Tami Grimes v. Board of Education of the Township of Hillside, Union County, 1/10/25 (#6-25)

6-25
OAL Dkt. No. 05678-23
Agency Dkt. No. 153-6/23
New Jersey Commissioner of Education
Final Decision
Tami Grimes,
Petitioner,
v.
Board of Education of the Township of Hillside,
Union County,
Respondent.
The record of this matter, the Initial Decision of the Office of Administrative Law (OAL),
and the exceptions filed by the petitioner, Tami Grimes, pursuant to N.J.A.C. 1:1-18.4, have been
reviewed and considered. 	The respondent, Hillside Board of Education (Board), did not file
exceptions or a reply to the petitioner’s exceptions.
Petitioner alleges that the Board improperly cut her compensation and failed to bank her
sick time. 	Petitioner is a 10-month employee who has been employed by the Board since
September 1, 2005. The Collective Bargaining Agreement between the Board and the Hillside
Education Association provides a 10-month employee, hired by September 1, with 10 sick days
annually that carryover year-to-year if unused. If an employee takes more sick days than she has
accumulated, the employee’s pay is docked to compensate for the additional time. On August
18, 2021, petitioner underwent a meniscus repair surgery and thereafter utilized sick time.
Petitioner asserts that she was not paid between October 2021 and December 31, 2021, while

2
on authorized sick leave, despite having accumulated sick time. Additionally, petitioner alleges
that she was docked “absence pay” for her absences on February 22, 2023, and March 10, 2023.
At the OAL hearing, petitioner testified on her own behalf and called Dana Veal (Veal),
the former secretary for the principal at Walter O. Krumbiegel Middle School, as a witness. The
Board’s payroll manager and benefits administrator, Evelyn Stanley (Stanley), and the Board’s
confidential secretary for human resources and labor relations, Dana LeBoeuf (LeBoeuf), testified
on behalf of the Board. Stanley and LeBoeuf testified that employees can view their absence
records through the Board’s absence management tracking system called Frontline, and through
the payroll portal. The portal is maintained by Computer Solutions Inc. (CSI), the District’s record-
keeping system for attendance, accounting, and payroll since 2004. Approximately every week,
LeBeouf exports data, including attendance data, from Frontline into CSI. 	At the hearing, the
Board provided a copy of petitioner’s attendance records from CSI for school years 2005-2006
through 2023-2024 (Exhibit R-1).
Veal testified that she kept paper records of employees’ sick time in a document she
referred to as a Certified Staff Report. 	LeBoeuf heard Veal’s testimony and testified that the
Certified Staff Report does not concern absenteeism. Instead, the report is a listing of all staff
members, their certification codes, and job codes. The report aligns teachers with their job codes
to ensure that they are teaching in the correct area.
The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found that a survey of the totality of evidence cast
substantial doubt on petitioner’s version of events and that Veal’s testimony regarding the
contents of the Certified Staff report was overborne by testimony from LeBoeuf. The ALJ found
that the Board’s witnesses were credible and presented consistent and persuasive testimony

3
which was supported by other offered evidence. 	In doing so, the ALJ rejected petitioner’s
arguments that the Board’s testimony and documents regarding petitioner’s sick time should be
disregarded as inadmissible hearsay. 	Ultimately, the ALJ concluded that petitioner had not
sustained her burden of establishing, by a preponderance of the credible evidence, that she is
entitled to more sick leave than indicated in the Board’s records. The ALJ also concluded that
petitioner did not establish that the Board wrongly failed to pay a portion of her 2021 leave of
absence and improperly docked her for “absence pay.”
In her exceptions, petitioner reiterates arguments that were considered and rejected by
the ALJ, namely that the Board’s witnesses have no personal knowledge of the sick time
petitioner took and that the hearsay evidence relied upon by the ALJ was not corroborated by
legally competent evidence in the record, and therefore does not satisfy the residuum rule.
N.J.A.C. 1:1-15.5(b). Petitioner also takes exception to the ALJ’s finding that no credible evidence
undermines the trustworthiness of Exhibit R-1. In addition, petitioner contends that none of the
Board’s documents were proffered as self-authenticating and therefore cannot “speak for
themselves” as a matter of law. Lastly, petitioner argues that several of the Board’s exhibits were
introduced as exhibits which were created as part of its calculation as to the time owed
petitioner.
Upon review, the Commissioner concurs with the ALJ – for the reasons stated in the Initial
Decision – that petitioner did not sustain her burden of establishing, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that she is entitled to accumulated sick leave beyond the days reflected in the Board’s
records. 	The Commissioner further concurs with the ALJ that petitioner failed to show, by a

4
preponderance of credible evidence, that the Board improperly failed to pay some of her 2021
sick leave and improperly docked her for absence pay.
The Commissioner does not find petitioner’s exceptions to be persuasive.1 	Petitioner
argues that the Board cannot accomplish its burden of proof simply by introducing hearsay
evidence. However, as the ALJ correctly concluded, the burden of proof in the instant matter
rests with petitioner. She did not meet her burden. Petitioner provided no documentation to
support the number of sick days she claims she accumulated or is owed, nor did she provide
documentation challenging the information contained in Exhibit R-1. Petitioner did not produce
any records or documentation indicating flaws in the CSI system. 	She submitted no credible
documentation or witness testimony supporting her belief that a person within the District
modified her number of accumulated sick days. Petitioner testified that she did not know the
number of sick days she took between 2005 and the day of the hearing, and she could only
provide an estimate of sick days she took each year. Notably, petitioner testified that she had
not checked how many sick days she had prior to her surgery, and that nothing prevented her
from examining her own records. 	Moreover, the Commissioner concurs with the ALJ’s
determination that Exhibit R-1 qualifies as admissible hearsay under the exception for records of
regularly conducted activity. N.J.R.E. 803(c)(6).
Petitioner takes exception to the ALJ’s finding that no credible evidence undermines the
trustworthiness of Exhibit R-1, arguing that the ALJ disregarded Veal’s testimony that emails and
a paper file exist that contradict the data in Exhibit R-1. The Commissioner notes that the ALJ
1 Petitioner’s inclusion of the Board’s response to Request for Admissions and the Board’s response to
discovery demands is improper per N.J.A.C. 1:1-18.4(c). Therefore, these documents were not considered.

5
had the opportunity to assess the credibility of the various witnesses who appeared before her
and make findings of fact based upon their testimony. In this regard, the clear and unequivocal
standard governing the Commissioner’s review is:
The agency head may not reject or modify any findings of fact as to issues of
credibility of lay witness testimony unless it is first determined from a review of
the record that the findings are arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable or are not
supported by sufficient, competent, and credible evidence in the record. N.J.S.A.
52:14B-10(c).
The Commissioner finds no basis in the record to disturb the ALJ’s credibility assessment
regarding Veal’s testimony about the Certified Staff Report. The ALJ did not demonstrate bias
against Veal, and Grimes admitted under oath that she never saw the Certified Staff Report.
Instead, the ALJ found LeBoeuf’s testimony to be more credible and properly placed more weight
on that evidence.
Accordingly, the Initial Decision is adopted as the final decision in this matter, and the
petition of appeal is hereby dismissed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.2
ACTING COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION
Date of Decision: 	January 10, 2025
Date of Mailing: 	January 13, 2025
2 This decision may be appealed to the Appellate Division of the Superior Court pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:6-
9.1. Under N.J.Ct.R. 2:4-1(b), a notice of appeal must be filed with the Appellate Division within 45 days
from the date of mailing of this decision.

New Jersey is an Equal Opportunity Employer
State of New Jersey
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
INITIAL DECISION
OAL DKT. NO. EDU 05678-23
AGENCY DKT. NO. 153-6/23
TAMI GRIMES,
Petitioner,
v.
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE
TOWNSHIP OF HILLSIDE,
UNION COUNTY,
Respondent.
__________________________
Juan C. Fernandez, Esq, for petitioner (Fernandez Garcia, attorneys)
Ray Hamlin, Esq., for respondent (Hunt, Hamlin & Ridley, attorneys)
Record Closed: July 19, 2024 	Decided: October 16, 2024
BEFORE MARGARET M. MONACO, ALJ:
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Petitioner Tami Grimes (Grimes) challenges action by respondent Board of
Education of the Township of Hillside (the Board or the District) regarding her sick time
and the reduction of her compensation for “absence pay.”

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 05678-23
2
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On June 1, 2023, Grimes filed a Verified Petition of Appeal with the Commissioner
of Education contesting the Board’s action regarding her sick time and “absence pay.”1
Grimes alleges that the Board improperly and in bad faith cut her compensation and failed
to bank her sick time. Specifically, Grimes asserts that she was not paid between October
2021 through December 31, 2021, when she was on authorized sick leave even though
she had accumulated sick time, and she was also docked for “absence pay” relating to
her absences from work on February 22 and March 10, 2023. 	On June 26, 2023, the
Board filed an Answer to Petition, and the Department of Education transmitted the matter
to the Office of Administrative Law for determination as a contested case. 	The hearing
was held on February 21 and 22, 2024, after which the record remained open pending
the receipt of transcripts of the hearing and post hearing submissions. 	The parties
submitted briefs and reply briefs in support of their respective positions and the record
closed upon receipt of the last submission.
FACTUAL DISCUSSION
At the hearing, the Board offered testimony by Evelyn Stanley and Dana LeBoeuf.
Grimes testified on her own behalf and presented testimony by Donna Veal.
Based upon a review of the testimony and the documentary evidence presented
and having had the opportunity to observe the demeanor and assess the credibility of the
witnesses who testified, I FIND the following pertinent FACTS and accept as FACT the
testimony set forth below.
Grimes has been employed as a teacher in the District since September 1, 2005.
She is currently assigned to the Hillside Innovation Academy and was previously
assigned to the Walter O. Krumbiegel Middle School.
1 Although Grimes alleged other claims in her Verified Petition of Appeal relating to longevity pay and the
Board’s alleged inaction regarding her grievance, the evidence offered at the hearing focused on Grimes’s
sick days and absence pay related claims.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 05678-23
3
Evelyn Stanley (Stanley) has been employed by the Board for approximately
nineteen years as its payroll manager and benefits administrator.
Dana LeBoeuf (LeBoeuf) has been employed by the Board for twenty-three years
and has served in her present role as a confidential secretary for human resources and
labor relations for approximately twenty-two years. As a confidential secretary for human
resources and labor relations, LeBoeuf is responsible for attendance, including verifying
days that are requested via paper and recording leaves of absence. 	She assumed the
responsibility for attendance in October 2021, after another confidential secretary, Maria
Cruz, passed away.
Grimes is a ten-month employee. A ten-month employee who is employed as of
September 1 receives ten sick days each year. Sick days carryover from year to year. If
an 	employee 	exceeds 	the 	employee’s 	allotted 	and 	accumulated 	sick 	days, 	the
employee’s salary is docked for the sick time taken. A sick leave bank is made available
to employees. In 2021, an employee had to donate a sick day to become a member of
the sick leave bank. (See P-6.) A member of the sick leave bank who exhausted his/her
accumulated sick time could apply to the sick bank committee for donated time. Grimes
was not a member of, or donor to, the sick leave bank.2
The District provides a cash incentive for perfect attendance. If an employee has
not taken any sick or personal days during the school year, the employee would be
compensated based on the number of years that the employee obtained perfect
attendance. Grimes does not assert, and no evidence supports, that she achieved perfect
attendance in any given year.
The District maintains a computerized system to track an employee’s time off from
work, including sick days. The District’s absence management tracking system, formerly
known as AESOP, is part of the Frontline attendance system. Employees are responsible
for inputting his/her absence into Frontline. 	The staff member would log into Frontline
before 6:30 a.m. on the date of the absence and input his/her absence, along with the
2 Although the collective bargaining agreement dated July 1, 2021 through June 30, 2024 changed the
policy regarding the sick leave bank, that agreement was not ratified until 2022.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 05678-23
4
type of time taken (e.g., sick day, personal day). If the employee misses the cut-off time,
the employee would call the school secretary, who has access into Frontline, and advise
of the day being taken and the type of day taken. When a staff member submits a request
for an absence via paper, LeBoeuf would verify that the employee has entered that day
into Frontline. LeBoeuf explained that paper requests are not used for sick days but for
days that require additional documentation such as a jury duty day. On an approximate
weekly basis, LeBoeuf exports the attendance information from Frontline into the District’s
software system, Computer Solutions, Inc. (CSI). 	CSI is the District’s record keeping
system for attendance, payroll, and accounting. 	Employees cannot access the CSI
system.
An employee can access Frontline and view the number of accumulated days that
the employee has available, including sick time. Employees can also obtain information
regarding their accumulated sick days by accessing the District’s payroll portal. Prior to
October 2021, Ms. Cruz informed all employees on a yearly basis of their ability to review
information related to their accumulated leave. 	Specifically, Ms. Cruz’s annual letter
advised the staff that their October paystub included an attendance summary, and the
employee could also access their days through the payroll portal. (See R-2.)3 The letter
further advised that employees should check with their school secretary should there be
any discrepancies and contact Ms. Cruz if there is still a concern. 	The employees’
October paystub includes a summary of days used and remaining, including sick time.
(See P-4.)
Grimes had meniscus repair surgery on August 18, 2021, and she took sick time
after that surgery. On October 5, 2021, Grimes sent an e-mail to LeBoeuf advising that
her doctor had left her return date open. (R-3.) In response, LeBoeuf informed Grimes,
“[y]ou currently have 15 sick days left,” and LeBoeuf inquired, “[d]o you want to continue
using them?” (Ibid.) In an e-mail sent on October 5, 2021, Grimes stated, “Yes! Please
use the 15 days I have left.” (Ibid.)
3 	Prior to the District having its payroll portal, Ms. Cruz’s letter included the number of days that the
employee had available.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 05678-23
5
In December 2021, Grimes sent e-mails to Stanley and LeBoeuf requesting a
printout of her time/days. (P-2.) On February 16, 2022, Grimes sent an e-mail to Stanley
thanking her for the printout and indicating that she needed a printout from 2005 to
present. 	(P-2.) 	Grimes was later provided with the requested information, which
consisted of yearly attendance records from CSI. (P-5; see R-1.)
At the hearing, the Board offered a copy of Grimes’s attendance records from CSI
for the 2005–2006 through the 2023–2024 school years, which Stanley had printed out.
(R-1.) 	As part of her duties and responsibilities, Stanley reviews the information
contained in R-1 for payroll purposes. 	The printout includes monthly calendars, along
with a summary for each school year indicating time taken, time remaining, time allowed,
and time carried over for different types of days (e.g., sick, personal, school business,
family illness). 	Regarding Grimes’s sick time for the school years (SY) 2005–2006
through 2023–2024, R-1 reflects the following:
.
2005–2006 SY: Grimes received 10 days, used 8 days, and
had 2 days remaining.
2006–2007 SY: Grimes received 10 days, had a carryover of
2 days, used 10 days, and had 2 days remaining.
2007–2008 SY: Grimes received 10 days, had a carryover of
2 days, used 9 days, and had 3 days remaining.
2008–2009 SY: Grimes received 10 days, had a carryover of
3 days, used 4 days, and had 9 days remaining.
2009–2010 SY: Grimes received 10 days, had a carryover of
9 days, used 6 days, and had 13 days remaining.
2010–2011 SY: Grimes received 10 days, had a carryover of
13 days, used 9 days, and had 14 days remaining.
2011–2012 SY: Grimes received 10 days, had a carryover of
14 days, used 3 days, and had 21 days remaining.
2012–2013 SY: Grimes received 10 days, had a carryover of
21 days, used 7 days, and had 24 days remaining.
2013–2014 SY: Grimes received 10 days, had a carryover of
24 days, used 10 days, and had 24 days remaining.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 05678-23
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2014–2015 SY: Grimes received 10 days, had a carryover of
24 days, used 11 days, and had 23 days remaining.
2015–2016 SY: Grimes received 10 days, had a carryover of
23 days, used 7 days, and had 26 days remaining.
2016–2017 SY: Grimes received 10 days, had a carryover of
26 days, used 5.5 days, and had 30.5 days remaining.
2017–2018 SY: Grimes received 10 days, had a carryover of
30.5 days, used 15 days, and had 25.5 days remaining.
2018–2019 SY: Grimes received 10 days, had a carryover of
25.5 days, used 15 days, and had 20.5 days remaining.
2019–2020 SY: Grimes received 10 days, had a carryover of
20.5 days, used 4.5 days, and had 26 days remaining.
2020–2021 SY: Grimes received 10 days, had a carryover of
26 days, used 12 days, and had 24 days remaining.
2021–2022 SY: Grimes received 10 days, had a carryover of
24 days, used 42.5 days, and had a negative 8.5 days
remaining.
2022–2023 SY: Grimes received 10 days, had a carryover of
a 	negative 	8.5 	days, 	used 	1.5 	days, 	and 	had 	0 	days
remaining.
2023–2024 SY: Grimes received 10 days, had carryover of 0
days, used 5.5 days, and had 4.5 days remaining.
LeBoeuf testified that the information in R-1 is information that is regularly kept by
the District, and the only place where attendance is stored is CSI and Frontline. 	The
information reflected in R-1 is the result of what the employee entered into Frontline,
which is then exported into CSI. 	LeBoeuf has not seen any written records of an
employee’s sick days of absence, and she is not aware of any location in the District
where an employee’s attendance records are stored other than the District’s software
system. 	LeBoeuf has never seen any records or documentation that differs from the
information in R-1 for Grimes. 	LeBoeuf explained that she could access Frontline and
click on the absence to ascertain who entered the day, and she can print a report from
Frontline. However, this can only be done for one year from the date of her inquiry.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 05678-23
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Similarly, Stanley described that attendance is stored in Frontline and CSI, and
she has never seen any paper attendance records for Grimes. To Stanley’s knowledge,
the District did not maintain attendance records through non-computer means (i.e., paper
records). 	Stanley was not aware of any paper attendance records maintained at the
schools.
LeBoeuf never received any communication from Grimes regarding the number of
sick days that she believed that she had versus the days contained in R-1. LeBoeuf did
not recall ever being alerted by Grimes to a discrepancy in the days contained in Frontline.
LeBoeuf, the Superintendent, and the Director of Human Resources have access to all
of the employees’ records. LeBoeuf believed that another individual (Ms. Melgar) might
also have access but did not believe that she could make changes to the system.
LeBoeuf has not received complaints from other employees claiming an entitlement to
more days than the days that appeared on the system except for one teacher who had
entered days that she did not take and had a printout from absence management
regarding what the carryover should have been. 	LeBoeuf was never advised by an
employee that the employee believed that the system was tampered with; she never
heard of any instance where an employee complained to her or anyone else in the office
about someone accessing their log-in information; and she has never seen or heard of
any complaints from a District employee regarding inaccurate information that was
entered in the system by someone else.
Stanley has not seen any documentation from Grimes regarding the number of
days that Grimes believes that she currently has available. 	She never had any
communications with Grimes where Grimes told her, “I have ‘X’ amount of days versus
what the [D]istrict says I have.” 	Stanley has not experienced any issues with other
employees saying their sick time is incorrect, and she was not aware of the District having
that problem.
LeBoeuf and Stanley explained that Subfinder was the system that the District
previously used to employ substitute teachers. When a teacher was out, the District used
Subfinder to enter those days, and that system would call a substitute to replace the

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 05678-23
8
teacher. 	Substitutes can now log into Frontline to ascertain whether a job is available.
The District started using CSI in 2004, and the District’s payroll system has not changed
since 2004. Regarding Frontline, LeBoeuf testified that the District had Frontline for
approximately seven years and then paused it for about two years and started it back up
maybe three years ago. Regarding the pause in Frontline, she testified, “So, Frontline is
. . . —it was absence management. When we were using it to utilize or secure substitute
teachers, that system had stopped and we went back to the old way of obtaining substitute
teachers. It had nothing to do with the attendance part.” Ms. Cruz, and not LeBoeuf, was
part of the implementation process when the District switched from Frontline to Subfinder,
and LeBoeuf was not part of the process in terms of integration when Frontline was
brought back approximately two years later.
In addition to the evidence that forms the foundation of the aforesaid findings of
fact, a summary of other pertinent testimony follows.
The Testimony
Donna Veal
Veal was employed as the principal’s secretary at the Walter O. Krumbiegel Middle
School from July 2009 until her retirement effective January 1, 2021. Veal described that
her duties entailed, among others, maintaining attendance records, including record
keeping relating to teachers’ attendance, and she worked closely with Ms. Cruz. When
she was first employed, all employees would go into the Subfinder system and input their
absences except for certain types of absences. 	Employees could input their sick time
and family sick time, and employees were responsible for inputting their time into the
system. 	A Request for Absence form needed to be completed and approved by the
principal for personal business and school business requests, and Veal would input that
time into the system after the principal signed off on the document. 	Veal testified that
only individuals with an administrative capability would be able to make changes to days
in the system unless the employee gave someone his/her log-in information. During her
employment, Veal never received any reports from Grimes or any other employee that it

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 05678-23
9
appeared that someone from the Central Office had added days that the employee did
not take.
According to Veal, she kept computer and paper records of teachers’ sick time.
She referred to a Certificated Staff Report, which she believed was to determine the
percentage of sick time utilized by certificated teaching staff each month. Veal described
that she had an Excel spreadsheet containing the names of all the teachers; she would
pull information from Subfinder or AESOP regarding absences; and she would record the
absences on the spreadsheet for the particular day of the month. At the end of the month,
Veal would add up the total number of sick days for every teacher and calculate the
monthly percentage for the building. She would send to Ms. Cruz in paper form the cover
sheet listing the percentage along with copies of the Excel spreadsheet for that month.
Ms. Cruz would initial it and forward a copy or the original with her initials back to Veal,
which Veal would file. 	Veal kept the documentation in a hanging folder labeled
“Certificated Staff Report” in the right-hand side of her desk. 	According to Veal, there
were eleven years of these attendance documents when she left employment, and Veal
would be able to state the number of sick days that she reported monthly to the Central
Office regarding Grimes if she had that documentation. Veal testified that she routinely
provided a record of absences in connection with a staff member’s evaluation. She also
would be called if a teacher missed the cut-off time for inputting his/her absence in the
system, and she sent out an e-mail to the entire staff by 8:00 a.m. every morning that
listed who was absent and the person covering that absence.
Veal recalled that Grimes used her personal and family illness days every year
between 2009 and 2020 because those days could not be carried over. When asked how
many sick days Veal recalled Grimes taking between 2009 and 2020, she testified, “I can’t
answer that, like I don’t have that kind of a memory to tell you in any given year, off the
top of my head, what she took as far as days,” and she could not give “an exact number
per year.” Veal also articulated her belief that “it would be no more than one or two actual
sick days in any calendar year,” except for one year when Grimes had the flu and there
“were consecutive days of absence[.]” Veal did not recall Grimes calling out sick except
for a couple times a year, and she did not recall Grimes ever taking ten sick days in a
year. Veal had never seen a report like R-1 during her employment. When shown R-1,

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 05678-23
10
Veal did not recall Grimes taking 9 sick days in 2010, 11 sick days in 2014, 15 sick days
in 2017 and 2018, and 12 or 16 sick days in 2020. Veal admitted that she did know how
many sick days Grimes took during any school year. 	She did not recall Grimes taking
double digit days except for the one year when she had the flu.
On cross-examination, Veal was unable to recall the specific number of teachers
at the school during her employment, and she had difficulty remembering the names of
individuals who held various positions along with the number of students at the school.
Veal acknowledged that there were a lot of absences at the school. She was unable to
state the number of absences in March 2015. 	Veal acknowledged that during her
employment she never had a conversation with Grimes about her accumulated time. Veal
admitted that she had no documentation to support her belief that Grimes did not take
that many sick days.
Tami Grimes4
Grimes testified that in September 2021, she reached out to LeBoeuf about her
FMLA status. According to Grimes, LeBoeuf “let me know that I had enough days to be
out, to be covered under sick days for the 15th of September, the 30th of September,
October 15th and I think I would be paid partial for the October 30th, . . . and . . . she said
I think I had thirty days, I don’t recall but it wasn’t enough days[.]” Grimes described that
she said, “Why? 	I didn’t realize I didn’t have that many days, I thought I had days. 	I
would’ve never scheduled a surgery had I known I didn’t have the days[.]” At that time,
Grimes asked, “do we still have the sick bank in the district to use,” and LeBoeuf advised,
“‘No,’ we didn’t have it at that time. 	It wasn’t available for [Grimes] to use at that time.”
Grimes indicated that she did not know until she heard the testimony that an employee
had to be a part of the sick bank to use it. 	Grimes later described that during the
September conversation when LeBoeuf informed her that she did not have enough sick
time for her illness, Grimes indicated that she “should have days,” she has “never taken
4 It is undisputed that events regarding Grimes’s surgery and later use of sick time occurred in 2021–2022.
On various occasions during her testimony, Grimes referred to 2020 rather than 2021. The summary of
her testimony will include the correct 2021 year.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 05678-23
11
off that many days, [and] if [she] didn’t have days [she] would never even had the surgery,”
and LeBoeuf stated that “she was only going by what was in the system[.]”
When asked whether she actually had sick days when she was not paid for the
sick days in 2021, Grimes testified, “I thought I did . . . [b]ecause I know that I come to
work every day and I know how many days that I use in a year.” Grimes acknowledged
that she elected to have surgery prior to checking how many sick days she had. When
asked 	whether 	she 	contacted 	LeBoeuf 	prior 	to 	her 	surgery 	to 	check 	how 	much
accumulated sick leave she had, Grimes testified, “I wouldn’t have had to contact Ms.
LeBoeuf, I would’ve contacted Ms. Cruz because she was still alive at the time and we
have the absent management system and I just knew that I had the days so I never
checked. 	No, that was my -- my negligence for not checking.” 	Grimes acknowledged
that she never had a discussion with Cruz about her sick time. Grimes admitted that she
did not check her sick time on the absence management system, and she did not look at
her yearly October statements that included the number of her accumulated days.
Grimes acknowledged that she did not have a discussion with anyone about her
accumulated sick time or lack thereof before she was not paid for part of the time that she
was out for her surgery. 	Grimes recalled receiving the letter from Ms. Cruz to all
employees regarding their accumulated leave at least once or twice prior to 2021. (R-2.)
Grimes admitted that nothing prevented her from checking her own records regarding her
accumulated leave, she never checked her records, and she never looked at the payroll
portal before “this case has come up[.]” 	According to Grimes, in her October e-mail
advising LeBoeuf to use her 15 days (R-3), she did not indicate that she had like 45 more
days “[b]ecause [LeBoeuf] had already told [her] that [she] didn’t have any days left.”
Grimes acknowledged that there is no writing contemporaneous with R-3 where she
disputed the number of sick days that she had.
Grimes also testified that she went into AESOP the same day that LeBoeuf
informed her that she did not have days and Grimes inquired about the sick bank. When
asked why she would send an inquiry in October about what days she had left if she went
on the system in September, Grimes testified, “so I’m misspeaking because I’m getting
confused” and then stated that she went on the system when LeBoeuf e-mailed her in
October about the 15 days she had left. Grimes later stated that she talked to LeBoeuf

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12
in September and October and went on the system in September and October. Grimes
admitted that she did not have any document to prove that the District’s calendars and
records were inaccurate, to prove the amount of sick time that she had, or to disprove the
information contained in R-1.
Grimes testified that she did not know how many sick days she took between 2005
and her testimony. 	She did not believe that she took 8 sick days in 2005 because she
“just started working for the district[.]” Grimes testified that she did not take 10 sick days
in 2006, and she has “never taken ten sick days in [her] whole career.” Grimes indicated
that she did not think that she took 9 sick days in 2007; she “probably” took 4 sick days
in 2008; she was not sure if she took 6 sick days in 2009; she did not take 9 sick days in
2010; she “probably’ took 3 sick days in 2011; she could have taken 7 sick days in 2012;
she did not take 10 sick days in 2013 or 11 sick days in 2014; she “probably” took 7 sick
days in 2015; she was not sure if she took 5.5 sick days in 2016; she did not take 15 sick
days in 2017 or 15 sick days in 2018; she was not sure if she took 4.5 sick days in 2018
[sic]; she did not take 12 or 16 sick days in 2020; she could have taken 42.5 sick days in
2021 because of her surgery; she could have taken 1.5 sick days in 2022; and she was
not sure if she took 5.5 sick days in 2023.
Grimes testified that “[a]t the time of [her] surgery [she] should’ve at least had, at
the least, maybe like 102 days, give or take, 75” sick days “[b]ecause when I add up the
years that I’ve been employed in Hillside, and I get ten sick days a year, so you figure out
of those sick days I might’ve taken, sick days, maybe at the most four days one year, and
maybe the other years two or three days, so that’s what I’m -- I’m seeing 75 maybe at the
least.” According to Grimes, she took “maybe three to four, if that” sick days in 2007; she
took “maybe . . . two or three” sick days in 2012; and she had “never taken more until
recently [of] over two to three sick days a year.” 	In response to counsel’s question, “I
thought on direct you said no more than four” days a year, Grimes responded, “Okay, four
days a year.” 	She indicated that she had never taken 10 or 15 sick days in her career
except for her surgery. Grimes did not know the specific years that she used 4 sick days.
Regarding how many sick days Grimes took each year, Grimes acknowledged, “I don’t
know definite,” but she could say “definitively” that she never took 7 or 9 sick days.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 05678-23
13
Grimes testified, “My sole reason for challenging [the District’s information] is
because I believe that my days were altered prior to Ms. Cruz being deceased . . . . 	I
believe I had days and I believe the [D]istrict altered them.” 	Regarding whom in the
District would have altered her days, Grimes indicated, “I don’t know, whoever had access
to the CSI System.” 	Grimes articulated her belief that there was fraudulent conduct
related to her sick days. She testified:
I’ll take it back to Sub Finder, I believe that when I came to the district
in 2005 . . . and when they switched the systems from Sub Finder to
AESOP that, in fact, there were employees whose days were missing
and 	that 	weren’t 	accurate, 	and 	I 	probably 	was 	one 	of 	those
employees, but because I did not check I did not know, so that went
unchecked. And in the process of Ms. Cruz passing away, I think if
Ms. Cruz would’ve been living we wouldn’t be here in Court, this
would be a mute [sic] issue. 	But whoever took over for Ms. Cruz, I
guess they -- this is my speculation, covering or covering for the
district or doing what, but I believe that my days were put in for me
to be absent that were not in fact the days that I was absent. I believe
that, yes, it was some type of criminal activity, because it is criminal
when you mess with people’s personnel records, on the district’s
part. I do believe that.
Grimes claimed that she lost “about $24,000” in pay when she was out on leave
between October through December 31, 2021. Grimes offered P-9, which she stated was
from her absent management system that she accessed on March 27, 2022. P-9 lists the
following current balances: 15 sick days; 2 personal business days; 1 family illness days;
and minus 15 FMLA-Paid-Admin days. 	Grimes indicated that, although she was told in
2021 that she had no sick time, P-9 reflects that she had 15 sick days. 	Grimes agreed
that she cannot take paid FMLA unless she had sick days. Regarding what the negative
FMLA Paid-Admin means, Grimes testified, “It means that I guess I was paid for my FMLA
when I was out.” In or around April 15, 2023, Grimes was also docked for “absence pay”
relating to her absences from work on February 22 and March 10, 2023.
Dana LeBoeuf
LeBoeuf had not previously seen a document like P-9. 	She noted that it is from
Grimes’s mobile app and is geared toward the employee and not the employer.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 05678-23
14
LeBoeuf explained that R-1 reflects that Grimes had 34 sick days for the 2021–
2022 school year (i.e., 10 days received and a carryover of 24 days). Grimes utilized 34
paid FMLA days toward her leave of absence in 2021, which left her with zero days for
the remainder of the year. In March, April, May, and June 2022, sick days were entered
in the system beyond Grimes’s total allotment for the 2021–2022 school year. 	Grimes
used 8.5 extra sick days and was paid for them. This led to Grimes having a remaining
negative balance of 8.5 sick days as of June 30, 2022. The sick days would have been
entered in the system by Grimes or the school secretary if Grimes missed the cut-off time.
LeBoeuf explained that an employee can go in his/her portal and put in for paid sick days
when the employee does not have the days if the system is overridden. When the days
were entered beyond Grimes’s sick time allotment, an error message would have come
up indicating that she did not have the time, and if the “Okay” option was clicked the day
would be entered as a sick day. LeBoeuf indicated that the extra days should have been
docked, but Grimes was paid for them because the system was overridden. This resulted
in a negative carryover in the 2022–2023 school year. In September 2022, Grimes would
receive 10 new sick days. However, there was a negative carryover of 8.5 sick days from
the 2021–2022 school year, leaving Grimes with a balance of 1.5 sick days to utilize in
the 2022–2023 school year. Grimes would be able to see the negative 8.5 day carryover
and the 1.5 balance on the absence management system. R-1 reflects that Grimes was
docked for February 8 and March 30, 2023, because there were no days available for her
to use.
LeBoeuf heard Veal’s testimony. LeBoeuf testified that she did not know what Veal
did but the document she referenced is not a Certificated Staff Report. 	She explained
that a Certificated Staff Report is a report from the New Jersey Department of Education,
which basically is a listing of all staff members, their certification codes and their job
codes. The report aligns the teachers with their job codes to ensure that they are teaching
in the proper areas. The report does not have anything to do with attendance and does
not include sick time.

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15
LEGAL DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Grimes shoulders the burden of proving her sick time and absence pay claims by
a preponderance of the credible evidence. See In re Polk, 90 N.J. 550 (1982); Atkinson
v. Parsekian, 37 N.J. 143 (1962). This forum has the duty to decide in favor of the party
on whose side the weight of the evidence preponderates, and according to a reasonable
probability of truth. Jackson v. Del., Lackawanna & W. R.R. Co., 111 N.J.L. 487, 490 (E.
& A. 1933). Evidence is said to preponderate “if it establishes ‘the reasonable probability
of the fact.’” 	Jaeger v. Elizabethtown Consol. Gas Co., 124 N.J.L. 420, 423 (Sup. Ct.
1940) (citation omitted). 	The evidence must “be such as leading a reasonably cautious
mind to the given conclusion.” Bornstein v. Metro. Bottling Co., 26 N.J. 263, 275 (1958).
Precisely what is needed to satisfy this burden necessarily must be judged on a case-by-
case basis.
Grimes contends that she has satisfied her burden of proving the sick time owed
to her by the Board and that she had 107 sick days as of 2022. Grimes argues that the
Board’s witnesses were unable to verify that the entries in R-1 were accurate; the
witnesses had no personal knowledge of the sick time utilized by Grimes; the Board’s
documents and/or testimony regarding Grimes’s sick time is hearsay and should be
disregarded; and the testimony by Grimes and Veal is the only competent factual
evidence regarding the sick time Grimes utilized. Grimes further asserts that the Board
failed to review or produce other existing records to determine Grimes’s sick time (e.g.,
faculty evaluations, Excel spreadsheets sent to Ms. Cruz), which should result in an
adverse inference against the Board.5
In evaluating the evidence presented, it is necessary for me to assess the
credibility of the witnesses for purposes of making factual findings as to the disputed facts.
Credibility is the value that a finder of the facts gives to a witness’s testimony. It requires
an overall assessment of the witness’s story in light of its rationality or internal consistency
and the manner in which it “hangs together” with the other evidence. 	Carbo v. United
5 Grimes’s brief will not be considered to the extent that it relies on allegations in the Verified Petition of
Appeal that were not part of the hearing record and attaches documents that were not introduced at the
hearing.

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16
States, 314 F.2d 718, 749 (9th Cir. 1963). 	“Testimony to be believed must not only
proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but must be credible in itself,” in that “[i]t
must be such as the common experience and observation of mankind can approve as
probable in the circumstances.” 	In re Perrone, 5 N.J. 514, 522 (1950). 	A fact finder “is
free to weigh the evidence and to reject the testimony of a witness . . . when it is contrary
to circumstances given in evidence or contains inherent improbabilities or contradictions
which alone or in connection with other circumstances in evidence excite suspicion as to
its truth.” 	Id. at 521–22; see D’Amato by McPherson v. D’Amato, 305 N.J. Super. 109,
115 (App. Div. 1997). A trier of fact may also reject testimony as “inherently incredible”
and when “it is inconsistent with other testimony or with common experience” or
“overborne” by the testimony of other witnesses. Congleton v. Pura-Tex Stone Corp., 53
N.J. Super. 282, 287 (App. Div. 1958). Further, “‘[t]he interest, motive, bias, or prejudice
of a witness may affect his credibility and justify the [trier of fact], whose province it is to
pass upon the credibility of an interested witness, in disbelieving his testimony.’” State v.
Salimone, 19 N.J. Super. 600, 608 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 10 N.J. 316 (1952) (citation
omitted). The choice of rejecting the testimony of a witness, in whole or in part, rests with
the trier and finder of the facts and must simply be a reasonable one. Renan Realty Corp.
v. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs, 182 N.J. Super. 415, 421 (App. Div. 1981).
In judging the strength of the evidence and evaluating the credibility of the
witnesses, I found the Board’s witnesses to be forthright and credible witnesses. 	They
presented persuasive and substantially consistent testimony as to the pertinent facts,
which was corroborated by other offered evidence, and the strength and credibility of this
testimony was not, in my view, undermined by counsel’s thorough cross-examination.
The record is devoid of credible evidence suggesting that the witnesses harbored any
motive or bias to fabricate their versions of the relevant facts. Plainly, on balance, Grimes
has a greater stake in the outcome of this proceeding.
I am unpersuaded by Grimes’s argument that the Board’s testimony and/or
documents addressing her sick time should be disregarded because it is hearsay.
Hearsay evidence is admissible in administrative proceedings and “shall be accorded
whatever weight the judge deems appropriate taking into account the nature, character
and scope of the evidence, the circumstances of its creation and production, and,

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17
generally, its reliability.” 	N.J.A.C. 1:1-15.5(a). 	Notwithstanding the admissibility of
hearsay evidence, the “residuum rule” requires that “some legally competent evidence
must exist to support each ultimate finding of fact to an extent sufficient to provide
assurances of reliability and to avoid the fact or appearance of arbitrariness.” 	N.J.A.C.
1:1-15.5(b). See Weston v. State, 60 N.J. 36, 51 (1972).
In the within matter, Stanley printed R-1 from the Board’s CSI system, and the
report qualifies as admissible hearsay under the hearsay exception for records of
regularly conducted activity. See N.J.R.E. 803(c)(6). 	The sick time reflected in R-1
consists of absences that the employee (or the school secretary) entered into Frontline,
which LeBoeuf then exported into CSI. 	LeBoeuf testified that the information in R-1 is
information that is regularly kept by the District, and Stanley reviews the information
contained in R-1 for payroll purposes as part of her duties and responsibilities. Clearly,
the Board has a responsibility to maintain records of its employees’ absences. 	The
information in R-1 was made in the regular course of business, it was the regular practice
of 	the 	Board 	to 	make 	such 	records, 	and 	no 	credible 	evidence 	undermines 	the
trustworthiness of R-1, which was printed from the Board’s computerized record keeping
system used in part for payroll purposes.
Succinctly stated, I found Grimes’s testimony to be riddled with inconsistencies,
lacking internal consistency, and not “hanging together” with, and discredited and
overborne in significant respects by, other evidence in the record. A canvas of the totality
of the evidence casts substantial doubt on the accuracy, reliability, and believability of
Grimes’s version of the events. For example, divergent testimony was offered regarding
when Grimes went into the system to check her sick time and the maximum number of
sick days that Grimes took in a school year during her career. 	Grimes further testified
that at the time of her September 2021 conversation with LeBoeuf, “I didn’t realize I didn’t
have that many days, I thought I had days. I would’ve never scheduled a surgery had I
known I didn’t have the days[.]” 	In other words, Grimes was not herself aware of the
number of accumulated sick days that she then had, and Grimes admitted that she did
not check with the District’s personnel in advance of her surgery to ensure that she had
the needed accumulated leave. Beyond this, rather than challenging the information from
LeBoeuf that she did not have the requisite accumulated leave, Grimes instead inquired

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 05678-23
18
about the sick bank, which she was not entitled to benefit from. Grimes further admitted
that she never had a discussion with Cruz about her sick time; she did not check her sick
time on the absence management system; she did not look at her yearly October
statements that included the number of her accumulated days; and she never looked at
the payroll portal before “this case has come up[.]” 	She also admitted that nothing
prevented her from checking her own records regarding her accumulated leave, and she
did not possess any document to prove that the District’s calendars and records were
inaccurate, to prove the amount of sick time that she had, or to disprove the information
contained in R-1. 	And Grimes admitted that she did not know how many sick days she
took between 2005 and her testimony. 	Regarding how many sick days she took each
year, Grimes acknowledged that she only gave estimates, and she did not know
definitively how many days that she took each year.
Grimes offered no documentation in support of the number of sick days that she
claims she accumulated and is owed, and no documentation to refute the information in
the Board’s records. Although Grimes may genuinely believe that she should have more
accumulated sick days, the record is bereft of any documented evidence to corroborate
her belief. 	Indeed, Grimes’s testimony makes clear that she cannot herself state the
number of accumulated sick days that she possessed, and the number of sick days that
she used, during her years with the District. Equally lacking is any credible evidence to
support Grimes’s belief that some unknown person altered the amount of her sick days,
which I found to be inherently improbable and inconsistent with common experience.
I place no weight on Veal’s testimony regarding the number of sick days that she
believed Grimes used. I find it inherently improbable that, although Veal could not recall
various matters during her employment (e.g., number of teachers or students at the
school), she knew the number of sick days that one employee may or may not have taken
without the benefit of any documentation to support that belief. 	And Veal candidly
admitted that she did know how many sick days Grimes took during any school year. 	I
further found Veal’s testimony regarding the contents of the Certificated Staff Report,
which Grimes admitted that she never saw, to be overborne by that offered by LeBoeuf.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 05678-23
19
In sum, I CONCLUDE that Grimes failed to establish, by a preponderance of the
credible evidence, that she is entitled to accumulated sick leave beyond the amount
reflected in the Board’s records. I further CONCLUDE that Grimes failed to establish, by
a preponderance of the credible evidence, that the Board improperly failed to pay a
portion of her 2021 leave of absence and improperly docked her for “absence pay” in
2023.
ORDER
I ORDER that petitioner's Petition of Appeal be and hereby is DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE.
I 	hereby 	FILE 	this 	initial 	decision 	with 	the 	COMMISSIONER 	OF 	THE
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION for consideration.
This recommended decision may be adopted, modified, or rejected by the
COMMISSIONER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, who by law is authorized
to make a final decision in this matter. 	If the Commissioner of the Department of
Education does not adopt, modify, or reject this decision within forty-five days and unless
such time limit is otherwise extended, this recommended decision shall become a final
decision in accordance with N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 05678-23
20
Within thirteen days from the date on which this recommended decision was
mailed to the parties, any party may file written exceptions with the COMMISSIONER OF
THE 	DEPARTMENT 	OF 	EDUCATION. 	Exceptions 	may 	be 	filed 	by 	email 	to
ControversiesDisputesFilings@doe.nj.gov or by mail to Office of Controversies
and Disputes, 100 Riverview Plaza, 4th Floor, PO Box 500, Trenton, New Jersey
08625-0500. A copy of any exceptions must be sent to the judge and to the other parties.
October 16, 2024
DATE 	MARGARET M. MONACO, ALJ
Date Received at Agency:
Date Mailed to Parties:
jb

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21
APPENDIX
List of Witnesses
For Petitioner:
Donna Veal
Tami Grimes
For Respondent:
Evelyn Stanley
Dana LeBoeuf
List of Exhibits in Evidence
For Petitioner:
P-1 	No exhibit admitted
P-2 	E-mails and letter dated February 2, 2022
P-3 	Employee Benefits Contributions Invoice dated March 16, 2022
P-4 	2021 and 2022 W-2s and paycheck information for October 30, 2018 and April 6,
2023 pay dates
P-5 	E-mail dated February 17, 2022 and attachments
P-6 	Agreement between the Hillside Board of Education and the Hillside Education
Association (July 1, 2017 through June 30, 2020)
P-7 	Agreement between the Hillside Board of Education and the Hillside Education
Association (July 1, 2021 through June 30, 2024)
P-8 	Verified Petition of Appeal
P-9 	Printout from Absence Management
For Respondent:
R-1 	Employee Attendance records
R-2 	Letter from Maria Cruz to Staff
R-3 	E-mails dated October 5, 2021