Monika Vakulchik V. Board of Education of the Borough of Dunellen, Middlesex County, 9/16/21, (#194-21)

New Jersey Commissioner of Education
Final Decision
Monika Vakulchik,
Petitioner,
v.
Board of Education of the Borough of Dunellen,
Middlesex County,
Respondent.
Synopsis
Petitioner, a Speech Language Pathologist employed by the respondent Board from October 2016 through
the 2019-2020 school year, received a summative performance report completed on May 1, 2020 by the
school district’s Director of Special Services which included a statement recommending that petitioner
not be renewed for the 2020-2021 school year. Petitioner subsequently filed the within appeal, alleging
that the Board failed to provide her with proper notice pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:27-10 that her non-
tenured teaching staff position was recommended for non-renewal for the 2020-2021 school year. Based
on her claim that she did not receive proper statutory notice of termination, petitioner requested that she
be deemed renewed and issued a new employment contract. The parties filed cross motions for summary
decision.
The ALJ found, inter alia, that: there are no material facts at issue in this case, and the matter is ripe for
summary decision; despite the fact that the District failed to address why there was not strict compliance
with the statutory requirements of N.J.S.A. 18A:27-10, the Board substantially complied with the
statutory notice requirements for non-renewals; the petitioner was not prejudiced by receiving notice
through her summative performance report rather than from the superintendent, as she acknowledged
receiving the recommendation and asserted her rights to a statement of reasons and a Donaldson hearing;
further, the Board’s 4-3 vote to renew petitioner’s contract following the Donaldson hearing failed
because it did not constitute a majority vote of the full membership of the Board, which would consist of
five out of nine votes. Accordingly, the ALJ granted the Board’s motion for summary decision and
dismissed the petition.
Upon review, the Commissioner concurred with the ALJ that summary decision is appropriate but
disagreed with the ALJ that the Board substantially complied with the requirements of N.J.S.A. 18A:27-
10. In so doing, the Commissioner found, inter alia, that the doctrine of substantial compliance requires,
among other things, that the defaulting party provide a logical explanation for why there was not a strict
compliance with the statute; here, the Board failed to provide written notice from the superintendent that
petitioner’s employment would be terminated and offered no explanation as to why this occurred, in
violation of N.J.S.A. 18A:27-10. Therefore, by operation of N.J.S.A. 18A:27-11, petitioner’s employment
contract for 2020-2021 was renewed upon the same terms and conditions of her 2019-2020 contract.
Accordingly, the Initial Decision of the OAL was reversed; petitioner’s motion for summary decision
was granted ; and the Board was directed to reinstate petitioner to her position and to pay her the salary
that she was entitled to for the 2020-2021 school year, subject to mitigation. The petition was dismissed.
This synopsis is not part of the Commissioner’s decision. It has been prepared for the convenience of the reader. It
has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Commissioner.
194-21

OAL Dkt. No. EDU 09348-20
Agency Dkt. No. 159-7/20
New Jersey Commissioner of Education
Final Decision
Monika Vakulchik,
Petitioner,
v.
Board of Education of the Borough of
Dunellen, Middlesex County,
Respondent.
The record of this matter, the Initial Decision of the Office of Administrative Law
(OAL), the exceptions filed by petitioner pursuant to N.J.A.C. 1:1-18.4, and the Board’s reply
thereto, have been reviewed and considered.
Petitioner was employed by the Board as a Speech Language Pathologist
beginning on October 4, 2016. On May 1, 2020, her summative performance report, which had
been completed by the district’s Director of Special Services, included a statement that
recommended that her contract not be renewed. On May 4, 2020, petitioner emailed the
superintendent and the Board, indicating that she was notified of her non-reemployment for the
2020-2021 school year and requesting a written statement of reasons. On May 5, 2020, the
Board voted on the superintendent’s recommendations for renewals, and petitioner’s name was
not on the list of renewed staff. On May 18, 2020, petitioner wrote to the Board and
superintendent, indicating that – because she had not received written notice from the
superintendent of her non-renewal by May 15 – she was accepting the Board’s offer of
194-21

2
employment for the 2020-2021 school year. The superintendent responded and indicated that
petitioner was aware that her contract was not being renewed, and he subsequently provided a
statement of reasons. Petitioner then requested a Donaldson hearing,1 after which the Board
voted, with four members in favor of renewing her employment and three against; one member
abstained, and one seat was vacant. The Board informed petitioner that the action did not pass,
and petitioner appealed.
Following cross motions for summary decision, the ALJ found that the Board
substantially complied with the statutory notice requirements for non-renewals and that
petitioner was not prejudiced by receiving notice through her summative performance report
rather than from the superintendent, as she acknowledged receiving the recommendation and
asserted her rights to a statement of reasons and a Donaldson hearing. The ALJ further found
that the Board’s 4-3 vote to renew petitioner’s contract failed because it was not by a majority
vote of the full membership of the Board, which would consist of five out of nine votes.
Accordingly, the ALJ granted the Board’s motion for summary decision.
In her exceptions, petitioner argues that the Board cannot prevail based on the
doctrine of substantial compliance because it has failed to provide any explanation for its
noncompliance with the statutory requirements, and the fact that she was not prejudiced is due solely
to her own diligence in following up and is insufficient on its own to support a finding of substantial
compliance. Petitioner claims that it would be reasonable for her, or other teaching staff members in
similar circumstances, to interpret a recommendation in an evaluation as solely a recommendation
and not a notice of non-renewal, and that the loss of time to seek new employment that would result
from such an interpretation has a great possibility for prejudice. Petitioner also contends that the
1 A Donaldson hearing is the colloquial name for the informal appearance before the Board during which a teaching
staff member may discuss the statement of reasons for non-renewal and attempt to persuade the Board to renew the
staff member’s contract.

3
statute does not require a majority vote of the full membership of the Board following a Donaldson
hearing.
In reply, the Board argues that the purpose of the statutory scheme is to provide
teachers with timely notice that they are not going to be reemployed so that they may seek other
employment, and so they can seek a statement of reasons and a Donaldson hearing. The Board
contends that the reason it did not strictly comply with the written notice requirement was that
petitioner was clearly aware that her employment was not being renewed, as she wrote to the
superintendent stating as much when she requested a statement of reasons. According to the Board,
sending petitioner a letter informing her of something she already knew would be illogical. The
Board also notes that petitioner’s arguments regarding the voting requirements merely restate
arguments raised below and properly addressed and rejected by the ALJ.
Upon review, the Commissioner concurs with the ALJ that summary decision is
appropriate but disagrees with the ALJ that the Board substantially complied with the
requirements of N.J.S.A. 18A:27-10. The doctrine of substantial compliance requires, among
other things, that the defaulting party provide “a reasonable explanation why there was not a
strict compliance with the statute.” Bernstein v. Bd. of Trustees of Teachers’ Pension & Annuity
Fund, 151 N.J. Super. 71, 76-77 (App. Div. 1997). Here, the Board failed to provide any
explanation throughout the proceedings,2 until a conclusory assertion in its reply to petitioner’s
exceptions that it would be “illogical” to provide written notice to petitioner when she already
was apparently aware of the non-renewal. The Board is not permitted to introduce new evidence
in its reply to petitioner’s exceptions, and this statement is therefore inappropriate.3
2 As the ALJ noted, “the District has not addressed why there was not strict compliance with the statute.” Initial
Decision, page 12.
3 The statement does not even rise to the level of evidence, as it is unsupported by any documentation, testimony, or
certification or affidavit.

4
Moreover, even if the Board’s late explanation were to be accepted, the
Commissioner does not find the Board’s explanation to be reasonable. While the Board claims
that petitioner was on notice of her non-renewal prior to the statutory deadline, petitioner’s
characterization of the recommendation in her evaluation as a notice of non-renewal is not the
determining factor for whether that notice was sufficient. The requirements of a notice are
clearly set forth in N.J.S.A. 18A:27-10, and they include that the notice be “from the chief school
administrator” and indicate that “employment will not be offered.” A mere recommendation
from an individual other than the superintendent meets neither of these criteria, and it would not
be “illogical” for the Board to follow the evaluation with a formal notification that provided
definitive information and was compliant with the statute. Nor should petitioner’s diligence in
requesting a written statement of reasons and a Donaldson hearing be used to her detriment. In
enacting the notice statute and establishing renewal as the Board’s failure to comply with it, the
Legislature chose to place the burden of notification on the Board, not on teaching staff
members.
Another requirement of the substantial compliance doctrine is that the defending
party took a series of steps to comply with the statute. Bernstein, supra. The ALJ found that the
Board met this requirement because it provided petitioner with her summative report and held a
virtual meeting to discuss the report. But the requirement of the statute is written notice from the
superintendent, and these steps do not demonstrate any attempt to comply with the statute.
The cases cited by the ALJ and the Board to the contrary are distinguishable.
Both Nissman v. Bd. of Educ. of the Twp. of Long Beach Island, Ocean Cty., 272 N.J. Super. 373
(App. Div. 1994), and Jordan v. Bd. of Educ., 2017 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1865 (App. Div.
2017), address the question of what notice is sufficient to trigger the 90-day time limitation for a

5
non-renewed employee to file a petition of appeal. In both matters, the court notes that the test is
when the employee knew or should have known that she was not going to be offered a new
contract. Nissman, supra, at 379; Jordan, supra, at *6-7. Any reliance on this proposition to
support the Board’s position in this case is misplaced. The standard for determining whether
notice is sufficient to trigger the limitations period is distinct from notice sufficient to comply
with the Board’s statutory obligations. Contrary to a long history of cases about the filing
limitations period that discuss the “knew or should have known” standard – which was applied in
Nissman and Jordan because they were both about the limitations period – there is no
comparable case history, nor anything in the notice statute, that suggests that petitioner’s
knowledge is in any way relevant to whether the Board has met its burden of providing notice.
The Commissioner further notes that the facts of these two cases are
distinguishable, as Ms. Nissman received notice that complied with the version of N.J.S.A.
18A:27-10 that was in effect at the time, and the alleged technical defect in the notice provided
to Ms. Jordan was only that it was signed by the district’s director of human resources.
However, it was written on the superintendent’s letterhead, advised Ms. Jordan that at the
upcoming board of education meeting, the superintendent would recommend that the board not
renew her employment, and stated that her employment would terminate effective June 30. The
form and substance of this notice are significantly closer to the requirements of N.J.S.A. 18A:27-
10 than the “notice” petitioner received here, which was a short statement at the end of her
summative evaluation stating that she was recommended for non-renewal, signed by the
district’s Director of Special Services. Petitioner’s evaluation does not purport to be issued by
the superintendent. It does not indicate to petitioner what recommendation the superintendent
would make to the Board. It does not provide an end date for petitioner’s termination.

6
Accordingly, the Commissioner concludes that the Board is not entitled to the same finding of
compliance as in Jordan.
Because the Board failed to provide the required written notice from the
superintendent, by operation of N.J.S.A. 18A:27-11, petitioner’s employment contract for the
2020-2021 school year was renewed upon the same terms and conditions of petitioner’s 2019-
2020 contract, with any increases in salary as may be required by law or policies of the board of
education. 4
Accordingly, the Initial Decision of the OAL is reversed, and petitioner’s motion
for summary decision is granted. The Board is directed to reinstate petitioner to her position and
to pay to petitioner the salary to which she would have been entitled during the 2020-2021
school year, subject to mitigation from other earnings.
IT IS SO ORDERED.5
ACTING COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION
Date of Decision:
Date of Mailing:
4 Because the Commissioner has concluded that the contract was renewed by operation of N.J.S.A. 18A:27-11, it is
unnecessary to reach the issue of whether the Board’s vote following petitioner’s Donaldson hearing was effective.
5 This decision may be appealed to the Appellate Division of the Superior Court pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:6-9.1.
Under N.J.Ct.R. 2:4-1(b), a notice of appeal must be filed with the Appellate Division within 45 days from the date
of mailing of this decision.
September 16, 2021
September 16, 2021

New Jersey is an Equal Opportunity Employer
State of New Jersey
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
INITIAL DECISION
SUMMARY DECISION
OAL DKT. NO. EDU 09348-20
AGENCY DKT. NO. 159-7/20
MONIKA VAKULCHIK,
Petitioner,
v.
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE
BOROUGH OF DUNELLEN,
MIDDLESEX COUNTY,
Respondent.
_________________________________
Craig A. Long, Esquire, for petitioner (Zazzali, Fagella, Nowak, Kleinbaum &
Friedman, attorneys)
Marc H. Zitomer, Esquire, for respondent (Schenck, Price, Smith & King, LLP,
attorneys)
Record Closed: May 10, 2021 	Decided: June 22, 2021
BEFORE DEAN J. BUONO, ALJ:

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 09348-20
2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Petitioner 	Monika 	Vakulchik 	(“Vakulchik”) 	alleges 	that 	respondent 	Dunellen
Board of Education (the “Board”) failed to provide her with proper notice pursuant to
N.J.S.A. 	18A:27-10 	that 	her 	non-tenured 	teaching 	staff 	member 	position 	was
recommended for non-renewal for the ensuing school year. Accordingly, because
Vakulchik claims that she did not receive proper statutory notice, she asks that she be
deemed renewed and offered a new teaching contract. Vakulchik further argues that,
even if this court finds that she received sufficient notice of non-renewal, the Board
subsequently voted to reemploy Vakulchik by a vote of 4-3, with one abstention, and
one vacancy, on a nine-member board. Accordingly, Vakulchik argues that a plain
reading of N.J.S.A. 18A:27-11 requires the Board to reemploy her and issue a new
contract of employment. At issue is whether (1) Vakulchik’s summative performance
evaluation signed by Dunellen’s Director of Special Services constituted proper written
notice by the “chief school administrator” that Vakulchik’s employment would not be
offered for the following school year, and if so, whether (2) the Board’s vote of 4-3 to
reemploy 	Vakulchik 	was 	effective 	to 	reemploy 	Vakulchik, 	when 	there 	was 	one
abstention, and one vacancy on the nine-member board at the time of the vote.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Petitioner 	filed 	the 	instant 	petition 	with 	the 	New 	Jersey 	Commissioner 	of
Education, which was received on July 17, 2020,by the Division of Controversies and
Disputes, Department of Education (Department). 	The matter was transmitted as a
contested case on 	September 16, 2020, to the Office of Administrative Law (OAL).
After several telephone conferences the parties represented that the matter was
ripe for decision on a motion for summary decision. 	The parties filed motions and
cross-motions for summary decision. 	The parties did not request oral argument as the
written submissions were sufficient to dispose of the matter.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 09348-20
3
STIPULATIONS OF FACT
The parties agreed to certain facts that could be stipulated. As such I
FIND AS FACT the following:
l. 	Respondent Dunellen Board of Education ("Board") is a pre-K to 12
District located in Middlesex County, New Jersey.
2. 	Petitioner 	Monika 	Vakulchik 	(hereinafter 	“petitioner”) 	commenced
employment with respondent on or about October 4, 2016, in the
position 	of 	Speech 	Language 	Pathologist, 	and 	served 	in 	that
position until June 30, 2020.
3. 	On 	May 	I, 	2020, 	petitioner 	was 	given 	her 	2019-20 	Summative
Performance Report signed by Amanda Lamoglia, Director of Special
Services for Dunellen Schools. The overall score on said report was
3.333. (Exhibit A.)
4. 	The 	summative 	report 	concluded 	with 	the 	following 	statement,
“Recommended for Dismissal/Non-renewal. The teacher has failed
to make progress 	on 	a Corrective Action Plan, 	or 	the teacher
consistently 	performs 	below 	the 	established 	standards, 	or 	in a
manner that is inconsistent with the school's mission and goal.” Id.
5. 	On May I, 2020, petitioner submitted a response to the summative
evaluation report which is incorporated therein. Id.
6. 	On May 	1, 2020, petitioner 	participated 	in a virtual meeting over
Google Meet, in which she, the Director of Special Services and her
Principal, 	together 	with 	a 	union 	representative, 	discussed 	her
summative evaluation.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 09348-20
4
7. 	Petitioner signed the aforesaid Summative Performance report on
May 8, 2020. Id.
8. 	On May 4, 2020, petitioner emailed Mr. Mosley, Superintendent of
Schools, and copied the Board of Education. In that email she stated,
“On 05/01/2020, I was notified of non-reemployment for the 2020-2021
school year. I am requesting a written statement of reasons for non-
reemployment”. (Exhibit B).
9. 	On 	May 	5, 	2020, 	the 	Board 	voted 	on 	the 	Superintendent's
recommendations 	for 	staff 	renewals 	for 	the 	2020-21 	school 	year.
Petitioner's name was not on the list of staff which was renewed.
(Exhibit C).
10. 	Petitioner 	was 	not 	provided 	with 	written 	notification 	from 	the
Superintendent 	by 	May 	15, 	2020, 	that 	her 	contract 	was 	not 	being
renewed for the 2020-21 school year.
11. 	On 	May 	18, 	2020, 	petitioner 	wrote 	to 	the 	Board 	and 	copied 	the
Superintendent and stated, “Insofar as I have not received notice from
the chief school administrator in accordance with N.J.S.A. l8A:27-l0; 27-
11 that employment for the succeeding school year will not be offered, I
hereby accept your offer of employment.” (Exhibit D).
12. 	On May 18, 2020, the 	Superintendent emailed 	p etitioner 	and 	stated,
“You are well-aware that your contact was not renewed as evidenced by
your 	email 	to 	the 	Board 	on 	May 	4, 	2020 	where 	you 	stated, 	‘On
05/01/2020, 	I 	was 	notified 	of 	non-reemployment 	for 	the 	2020-2021
school year.’ This was well-before the May 15, 2020 date set forth in
the statute that you cited. You will receive my response to your request
for a statement of reasons for my decision shortly. However, to be clear,
you do not have a contract for the 2020-2021 school year and your name
did not appear on the May 7, 2020, Board of Education meeting agenda

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 09348-20
5
renewal motions. 	I trust that I have clarified any confusion on your part.”
(Exhibit E.)
13. 	On May 28, 2020, the Superintendent provided petitioner with a statement
of reasons for her non-renewal. (Exhibit F.)
14. 	Based 	upon 	the 	Superintendent's 	assertion 	that 	petitioner 	was 	not
renewed, 	she 	asserted 	rights 	pursuant 	to 	N.J.S.A. 	18A:27-3.2 	and
N.J.A.C. 	6A:32-4.6 	and 	requested 	an 	appearance 	before 	respondent
(“Donaldson hearing”), which took place at the June 15, 2020, Board
meeting.
15. 	At its meeting held on June 15, 2020, the Board, which, due to a vacancy,
consisted 	of eight members, voted four members in favor of renewing
petitioner's 	employment; 	three members 	opposed; 	and 	one member
abstaining.
16. 	On June 16, 2020, the Board informed petitioner in writing that “the
Board's action to reinstate you following your Donaldson hearing last
evening did not pass[,]” and that petitioner's employment would end on
June 30, 2020. (Exhibit G.)
17. 	Board Policy 3142 governs the non-renewal of teaching staff members.
(Exhibit H.)
18. 	Respondent acknowledges that petitioner has reserved her rights to
bring separate claims independently of, and unrelated to, the claims at
issue 	in 	this 	proceeding, 	including 	but 	not 	limited 	to 	retaliation,
wrongful termination, and discrimination. It is understood that petitioner
is not making the aforesaid claims in this matter. Respondent reserves
its rights to present evidence in those proceedings that petitioner's non-
renewal of employment was premised on legitimate non-discriminatory
business reasons.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 09348-20
6
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The following facts are derived from the parties’ respective submissions. 	Some
of the facts are repetitive from the Stipulations of Fact but are necessary for continuity of
the explanation of the case and as such, I FIND them to be the FACTS of the case:
The Board is a pre-K to 12 District located in Middlesex County, New Jersey.
Vakulchik commenced employment with the Board on or about October 4, 2016, in the
position of Speech Language Pathologist, and served in that position until June 30,
2020. On May 1, 2020, Vakulchik was given her 2019-20 Summative Performance
Report (the “Summative Report”) signed by Amanda Lamoglia (“Lamoglia”), Director of
Special Services for Dunellen Schools. The Summative Report reflected an overall
score 	of 	3.333 	and 	concluded 	with 	the 	following 	statement, 	“Recommended 	for
Dismissal/Non-renewal. The teacher has failed to make progress on a Corrective Action
Plan, or the teacher consistently performs below the established standards, or in a
manner that is inconsistent with the school's mission and goal.”
On May 1, 2020, Vakulchik submitted a response to the Summative Report and
participated in a virtual meeting over Google Meet, in which she, the Director of Special
Services 	and 	her 	Principal, 	together 	with 	a 	union 	representative, 	discussed 	her
Summative Report.
On May 4, 2020, Vakulchik emailed Mr. Mosley, Superintendent of Schools, and
copied the Board of Education. In that email she stated, “On 05/01/2020, I was notified
of 	non-reemployment 	for 	the 	2020-2021 	school 	year. 	I 	am 	requesting 	a 	written
statement of reasons for non-reemployment.” She signed the Summative Report on
May 8, 2020.
In 	the 	interim, 	on 	May 5, 	2020, 	the 	Board 	voted 	on 	the Superintendent's
recommendations for staff renewals for the 2020-2021 school year. 	Vakulchik’s name
was not on the list of staff which was renewed. 	However, she did not receive a

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 09348-20
7
separate written notification of her nonrenewal from the Superintendent by May 15,
2020.
On May 18, 2020, Vakulchik wrote to the Board and copied the Superintendent
and stated, “Insofar as I have not received notice from the chief school administrator in
accordance 	with 	[N.J.S.A. 	18A:27-10 	and 	18A:27-11] 	that 	employment 	for 	the
succeeding school year will not be offered, I hereby accept your offer of employment.”
On the same day, the Superintendent responded to Vakulchik by email and stated, "You
are well-aware that your contact was not renewed as evidenced by your email to the
Board on May 4, 2020 where you stated, ‘On 05/01/2020, I was notified of non-
reemployment for the 2020-2021 school year.’ This was well-before the May 15, 2020,
date set forth in the statute that you cited. You will receive my response to your request
for a statement of reasons for my decision shortly. However, to be clear, you do not
have a contract for the 2020-2021 school year and your name did not appear on the
May 7, 2020, Board of Education meeting agenda renewal motions. 	I trust that I have
clarified any confusion on your part.” On May 28, 2020, the Superintendent provided
Vakulchik with a statement of reasons for her non-renewal.
Based upon the Superintendent's assertion that Vakulchik was not renewed, she
asserted rights pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:27-3.2 and N.J.A.C. 6A:32-4.6 and requested
an appearance before the Board (“Donaldson hearing”) pursuant to Donaldson v. Board
of Educ. of North Wildwood, 65 N.J. 236, 240-41 (1974). Vakuchik’s Donaldson hearing
took place at the Board’s June 15, 2020, meeting. At the time of that meeting, due to a
vacancy, the Board consisted of only eight members. 	The vote regarding renewal of
Vakulchik’s 	employment, 	was 	four 	members 	in 	favor 	of 	renewal; 	three 	members
opposed to renewal; and one member abstaining.
On June 16, 2020, the Board informed Vakulchik in writing that “the Board's
action to reinstate you following your Donaldson hearing last evening did not pass[,]”
and that petitioner's employment would end on June 30, 2020.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 09348-20
8
LEGAL DISCUSSION
In the case at bar, both sides seek relief pursuant to N.J.A.C. 1:1-12.5, which
provides that summary decision should be rendered “if the papers and discovery which
have been filed, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue
as to any material fact challenged and that the moving party is entitled to prevail as a
matter of law.” 	The regulation mirrors R. 4:46-2(c), which provides that “[t]he judgment
or order sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment or order as a matter of law.” 	I FIND there is no issue of material
fact in dispute with regard to the foregoing matter and I CONCLUDE the matter is ripe
for summary decision.
Under the Uniform Administrative Procedure Rules, N.J.A.C. 1:1-1.1 to -21.6, “[a]
party may move for summary decision upon all or any of the substantive issues in a
contested case.” 	N.J.A.C. 1:1-12.5(a). 	Such motion “shall be served with briefs and
with or without supporting affidavits” and “[t]he decision sought may be rendered if the
papers and discovery which have been filed, together with the affidavits, if any, show
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and that the moving
party is entitled to prevail as a matter of law.” 	N.J.A.C. 1:1-12.5(b). 	When the motion
“is made and supported, an adverse party in order to prevail must by responding
affidavit set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue which can only be
determined in an evidentiary proceeding.” Id.
Determining whether a genuine issue with respect to a material fact exists
requires consideration of whether the competent evidential materials presented, when
viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, are sufficient to permit a
rational fact finder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of the non-moving
party. Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am. 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995).
I. 	The 	Board’s 	motion 	for 	summary 	decision 	should 	be 	granted
because 	the 	Board 	substantially 	complied 	with 	the 	notice

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 09348-20
9
requirements of N.J.S.A. 18A:27-10; although the Summative Report
was not signed by the Superintendent, it provided Vakulchik with
timely and adequate notice of non-renewal, and Vakulchik was not
prejudiced.
The Board’s motion for summary decision should be granted because there is no
genuine issue of material fact with respect to whether the Board provided Valkuchik with
timely, adequate notice that her contract would not be renewed for the 2020-2021
school year.
N.J.S.A. 18A:27-10 provides that [o]n or before May 15 in each year, each non-
tenured teaching staff member continuously employed by a board of education since
the preceding September 30 shall receive either:
a. 	A written offer of a contract for employment from the board
of education for the next succeeding year providing for at
least the same terms and conditions of employment but with
such increases in salary as may be required by law or
policies of the board of education, or
b. 	A written notice from the chief school administrator that
such employment will not be offered.”
[emphasis added.]
When interpreting a statute, “we begin with its plain language, which is the "best
indicator” of legislative intent.” State v. Rodriguez, 238 N.J. 105, 113 (2019). A statute's
plain language “must be construed ‘in context with related provisions so as to give
sense to the legislation as a whole.’” Id. (quoting Spade v. Select Comfort Corp., 232
N.J. 504, 515 (2018)). Unless the statutory language is “inconsistent with the manifest
intent of the legislature, or ‘another or different meaning is expressly indicated,’ we
ascribe to the Legislature's words and phrases ‘their generally accepted meaning,
according to the approved usage of the language.’” Finkelman v. Nat'l Football League,
236 N.J. 280, 289 (2019) (quoting N.J.S.A. 1:1-1).
Consequently, if the plain language “leads to a clear and unambiguous result,
then our interpretive process is over.” Johnson v. Roselle EZ Quick LLC, 226 N.J. 370,

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10
386 (2016) (quoting Richardson v. PFRS, 192 N.J. 189, 195 (2007)). However, “if there
is 	ambiguity 	in 	the 	statutory 	language 	that 	leads 	to 	more 	than 	one 	plausible
interpretation, we may turn to extrinsic evidence, ‘including legislative history, committee
reports, and contemporaneous construction.’” DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 492-
93, 874 (2005).
Here, 	N.J.S.A. 	18A:27-10(b) 	specifically 	requires 	that 	the 	“chief 	school
administrator” provide written notice, on or before May 15, to the non-tenured teaching
staff to inform them that employment will not be offered for the succeeding school year.
“Chief school administrator" is defined in N.J.A.C. as “the superintendent of schools or
the administrative principal if there is no superintendent.” N.J.A.C. 6A:10-1.2. Further,
the superintendent of schools has consistently been described as “the chief school
administrator for the district.” See e.g., Lenape Reg'l High Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v.
Lenape Dist. Support Staff Ass'n, 2010 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 304, *6.
Here, Vakulchik received the Summative Report on May 1, 2020, which was
signed only by Lamoglia, the Director of Special Services. This Summative Report
concluded with the following statement, “Recommended for Dismissal/Non-renewal.”
The first written notice that Vakulchik received directly from the Superintendent was on
May 	18, 	2020, 	three 	days 	after 	the 	May 	15 	deadline, 	when 	the 	Superintendent
responded to Vakulchik’s email reiterating that her contract would not be renewed for
the 	subsequent 	school 	year. 	When 	the 	Board 	voted 	on 	the 	Superintendent's
recommendations for staff renewals for the 2020-2021 school year on May 5, 2020,
Vakulchik’s name was not on the list of staff that were renewed. However, the lack of
inclusion on a “renewal list” of teaching staff members approved by the Board for
reemployment at a regularly scheduled meeting is not determinative of a teacher's
status with respect to employment for the following school year, nor is it sufficient notice
of non-renewal to satisfy the statute. See Aitken v. Manalapan Twp. Bd. of Educ., 1974
S.L.D. 207, 210-12.
However, even if I find that the statute’s technical requirements were not met, the
doctrine of “substantial compliance” should nonetheless allow the Board to succeed on
its motion for summary decision. The equitable doctrine of substantial compliance “has

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 09348-20
11
deep roots in English common law and has received repeated recognition in [New
Jersey’s] own cases as well as in cases elsewhere.” Galik v. Clara Maass Med. Ctr.,
167 N.J. 341, 353 (2001) (internal citations omitted). Its purpose “is to avoid the harsh
consequences that flow from technically inadequate actions that nonetheless meet a
statute's underlying purpose.” Anske v. Borough of Palisades Park, 139 N.J. Super.
342, 347 (App.Div.1976). It is a doctrine “based on justice and fairness, designed to
avoid technical rejection of legitimate claims.” Zamel v. Port of N.Y. Auth., 56 N.J. 1, 6
(1970).
In order to successfully invoke the doctrine, a party must demonstrate (1) lack of
prejudice to the defending party; (2) a series of steps taken to comply with the statute
involved; (3) a general compliance with the purpose of the statute; (4) a reasonable
notice of petitioner's claim, and (5) a reasonable explanation why there was not a strict
compliance with the statute. See Bernstein v. Board of Trustees of the Teachers'
Pension and Annuity Fund, 151 N.J. Super. 71, 76 (App. Div. 1977).
The failure to provide notice in compliance with N.J.S.A. 18A:27-4.1, N.J.S.A.
18A:27-10, and N.J.S.A. 18A:27-11 did not prejudice Vakulchik. For example, under
different circumstances, if a non-tenured staff member is unsure as to whether they
have been recommended for non-renewal by the Superintendent, the staff member
might fail to exercise their rights to an informal proceeding under N.J.S.A. 18A:27-4.1 or
might do so untimely. Here, however, Vakulchik was not prejudiced. On May 1, 2020,
the day she received the Summative Report, she e-mailed the Superintendent, and
copied the Board, confirming that she was notified that she would be recommended for
non-renewal for the 2020-2021 school year and requested a written statement of the
reasons. The Superintendent provided her with a statement of the reasons on May 28,
2020. Finally, she asserted her rights pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:27-3.2 and N.J.A.C.
6A:32-4.6 and requested a Donaldson hearing before the Board, which took place at the
June 15, 2020, Board meeting. Vakulchik was clearly put on notice that she would be
recommended for 	non-renewal, 	was 	able to fully assert 	her rights, 	and 	was 	not
prejudiced.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 09348-20
12
As to the second factor, the Board took a series of steps to comply with the
statute. It provided Vakulchik with the Summative Report, signed by Lamoglia, the
Director of Special Services, which included the specific language “recommended for
non-renewal.” Vakulchik also participated in a virtual meeting over Google Meet, in
which she, Lamoglia, and her principal, together with a union representative, discussed
her Summative Report.
The District was in general compliance with the purpose of the statute. The
primary purpose is to provide teachers with timely notice when they are not going to be
reemployed so that they may seek other employment. See Wachstein v. Burlington
County Bd. of Educ., 1 976 S.L.D. 928, 931; see also Armstrong v. East Brunswick Twp.
Bd. of Educ., 1975 S.L.D. 112, modified, St. Bd., 1975 S.L.D. 117 (modified to adjust
amount of termination pay granted by Commissioner), aff'd., App. Div., 1976 S.L.D.
1104. The statute also works to ensure that a teacher has notice of a recommendation
of non-renewal and can timely request a statement of reasons and a Donaldson
hearing.
Here, while the notice Vakulchik received from the Superintendent was after the
May 15 deadline, Vakulchik was nonetheless on notice that her contract would be
recommended for non-renewal, as evinced by her May 4, 2020, email. As such, while
the Board’s actions did not conform to the technical requirements set forth in N.J.S.A.
18A:27-10, the primary purpose of the statute was met—Vakulchik was aware that her
contract would be recommended for non-renewal, took the appropriate steps to request
a list of the reasons and a Donaldson hearing, and had adequate time to seek alternate
employment. The District gave Vakulchik “reasonable notice” and she was timely able to
assert her rights. As to the final factor, curiously however, the District has not addressed
why there was not strict compliance with the statute.
Where, as here, a staff member does not receive “[a] written notice from the chief
school administrator that such employment will not be offered[,]” N.J.S.A. 18A:27-10,
but the district has “substantially complied” with the underlying purpose of the statute,
the staff member should be deemed to have received sufficient notice. For this reason,
it is appropriate to grant the Board’s motion for summary decision and find that

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 09348-20
13
Vakulchik received timely notice of the Superintendent’s recommendation for non-
renewal. The failure of the District to comply with the technical requirements of N.J.S.A.
18A:27-10 should not be deemed an offer of continued employment for the next
succeeding 	year 	(N.J.S.A. 	18A:27-11) 	where, 	as 	here, 	the 	requirements 	were
substantially 	met 	and 	the 	District’s 	actions 	conformed 	to 	the 	statute’s 	underlying
purpose.
In Nissman v. Bd. of Educ. of the Township of Long Beach Island, 272 N.J.
Super. 373 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 137 N.J. 315 (1994) the Court discussed the
notice requirements of N.J.S.A. 18A:27-10 and determined that whether the employee
“knew or should have known that [he or] she was not going to be offered a new contract
for the following academic year” factored into whether or not a letter that the petitioner
had received from the Board was a “final action.” Id. at 379. The Board used Nissman to
support its contention that, even if the Superintendent had not timely notified Vakulchik
in writing that her contract would not be renewed, the fact that she was aware that her
contract would not be renewed, as evinced by her May 4, 2020, email, is enough to
meet its statutory burden.
While 	the facts 	in 	Nissman 	differ 	slightly 	from 	the facts 	of 	this 	case, 	the
overarching purpose of the statute remains the same: to give a teaching staff member
timely 	and 	adequate 	notice 	of 	non-renewal 	so 	they 	can 	seek 	new 	employment
elsewhere. In Nissman, petitioner challenged the Board’s resolution not to offer the
petitioner a new contract or grant her tenure pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:27:10. The
statute at the time of decision required notice from the local board of non-renewal,
rather than the chief school administrator. Petitioner had timely and appropriately
received the local board’s adoption of a resolution that the petitioner’s employment
contract, expiring in August of that year, would not be renewed and that she would not
be offered a new contract or granted tenure. Petitioner received the resolution and
continued to work in her position as principal up to and including the last day of her
contract. While the Court never questioned whether the notice requirements had been
met, the question the Court answered was whether the board resolution operated as a
“final action.” The petitioner’s knowledge that her contract would not be renewed was a
primary factor in that calculus.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 09348-20
14
The Board also cited Jordan v. Board of Educ., 2017 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS
1865, *6-7, 2017 WL 3091782 to support its position that the Summative Report that
Vakulchik received, while not technically in compliance with N.J.S.A. 18A:27-10, was
nonetheless adequate. In Jordan, the petitioner received a May 8, 2014, letter on the
Superintendent’s letterhead, signed by the Director of Human Resources at the high
school where 	she taught,, informing her that at the local board meeting scheduled for
May 	13, 	2014, 	the 	Superintendent 	would 	recommend 	that 	the 	board 	not 	renew
petitioner’s employment for the 2014-2015 school year. The letter further stated that
petitioner’s employment would terminate effective June 30, 2014. The Court held that
the plain language of a May 8 letter simply did not support petitioner’s interpretation that
the letter merely advised her of the possibility that she would not be offered a new
contract. Id. The Court found that “the letter clearly qualifies as written notice that
plaintiff's employment will be terminated and [that] she will not be offered tenure.” Id.
Similarly, 	here, 	Vakulchik 	was 	unambiguously 	aware 	that 	she 	was 	being
recommended for non-renewal to the Board. Not only did her May 4, 2020, email reveal
as much, but she also met with Lamoglia and her principal, together with a union
representative, to discuss the Summative Evaluation, and signed it on May 8, 2020. As
such, I CONCLUDE that Vakulchik had proper notice.
II. 	The Board’s 4-3 vote in favor of renewing Vakulchik’s contract failed
and thus does not require the Board to issue a new contract of
employment.
Since I found that Vakulchik did in fact receive proper notice, the Board’s vote of
4-3 in favor of renewing Vakulchik’s contract did not operate to renew her contract
pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:27-4.1 because the vote was not by a majority vote of the full
membership of the Board. N.J.S.A. 18A:27-4.1(b) states:
A 	board 	of 	education 	shall 	renew 	the
employment contract of a certificated or non-
certificated officer or employee only upon the
recommendation 	of 	the 	chief 	school

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 09348-20
15
administrator and by a recorded roll call majority
vote of the full membership of the board. The
board shall not withhold its approval for arbitrary
and capricious reasons. A nontenured officer or
employee who is not recommended for renewal
by 	the 	chief 	school 	administrator 	shall 	be
deemed 	nonrenewed. 	Prior 	to 	notifying 	the
officer or employee of the nonrenewal, the chief
school administrator shall notify the board of the
recommendation not to renew the officer's or
employee's 	contract 	and 	the 	reasons 	for 	the
recommendation. An officer or employee whose
employment contract is not renewed shall have
the right to a written statement of reasons for
nonrenewal pursuant to section 2 of P.L.1975,
c.132 	(C.18A:27-3.2) 	and 	to 	an 	informal
appearance before the board. The purpose of
the 	appearance 	shall 	be 	to 	permit 	the 	staff
member to convince the members of the board
to offer reemployment.
[emphasis added.]
When all seats are filled in Dunellen, the Board is comprised of nine members.
The majority of the full membership of the Board is five, regardless of the number of
members who attend the meeting. However, the statute does not directly state whether
a vote from the full membership of the Board after an informal appearance is required to
offer reemployment to an employee whose contract is deemed not renewed by the chief
school administrator.
Valkuchik argues that, save for N.J.S.A. 18A:27-4.1, none of the provisions cited
by the Board that require a vote of the majority of the full membership of the Board (see
Respondent’s Brief at 8-9) contain the differentiating clause that permits the Board to
conduct a vote following an “informal appearance” by the affected staff member. She
argues that here, the Legislature declined to specify the number of votes required
following an “informal appearance.” In contrast, she argues, other scenarios cited by the
Board require “the majority of the full membership” of the Board.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 09348-20
16
As discussed in Section II, the first step in statutory interpretation is to look to the
plain language of the statute—if the plain language “leads to a clear and unambiguous
result, then the interpretive process should end, without resort to extrinsic sources.”
State v. D.A., 191 N.J. 158, 164 (2007). Only when the meaning of a statute is not self-
evident on its face—"when it is subject to varying plausible interpretations, or the strict
application of the words will lead to an absurd result or one at odds with public policy or
an overall statutory scheme—”is it appropriate for the Court to “turn to extrinsic sources,
such as legislative history.” Farmers Mut. Fire Ins. Co. of Salem v. New Jersey
Property-Liability Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 215 N.J. 522, 536 (2013).
It is a fundamental rule of statutory interpretation that “no clause, sentence or
word [in a statute] shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant.” State v. Lefante, 12 N.J.
505, 517 (1953) (quoting Shack v. Dickenhorst, 99 N.J.L. 120 (1923) (emphasis
added)). Therefore, a reviewing court should assume that the Legislature did not use
“any unnecessary or meaningless language.” Patel v. N.J. Motor Vehicle Comm'n, 200
N.J. 413, 418-19 (2009), and should instead “try to give effect to every word of [a]
statute . . . [rather than] construe [a] statute to render part of it superfluous,” Med. Soc'y
of N.J. v. N.J. Dep't of Law & Pub. Safety, Div. of Consumer Affairs., 120 N.J. 18, 26-
27(1990) (citations omitted). Every word of a statute must be given full effect. Serio v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 210 N.J. Super. 167, 171 (App. Div. 1986)(citation omitted).
N.J.S.A. 18A:27-4.1 clearly states that “[t]he purpose of the appearance shall be
to 	permit 	the 	staff 	member 	to 	convince 	the 	members 	of 	the 	board 	to 	offer
reemployment.” The Legislature did not qualify this statement to indicate that anything
less than a majority vote by the full membership would be sufficient.
Further, “statutes are considered to be in pari materia when they relate to the
same person or thing, to the same class of persons or things, or have the same purpose
or object.” Marino v. Marino, 200 N.J. Super. 315, 330. Statutes “in pari materia are to
be 	construed 	together 	when 	helpful 	in 	resolving 	doubts 	or 	uncertainties 	and 	the
ascertainment of legislative intent.” In re Return of Weapons to J.W.D., 149 N.J 108,
115 	(1997). 	However, 	before 	undertaking 	an 	in 	pari 	materia 	analysis 	to 	discern

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 09348-20
17
legislative intent, courts “must first decide whether the two statutes in question actually
‘concern the same object.’” 2B Sutherland on Statutory Construction § 51:3 (7th ed.
2008). Considerations include whether the statutes are “designed to serve the same
purpose and objective.” Id.
N.J.S.A. 18A:27-1 states that “[n]o teaching staff member shall be appointed,
except by a recorded roll call majority vote of the full membership of the board of
education appointing him.” This aligns with N.J.S.A. 18A:27-4.1(a) and (b), which state
that a board may appoint or renew an employee “only upon the recommendation of the
chief 	school 	administrator 	and 	by 	a 	recorded 	roll 	call 	majority 	vote 	of 	the 	full
membership of the board.” In sum, both N.J.S.A. 18A:27-1 and N.J.S.A. 18A:27-4.1
relate to the same purpose—personnel appointments by board approval—both with and
without the recommendation of the Superintendent. Both require a recorded roll call
majority vote of the full membership of the board and should be read in harmony with
one another.
Vakulchik 	cites 	Matawan 	Regional 	Teachers 	Ass'n 	v. 	Matawan-Aberdeen
Regional School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 223 N.J. Super. 504, 507 (App. Div. 1987) to stand
for the proposition that where a statute “is silent with respect to the number of votes
necessary to adopt rules and to govern and manage the district . . . [i]t must be
assumed that by its silence the Legislature intended the common-law rule to apply.” Id.
More specifically, Vakulchik contends that “a majority vote of the members of the board
constituting a quorum shall be sufficient.”
However, the statute at issue in Matawan, N.J.S.A. 18A:11-1, is completely
devoid of any discussion with respect to the number of board votes necessary to adopt
rules and to govern and manage the district. Here, the statute is not silent. The entirety
of 	N.J.S.A. 18A:27-4.1 (b) addresses the board’s renewal votes based upon the
recommendation or non-recommendation of the Superintendent—these votes require a
recorded roll call majority vote of the full membership of the board.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 09348-20
18
Further, the differentiating characteristic of an informal appearance before the
board is that it is not “an adversarial proceeding,” but rather, takes place for “[t]he
purpose of . . . provid[ing] the staff member the opportunity to convince [the] board . . .
to offer reemployment.” N.J.A.C. 6A:10-8.1(c) and (i). The non-tenured staff member
may present witnesses on their behalf, who do not need to present testimony under
oath 	and 	will 	not 	be 	cross-examined 	by 	the 	board. 	N.J.A.C. 	6A:10-9.1. 	The
differentiating 	aspect 	is 	not 	that 	it 	does 	not 	require 	a 	majority 	vote 	of 	the 	full
membership board, but that it is an informal, non-adversarial appearance.
Finally, “[a]n absurd result must be avoided in interpreting a statute.” Gallagher v.
Irvington, 190 N.J. Super. 394, 397 (App. Div. 1983). Allowing an interpretation that
permits 	the 	Board 	to renew a 	staff 	member 	against 	the 	recommendation 	of 	the
Superintendent with a simple majority vote, while requiring five yes-votes of the full
nine-member Board if the renewal recommendation comes from the Superintendent is
untenable. A non-tenured staff member could be renewed with only three votes of a
five-member quorum against the recommendation of the Superintendent but would
require five votes if the recommendation comes from the Superintendent. See Negron v.
Board of Educ., 2012 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2634, *12. In Negron, the local board
was faced with the vote on the reemployment of the Superintendent pursuant to
N.J.S.A. 18A:11-11. Because it was the Superintendent up for the vote, it did not require
the Superintendent’s recommendation. The Court nonetheless determined that the re-
employment decision required a recorded roll call majority vote of the full membership of
the board of education. The Court noted that it “would indeed be an anomaly in a board
of education's powers if a superintendent's contract could be extended for one or two
years 	without 	an 	affirmative 	vote 	of 	the 	full 	board 	membership 	when 	so 	many
employment decisions require such a majority vote.” 	Such is the case here. 	I
CONCLUDE that the Board’s vote of 4-3 in favor of renewing Vakulchik’s contract did
not operate to renew her contract pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:27-4.1 because the vote
was not by a majority of the full membership of the Board.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 09348-20
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ORDER
It 	is 	hereby 	ORDERED 	that 	petitioner’s 	motion 	for 	summary 	decision 	be
DISMISSED. 	It is further ORDERED that respondent Dunellen Board of Education’s
motion for summary decision be GRANTED; it is further ORDERED that the foregoing
petition of appeal is hereby DISMISSED.
I 	hereby 	FILE 	this 	initial 	decision 	with 	the 	COMMISSIONER 	OF 	THE
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION for consideration.
This 	recommended 	decision 	may 	be 	adopted, 	modified 	or 	rejected 	by 	the
COMMISSIONER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, who by law is authorized
to make a final decision in this matter. 	If the Commissioner of the Department of
Education does not adopt, modify or reject this decision within forty-five days and unless
such time limit is otherwise extended, this recommended decision shall become a final
decision in accordance with N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 09348-20
20
Within thirteen days from the date on which this recommended decision was
mailed to the parties, any party may file written exceptions with the COMMISSIONER
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, ATTN: 	BUREAU OF CONTROVERSIES
AND DISPUTES, 100 Riverview Plaza, 4th Floor, PO Box 500, Trenton, New Jersey
08625-0500, marked “Attention: Exceptions.” A copy of any exceptions must be sent to
the judge and to the other parties.
June 22, 2021
DATE 	DEAN J. BUONO, ALJ
Date Received at Agency: 	June 22, 2021
Date Mailed to Parties: 	June 22, 2021
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