevant here: “A
general, usual, or stated election. When applied to elections,
the terms ‘regular’ and ‘general’ are used interchangeably and
synonymously.” 33
In article XI, § 4, “general” election is juxtaposed with “spe-
cial” election. This dichotomy indicates that article XI, § 4,
contemplates only two kinds of elections: those that are regular
and those that are out of the regular course. While not disposi-
tive, we note that at least one newspaper interpreted “general”
to be “regular” before the voters took to the polls in 1912. 34 We
agree. In the context of article XI, § 4, we interpret “general”
election to be used interchangeably and synonymously with
“regular” election.
“General” Includes Statewide
General Elections
The determinative question in this case then is whether
the “next general . . . election” in Neb. Const. art. XI, § 4, is
limited to a regular election for the city alone or whether it
includes a regular statewide election. We interpret the words
at the heart of this dispute to include a regular statewide
election.
Respondents argue that language in State v. Schroeder indi-
cates that when article XI, § 4, was adopted in 1912, the term
“general election” in article XI, § 4, would have been under-
stood to refer to city elections only and not the November
general election. 35 But Respondents reach that conclusion by
plucking that language from its context.
The issue in State v. Schroeder was how long someone
appointed to fill a vacancy as city alderman was entitled to
hold that office. A statute pertaining to aldermen provided
33 Id.
34 Omaha Daily Bee, Jan. 12, 1911, at 2 (“after which it is to be submitted to
the voters at a regular or special election”).
35 See State v. Schroeder, supra note 3.

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that those appointed to fill vacancies were to hold the office
“‘until the next general election.’” 36 The appointed alder-
man argued that “general election” for purposes of that
statute meant “the [municipal] election expressly appointed
by statute for the election of aldermen,” 37 while the relator
argued that “general election” referred to the “next election
at which municipal officers in general are elected.” 38 This
court adopted the relator’s reading of the statute and stated,
“The words ‘general election’ have no uncertain meaning in
this state, and when used with reference to city elections[,]
without any qualifying words, must mean the election for
municipal officers in general.” 39
Respondents claim that the above-quoted language shows
that at the time article XI, § 4, was enacted, “general elec-
tion” in that provision would have been understood to refer
to a city general election because article XI, § 4, pertains to
amendments of city charters and appears “without any qualify-
ing words.” But it must be recalled that the dispute in State
v. Schroeder was not whether the term “general election”
included a statewide general election in November; it was
whether “general election” in that particular statute meant the
next municipal election at which aldermen were elected or the
next municipal election at which municipal officers in general
were elected. Viewed in its proper context, the language relied
on by Respondents is not, in our opinion, instructive as to the
original understanding of article XI, § 4.
Similarly, our invocation of that proposition in Allen v.
Tobin 40 fails to move the needle in Respondents’ favor. In that
case, the plaintiffs contended that a petition was invalid for
failing to have sufficient signatures based on the percentage
36 Id. at 761, 113 N.W. at 193.
37 Id. at 762, 113 N.W. at 193.
38 Id. at 761, 113 N.W. at 193.
39 Id. at 762, 113 N.W. at 194.
40 Allen v. Tobin, 155 Neb. 212, 51 N.W.2d 338 (1952).

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of votes cast at “the last general election.” 41 The petitioners
argued that the last general election was limited to the last
state general election and that the intervening city election was
not a general election for the purposes of the relevant statute.
We disagreed.
We noted:
Ordinarily, a general election is one provided for by
law for the election of officers throughout the state, or
certain subdivisions thereof, after the expiration of the
full terms of the former officers. . . .
A regular or general election is one which recurs at
stated intervals as fixed by law; it is one which occurs
at stated intervals without any superinducing cause other
than the efflux of time. In the application of the foregoing
rules, it is held that the term “general election” embraces
a regular annual municipal election. . . .
Any election at which there is a general and popular
expression of the public will, whether that election be a
state, county, or city election, is a general election. 42
We went on to hold that the city general election was, in
fact, a general election. We did not, however, contrary to
Respondents’ position, hold that the city general election was
the only applicable general election. That opinion stands for the
principle that a city general election is included in the defini-
tion of “general election,” and, inherently, it does not exclude
the state general election.
Our holding in Allen v. Tobin is similar to our holding in
State, ex rel. City of Lincoln, v. Marsh. 43 There, we recognized
that a general election was merely one that occurs on a “regu-
lar date[,] operating automatically as to time.” 44 General elec-
41 Id. at 217, 51 N.W.2d at 341.
42 Id. at 218-19, 51 N.W.2d at 342 (citations omitted).
43 State, ex rel. City of Lincoln, v. Marsh, 107 Neb. 607, 187 N.W. 88 (1922).
44 Id. at 608, 187 N.W. at 88. Accord State, ex rel. City of Lincoln, v.
Johnson, 117 Neb. 301, 220 N.W. 273 (1928).

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tions were those held automatically and scheduled on a regular
basis, as opposed to special elections. Likewise, in State, ex
rel. Long, v. City of Nebraska City, 45 we rejected the notion
that the state general election was a special city election as far
as it affected a purely municipal question. We recognized that
in the context of elections, the word “general” has the same
meaning as “regular”; that is, “‘returning or recurring at stated
or fixed times or uniform intervals.’” 46
Moreover, when article XI, § 4, was adopted in 1912, so
too was an amendment to Neb. Const. art. XVII, § 4, which
provides that “[t]he general election of this state” is held
in November every 2 years. Therefore, the voters contem-
plated that “general . . . election” in article XI, § 4, included
the statewide general election set forth in article XVII, § 4.
Interpreting the use of the general term “general . . . election,”
without a modifier, in article XI, § 4, to be limited to city gen-
eral elections disregards the constitution’s own recognition of
a statewide general election.
One other canon of construction guides our analysis—the
general terms canon. 47 General words, as all words, “are
to be accorded their full and fair scope. They are not to be
arbitrarily limited.” 48 The general terms canon supports con-
struction of the words “next general . . . election” in article
XI, § 4, to include both statewide general elections and city
general elections.
[17] We hold that in the context of article XI, § 4, “next
general . . . election” means the next regular election, one
that is recurring automatically as to time. The statewide gen-
eral election, which recurs every 2 years “on the Tuesday
45 State, ex rel. Long, v. City of Nebraska City, 123 Neb. 614, 243 N.W. 858
(1932).
46 Id. at 617-18, 243 N.W. at 860.
47 See, generally, Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The
Interpretation of Texts 101-106 (2012).
48 Id. at 101.

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succeeding the first Monday of November,” is such a general
election. 49
Effectuating Article XI, § 4
[18] Respondents argue that our interpretation of article XI,
§ 4, in this matter will create problems with the administration
of state statutes, including the Election Act, 50 Open Meetings
Act, 51 and their own municipal laws. 52 While we are cognizant
of Respondents’ concerns, we are unpersuaded by this argu-
ment. “[S]tatutes [and municipal laws] follow constitutions, not
the other way around.” 53 A constitution represents the supreme
written will of the people regarding the framework for their
government. 54 Accordingly, the proposed charter amendments
must be submitted to voters at the next statewide general elec-
tion in November 2026.
Respondents argue that the granting of a writ of manda-
mus in this matter will prevent them from presenting “for
the choice of the voters” an “alternative article or section”
when “submitting any . . . charter amendments” to a “vote
of the qualified electors” as they are empowered to do under
article XI, § 4. However, Respondents’ opportunity to offer
an “alternative article” when submitting the charter amend-
ments for a vote does not affect their ministerial duty under
article XI, § 4, to “submit the [petition charter amendment]
to a vote of the qualified electors at the next general or spe-
cial election.” Laws that may frustrate such opportunities for
49 Neb. Const. art. XVII, § 4.
50 E.g., §§ 32-556 and 32-559(2)(a).
51 §§ 84-1407 to 84-1414.
52 See, Lincoln Municipal Code, ch. 2.04; City of Lincoln Executive Order
No. 19107, Administrative Regulation 1-1, § C.1. (Apr. 19, 1977).
53 Working Families Party v. Commonwealth, 653 Pa. 41, 98, 209 A.3d 270,
304 (2019) (Wecht, J., concurring and dissenting).
54 E.g., State ex rel. Brooks v. Evnen, 317 Neb. 581, 10 N.W.3d 887 (2024);
Pony Lake Sch. Dist. v. State Committee for Reorg., 271 Neb. 173, 710
N.W.2d 609 (2006).

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Respondents to submit alternative articles in this matter do
not remove their responsibility to submit the petition charter
amendments for a vote.
Peremptory Writ Should Issue
Based on our analysis above, we determine that the Attorney
General has clearly and conclusively shown that (1) the
Attorney General has a clear right to the relief sought, (2)
there is a corresponding clear duty existing on the part of
Respondents to perform the act, and (3) there is no other plain
and adequate remedy in the course of the law. Because the
Attorney General has made the required showing, a peremptory
writ of mandamus should issue.
CONCLUSION
Neb. Const. art. XI, § 4, commands Respondents to submit
proposed charter amendments “at the next general . . . election
not held within thirty days after” a petition by the required
number of qualified electors is filed. Because qualifying peti-
tions were filed, Respondents were obligated to submit the pro-
posed amendments in conformity with this constitutional man-
date. Because “the next general . . . election not held within
thirty days after” the petitions were filed is the November 2026
statewide general election, Respondents have a ministerial duty
to submit the amendments at that election.
We therefore issue a peremptory writ of mandamus direct-
ing Respondents to submit the proposed charter amendments
to a vote of the qualified electors at the November 3, 2026,
election. Nothing in this opinion should be read to impair any
constitutional right to submit “any alternative article or sec-
tion” under Neb. Const. art. XI, § 4.
Peremptory writ of mandamus issued.
Funke, C.J., not participating.
Stacy, J., dissenting.
Today, the majority issues a peremptory writ of mandamus
based on an interpretation of article XI, § 4, of the Nebraska

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Constitution that, in my opinion, is not supported by the con-
stitutional text and is contrary to the Lincoln City Charter. I
respectfully dissent.
Since its adoption in 1912, article XI, § 4, has prescribed
the only process by which city charters can be amended once
adopted. 1 It states that when a petition proposing a charter
amendment is filed by a sufficient number of qualified city
electors, the petition must be submitted “to a vote of the
qualified electors at the next general or special election not
held within thirty days after such petition is filed.” 2
In this mandamus action, the Nebraska Attorney General
and the Lincoln City Council disagree on the meaning of
“next general or special election” as that phrase is used in
article XI, § 4. Although this court has construed similar
language in statutes, 3 we have not, until today, construed the
constitutional text.
The city council argues the text of article XI, § 4, is refer-
ring to the next city general or special election. Based on that
construction, the city council states that it intends to submit
three recently filed charter amendment petitions to the city
electors at the May 2027 city general election.
1 See, generally, 2A Eugene McQuillin, The Law of Municipal Corporations
§ 9:27 at 341-42 (3d ed. 2017) (explaining that “[a] mode of direct
amendment prescribed by the constitution is exclusive and constitutes the
only method by which changes may be made directly by the electors. That
is, a charter adopted by virtue of the constitution can be amended only in
the way prescribed in the constitution, which is controlling as against any
conflicting statutory enactment”).
2 Neb. Const. art. XI, § 4.
3 See, Allen v. Tobin, 155 Neb. 212, 221, 51 N.W.2d 338, 343 (1952)
(concluding language in state statute that required city petitions to be
signed by “20 percent of the votes cast at the last general election” meant
“the last general municipal election”); State v. Schroeder, 79 Neb. 759,
113 N.W. 192 (1907) (construing phrase “next general election” in state
statute governing cities of first class to mean next general municipal
election).

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The Attorney General says that will be too late. He argues
the text of article XI, § 4, should be construed to mean “any
general election—city or state.” 4 And based on that construc-
tion, he contends the city council must submit the charter
amendment petitions to city electors at the November 2026
statewide general election. The Attorney General candidly
acknowledges there is a statutory barrier to doing so because
the deadline for cities to submit issues at the statewide general
election has already lapsed. 5 He therefore suggests that such
statute is unconstitutional as applied, but I do not read the
majority opinion to address that issue.
Today, the majority adopts the interpretation urged by the
Attorney General and holds that the phrase “next general. . .
election” as used in article XI, § 4, means the “next regular
election . . . recurring automatically as to time” and therefore
necessarily includes “both statewide general elections and city
general elections.” Applying this construction, the majority
concludes the city council will violate article XI, § 4, if it does
not submit the charter amendment petitions to city voters at
the next statewide general election in November 2026, and it
therefore issued a peremptory writ compelling the city council
to submit the petitions “to a vote of the qualified electors at the
next general election held on November 3, 2026.”
I would not issue the writ on the facts of this case. As I will
explain, I disagree with the majority’s interpretation of article
XI, § 4, and I think compelling the city council to submit a
strictly local matter to Lincoln voters at the statewide general
election in November will require the city council to ignore
provisions of its home rule charter and to violate the estab-
lished timeframes prescribed in the Election Act. But even
4 Brief for relator at 6.
5 See 2026 Neb. Laws, L.B. 1075 (operative July 18, 2026; amending Neb.
Rev. Stat. § 32-559(2) (Cum. Supp. 2024)) (setting September 1 deadline
for political subdivision to submit issue to voters at statewide general
election).

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if I could be persuaded that the majority’s interpretation of
article XI, § 4, is correct and should be applied prospectively, 6
I do not think mandamus relief is warranted on the specific
facts of this case.
MEANING OF “GENERAL ELECTION”
UNDER ARTICLE XI, § 4
Article XI, § 4, prescribes the method for submitting pro-
posed charter amendment petitions to city voters, but it does
no more. Beyond the requirement that the petition must be
submitted “at the next general or special election not held
within thirty days after such petition is filed,” article XI, § 4,
is silent as to what type of general or special election must be
held or when it must be scheduled.
To construe the meaning of the phrase “general or special
election,” the majority opinion starts by reviewing diction-
ary definitions. I think the analysis should instead start by
reviewing the general election provisions in the Lincoln City
Charter and considering the effect of those provisions under
our jurisprudence on home rule charters and related elec-
tion statutes.
Home Rule Charters Generally.
When construing state constitutional provisions regarding
city charters, we have adopted the principle that “the constitu-
tional provision granting all cities the right to form their char-
ters for their own government should be liberally construed
in order that the beneficent intention thereof may be fully
carried out.” 7 And for more than a century, it has been under-
stood that “‘[t]he purpose of the constitutional provision (as
6 See, e.g., AVG Partners I v. Genesis Health Clubs, 307 Neb. 47, 59, 948
N.W.2d 212, 227 (2020) (principles of fairness and equity can support
applying new rule prospectively if court decides “‘an issue of first
impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed’”).
7 Consumers Coal Co. v. City of Lincoln, 109 Neb. 51, 75, 189 N.W. 643,
652 (1922).

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to home rule charters) is to render cities independent of state
legislation as to all subjects which are of strictly municipal
concern; therefore, as to such matters general laws applicable
to cities yield to the charter.’” 8
We explained the effect of this principle in Schroeder v.
Zehrung, 9 where we said:
While a home rule charter adopted pursuant to the con-
stitutional provision may not contravene any provisions
of the Constitution or of any general statute enacted by
the [L]egislature, it is, in all other respects, binding and
controlling. A city may enact and put into its charter any
provisions for its government that it deems proper, so
long as they do not run contrary to the Constitution or to
any general statute.
Under this principle, a provision of a home rule charter takes
precedence over a conflicting state statute in instances of local
municipal concern. 10 But when the Legislature enacts a law
affecting municipal affairs that is of statewide concern, the
state law takes precedence over any municipal action taken
under the home rule charter. 11 Stated differently, as to all sub-
jects of strictly local municipal concern in a home rule charter,
the city operates free and independent of state legislation. 12
There is no sure test for distinguishing between matters of
strictly municipal concern and those of statewide concern, and
8 Eppley Hotels Co. v City of Lincoln, 133 Neb. 550, 556, 276 N.W. 196,
200 (1937) (quoting Consumers Coal Co., supra note 7).
9 Schroeder v. Zehrung, 108 Neb. 573, 576, 188 N.W. 237, 238 (1922).
10 Kubicek v. City of Lincoln, 265 Neb. 521, 658 N.W.2d 291 (2003); Hall
v. Cox Cable of Omaha, Inc., 212 Neb. 887, 327 N.W.2d 595 (1982);
Herman v. Lee, 210 Neb. 563, 316 N.W.2d 56 (1982).
11 Dwyer v. Omaha-Douglas Public Building Commission, 188 Neb. 30, 195
N.W.2d 236 (1972); Omaha Parking Authority v. City of Omaha, 163 Neb.
97, 77 N.W.2d 862 (1956).
12 See Niklaus v. Miller, 159 Neb. 301, 66 N.W.2d 824 (1954).

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courts must consider each case as it arises and draw the line
of demarcation. 13
Because the purpose of home rule charters is to render cit-
ies independent of state legislation on all subjects of strictly
municipal concern, and because the provisions of article XI,
§ 4, must be liberally construed to carry out that purpose, I
suggest we need look no further than Lincoln’s home rule
charter to determine the proper meaning of “next general . . .
election.”
Lincoln’s Home Rule Charter.
The record in this mandamus action includes a certified
copy of Lincoln’s home rule charter, which provides in rele-
vant part:
The general election in the city shall be held on the
first Tuesday in May in every odd-numbered year. At all
general, primary and special elections, the polls shall be
kept open between the hours of 8:00 a.m. and 8:00 p.m.
All elections shall be proclaimed by the mayor not less
than ten (10) or more than forty (40) days prior to the date
of holding such elections. Notice of elections, including
elections to authorize the issuance of bonds, shall be
published in the city not less than ten (10) days before the
date of election. No other notice shall be required. In all
other respects such elections shall be held and conducted,
the vote canvassed and the result declared as provided by
the general laws of the state. 14
By virtue of the power conferred in article XI, § 2, of
the Nebraska Constitution, the qualified electors in Lincoln
adopted a home rule charter that expressly states how and
when its city general elections must be held and provides that
13 Dwyer, supra note 11.
14 Lincoln City Charter, art. III, § 1.

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such elections “shall” be held in May of odd-numbered years.
Because the general city election schedule in Lincoln’s home
rule charter is a quintessential example of a strictly local
municipal concern, any general statutes governing municipal
general elections must yield to the charter. 15
Additionally, I see nothing in this home rule charter provi-
sion that contravenes any provision of the state constitution
or any state statute governing municipal elections. In fact, I
find it notable that Neb. Rev. Stat. § 32-556 (Reissue 2016)
expressly states:
All city elections in cities with home rule charters shall be
held in accordance with the home rule charter except as
otherwise provided in the Election Act and may be held
in conjunction with the statewide primary or general elec-
tion. If the home rule charter is silent as to any subject
covered by the act, the act shall apply.
(Emphasis supplied.)
It seems to me that whether this issue is considered under
our established jurisprudence governing home rule charters or
under current state statute, the answer is the same—Lincoln’s
next general election must be held in accordance with its home
rule charter. So, for purposes of article XI, § 4, the “next gen-
eral . . . election” will be in May 2027.
Because the city council has no clear legal duty under
either Lincoln’s home rule charter or current Nebraska stat-
ute to submit the charter amendment petitions to city voters
any sooner than May 2027, it should not be compelled to do
so. And though the city council has discretion to hold a city
general election in conjunction with the statewide general
election, 16 mandamus will not lie to control a city’s decision
15 See, Eppley Hotels Co., supra note 8; Consumers Coal Co., supra note 7.
16 See § 32-556.

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of matters left by statute to the discretion of the govern-
ing body. 17
In this mandamus action, the Attorney General has the bur-
den to prove clearly and conclusively 18 that under article XI,
§ 4, the Lincoln City Council is legally obligated to place the
charter amendment petitions on the November 2026 statewide
general election ballot, rather than on the May 2027 city gen-
eral election ballot. In my opinion, that burden has not been
met and the peremptory writ should not have issued.
Writ Should Not Issue Even Under
Majority’s Interpretation.
Finally, even if I could be persuaded that the majority’s
interpretation of “next general . . . election” under article XI,
§ 4, is correct, I would still decline to issue the writ on the
facts of this case. It is a settled principle in our mandamus
jurisprudence that
the remedy of mandamus is not a writ of right and in
determining whether or not the writ should issue, the court
should consider the facts of the particular case, the nature
of the exigency which calls for the exercise of the court’s
discretion, the consequences of the granting of the writ,
and the nature and extent of the wrong which would result
from its refusal. Such a writ will be issued ordinarily only
to prevent injustice and not to promote it. 19
17 State ex rel. Evans v. Brown, 152 Neb. 612, 614, 41 N.W.2d 862, 863
(1950) (holding mandamus will not lie to compel city to hold special
election on municipal ordinance referendum because operative statute
gave city discretion to submit matter at “‘next municipal election held not
less than thirty days after filing of the petition’” or at a “‘special election
for that purpose’”).
18 See, Burbank v. Evnen, 321 Neb. 65, 32 N.W.3d 612 (2026); State ex rel.
Lanman v. Board of Cty. Commissioners, 277 Neb. 492, 763 N.W.2d 392
(2009).
19 State ex rel. City of Omaha v. Lynch, 181 Neb. 810, 815, 151 N.W.2d 278,
282 (1967).

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Applying this principle, we have regularly declined to issue a
writ when the effect would be to compel the performance of an
unlawful act. 20 Relatedly, we have observed that “‘“[w]here the
issue of a writ would disturb official action, or create disorder
or confusion, it may be denied; and this is so even where the
petitioner has a clear legal right for which mandamus would be
an appropriate remedy.”’” 21 I think the facts of this case fall
squarely within these rules, and I suggest that mandamus is not
an appropriate remedy even under the majority’s interpretation
of article XI, § 4.
Under the rule announced by the majority today, if a petition
to amend a city’s home rule charter is filed with the city coun-
cil 31 days before a statewide general election, the city council
will have no choice but to submit the proposal to the city elec-
tors for their approval or rejection at that statewide general
election, even though the deadlines established in state statutes
for placing matters on the statewide general election ballot
have already lapsed and the election process mandated by the
city’s home rule charter cannot be completed. In other words,
to comply with article XI, § 4, as construed by the majority
today, the city council must not only ignore the process estab-
lished in its own home rule charter, but it must also defy the
statutory time limits imposed by the Election Act.
I see nothing in the verified petition that supports any
need for exigency or that suggests any specific harm would
20 See State ex rel. School Dist. v. Board of Equalization, 166 Neb. 785, 793,
90 N.W.2d 421, 427 (1958) (“[i]t would be anomalous indeed that a court
should be required to issue a writ of mandamus to compel action which
the court would be required to subsequently enjoin at the suit of an injured
party”). Accord, State ex rel. League of Nebraska Municipalities v. Loup
River P. P. Dist., 158 Neb. 160, 62 N.W.2d 682 (1954); State ex rel. Heil
v. Jakubowski, 151 Neb. 471, 38 N.W.2d 26 (1949); State, ex rel. Read, v.
Farmers Irrigation District, 116 Neb. 373, 217 N.W. 607 (1928); State v.
Cowles, 90 Neb. 839, 134 N.W. 959 (1912).
21 State ex rel. School Dist., supra note 20, 166 Neb. at 794, 90 N.W.2d at
427 (quoting State, ex rel. Long, v. Barstler, 122 Neb. 167, 240 N.W. 273
(1931)).

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result if the peremptory writ were not granted and the charter
amendment petitions were instead submitted to city voters at
the next city general election in May 2027. But even assum-
ing some harm could be shown from such a delay, I am not
persuaded it would outweigh the consequences of granting
the peremptory writ in this case, and the disorder and confu-
sion it is likely to cause to election officials and electors.
CONCLUSION
For all these reasons, I would deny the writ and dismiss this
action.
Pirtle, Judge, joins.