JAMES F. TAYLOR V. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE TOWNSHIP OF HARDYSTON, SUSSEX COUNTY, 10/27/05, (#388-05)

#388-05 (OAL Decision http://lawlibrary.rutgers.edu/oal/html/initial/edu01049-05_1.html)
JAMES F. TAYLOR, 	:
PETITIONER, 	:
V. 	: 	COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE TOWNSHIP 	: 	DECISION
OF HARDYSTON, SUSSEX COUNTY,
:
RESPONDENT.
__________________________________________:
SYNOPSIS
Petitioner ─ a former principal terminated through a reduction in force (RIF) in 1996 ─ contends that
the terms of respondentís 2004 offer of reemployment were deliberately unacceptable so as to
circumvent petitionerís tenure and seniority rights; he seeks reinstatement to the position of principal
or appointment to the position of assistant superintendent, retroactive to July 1, 2004, with annual
salary and emoluments consistent with the statewide salary ranges for those positions. 	Respondent
filed a motion for summary decision, alleging that the petition was barred by the 90-day limitation of
N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.3(d).
The ALJ found, inter alia, that: 	the matter was ripe for summary decision as there are no genuine
issues of material fact; the letter dated July 15, 2004 provided adequate notice to petitioner that the
Board did not intend to alter the terms of the reemployment contract; 	the 90-day period therefore
began on July 15, 2004, and ended on October 13, 2004, making the petitionerís October 20, 2004
filing untimely; 	petitionerís claims to tenure and seniority rights for two other positions ñ assistant
superintendent for curriculum and instruction, and supervisor of curriculum and instruction ñ are also
time barred; and there are no compelling or exceptional circumstances to warrant relaxation or waiver
of the 90-day rule. 	The Initial Decision of the OAL granted the respondentís motion for summary
decision, and dismissed the petition.
The Commissioner adopts the ALJís decision, and dismisses the petition. 	In so determining, the
Commissioner notes her concurrence with the ALJís reasoning except for the ALJís reliance on
Drapczuk v. Board of Education of the Township of Winfield, Union County, as the Commissioner
rejected the Initial Decision in that matter, holding that the underlying issue was not whether a letter
constituted ìsufficient noticeî in accord with Kaprow, supra, but whether the Board did, in fact, make
a lawful determination of nonrenewal as required by N.J.S.A. 18A:17-20.1.
This synopsis is not part of the Commissionerís decision. It has been prepared for the convenience of the
reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Commissioner.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 1049-05
AGENCY DKT. NO. 366-10/04
JAMES F. TAYLOR, 	:
PETITIONER, 	:
V. 	: 	COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE TOWNSHIP 	: 	DECISION
OF HARDYSTON, SUSSEX COUNTY,
:
RESPONDENT.
__________________________________________:
The record of this matter and the Initial Decision of the Office of Administrative
Law have been reviewed. No exceptions were filed by the parties.
Upon 	a 	careful 	and 	independent 	review 	of 	the 	record 	in 	this 	matter, 	the
Commissioner concurs with the administrative law judgeís (ALJís) determination to grant the
Hardyston Township Board of Educationís (Boardís) motion for summary decision in that there
are no material facts in dispute and the Board is entitled to prevail as a matter of law. 	See
N.J.A.C. 1:1-12.5(b) and Contini, supra. 	In this regard, with respect to petitionerís claim to the
principalís position at Hardyston Middle School, the Commissioner agrees with the ALJís
conclusion that the Boardís letter of July 15, 2004 provided final and adequate notice to
petitioner that the Board did not intend to alter the terms of the re-employment contract offered
to him so as to trigger the 90-day rule for filing an appeal to the Commissioner set forth at
N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.3(d). 	Since the within petition was filed on October 20, 2004, after the 90-day
deadline, the Commissioner concurs that petitionerís appeal petition was untimely filed.
In so determining, however, the Commissioner notes that the ALJ in this matter
relied, in part, on the ALJís conclusion in the matter of Drapczuk v. Board of Education of the
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Township of Winfield, Union County, decided by the Commissioner May 20, 2005, in which the
ALJ concluded that Drapczukís petition was untimely because he did not file his appeal within
90 days of receipt of a letter from the president and vice-president informing him that the board
did not intend to renew his contract. 	However, the Commissioner in Drapczuk rejected the
ALJís conclusion, finding, instead, that petitionerís appeal was timely filed. The Commissioner
reasoned that, notwithstanding petitionerís receipt of an April 24, 2001 letter from the president
and vice-president of the board informing him that the board did not intend to renew his contract,
the earliest date that petitioner could have asserted a viable claim that his chief school
administratorís contract was renewed by operation of N.J.S.A. 18A:17-20.1 was July 1, 2001
because the board could have acted at any time prior to and including June 30, 2001 to correct
any alleged deficiencies in its notification or determination of nonrenewal. (The Commissioner
emphasized in that matter that the underlying issue was not whether the April 24 letter
constituted ìsufficient noticeî in accord with Kaprow, supra, but whether the board did, in fact,
make a lawful determination of nonrenewal as required by N.J.S.A. 18A:17-20.1.) 	Drapczuk,
slip op. at 2-3. 	The State Board affirmed the Commissionerís decision in Drapczuk on
October 19, 2005.
Notwithstanding the Commissionerís rejection of the ALJís misplaced reliance on
Drapczuk in this matter, the Commissioner agrees with the ALJís analysis and ultimate
conclusion that petitioner in this instance received adequate and final notice of the Boardís
determination that it did not intend to alter terms of the reemployment contract it was offering to
him in its letter dated July 15, 2004, and that such notice was consistent with the Supreme
Courtís determination in Kaprow, supra, which established that the 90-day period begins when a
petitioner learns of facts that would enable him to file a timely claim. Kaprow, supra, at 588-89.
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In that petitioner did not file his appeal within 90 days from the Boardís July 15, 2004
notification, the Commissioner finds that his appeal is time-barred.
Likewise, the Commissioner concurs that petitioner had actual knowledge of a
possible claim to the position of Assistant Superintendent for Curriculum and Instruction no later
than January 5, 2004, and to the position of Supervisor of Curriculum and Instruction ─ by his
own admission ─ ìno earlier than May 2004.î 	In that the petition in this matter was not filed
until October 20, 2004, petitioner clearly filed his claims for these positions after the 90-day
period set forth at N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.3(d).
Moreover, the Commissioner does not find that the factual circumstances set forth
in petitionerís pleadings constitute grounds for relaxation of the 90-day rule. 	No constitutional
issues are involved in petitionerís claims, nor does the petition present issues of significant
public interest beyond the parties. 	On the contrary, the Commissioner herein determines ─ as
did 	the 	Commissioner 	in 	LeMee v. 	Board 	of 	Education 	of 	the 	Village 	of 	Ridgewood,
1990 S.L.D. 663, 673 ─ that the greater public interest lies with the enforcement of the 90-day
rule and the dismissal of petitionerís appeal as untimely.
Accordingly, with the exception of the reliance on the Drapczuk decision noted
above, the Initial Decision of the ALJ is adopted for the reasons expressed therein.
IT IS SO ORDERED.*
ACTING COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION
Date of Decision: October 27, 2005
Date of Mailing: 	October 27, 2005
* This decision may be appealed to the State Board of Education pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:6-27 et seq. and
N.J.A.C. 6A:4-1.1 et seq.
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