Jeffrey Moultrie v. New Jersey Department of Education, Office of Student Protection, 7/11/2024, (#261-24)

261-24
OAL Dkt. No. EDU 11412-22
Agency Dkt. No. 305-11/22
New Jersey Commissioner of Education
Final Decision
Jeffrey Moultrie,
Petitioner,
v.
New Jersey Department of Education, Office of
Student Protection,
Respondent.
The record of this matter, the Initial Decision of the Office of Administrative Law (OAL),
the exceptions filed by respondent New Jersey Department of Education, Office of Student
Protection (OSP) pursuant to N.J.A.C. 1:1-18.4, and petitioner’s reply thereto, have been
reviewed and considered.
In September 2022, Seashore Transportation hired petitioner as school bus driver for both
public and private schools. 	A fingerprint check conducted pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:39-19.1(a)
revealed that, in 1978, petitioner was convicted of second-degree attempted robbery in New
York State. 	N.J.S.A. 18A:39-19.1(a) provides that school bus drivers “shall be permanently
disqualified from employment or service if the individual’s criminal history record reveals a
record of conviction for which public school employment candidates are disqualified pursuant to

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section 1 of P.L. 1986, c. 116 (C.18A:6-7.1).” Under N.J.S.A. 18A:6-7.1(c)(1) and (4), an attempted
robbery conviction permanently disqualifies a person from public school employment.1
Accordingly, via email and letter dated October 18, 2022, OSP informed petitioner that,
pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:39-19.1, he was “permanently disqualified from school employment, or
service as a school board member or trustee of a charter school under the supervision of the
Department of Education, or employment with a contracted service provider under contract with
said school or educational facility.” The letter further provided that OSP would direct the Motor
Vehicle Commission to revoke petitioner’s bus endorsement unless he filed a challenge to the
accuracy of his criminal record within 14 days.
Petitioner appealed OSP’s decision and the matter was transmitted to the OAL for a
contested case hearing. At no point did petitioner deny the existence of the conviction or the
fact that attempted robbery was a permanently disqualifying crime under N.J.S.A. 18A:6-7.1.
Rather, petitioner argued that the Rehabilitated Convicted Offenders Act (RCOA), N.J.S.A.
2A:168A-1 to -16, supersedes N.J.S.A. 18A:6-7.1 and that, therefore, he should not be disqualified
because he can prove that he has been rehabilitated since the 1978 conviction. In opposition to
petitioner’s appeal, OSP maintained that petitioner’s permanent disqualification was mandatory
under N.J.S.A. 18A:6-7.1 irrespective of any evidence of rehabilitation.
When it enacted the RCOA in 1968, the Legislature “declared that the public interest is
advanced ‘by removing impediments and restrictions upon [convicted offenders’] ability to
obtain employment.’” N.J. Tpk. Auth. v. Local 196, I.F.P.T.E., 190 N.J. 283, 301 (2007) (quoting
1 N.J.S.A. 18A:6-7.1(d) provides that out-of-state convictions for crimes that are substantially
equivalent to New Jersey disqualifying crimes will permanently disqualify the offender from
public school employment.

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N.J.S.A. 2A:168A-1). 	In this matter, petitioner specifically relies upon N.J.S.A. 2A:168A-1 and -2
of the RCOA. 	N.J.S.A. 2A:168A-1, the RCOA’s preamble, states in pertinent part that “the
Legislature finds and declares that notwithstanding the contrary provisions of any law or rule or
regulation issued pursuant to law, a person shall not be disqualified or discriminated against by
any licensing authority because of any conviction from a crime . . . unless the conviction relates
adversely to the occupation, trade, vocation, profession or business for which the license or
certificate is sought.” (emphasis added). N.J.S.A. 2A:168A-2 provides that, “[i]n determining that
a conviction for a crime relates adversely to the occupation, trade, vocation, profession or
business, the licensing authority shall explain in writing how the following factors, or any other
factors, relate to the license or certificate sought,” and those factors include:
a. 	The nature and duties of the occupation, trade, vocation,
profession or business, a license or certificate for which the person
is applying;
b. 	Nature and seriousness of the crime;
c. 	Circumstances under which the crime occurred;
d. 	Date of the crime;
e. 	Age of the person when the crime was committed;
f. 	Whether the crime was an isolated or repeated incident;
g. 	Social conditions which may have contributed to the crime;
h. 	Any evidence of rehabilitation, including good conduct in
prison or in the community, counseling or psychiatric treatment
received, 	acquisition 	of 	additional 	academic 	or 	vocational
schooling, successful participation in correctional work-release

4
programs, or the recommendation of persons who have or have
had the applicant under their supervision.2
At the hearing, petitioner credibly testified regarding his arrest, which occurred when he
was eighteen years old, and the surrounding circumstances; his early release from parole; his
service in the United States Army, including multiple medals he received while serving, and his
honorable discharge; and subsequent employment with Amtrak and the United States Postal
Service, where he also received various awards and commendations for his work performance,
as well as work driving for an ambulance service. Petitioner’s employer, the owner and operator
of Seashore Transportation, credibly testified that he kept petitioner on staff as a mechanic after
OSP disqualified him. He added that petitioner is an excellent employee and that he needs bus
drivers.
In response, OSP maintained that petitioner’s permanent disqualification was mandatory
under N.J.S.A. 18A:6-7.1. 	In support of its position, OSP emphasized that N.J.S.A. 18A:6-7.1—
enacted in 1986, decades after the RCOA—initially contained language similar to the RCOA that
permitted employment applicants convicted of disqualifying offenses to provide clear and
convincing evidence demonstrating rehabilitation for the Department to consider. See L. 1986,
c. 116, § 1. However, in 1998, the Legislature amended N.J.S.A. 18A:6-7.1, expanded the list of
disqualifying offenses, and deleted the provision in the law that had permitted applicants to
provide evidence of rehabilitation. L. 1998, c. 31, § 5. See also David Kelly v. N.J. Dep’t of Educ.,
2 Although the RCOA was expanded in 2007 to provide that, under certain conditions, a certificate
may be issued by a court, Parole Board or other supervising authority pursuant to N.J.S.A.
2A:168A-7 and -8 that would presumptively demonstrate a qualified offender’s “rehabilitation
for purposes of seeking public employment,” In re Carluccio, 426 N.J. Super. 15, 28 (App. Div.
2012), petitioner concedes that he lacks such a certificate.

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Crim. Hist. Rev. Unit, Commissioner Decision No. 344-14 (Aug. 21, 2014) (explaining that
“the Legislature has repeatedly amended” N.J.S.A. 18A:6-7.1, “broadening the scope of
disqualifying offenses and precluding evidence of rehabilitation, to provide greater protection
for children from those it deemed a danger to them”).
OSP argued that because N.J.S.A. 18A:6-7.1 was amended more recently and is specific to
employment in public schools, the Legislature must have intended for it to govern in this situation
over the RCOA. OSP also relied upon In the Matter of the Denial of the Issuance of a Teaching
Certificate to Otto Krupp, Commissioner Decision No. 255-04 (June 24, 2004), wherein the
Commissioner found “no conflict or tension” between the RCOA and N.J.S.A. 18A:6-7.1. Krupp,
at 19. In Krupp, the Commissioner explained that by amending N.J.S.A. 18A:6-7.1 in 1998, the
Legislature “proclaimed that a conviction for a first or second degree crime was inimical to
employment in the public schools” and determined that “an individual’s conviction for certain
crimes . . . relates adversely to employment in the public school system of New Jersey” as
contemplated by N.J.S.A. 2A:168A-1. Id. at 19-21. Consequently, once the 1998 amendments
took effect, OSP was not required to consider evidence of rehabilitation under the RCOA before
permanently disqualifying said individuals from public school employment.
Ultimately, the ALJ agreed with petitioner. In particular, the ALJ concluded that the RCOA
applied, that petitioner offered credible evidence of rehabilitation under the RCOA, and that OSP
“failed to establish that petitioner’s 1978 conviction relates adversely to the license being
sought.” Initial Decision, at 12. Without analyzing the significance of the 1998 amendments to
N.J.S.A. 18A:6-7.1, the ALJ concluded that “the Legislature reopened the doors to employment in
the public schools for certain rehabilitated offenders, notwithstanding any law to the contrary,

6
including N.J.S.A. 18A:6-7.1 and N.J.S.A. 18A:39-19.1, when it enacted RCOA.” Initial Decision, at
11. 	Accordingly, the ALJ reversed OSP’s determination that petitioner was permanently
disqualified from public school employment.
OSP takes exception to: (1) the ALJ’s determination that petitioner presented evidence
of rehabilitation pursuant to the RCOA that must be considered; and (2) the ALJ’s legal conclusion
that respondent is precluded from fulfilling its mandatory statutory obligation under N.J.S.A.
18A:6-7.1 to permanently disqualify petitioner from employment as a public school bus driver
because the RCOA supersedes N.J.S.A. 18A:6-7.1. 	In reply, petitioner argues that the ALJ’s
decision is correct and should be adopted by the Commissioner for the reasons he asserted
before the ALJ. He reiterates that he has clearly shown that he has been rehabilitated pursuant
to the RCOA since his conviction many years ago.
Upon careful review, the Commissioner adopts the ALJ’s uncontested factual findings and
credibility determinations as expressed in the Initial Decision but rejects the ALJ’s legal
conclusions. 	The Commissioner holds that the ALJ erroneously reversed OSP’s permanent
disqualification of petitioner from employment as a public school bus driver based upon a flawed
analysis of the RCOA and N.J.S.A. 18A:6-7.1. 	Specifically, the ALJ overlooked a prior
Commissioner decision, Krupp, which directly addresses the relationship between the two
statutory schemes and the significance of the 1998 amendments to N.J.S.A. 18A:6-7.1. The ALJ
also failed to apply well-established principles of statutory interpretation. 	The Commissioner
concurs with OSP that petitioner’s permanent disqualification from employment as a public
school bus driver was mandatory under N.J.S.A. 18A:6-7.1 notwithstanding evidence of
rehabilitation offered pursuant to the RCOA.

7
This conclusion is consistent with Krupp. As noted, in Krupp, the Commissioner held that
“[b]ecause the . . . 1998 amendments to N.J.S.A. 18A:6-7.1 [were] specifically predicated on the
Legislature’s belief that an individual’s conviction for certain crimes . . . relates adversely to
employment in the public school system of New Jersey, disqualification or discrimination against
such an individual . . . is specifically exempted from the dictates of the RCOA by that provision’s
[N.J.S.A. 2A:168A-1’s] clear language as a consequence of the relationship between the offense
and the certification being sought.” Krupp, at 21. The Commissioner finds and concludes that
the ALJ erroneously distinguished Krupp on the basis that in that matter, the applicant did not
provide sufficient proof of rehabilitation whereas petitioner in this case did so. By distinguishing
Krupp on its facts, the ALJ bypassed the significance of the 1998 amendments to N.J.S.A. 18A:6-
7.1, as well as the fact that the Commissioner’s interpretation of those amendments as explained
in Krupp is entitled to deference because the “agency’s expertise and superior knowledge of a
particular field” is implicated. Greenwood v. State Police Training Ctr., 127 N.J. 500, 513 (1992).
Furthermore, well-established principles of statutory interpretation support the need to
consider the 1998 amendments to N.J.S.A. 18A:6-7.1 as part of the legal analysis in this matter.
See State v. Gomes, 253 N.J. 6, 28 (2023) (holding that when determining “the intended overall
meaning of the texts of multiple statutes that were adopted at different times,” it is “the most
recent statutory enactment [that] ordinarily supersedes, or at least qualifies or illuminates,
language that was adopted in earlier statutes”). 	Additionally, “a more specific statutory
provision” such as N.J.S.A. 18A:6-7.1, which expressly addresses employment in public schools,
“usually controls over a more general one,” such as the RCOA. Ibid. To conclude as the ALJ did
that the RCOA, specifically N.J.S.A. 2A:168A-2, controls in this matter would render the

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Legislature’s 1998 amendments to N.J.S.A. 18A:6-7.1 inoperative and meaningless, thereby
violating another important principle of statutory interpretation. See Innes v. Innes, 117 N.J. 496,
509 (1990) (holding that one must “avoid constructions that render any part of a statute
inoperative, superfluous, or meaningless”).
Moreover, when considering the significance of the 1998 amendments to N.J.S.A. 18A:6-
7.1, it is important to acknowledge that the Legislature is presumed to be “aware of its own
enactments.” Headen v. Jersey City Bd. of Educ., 212 N.J. 437, 449 (2012). When it removed the
rehabilitation language from N.J.S.A. 18A:6-7.1 in 1998 and determined instead that convictions
for certain crimes would permanently disqualify applicants from public school employment, the
Legislature was aware of the RCOA. 	It nonetheless determined that convictions for certain
enumerated crimes were so adverse to public school employment—in environments where
student safety is at stake—that evidence of an offender’s rehabilitation should not be
considered. As the Commissioner explained in Krupp:
[T]he Legislature in enacting the 1998 amendments to N.J.S.A.
18A:6-7.1 proclaimed that a conviction for a first or second degree
crime was inimical to employment in the public schools. 	When
these amendments were drafted, the Legislature declared that the
interest and safety of school children in the State of New Jersey
must prevail. 	Indeed, one of the sponsors of the amendments
declared, “We are entrusting these people with our children’s
safety. The risk that these people have not been rehabilitated is a
gamble that we are not willing to take.”
[Krupp, at 21.]
Accordingly, 	the 	Commissioner 	holds 	that 	petitioner 	shall 	remain 	permanently
disqualified from employment as a public school bus driver pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:39-19.1 and
N.J.S.A. 18A:6-7.1. 	However, as petitioner’s employer testified that he hired petitioner as a

9
school bus driver for both public and private schools, OSP shall direct the Motor Vehicle
Commission to restore petitioner’s school bus endorsement for purposes of employment as a
nonpublic school bus driver as he is not disqualified from operating a school bus for a nonpublic
school. See Scott Baron v. N.J Dep’t of Educ., Off. of Student Prot., Commissioner Decision No.
95-20 (March 13, 2020) (holding that “N.J.S.A. 18A:39-19.1 applies only to bus drivers employed
by public schools or other educational entities under the supervision of the Department of
Education”).
IT IS SO ORDERED.3
ACTING COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION
Date of Decision: 	July 11, 2024
Date of Mailing: 	July 12, 2024
3 This decision may be appealed to the Appellate Division of the Superior Court pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:6-
9.1. Under N.J.Ct.R. 2:4-1(b), a notice of appeal must be filed with the Appellate Division within 45 days
from the date of mailing of this decision.

New Jersey is an Equal Opportunity Employer
State of New Jersey
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
INITIAL DECISION
OAL DKT. NO. EDU 11412-22
AGENCY DKT. NO. 305-11/22
JEFFREY MOULTRIE,
Petitioner,
v.
NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF
EDUCATION, OFFICE OF STUDENT
PROTECTION,
Respondent.
Martin J. Arbus, Esq, for petitioner, (Arbus, Maybruch & Goode, LLC, attorneys)
David L. Kalisky, Deputy Attorney General, for respondent (Matthew J. Platkin,
Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney)
Record Closed: April 18, 2024 Decided: May 29, 2024
BEFORE WILLIAM T. COOPER III, ALJ:
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Petitioner, Jeffrey Moultrie (petitioner), appeals the determination by
respondent, Department of Education, Office of Student Protection (respondent or
OSP), that pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:6-7.1, he is permanently disqualified from

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OAL DKT. NO. EDU 11412-22
employment as a public-school bus driver and any other public-school employment
because of his 1978 conviction in New York for second-degree robbery. Petitioner
does not dispute the accuracy of his criminal history record or that N.J.S.A. 18A:6-7.1
requires his disqualification. Petitioner argues that the Rehabilitated Convicted
Offenders Act (RCOA), N.J.S.A. 2A:168A-1 to -16, supersedes N.J.S.A. 18A:6-7.1, and
that due to his rehabilitation, he should not be disqualified.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On October 18, 2022, the OSP issued a notice disqualifying petitioner from working
at any educational institution under the supervision of the Department of Education.
On November 11, 2022, the petitioner timely appealed respondent’s
disqualification determination to the Commissioner of Education, pursuant to N.J.A.C.
6A:3-1.1 to -1.17. On December 18, 2022, respondent filed a motion to dismiss in lieu of
an answer.
The matter, including the motion, was transmitted as a contested case to the Office
of Administrative Law, where it was filed on December 21, 2022. N.J.S.A. 52:14 B-1 to -
15; N.J.S.A. 52:14 F-1 to -13.
On October 6, 2023, an Order denying respondent’s motion to dismiss was
entered.
A hearing was conducted on January 23, 2024. The record remained open for the
parties to submit written summations, which were submitted on February 26, 2024.
Clarification from the parties concerning the difference between a private school
and public-school bus operator was requested, and the responses were received on April
18, 2024. The record closed on that date.

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OAL DKT. NO. EDU 11412-22
FACTUAL DISCUSSION AND FINDINGS
Testimony
Jeffrey Moultrie
The petitioner testified in support of his application and candidly admitted to the
actions that led to his arrest on September 18, 1978. Petitioner grew up in the South
Bronx in what he characterized as a bad neighborhood. On the day of his arrest, he was
eighteen years and one month, hanging out with his friends. The group began to “hassle”
a gentleman who walked by, and the New York City Police Department’s Anti-Crime Unit
appeared on the scene and arrested the entire group. There were no weapons involved,
but because of his age, the petitioner was charged with attempted robbery in the second
degree, a crime that exposed him to a total of twelve years of incarceration. He was
represented by a public defender who recommended he accept a plea bargain wherein
the state would recommend a four-year sentence. The petitioner agreed, and on
November 22, 1978, he was sentenced to a maximum of four years of incarceration. The
petitioner served two years and was released. During his period of incarceration, the
petitioner earned his General Education Degree (GED).
A condition of his parole was to “find and maintain gainful employment throughout
his parole term,” and he was able to comply with this condition with the assistance of the
Neighborhood Work Project for convicted offenders. An additional condition of his parole
included regular drug testing, which was not an issue as he did not use illegal drugs. The
petitioner was successfully released early from his parole.
In 1982, the petitioner was accepted to the University of Syracuse (Syracuse),
where he also played football. Unfortunately, the petitioner could not afford to stay in
Syracuse and left the school in 1984. The petitioner maintained employment from 1984
to 1987, at which time he joined the United States Army (Army). While in the Army, the
petitioner was trained as a “Light Wheel Vehicle Mechanic” and as a “Food Service
Specialist.” During his training, the petitioner was stationed at Fort Knox in Kentucky,
Fort Sill in Oklahoma, and Fort Lee in Virginia. The petitioner was deployed in 1990 to

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OAL DKT. NO. EDU 11412-22
Germany and then to Saudi Arabia, where he participated in the Desert Shield campaign.
The petitioner was returned to Fort Drum in New York State, where he was released from
the armed service. The petitioner rose to the rank of sergeant and received an “Honorable
Discharge” on January 8, 1995. The petitioner’s discharge noted that he had earned the
“Army Achievement Medal,” “Army Service Medal,” “National Defense Service Medal,”
“Overseas Service Ribbon,” “Mechanic Badge,” “Army Good Conduct Medal,” and “Expert
Badge Rifle and Hand Grenade.”
Upon his honorable discharge, the petitioner relocated to the Bronx, N.Y. where
he worked several jobs, including as a driver for a local cab service and as an attendant
at a local gas station. In 1997, he was able to secure employment with Amtrak as a coach
attendant. Petitioner’s employment with Amtrak led to employment with the United States
Postal Service (USPS). As a USPS employee, the petitioner received a “Spot Award”
and “Certificate of Appreciation” in recognition of his outstanding ability and quality
performance of duty on January 8, 2007, and again on March 5, 2010, petitioner received
a letter of appreciation for reporting to work during the blizzard that occurred February 26,
2010.
The petitioner left USPS for employment that had better wages and benefits. He
obtained his Commercial Driver License (CDL) in the State of New York and was
employed by the Richmond County Ambulance Service located in Staten Island, N.Y.
The petitioner is married and has five children, four boys and one girl, and his
family moved to Perth Amboy, New Jersey, where he obtained employment with
Seashore Transportation (Seashore). The petitioner passed the New Jersey CDL test
but was unable to obtain passenger endorsement due to his 1978 criminal conviction.
John Villapiano
John Villapiano (Villapiano) is the owner and operator of Seashore. He testified
that he hired the petitioner in September 2022 to be a school bus driver for both public
and private schools. When the petitioner was disqualified, Villapiano provided the
petitioner an opportunity to work in the “garage” as a mechanic. He explained that the

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OAL DKT. NO. EDU 11412-22
petitioner does an excellent job keeping the bus fleet running. However, Villapiano
advised that what he really needs is a bus driver because finding people qualified to
operate a school bus has become very difficult. Villapiano further testified that the
petitioner is an excellent employee, is punctual, and has had no problems at all while
working for Seashore.
FINDINGS
For testimony to be believed, it must not only come from the mouth of a credible
witness, but it also must be credible. It must elicit evidence that is from such common
experience and observation that it can be approved as proper under the circumstances.
See Spagnuolo v. Bonnet, 16 N.J. 546 (1954); Gallo v. Gallo, 66 N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div.
1961). A credibility determination requires an overall assessment of the witnesses’ story
in light of its rationality or internal consistency and the manner in which it “hangs together”
with other evidence. Carbo v. United States, 314 F.2d 718, 749 (9th Cir. 1963). Also,
“the interest, motive, bias, or prejudice of a witness may affect his credibility and justify
the [trier of fact], whose province it is to pass upon the credibility of an interested witness,
in disbelieving his testimony.” State v. Salimone, 19 N.J. Super. 600, 608 (App. Div.),
certif. denied, 10 N.J. 316 (1952) (citation omitted).
A trier of fact may reject testimony because it is inherently incredible, or because
it is inconsistent with other testimony or with common experience, or because it is
overborne by other testimony. Congleton v. Pura-Tex Stone Corp.,53 N.J. Super 282,
287 (App. Div. 1958).
There was no indication that either the petitioner or Villapiano had any interest,
motive or bias that would affect their testimony. As such, I accept both witnesses as
credible.
The respondent did not dispute any of the testimony provided or object to any of
the evidence submitted by the petitioner, nor did any witnesses testify on behalf of OSP.

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OAL DKT. NO. EDU 11412-22
Based upon the testimony heard and documents entered in evidence, I FIND the
following as FACT:
1. The petitioner was originally hired by Seashore as a bus driver for both
public and private schools in the Monmouth and Ocean County areas. The
petitioner applied for a CDL with P (Passenger) and S (School Bus)
endorsements necessary to operate a school bus for Seashore. As
required, the petitioner submitted his fingerprints as part of the background
check.
2. The fingerprint search revealed that the petitioner had a 1978 criminal
conviction out of the State of New York for second-degree robbery.
3. The petitioner does not challenge the accuracy of his criminal history record
or the fact that his criminal convictions would disqualify him under N.J.S.A.
18A:6-7.1.
4. Based upon his criminal history, the petitioner was notified that he was
“permanently disqualified” from serving in any position, paid or unpaid, with
any educational institution under the supervision of the Department of
Education, or any contracted service provider under contract with any
“school or educational facility.” The notice does not differentiate between
public and private schools.
5. On September 18, 1978, when the petitioner was a resident of Bronx, New
York, he was arrested and charged with robbery. Petitioner readily admits
to this conviction but explained that he did not participate in the robbery and
was instead attempting to prevent younger individuals from attempting to
rob an older gentleman. Unfortunately, because he was eighteen years old,
he was charged as an adult with robbery. The petitioner was represented
by a public defender and was advised that if he did not accept a plea
agreement, he would face up to twelve years of incarceration. The
petitioner accepted the plea agreement, pleaded guilty to robbery, and on
November 22, 1978, was sentenced to four years of incarceration. The

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OAL DKT. NO. EDU 11412-22
petitioner served less than two years of his four-year sentence and was
released on parole in April 1980. While he served his time in prison, the
petitioner earned his GED and had no issues during his two years of parole.
6. Upon his release and the termination of his parole, the petitioner attended
Syracuse University, where he played football. Unfortunately, after two
years, the petitioner was unable to afford tuition, and as a result, he returned
to his parents’ home in the Bronx.
7. In 1985, the petitioner entered military service with the United States Army
(Army). The petitioner served two four-year enlistments, achieving the rank
of sergeant. While in the service, the petitioner received numerous
accommodations, including a National Defense Service Medal and a good
conduct medal. The petitioner served during Operation Desert Storm as a
mechanic, repairing military vehicles during combat operations. The
petitioner was “Honorably Discharged” from the Army on January 8, 1995.
8. Upon his discharge, the petitioner maintained gainful employment, which
included working for Amtrak, the United States Postal Service (USPS), and
Richmond County (Staten Island) Ambulance service.
9. The petitioner is married and has five children. His family moved to New
Jersey, and the petitioner was hired by Seashore as a bus driver. The
petitioner passed the NJ State CDL driving test but was permanently
banned based upon his criminal conviction from forty-five years ago.
10. The petitioner’s forty-five-year-old 1978 criminal conviction is petitioner’s
only criminal violation.
11. Seashore provides bus services to both public and private schools. The
position of OSP is that because Seashore holds contracts with boards of
education under the Department’s authority, the petitioner’s inability to meet
the criminal history record requirements under N.J.S.A. 18A:39-19.1
precludes petitioner from working as a school bus driver.

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OAL DKT. NO. EDU 11412-22
LEGAL ANALYSIS
The issue here is whether the respondent’s determination to permanently
disqualify petitioner from employment as a public-school bus driver was appropriate.
N.J.S.A. 18A:6-7.1 provides that if a prospective public school bus driver’s criminal
history background check reveals a disqualifying second-degree attempted robbery
conviction, that person is permanently disqualified from school employment. N.J.S.A.
18A:6-7.1 provides in relevant part as follows:
A facility, center, school, or school system under the
supervision of the Department of Education and board of
education which cares for, or is involved in the education of
children under the age of 18 shall not employ for pay or
contract for the paid services of any . . . person serving in a
position which involves regular contact with pupils unless the
employer has first determined consistent with the
requirements and standards of this act, that no criminal history
record information exists on file . . . which would disqualify that
individual from being employed or utilized in such capacity or
position. An individual employed by a board of education
or a school bus contractor holding a contract with a
board of education, in the capacity of a school bus driver,
shall be required to meet the criminal history record
requirements
. . . .
An individual, except as provided in subsection g. of this
section, shall be permanently disqualified from
employment or service under this act if the individual's
criminal history record check reveals a record of
conviction for any crime of the first or second degree; or
. . . .
c.
(1) A crime involving the use of force or the threat of
force to or upon a person or property including, but not
limited to, robbery, aggravated assault, stalking,
kidnapping, arson, manslaughter and murder[.]
[N.J.S.A. 18A:6-7.1 (emphasis added).]

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OAL DKT. NO. EDU 11412-22
Further, N.J.S.A. 18A:6-7.1 mandates that the criminal convictions that would
result in such disqualification include, but are not limited to, “a record of conviction for any
crime of the . . . second degree; or . . . [a] crime involving the use of force or threat of
force to or upon a person or property including, but not limited to, robbery[.]” N.J.S.A.
18A:6-7.1(c)(1) (emphasis added). This statute also provides that “for purposes of this
section, a conviction exists if the individual has at any time been convicted under the laws
of this State or under any similar statutes of the United States or any other state for a
substantially equivalent crime or other offense.” N.J.S.A. 18A:6-7.1(d). Finally, under the
disqualification law, a prospective employee is afforded “an opportunity to challenge the
accuracy of the disqualifying criminal history record.” N.J.S.A. 18A:6-7.1(e). Here, there
is no dispute that the petitioner has a 1978 criminal conviction in the State of New York
for second-degree robbery. Based upon this conviction, the respondent maintains that
the decision to disqualify the petitioner is mandatory.
Petitioner counters that RCOA allows the employment in public schools for certain
rehabilitated offenders, notwithstanding any laws to the contrary, including N.J.S.A.
18A:6-7.1, noting:
The Legislature finds and declares that it is in the public
interest to assist the rehabilitation of convicted offenders by
removing impediments and restrictions upon their ability to
obtain employment or to participate in vocational or
educational rehabilitation programs based solely upon the
existence of a criminal record.
Therefore, the Legislature finds and declares that
notwithstanding the contrary provisions of any law or rule or
regulation issued pursuant to law, a person shall not be
disqualified or discriminated against by any licensing authority
because of any conviction for a crime, unless N.J.S.A. 2C:51-
2 is applicable or unless the conviction relates adversely to
the occupation, trade, vocation, profession or business for
which the license or certificate is sought.
[N.J.S.A. 2A:168A-1.]

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N.J.S.A. 2A:168A-2 provides:
Notwithstanding the contrary provisions of any law or rule or
regulation issued pursuant to law, no State, county or
municipal department, board, officer or agency, hereinafter
referred to as “licensing authority” authorized to pass upon the
qualifications of any applicant for a license or certificate of
authority or qualification to engage in the practice of a
profession or business or for admission to an examination to
qualify for such a license or certificate may disqualify or
discriminate against an applicant for a license or certificate or
an application for admission to a qualifying examination on the
grounds that the applicant has been convicted of a crime, or
adjudged a disorderly person, except that a licensing authority
may disqualify or discriminate against an applicant for a
license or certificate if N.J.S.A. 2C:51-2 or any disqualifying
criminal activity set forth in subsection a. of section 7 of
P.L.2009, c.53 (C.17:11C-57) is applicable, or if a conviction
for a crime relates adversely to the occupation, trade,
vocation, profession or business for which the license or
certificate is sought. In determining that a conviction for a
crime relates adversely to the occupation, trade, vocation,
profession or business, the licensing authority shall explain in
writing how the following factors, or any other factors, relate
to the license or certificate sought:
a. The nature and duties of the occupation, trade,
vocation, profession or business, a license or
certificate for which the person is applying;
b. Nature and seriousness of the crime;
c. Circumstances under which the crime occurred;
d. Date of the crime;
e. Age of the person when the crime was committed;
f. Whether the crime was an isolated or repeated
incident;
g. Social conditions which may have contributed to the
crime;
h. Any evidence of rehabilitation, including good conduct
in prison or in the community, counseling or psychiatric
treatment received, acquisition of additional academic
or vocational schooling, successful participation in
correctional work-release programs, or the
recommendation of persons who have or have had the
applicant under their supervision.

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In this matter, the OSP did not detail how the enumerated factors related to the
bus license sought by petitioner. Rather, it was argued that, “[b]ecause the enactment of
the 1998 amendments to N.J.S.A. 18A:6-7.1 is specifically predicated on the Legislature’s
belief that an individual’s conviction for certain crimes, including [robbery], relates
adversely to employment in the public school system of New Jersey, disqualification or
discrimination against such an individual who has applied for [public school employment]
is specifically exempted from the dictates of the RCOA by that provision’s clear language
as a consequence of the relationship between the offense and [the employment] being
sought.” In re Krupp, EDU 05196-03, Final Decision (October 6, 2004),
https://njlaw.rutgers.edu/collections/oal.
However, the Legislature reopened the doors to employment in the public schools
for certain rehabilitated offenders, notwithstanding any law to the contrary, including
N.J.S.A. 18A:6-7.1 and N.J.S.A. 18A:39-19.1, when it enacted RCOA.
Thus, RCOA permits a licensing authority to disqualify or discriminate against an
applicant for a license or certificate if that applicant has a conviction for a crime that
“relates adversely to the occupation, trade, vocation, profession or business for which the
license or certificate is sought.” In determining whether a conviction for a crime so relates,
the licensing authority is required to detail how specific factors relate to the license or
certificate sought. These factors include but are not limited to; a.) Nature and duties of
the occupation, trade, vocation, profession or business, a license or certificate for which
the person is applying; b.) Nature and seriousness of the crime; c.) Circumstances under
which the crime occurred; d.) Date of the crime; e.) Age of the person when the crime
was committed; f.) Whether the crime was an isolated or repeated incident; g.) Social
conditions which may have contributed to the crime; and h.) Any evidence of
rehabilitation, including good conduct in prison or in the community, schooling, successful
participation in correctional work-release programs, or the recommendation of persons
who have or have had the applicant under their supervision. See N.J.S.A. 2A:168A-2.
Respondent’s reliance upon In re Krupp is misplaced, as that case is factually
distinguishable from the present matter. Krupp was a former mathematics teacher who
was seeking reinstatement of his teaching certificate after serving twenty-three years in

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prison for a conviction of first-degree murder. Krupp, who was recently released from
prison prior to applying to renew his teaching certificate, was unable to provide sufficient
proof that he had been rehabilitated. Here, the credible evidence establishes that the
petitioner has been rehabilitated; the disqualifying crime occurred forty-five years ago
when the petitioner had just turned eighteen years old; the petitioner has led a law-abiding
lifestyle since his release from prison; subsequently attended Syracuse University; then
served in the United States Army from 1987 to 1995 (including service in the Desert Storm
campaign), achieving an honorable discharge in 1995; and since his honorable discharge,
petitioner has maintained gainful employment, which includes, among others,
employment at Amtrak, the United States Postal Service, and Richmond County
Ambulance Services. Further, the petitioner is married and has five children. Lastly, his
employer describes him as an excellent employee. In short, the petitioner is the ideal
example of why RCOA was enacted.
Accordingly, I CONCLUDE that the credible evidence establishes that the
petitioner has been rehabilitated. I further CONCLUDE that respondent has failed to
establish that petitioner’s 1978 conviction relates adversely to the license being sought.
ORDER
For the reasons set forth above, the determination by respondent Department of
Education, Office of Student Protections that pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:6-7.1, the
petitioner is permanently disqualified from employment as a public-school bus driver and
any other public-school employment, is hereby REVERSED. The OSP shall notify the
Motor Vehicle Commission to issue the petitioner a school bus driver license.
I hereby FILE this initial decision with the COMMISSIONER OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION for consideration.
This recommended decision may be adopted, modified, or rejected by the
COMMISSIONER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, who by law is authorized
to make a final decision in this matter. If the Commissioner of the Department of
Education does not adopt, modify, or reject this decision within forty-five days and unless

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such time limit is otherwise extended, this recommended decision shall become a final
decision in accordance with N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10.
Within thirteen days from the date on which this recommended decision was
mailed to the parties, any party may file written exceptions with the COMMISSIONER OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION. Exceptions may be filed by email to
ControversiesDisputesFilings@doe.nj.gov or by mail to Office of Controversies
and Disputes, 100 Riverview Plaza, 4th Floor, PO Box 500, Trenton, New Jersey
08625-0500. A copy of any exceptions must be sent to the judge and to the other parties.
May 29, 2024
DATE WILLIAM T. COOPER, III, ALJ
Date Received at Agency: May 29, 2024
Date E-Mailed to Parties: May 29, 2024
WTC/sg

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APPENDIX
WITNESSES
For petitioner
Jeffrey Moultrie
John Villapiano
For respondent
None
EXHIBITS
For petitioner
P-1 Certificate of Discharge from United States Army 1/8/95.
P-2 United States Postal Service 3/5/10 letter of accommodation.
P-3 United States Postal Service 1/8/07 certificate of appreciation.
P-4 Supreme Court of New York certificate of disposition. Dated 12/7/05.
For respondent
None