Y.H. and S.H., on behalf of minor child, A.G.H. v. Board of Education of the Township of West Orange, Essex County, 1/29/26 (#38-26)

38-26
OAL Dkt. No. EDU 17924025
Agency Dkt. No. 319-9/25
New Jersey Commissioner of Education
Final Decision
Y.H. and S.H., on behalf of minor child, A.G.H.,
Petitioners,
v.
Board of Education of the Township of West
Orange, Essex County,
Respondent.
The record of this matter and the Initial Decision of the Office of Administrative Law (OAL) have
been reviewed and considered.
Upon review, the Commissioner concurs with the ALJ that the petition is untimely under N.J.A.C.
6A:3-1.3(d), and that petitioners have failed to present a compelling reason or exceptional circumstances
warranting relaxation of the ninety-day rule.
Accordingly, the Initial Decision is adopted as the final decision in this matter, and the petition of
appeal is hereby dismissed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.1
COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION
Date of Decision: 	January 29, 2026
Date of Mailing: 	January 30, 2026
1 This decision may be appealed to the Appellate Division of the Superior Court pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:6-9.1. Under
N.J.Ct.R. 2:4-1(b), a notice of appeal must be filed with the Appellate Division within 45 days from the date of mailing
of this decision.

New Jersey is an Equal Opportunity Employer
State of New Jersey
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
INITIAL DECISION
DISMISSAL
OAL DKT. NO. EDU 17924-25
AGENCY DKT. NO. 319-9/25
Y.H. AND S.H. O/B/O A.G.H.,
Petitioner,
v.
WEST ORANGE, BOARD OF
EDUCATION, ESSEX COUNTY
Respondent.
_____________________________________
Y.H. and S.H., appearing pro se for minor child A.G.H.
Jaclyn Arminio, Esq., for respondent (Cleary, Giacobbe, Alfieri, Jacobs, LLC,
attorneys)
Record Closed: December 8, 2025 	Decided: December 12, 2025
BEFORE NANCI G. STOKES, ALJ:
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On Sunday, September 19, 2025, or ninety-two days after the respondent's
determination, petitioners challenged the respondent's June 19, 2025, finding that A.G.H.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 19724-25
2
committed an act of Harassment, Bullying, and Intimidation (HIB). 	Is the claim time-
barred? Yes. Under N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.3(d), a challenger must appeal "no later than the
90th day [after receiving] notice of a final order, ruling, or other action by the district board
of education . . . that is the subject of the [case]." Ibid.
.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
By email dated September 19, 2025, Y.H. and S.H. filed a Petition on behalf of
their minor child, A.G.H., with the Commissioner of the Department of Education (DOE),
contesting the West Orange Board of Education's (District or Board) conclusion received
on June 19, 2025, that A.G.H. committed a series of HIBs against another student.
Petitioners assert that the events between the students were "peer conflict" that did not
rise to the level of a HIB, and seek to overturn the HIB determination, clearing A.G.H.'s
record of the HIB.
In response to the petition, the Board filed a Motion to Dismiss in place of an
Answer on October 9, 2025, arguing that Y.H. and S.H. filed their petition out of time. The
Commissioner opted not to address the respondent's motion to dismiss and transmitted
this case to the OAL. On October 15, 2025, the OAL filed the contested case under the
Administrative Procedure Act, N.J.S.A. 52:14B-1 to -15, and the act establishing the OAL,
N.J.S.A. 52:14F-1 to -13, for a hearing under the Uniform Administrative Procedure Rules,
N.J.A.C. 1:1-1.1 to -21.6.
Following a prehearing conference addressing motion procedures, this tribunal
requested that petitioners submit their opposition to the motion by December 1, 2025,
which they did. On December 8, 2025, the Board replied, and I closed the record.
DISCUSSION AND FINDINGS OF FACT
Based on the petition and its supporting documents, as well as arguments
presented in support and in opposition to this motion, I FIND the following as FACT for
purposes of this motion only:

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 19724-25
3
A.G.H. and A.T. are students at Washington High School within the West Orange
public school system. Following an incident between A.G.H. and A.T. on April 18, 2024,
wherein A.T. gave A.G.H. the "middle" finger and tried to instigate a physical fight, the
school staff separated the students and spoke to them. A.T. reported being taunted by
A.G.H. about his size, which resulted in a HIB investigation.
On May 2, 2024, the Superintendent presented an executive summary to the
Board stating that the school's investigation determined A.G.H. committed HIB against
A.T.
On May 7, 2024, the Board issued a letter to the petitioners that provided
information about the HIB determination. Yet, the Board did not hold a hearing before
issuing its determination.
On June 14, 2024, the petitioners requested a hearing and then filed a HIB report
against A.T. on behalf of A.G.H. on June 17, 2024.
On June 24, 2024, the Board advised the petitioners that A.T. did not engage in a
HIB against A.G.H.
On September 19, 2024, the petitioners filed a petition with the DOE, which filed it
as a contested case with the OAL.
On March 21, 2025, the assigned Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) remanded the
case back to the Board to allow the petitioners a hearing before the Board.
The Board conducted a full hearing on June 16, 2025, which the petitioners and
A.G.H. attended.
On June 19, 2025, the Board forwarded its determination by email and regular
mail, which upheld that A.G.H.'s actions constituted HIB against A.T.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 19724-25
4
On September 19, 2025, the petitioners filed a challenge to that determination with
the DOE. That filing was ninety-two days after the Board's June 19, 2025, determination.
Indeed, I FIND that the petitioners filed their challenge to the HIB decision more than
ninety days after receiving notification of the Board’s findings.
This 	tribunal 	allowed 	petitioners 	to 	respond 	to 	the 	motion 	concerning 	the
untimeliness of their petition. In other words, I make additional FINDINGS of FACT based
on their response necessary to address the motion. 	To excuse their late petition, the
petitioners offer employment concerns, difficulty retaining legal counsel, and scheduling
pressures. They contacted and consulted with an attorney in June 2025 but opted to wait
until they resolved their employment issues to move forward with retaining an attorney.
(Petitioner’s motion response.) They advised the consulting attorney that they would
contact the firm in early September, but they did not. 	Id. 	In response, the consulting
attorney reminded the petitioners that there may be deadlines applicable to their case,
like the Board’s June 19, 2025, HIB decision letter advised. Id.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Under N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.10, “upon motion to dismiss filed in lieu of answer, the
Commissioner may dismiss the petition on the grounds that the petitioner has advanced
no cause of action even if the petitioner’s factual allegations are accepted as true.” See
Sloan v. Klagholtz, 342 N.J. Super. 385, 394 (App. Div. 2001). Our courts recognize that
“[t]he test for determining the adequacy of a pleading is whether a cause of action is
suggested by the facts.” Velantzas v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 109 N.J. 189, 192 (1988).
The “inquiry is limited to examining the legal sufficiency of the facts alleged on the face
of the complaint,” Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 116 N.J. 739, 746
(1989), and “the legal requisites for [the petitioner’s] claim must be apparent from the
complaint itself.” Edwards v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Co., 357 N.J. Super. 196, 202 (App
Div.), certif. denied, 176 N.J. 278 (2003).

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 19724-25
5
Here, I CONCLUDE that the evidence, even viewed in the most favorable light to
petitioners, demonstrates that they filed their petition beyond the ninety-day limitation
period, and the motion’s outcome depends upon the circumstances presented to excuse
the late filing.
Timeliness
Under N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.3(d), a party must file an appeal with the Commissioner of
Education "no later than the 90th day from the date of receipt of the notice of a final order,
ruling, or other action by the district board of education, individual party, or agency, that
is the subject of the requested contested case hearing." This rule "provides a measure of
repose, an essential element in the proper and efficient administration of the school laws,"
giving school districts the "security of knowing" that an aggrieved party cannot challenge
its actions after ninety days. Kaprow v. Board of Educ. of Berkeley Twp., 131 N.J. 572,
582 (1993).
Courts 	strictly 	construe 	and 	consistently 	apply 	the 	ninety-day 	limitation
period. Kaprow, 131 N.J. at 588-89; Nissman v. Bd. of Educ., 272 N.J. Super 373, 380-
81, (App. Div. 1994); Riely v. Bd. of Educ., 173 N.J. Super. 109, 112-14, (App. Div. 1980).
This period begins to run when the petitioner "learn[s] from the Local Board the existence
of that state of facts that would enable him to file a timely claim." Kaprow, 131 N.J. at
588-89. Indeed, the "notice of a final order, ruling or other action" is "sufficient to inform
an individual of some fact that he or she has a right to know and that the communicating
party has a duty to communicate." Id. at 587. Notably, a petitioner need not receive official
and formal notification that they may have a valid claim to begin the ninety days. Id. at
588. 	Still, the ninety-day filing period is a jurisdictional limitation, which the courts and
the Commissioner strictly enforce and is typically not equitably relaxed absent fraud,
defective notice, or misleading conduct by the school district. Riely, 173 N.J. Super. at
113. Here, petitioners assert no such concern or deficiency and acknowledge receipt of
the Board's HIB determination on June 19, 2025.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 19724-25
6
Even accepting the petitioner's position that the Board improperly determined the
HIB against A.G.H., they needed to file a petition challenging that determination in a timely
manner. 	Undeniably, the petitioners acknowledge that they received notice of that
decision on June 19, 2025, and the obligation to file this challenge within ninety days.
Indeed, they filed their earlier petition regarding the same events promptly. Still, the
ninety-day limitation flows from the Board's June 19, 2025, notice and expires on
September 17, 2025. 	Indeed, I found that their petition was indisputably late. 	The
petitioners offer only personal reasons to explain their tardiness, even if only two days
after the ninety-day period expired. Undeniably, they sought consultation with an attorney,
but opted to wait to engage counsel's services, despite counsel's reminder that a
challenge to the Board's decision was time-sensitive.
The petitioners also suggest that this tribunal should consider the petition's late
filing as substantially compliant. However, cases relied upon by petitioners to support this
position do not address a jurisdictional limitation period, like here, but instead address
other filing issues. In Berstein v. Bd. of Trustees of Teachers' Pension and Annuity Fund,
151 N.J. Super. 71 (App. Div. 1977), the case addressed eligibility for ordinary disability
retirement and whether Berstein remained eligible to apply after her membership in the
fund 	ended, 	not 	whether 	she 	missed 	a 	statutory 	deadline 	to 	challenge 	a 	final
administrative decision. Id. Similarly, Galik v. Clara Maas Medical Center, 167 N.J. 241
(2001), 	involved a 	substantive 	pleading 	requirement, 	not 	a 	jurisdictional 	limitation
necessary to invoke a tribunal's authority. Id. To be sure, in O.W. and L.W. o/b/o A.W.
v. North Bergen Bd. of Educ., OAL Dkt. No. EDU 15824-24, Agency Dkt. No. 270-10/23
(Final Decision March 3, 2025), the Commissioner dismissed a petition challenging a HIB
determination as untimely even though petitioners attempted to file within the required
timeframe but failed to cure procedural deficiencies in time. 	In other words, the
Commissioner does not recognize substantial compliance in this regard.
Still, the Commissioner may exercise his authority under N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.1.6 to
relax the application of the ninety-day rule "where strict adherence thereto may be
deemed 	inappropriate 	or 	unnecessary 	or 	may 	result 	in 	injustice." Ibid. However,

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 19724-25
7
exceptions to the ninety-day rule are only appropriate where compelling circumstances
exist to justify the enlargement or relaxation of the time limit. See Kaprow, 131 N.J. at
590; DeMaio v. New Providence Bd. of Educ., 96 N.J.A.R.2d (EDU) 449, 453.
Yet, this extraordinary relief is usually reserved only for situations where the party
presents a substantial constitutional issue or a matter of significant public interest beyond
concern only to the parties. Portee v. Bd. of Educ. of Newark, 94 N.J.A.R.2d (EDU) 381,
384; Wise v. Trenton Bd. of Educ., EDU 160-00, Initial Decision (July 25, 2000), adopted,
Comm'r 	Decision 	(September 	11, 	2000), aff'd, 	St. 	Bd. 	(January 	3, 	2001),
http://njlaw.rutgers.edu/collections/oal/.
Notably, the petitioners' claim has only personal significance, making relaxation of
the rule even less appropriate. If the Commissioner relaxed the filing timeframe for every
harsh result, that action would nullify the rule's salutary public policy of encouraging
prompt resolution of disputes. 	Pacio v. Bd. of Educ. of Lakeland Reg. High Sch. Dist..,
1989 S.L.D. 2060 (Comm'r July 29, 1989). Thus, I CONCLUDE that the petitioners do not
present exceptional circumstances or a compelling reason that warrant relaxation of the
ninety-day rule and that they filed the petition beyond the required time frame.
ORDER
Given my findings of fact and conclusions of law, I ORDER that the Board’s motion
to dismiss be GRANTED. I further ORDER that the Petition of Appeal be DISMISSED.
I 	hereby 	FILE 	this 	initial 	decision 	with 	the 	COMMISSIONER 	OF 	THE
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION for consideration.
This recommended decision may be adopted, modified, or rejected by the
COMMISSIONER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, who by law is authorized
to make a final decision in this matter. 	If the Commissioner of the Department of
Education does not adopt, modify, or reject this decision within forty-five days and unless

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 19724-25
8
such time limit is otherwise extended, this recommended decision shall become a final
decision in accordance with N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10.
Within thirteen days from the date on which this recommended decision was
mailed to the parties, any party may file written exceptions with the COMMISSIONER OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, ATTN: 	BUREAU OF CONTROVERSIES AND
DISPUTES, 100 Riverview Plaza, 4th Floor, PO Box 500, Trenton, New Jersey 08625-
0500, marked “Attention: 	Exceptions.” 	A copy of any exceptions must be sent to the
judge and to the other parties.
December 12, 2025
DATE 	NANCI G. STOKES, ALJ
Date Received at Agency: 	December 12, 2025
Date Mailed to Parties:
ljb