Joel Schwartz and Corrine O’Hara v. Board of Education of the Town of Princeton, Mercer County, and Board of Education of the Township of Cranbury, Middlesex County, 12/17/19, (#337-19)

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337-19
New Jersey Commissioner of Education
Final Decision
Joel Schwartz and Corrine O’Hara,
Petitioners,
v.
Board of Education of the Town of Princeton,
Mercer County and Board of Education of the
Township of Cranbury, Middlesex County,
Respondents.
Synopsis
Petitioners – residents of Princeton – filed the within action to seek a review of the Town of
Princeton Board of Education’s (Princeton) decision to renew its send-receive relationship with
the Township of Cranbury Board of Education (Cranbury). 	Cranbury has for approximately
thirty years sent its high school students to Princeton under a send-receive agreement. In 2018,
an extension of the existing agreement was discussed at an open public meeting, and thereafter
Princeton’s board voted unanimously to approve the extended agreement. Princeton filed a
motion for summary decision, which was joined by Cranbury; petitioners opposed the motion.
The ALJ found, inter alia, that: there are no material facts at issue in this case, and the matter is
ripe for summary decision; 	local boards of education have broad discretionary authority and
their actions are entitled to a presumption of correctness; 	the decision to renew a send-receive
agreement is entirely discretionary as there is no statute, regulation, or policy that require a board
of education to consider certain information or make specific findings prior to voting on the
matter; in the instant case, Princeton made its discretionary determination after consulting with
the Board attorney and a demographics expert, holding a public meeting on the issue,
and listening to public comment; and Princeton did not act in an arbitrary, capricious or
unreasonable 	manner 	in 	extending 	the 	send-receive 	agreement 	with 	Cranbury. 	The 	ALJ
concluded that Princeton did not abuse its discretion in approving the send-receive relationship
with Cranbury. Accordingly, summary decision was granted and the petition was dismissed.
Upon review, the Commissioner adopted the Initial Decision of the OAL as the final decision in
this matter, and dismissed the petition.
This synopsis is not part of the Commissioner’s decision. It has been prepared for the convenience of the reader. It
has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Commissioner.
December 17, 2019

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OAL Dkt. No. EDU 14403-18
Agency Dkt. No. 231-9/18
New Jersey Commissioner of Education
Final Decision
Joel Schwartz and Corrine O’Hara,
Petitioners,
v.
Board of Education of the Town of Princeton,
Mercer County and Board of Education of the
Township of Cranbury, Middlesex County,
Respondents.
The record of this matter and the Initial Decision of the Office of Administrative
Law (OAL) have been reviewed, as have the exceptions filed by petitioners pursuant to
N.J.A.C. 1:1-18.4, and the replies thereto filed by the Princeton Board of Education (Princeton)
and Cranbury Board of Education (Cranbury).1
In this matter, petitioners – residents of the Town of Princeton – challenge
Princeton’s decision to extend its send-receive relationship with Cranbury. 	Cranbury has been
sending its high school students to Princeton for approximately 30 years pursuant to a sending-
receiving agreement. 	Discussion on whether to continue the relationship was held at the
Princeton Board Meeting on April 24, 2018, and the Board voted on June 12, 2018 to approve
the agreement. 	The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found that Princeton did not act in an
arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable manner in extending the agreement because, in making the
discretionary determination, the Board consulted with its attorney and a demographer, held
1 Cranbury’s reply exceptions consist of a letter joining in on the reply filed by Princeton.

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public discussion, and listened to public comment. 	Additionally, the ALJ concluded that the
Cranbury Board member who serves as a representative on Princeton’s Board had a right under
N.J.S.A. 18A:38-8.1 to vote on whether to renew the agreement, including the terms of the
agreement. However, the ALJ found that even assuming, arguendo, that it was improper for the
Cranbury representative to vote, there was no harm in the error because the agreement would
have passed regardless of whether the Cranbury representative voted. 	Finally, the ALJ found
that there is no authority or reason for the Commissioner to compel Princeton to conduct a
feasibility study.
In their exceptions, petitioners argue that summary decision should have been
denied because the Initial Decision was based on many disputed facts. 	Petitioners allege that
Princeton’s decision was not based on reports or analysis; instead, the Board presented limited
documents purporting to provide financial, legal and demographic impacts that in actuality
provided skewed information that was not based on verifiable facts. Petitioners maintain that the
ALJ erred in relying on the facts presented by respondents, which were only made by
certification of counsel and not by anyone with first-hand knowledge, including the fact that
severance would have been contested by Cranbury, that there were financial incentives to
continue the agreement, or that litigation would result in excessive costs.
Petitioners further argue that the ALJ mischaracterized their argument as asserting
that Princeton’s actions were arbitrary and capricious, when they actually argued that the Board
and its members breached their fiduciary obligations to citizens of the Town of Princeton.
Petitioners maintain that Princeton breached its fiduciary obligations by: relying on unexplained
economic 	and 	enrollment 	assumptions; 	failing 	to 	consider 	the 	overcrowding 	caused 	by
Cranbury’s students and the consequence that Princeton residents will have to pay for expansion

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of the schools to remedy the problem; and by overlooking other schools located immediately
adjacent to Cranbury that would be a better solution than sending their students to Princeton.
Considering economics, petitioners maintain that the Board only considered the fact that 280
Cranbury students generated around $4.8 million in gross tuition payments. 	Petitioners argue
that Princeton’s assumption that it only costs about $1 million per year to educate those students
was not based on any supporting data, and that it is inaccurate, given that it costs nearly five
times that amount to educate Princeton residents. Further, the Board failed to conduct a current
demographic study, and instead relied on former reports which were contradictory. With respect
to legal considerations, petitioners also contend that Princeton relied on misinformation about the
costs and risks of severance, and that Princeton ignored at least five instances where sending-
receiving agreements have been successfully terminated, including the termination of Cranbury’s
sending-receiving agreement with Lawrence Township in order to initiate the current sending-
receiving relationship with Princeton nearly 30 years ago.
Petitioners contend that the ALJ erred in finding that the “only sensible reason not
to renew the agreement, then, is if the Board wanted to sever the relationship.” 	(Petitioners’
exceptions at 19). 	The ALJ failed to consider that Princeton would have had an alternative to
severance – i.e., deferring any action until it had the information to make a reasoned decision.
Additionally, petitioners argue that the Cranbury representative had an inherent conflict of
interest when she voted at both Princeton’s and Cranbury’s board meetings in favor of the
agreement, and that nothing in N.J.S.A. 18A:38-8.1 allows her to vote on a sending-receiving
agreement. As such, petitioners seek for the Commissioner to reject the Initial Decision so that a
plenary hearing may be held.

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In reply, Princeton argues that contrary to petitioners’ argument, its summary
decision motion was not based on uncertified facts. Princeton submitted the certification of the
Board’s Business Administrator and Board Secretary who had direct knowledge of the events at
the relevant meetings, and also incorporated video recordings of those meetings. 	Furthermore,
Princeton maintains that the ALJ did not resolve any disputed facts. Whether or not petitioners
claim that the underlying information was incorrect or that additional information was necessary,
there is no dispute as to what information was presented at the Board meetings and what the
Board considered in reaching its determination, including presentations from the Board attorney,
public 	comment, 	and 	debate 	among 	Board 	members. 	Although 	petitioners 	contend 	that
Princeton’s decision was not based on actual and verifiable financial, demographic, and
educational facts, Princeton points out that these issues – with the exception of the annual tuition
amount – are based on estimates and projections, so they cannot be truly verified.
Princeton further contends that the ALJ applied the appropriate, long-settled
standard of review of discretionary determinations made by boards of education – whether the
action was arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. 	Nevertheless, Princeton maintains that it did
not breach a fiduciary duty, as there is no evidence of any fraud or corruption in its decision
making. 	Finally, 	Princeton 	argues 	that 	the 	ALJ 	properly concluded 	that 	the 	Cranbury
representative was authorized to vote on the agreement, as N.J.S.A. 18A:38-8.1 allows sending
district representatives to vote on tuition or on “any matter” which directly involves the sending
district’s students, or the programs and services they use. Therefore, Princeton requests that the
Commissioner adopt the Initial Decision.
Upon review, the Commissioner agrees with the ALJ that Princeton did not act in
an arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable manner in voting to extend the sending-receiving

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relationship with Cranbury. 	Such determination was based on information provided by the
Board attorney and following public discussion and comment. 	The Commissioner further
concurs with the ALJ that there is no basis by which Princeton should be compelled to conduct a
feasibility study when both Princeton and Cranbury wish to continue the sending-receiving
relationship. 	With respect to the sending district representative, the Commissioner notes that
regardless of whether the Cranbury representative was permitted by N.J.S.A. 18A:38-8.1 to vote
on the renewal of the sending-receiving agreement, the result would still be the same. 	When a
Board member’s improper vote does not change the ultimate result, and his or her participation
was not prejudicial to the cause, the error is harmless. 	Scardigli v. Borough of Haddonfield
Zoning Board of Adjustment, 300 N.J. Super. 314, 324 (App. Div. 1997). 	As the ALJ found,
excluding the Cranbury representative’s vote, six of ten Board members voted in favor of the
agreement, so a majority remained in favor of renewing the agreement. 	As such, the
Commissioner need not make a determination regarding whether N.J.S.A. 18A:38-8.1 permits
sending district representatives to vote on the renewal of a sending-receiving agreement, as any
error in this circumstance was harmless.
The Commissioner does not find petitioners’ exceptions to be persuasive. 	The
ALJ applied the correct standard for discretionary Board determinations. “It is well established
that any ‘action of the local board which lies within the area of its discretionary powers may not
be upset unless patently arbitrary, without rational basis or induced by improper motives.’”
M.S., on behalf of minor child, J.S. v. Board of Education of the Township of Hainesport,
Burlington County, Commissioner’s Decision No. 155-19, dated June 18, 2019, at 2 (quoting
Kopera v. W. Orange Bd. of Educ., 60 N.J. Super. 288 (App. Div. 1960)). 	It is clear that
Princeton had a rational basis for its decision to extend the sending-receiving relationship with

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Cranbury. 	Additionally, whether petitioners believe that the Board should have considered
additional information or done additional research, there is no doubt that Princeton made an
informed determination based on information provided by the Board attorney and following
public comment and discussion. 	Further, the Initial Decision was not based on disputed facts.
While petitioners seem to challenge the accuracy of the information presented to the Board, there
is no dispute regarding what Princeton reviewed and considered in rendering its determination.
Accordingly, the Initial Decision of the OAL is adopted – as modified herein – as
the final decision in this matter for the reasons expressed therein, and the petition is hereby
dismissed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.2
COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION
Date of Decision: 	December 17, 2019
Date of Mailing: 	December 19, 2019
2 This decision may be appealed to the Appellate Division of the Superior Court pursuant to P.L. 2008,
c. 36 (N.J.S.A 18A:6-9.1).

New Jersey is an Equal Opportunity Employer
State of New Jersey
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
INITIAL DECISION
GRANTING SUMMARY DECISON
OAL DKT. NO. EDU 14403-18
AGENCY DKT. NO. 231-9/18
JOEL SCHWARTZ AND CORRINE O’HARA,
Petitioners,
v.
TOWN OF PRINCETON BOARD OF
EDUCATION, MERCER COUNTY AND
TOWNSHIP OF CRANBURY BOARD
OF EDUCATION, MIDDLESEX COUNTY,
Respondents.
Steve J. Edelstein, Esq., for petitioners (Weiner Law Group, LLP, attorneys)
Vittorio S. LaPira, Esq., for respondent, Town of Princeton Board of Education
(Fogarty & O’Hara, attorneys)
Joseph D. Castellucci, Jr., Esq., for respondent, Township of Cranbury Board
of Education (Methfessel and Werbel, attorneys)
Record Closed: August 30, 2019 	Decided: October 3, 2019
BEFORE SARAH G. CROWLEY, ALJ:

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 14403-18
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PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND STATEMENT OF FACTS
The petitioners filed this action seeking a review of the Town of Princeton Board
of Education’s (Princeton) decision to renew its send-receive relationship with the
Township of Cranbury Board of Education (Cranbury). 	The matter was transmitted to
the Office of Administrative Law (OAL) as a contested case on October 3, 2018.
N.J.S.A. 52:14B-1 to -15 and N.J.S.A. 52:14f-1 to -13. 	A motion for summary decision
was filed by Princeton on March 1, 2019. 	By letter dated March 12, 2019, Cranbury
joined in the Motion. 	Opposition to the motion was filed by the petitioners on July 23,
2019, and a Reply brief was filed by Princeton on August 30, 2019.
Petitioners are residents of Princeton. 	Cranbury is a K-8 public body organized
pursuant 	to 	N.J.S.A. 	18A:10-1 	et 	seq. 	Pursuant 	to 	a 	send-receive 	relationship,
Cranbury sends its high school students to Princeton. 	This send-receive relationship
has 	existed 	for 	approximately 	thirty 	years 	since 	Cranbury 	petitioned 	to 	sever 	its
relationship with Lawrence Township in 1985. 	On April 24, 2018, the extension of this
agreement was discussed at an open public meeting of the Princeton BOE.
Presentations were made by the Board attorney, and interested parties were
given an opportunity to discuss the matter. 	The petitioners were present as were other
members of the public, who were permitted the opportunity to speak and ask questions.
The Board presented information from a demographer as well as detailed financial
information. 	The attorney for the Board provided a discussion of what would be
required 	for 	severance 	to 	occur, 	including 	a 	feasibility 	study, 	approval 	from 	the
Commissioner of the Department of Education, as well as potential litigation from
Cranbury. 	Thereafter, on June 12, 2018, the Board voted unanimously to approve the
agreement.
Petitioners argue that the Board acted arbitrary, capricious or unreasonably in
approving the send-receive relationship with Cranbury. 	The petitioners also argue that
the Cranbury BOE member should not have been permitted to vote on the issue, and

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 14403-18
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her vote vitiates or nullifies the vote. 	And finally, the petitioners seek an order from the
undersigned requiring the Princeton BOE to conduct a feasibility study on the severance
of the relationship with Cranbury.
LEGAL ANALYSIS
Summary decision is the administrative counterpart to summary judgment in the
judicial arena. 	N.J.A.C. 1:1-12.5 provides that summary decision should be rendered if
the papers and discovery which have been filed, together with the affidavits, if any,
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and that the
moving party is entitled to prevail as a matter of law. 	To defeat a summary decision
motion, the adverse party must respond by affidavits setting forth specific facts showing
that there is a genuine issue which can only be determined in an evidentiary hearing.
Use of the summary procedure is aimed at the swift uncovering of the merits and either
their effective disposition or their advancement toward a prompt resolution by trial.
Judson v. Peoples Bank and Trust Co. of Westfield, 17 N.J. 67, 74 (1954).
The New Jersey Supreme Court encouraged trial-level courts not to refrain from
granting summary judgment when the proper circumstances present themselves. 	Brill
v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 541 (1995). 	While cautioning that a
judge should not weigh the truth of the evidence or resolve factual disputes at this early
stage of the proceedings, the Court clarified that when the evidence is so one-sided that
one party must prevail as a matter of law, the trial court should not hesitate to grant
summary judgment. 	Id. at 540. 	Appellate courts recognize that “[a]n evidentiary
hearing is mandated only when the proposed administrative action is based on disputed
adjudicatory facts.” 	Contini v. Bd. of Educ. of Newark, 286 N.J. Super. 106, 120 (App.
Div. 1995), certif. denied, 145 N.J. 372 (1996).
Standard for Board Decisions
Under the familiar and deferential standard of review, local boards of education
“have broad discretionary authority and their actions are entitled to a presumption of

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 14403-18
4
correctness absent a showing of bad faith, illegal motive or a lack of rational basis.”
L.S. o/b/o E.S. v. Westfield Twp. Bd. of Educ., EDU 7387-09, Final Decision (December
20, 2009), https://njlaw.rutgers.edu/collections/oal/. 	The decision whether to renew a
send-receive agreement is entirely discretionary—meaning, the Princeton Board is not
required by statute, regulation, or board policy to consider certain information or make
particular findings before voting on the matter. 	Individual board members must decide
for themselves what information is needed to make an informed decision.
In the instant case, before voting on whether to renew the agreement, the
Princeton Board consulted its attorney and a demographer, presented information to the
community, and listened to public comments. During this deliberative period, petitioners
raised concerns to the Board about its decision-making process. First, even if it did not
renew the agreement, by operation of settled law, the relationship would nonetheless
continue on the same terms. 	The only sensible reason not to renew the agreement,
then, is if the Board wanted to sever the relationship. The Board had a rational basis to
avoid initiating the severance process, which its attorney advised is both uncertain and
expensive—two propositions petitioners do not dispute. 	Assuming the respondents
wanted severance, they would have to conduct a costly feasibility study and petition the
Commissioner of Education for permission to sever. 	Moreover, it was known to the
board that any such application would have been contested by Cranbury. The feasibility
study alone—which Princeton would have to fully finance—could cost tens of thousands
of dollars. And the unavoidable litigation costs and expert fees could easily exceed that
amount. Measured against the prospect of success, the Board’s decision to avoid these
costs was not arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable. 	The Board also had sound
financial incentives to continue the relationship. 	Tuition paid by Cranbury—$17,191
per-student, totaling about $5 million annually, which represents the second largest
source of revenue for the operating budget.
The petitioners’ main complaint is that the net loss estimates kept fluctuating,
from a high of $3.8 million to a low of $1 million. 	This illustrates why, in their view, the
Board needed to provide “verifiable facts or evidence” to substantiate the cost of
educating Cranbury students and the cost savings if those students no longer attended

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 14403-18
5
Princeton High School. 	The fact that Princeton High School was over-capacity and
projected to remain that way for the foreseeable future, does not render the Board’s
decision irrational. Moreover, the Board estimated, based on demographic reports, that
even without Cranbury students, Princeton High School would remain over-capacity for
all but one of the next eight school years. 	Thus, to accommodate the growing student
population, Princeton High School nonetheless needed to be renovated, using funds
raised by the then-proposed bond referendum. Petitioners question the accuracy of the
demographic reports and thus, the Board’s reliance on them. 	They argue that the five
reports were flawed in that they produced contradictory results and failed to consider
important information—for example, how recent housing developments in Princeton or
Cranbury’s affordable housing obligation would affect enrollment at the high school.
They also allege that the Board ignored a relevant 2015 demographic report prepared
by Cranbury. 	Yet there is no evidence that the reports were inaccurate or would have
been 	more 	accurate 	had 	they 	considered 	the 	information 	petitioners 	suggest.
Moreover, the petitioners did not present an expert of their own or an expert report from
their own demographer.
Petitioners’ also argue that the Board should have deliberated longer before
voting; the Board’s interactions with the community were merely “public relations
events.” It is undisputed that the Princeton Board did have a significant amount of data
before them, had the law presented by their attorney, and listed to the public at an open
public meeting. 	It is evident that the petitioners desired a different conclusion from the
Board. However, the law only requires that the Board not act in an arbitrary, capricious
or unreasonable manner. In this case, it did not.
Sending District’s Representative
The petitioners argue that Evelynn Spann, the Cranbury Board member should
not have been permitted to vote on the extension of the agreement. 	The law permits
Cranbury to appoint one representative to sit on the Princeton Board. N.J.S.A. 18A:38-
8.2(a)(2). 	That representative, Evelynn Spann, voted with six of her colleagues to
renew the send-receive agreement. 	The issue is whether she had the statutory

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 14403-18
6
authority to vote on that matter, as a sending district’s representative is only eligible to
vote on those matters listed from N.J.S.A. 18A:38-8.1(a)-(i). 	There is also no dispute
that 	the 	statute 	does 	not 	explicitly 	authorize 	voting 	on 	renewing 	a 	send-receive
agreement. The disagreement concerns whether voting on that subject is authorized by
the right to vote on (“tuition to be charged the sending district by the receiving district”)
and (“any matter directly involving the sending district pupils or programs and services
utilized by those pupils”). N.J.S.A. 18A:38-8.1(a) and (e).
The intent of the statute is that the sending district member voting rights be
limited to those matters that affect the sending district students. 	The Legislature must
have known that send-receive relationships are governed by written agreements. 	So,
petitioners are correct that the Legislature could have (and maybe should have) been
clearer if it intended to authorize voting on whether to renew such an agreement.
However, if we begin from the premise that any good send-receive agreement would
include, among other terms, tuition costs—as this agreement did—subsection (a) raises
difficult questions. On the one hand, authorizing the representative to vote on one term
in the agreement (tuition costs) is a clumsy way for the Legislature to authorize voting
on the entire agreement. 	On the other hand, the Princeton Board is correct that unless
the agreement is voted on in parts—which is an unusual way to conduct business—the
representative would be deprived of their right to vote on tuition costs.
When subsections (a) and (e) are read together, it is only logical that the
representative can vote on whether to renew the agreement. Subsection (e) authorizes
voting on “any matter directly involving the sending district pupils or programs and
services utilized by those pupils.” 	N.J.S.A. 18A:38-8.1(e). 	This broad language
seemingly covers other provisions in a typical send-receive agreement, for example,
transportation costs and special education responsibility. 	Because these provisions
concern the terms under which the sending district’s students are educated, they fit
comfortably within the language of subsection (e). 	For this reason, Ms. Spann was
authorized to vote on the matter.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 14403-18
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The petitioners also allege a conflict of interest on the part of the Cranbury board
member. 	This particular conflict of interest statute, however, is found in the School
Ethics Act, N.J.S.A. 18A:12-21 et seq., over which the School Ethics Commission has
primary jurisdiction. 	N.J.S.A. 18A:12-29; N.J.A.C. 6A:28-1.4. 	Thus, this matter is not
properly before the Commissioner of Education. 	See e.g., Gardner v. Hackensack Bd.
of Educ., EDU 09421-12, Initial Decision (May 1, 2013), adopted, Comm’r (June 7,
2013), https://njlaw.rutgers.edu/collections/oal/. 	Accordingly, I CONCLUDE that the
Cranbury Board member had a right under the statute to vote on whether to renew the
agreement and the terms of the agreement.
Finally, even assuming Ms. Spann voted improperly, that error was harmless.
See Scardigli v. Borough of Haddonfield Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 300 N.J. Super. 314,
324 (App. Div. 1997) (“[The board member’s] improper vote does not change the
ultimate result, and plaintiff has not claimed that [the board member’s] participation . . .
was prejudicial to plaintiff's cause. While it was erroneous to permit [the board member]
to vote under the circumstances, we conclude the error is harmless.”) 	Excluding her
vote, six of ten board members voted to renew the agreement. 	That satisfied both the
common law rule (requiring majority vote of those present) and the enhanced voting rule
(requiring majority vote of the full board). 	See Negron v. South Plainfield Bd. of Educ.,
EDU 	11522-10, 	Final 	Decision 	(March 	28, 	2011),
https://njlaw.rutgers.edu/collections/oal/.
Feasibility Study
The petitioners do not dispute that the statute requires a feasibility study before
severance 	of 	an 	existing 	send-receive 	relationship 	can 	occur. 	However, 	the
Commissioner of Education cannot compel the Princeton Board to prepare a feasibility
study. 	The Commissioner has supervisory authority over send-receive relationships.
See Merchantville Bd. of Educ. v. Pennsauken Bd. of Educ., 204 N.J. Super. 508, 511
(App. Div. 1985). 	Once established, such a relationship may not be severed “except
upon application made to and approved by the commissioner.” 	N.J.S.A. 18A:38-13. 	It
is not enough, in other words, for two districts to agree to end their relationship. 	The

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 14403-18
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district(s) 	seeking 	severance, 	as 	a 	pre-condition 	for 	filing 	an 	application 	to 	the
Commissioner, must “prepare and submit a feasibility study,” which considers the
financial, educational, and racial implications of ending the relationship. 	Ibid; N.J.A.C.
6A:3-6.1(a). 	This study helps the Commissioner determine whether granting the
application would have a “substantial negative impact.” 	N.J.S.A. 18A:38-13. 	If the
Commissioner finds that it would not, the application must be granted. Ibid. There is no
apparent reason, let alone a requirement, for a district to commission a feasibility study
if it wants to continue the relationship—which is true for Princeton and Cranbury.
Petitioners seek to order the Commissioner to initiate the severance process for
Princeton by ordering it to prepare a feasibility study. 	The Commissioner has no
authority and no reason to disrupt a harmonious send-receive relationship. 	Local
boards of education must decide whether to enter into such a relationship. 	But see
N.J.S.A. 18A:38-8 (districts may be required to receive students). 	Likewise, the
decision whether to initiate the process to end that relationship should also be left to
their sound discretion. 	The absence of a governing standard is the clearest sign that
the Legislature did not intend for the Commissioner to have this power. 	Cf. 	N.J.S.A.
18A:38-13 (standard for when severance application must be granted). 	Petitioners do
not suggest under what circumstances it would be appropriate for the Commissioner to
compel a board of education to prepare a feasibility study. 	Under their logic, if a
taxpayer petitions for this relief, the Commissioner should grant it.
Decisions of this kind, however, are reserved for the democratic process. 	If taxpayers
believe a feasibility study should be prepared, they must convince their local board
members, who can vote to have the study conducted.
CONCLUSION
Respondent has filed a Motion for Summary Decision alleging that there are no
factual issues in dispute, and they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 	The
undisputed 	evidence 	demonstrate 	that 	the 	Board’s 	decision 	was 	not 	arbitrary,
unreasonable or capricious. 	Moreover, the petitioners have no right to demand a
feasibility study or the dissolution of the send/receive agreement as a matter of law, as

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 14403-18
9
there is no private right to such a claim. 	Finally, the Cranbury Board member had a
right to vote and even if their vote was excluded, the majority vote from the Board
approved the send-receive relationship. 	Accordingly, I CONCLUDE that the Board did
not abuse its discretion in approving the send-receive relationship with Cranbury. 	I
therefore CONCLUDE that the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
ORDER
I hereby ORDER that the District’s Motion for Summary Decision is hereby
GRANTED and the Petition is hereby DISMISSED.
I 	hereby 	FILE 	this 	initial 	decision 	with 	the 	COMMISSIONER 	OF 	THE
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION for consideration.
This 	recommended 	decision 	may 	be 	adopted, 	modified 	or 	rejected 	by 	the
COMMISSIONER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, who by law is authorized
to make a final decision in this matter. 	If the Commissioner of the Department of
Education does not adopt, modify or reject this decision within forty-five days and unless
such time limit is otherwise extended, this recommended decision shall become a final
decision in accordance with N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10.

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10
Within thirteen days from the date on which this recommended decision was
mailed to the parties, any party may file written exceptions with the COMMISSIONER
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, ATTN: 	BUREAU OF CONTROVERSIES
AND DISPUTES, 100 Riverview Plaza, 4th Floor, PO Box 500, Trenton, New Jersey
08625-0500, marked “Attention: Exceptions.” A copy of any exceptions must be sent to
the judge and to the other parties.
October 3, 2019
DATE 	SARAH G. CROWLEY, ALJ
Date Received at Agency:
Date Mailed to Parties:
SGC/cb