G.P., on behalf of minor child, J.R. v. Board of Education of the Township of Rockaway, Morris County, 10/10/25 (#480-25E)

480-25E
OAL Dkt. No. EDU 14431-25
Agency Dkt. No. 277-8/25
New Jersey Commissioner of Education
Order on Emergent Relief
G.P., on behalf of minor child, J.R.,
Petitioner,
v.
Board of Education of the Township of Rockaway,
Morris County,
Respondent.
The record of this emergent matter, the sound recording of the hearing held at the Office of
Administrative Law (OAL), and the recommended Order of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) have been
reviewed and considered.
Upon review, the Commissioner concurs with the ALJ that petitioner has failed to demonstrate
entitlement to emergent relief pursuant to the standards enunciated in Crowe v. DeGioia, 90 N.J. 126,
132-34 (1982), and codified at N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.6.
Accordingly, the recommended Order denying petitioner’s application for emergent relief is
adopted for the reasons stated therein. This matter shall continue at the OAL with such proceedings as
the parties and the ALJ deem necessary to bring it to closure.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION
Date of Decision: 	October 10, 2025
Date of Mailing: 	October 10, 2025

New Jersey is an Equal Opportunity Employer
State of New Jersey
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR
EMERGENT RELIEF
OAL DKT. NO. EDU 14431-25
AGENCY DKT. NO. 277-8/25
G.P. o/b/o MINOR CHILD J.R.,
Petitioner,
v.
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE TOWNSHIP
OF ROCKAWAY, MORRIS COUNTY,
Respondent.
______________________________________
G.P. petitioner, on behalf of J.R., pro se
Jaclyn M. Morgese Esq., for respondent (Chasen, Lamparello, Mallon and
Cappuzzo, attorneys)
BEFORE ERNEST M. BONGIOVANNI, ALJ:
FACTUAL DISCUSSION
On 	August 	19, 	2025, 	a 	petition 	by 	G.P., 	on 	behalf 	of 	minor 	child 	J.R.
(G.P./Petitioner) was filed with a request for Emergent Relief. On September 5, 2025 at
1:30 PM a hearing on the Emergent request only, was held. Because of the length of the
petition, and the documents and in support of the emergent appeal, and the lack of
organization in the filings, requests were made by the undersigned for clarification of the

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 14431-25
2
argument and to cite specific parts of the law that are relevant to the application. 	The
parties were given until Sept 11, 2025 to clarify.
Petitioner filed voluminous additional arguments and citations sent via email
September 8 and Sept 10, 2025. 	Respondent, which filed its initial opposition to the
motion on September 3, 2025, filed supplemental opposition on September 8 and
September 11. 2025. 	In considering the submissions, I determined I would not accept
legal briefs filed in other cases concerning those cases, and I requested that the full text
of certain decisions or legal precedent be supplied with which petitioner and respondent
complied. 	I also advised petitioner I would now accept into evidence a “Hibster User
Guide” as it lacked proper authority and foundation.
The petition solely involves two findings of instances of HIB against J.R. by
respondent Board of Education of the Township of Rockaway (Board/respondent). The
Emergent appeal asks that during the pendency of the proceedings, this Court enter an
Order vacating the Board’s findings and its “mistaken records” about its investigation,
reasoning that every day these two HIB findings remain on J.R.’s school records results
in injury to his scholastic record, chances for scholastic and extracurricular involvement
and injures his reputation. G.P. also argues the school’s findings during the pendency of
the hearing increase the likelihood of incremental disciplinary punishment (although
neither side focused on the punishment, and it is fair to say, it was “buried” in the
avalanche of arguments and excessive documentary submissions. I believe the discipline
was on the order of two days when J.R. was not allowed to have lunch in the school
cafeteria).
Before analyzing the elements of Crowe and its application to the decision to
follow, I FIND that the overwhelming content of petitioner’s complaint is not against how
the Board weighed the evidence it its ultimate determination of HIB but rather a plethora
of alleged failures of the Board to follow procedural requirements of the Anti-Bullying Bill
of Rights Act, N.J.S.A. 18A:37-13 et seq. (the ACT). 	Thus, in analyzing some of the
elements of Crowe, I will simply state there is a presumption of correctness in the Board’s
determination in its findings in HIB investigations, and the Emergent relief application fails
to overcome that presumption by not significantly challenging the evidence that a) J.R.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 14431-25
3
actually committed the actions, here basically verbalizing insults about another student’s
weight or shape, or that b) such actions cannot under the ACT constitute a HIB.
Rather the Emergent relief focuses on alleged procedural defects in how the Board
failed to carry out alleged procedural mandates of the ACT. For example, G.P. complains
that neither she nor J.R.’s father were notified properly were not given “Same day notice”
she was allegedly entitled to under N.J.A.C. 6A:16-7.8(a)2i, but was instead informed two
days after the commencement of the HIB investigation. 	G.P. also argues that the
notification to her on June 11, 2025 of the Board’s findings of the two HIBS was untimely
under the act.
For all the procedural defects alleged by G.P., she seeks a “Temporary Order” for
1. 	Nonreliance on HIB findings #292933 and #293608
2. 	Annotation of local SSDS entries ‘disputed stayed” (with a local records
fallback)
3. 	In camera submission of Board Executive Summary, HIBster autologs.
Metadata
and any SSDS stamps with a privilege log,
4. 	A 7.7 correction or written denial of the 5/21/2025 entry on the Short front
page. (the last item relating to alleged erroneous statements concerning
procedural steps)1
The Board adamantly denies there was not proper Notice under the Act, Even if
there were any defects in the HIB investigation of Notices of same to the parents, it argues
petitioner fails to satisfy the elements of Crowe and N.J.A.C. 63:3-1.6 requirements for
emergent relief. Among other reasons, the Board cites J.L. ex rel A.L. v Bd. Of Educ of
the Bridgewater-Raritan Reg’s School Dist., OAL Dkt. 11464-14 Agency Dkt No, 77 3/14
Comm’r Dec. 2018
1 Petitioner’s “Crowe Letter-Brief, 9/3/25, second page (no pagination on original document)

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 14431-25
4
In that case Administrative Law Judge Kerins stated the proper remedy for
procedural defects, their being that the parents were not appropriately notified of the
results of the investigation. 	The Judge noted the ACT required “prompt response to an
alleged HIB incident and determined the principal was required to initiate an investigation
within one school day of a HIB being reported. Judge Kerins also found that the results
of an investigation be reported to the Board of Education no later than “the next Board of
education meeting following the completion of the investigation…[.]”
Significantly Judge Kerins did not find any specific timeline for an initial notice to
the parents of an investigation while the investigation is ongoing. 	In any event, in
reversing the Board’s decision, Judge Kerins ordered a remand and failed to provide any
remedy for changing the Board’s decision by vacating or expunging the Board’s action
pending the result of the remand. Ultimately the Appellate Division affirmed the Judge’s
remand as proper. 	J.L. ex rel A.L. v Bd. Of Educ. Of the Bridgewater-Raritan Reg’l
School Dist. Docket A-2022-16TI (App. Div. 2018).
LEGAL ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION
To be successful in an application for emergent relief the moving party prove and
demonstrate each element clearly and convincingly. 	Waste Management of N.J. v.
Union. Cnty, Utilities Authority, 399 N.J. Super 508, 520 (App. Div. 2008).
The “Crowe” standards
N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.6(b) sets forth the standards governing motions for emergent
relief and instructs that:
A motion for a stay or emergent relief shall be accompanied by a letter
memorandum or brief which shall address the following standards to be met
for granting such relief pursuant to Crowe v. DeGioia, 90 N.J. 126 (1982):
1. 	The 	petitioner 	will 	suffer 	irreparable 	harm 	if 	the
requested relief is not granted;
2. 	The legal right underlying petitioner’s claim is settled;

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 14431-25
5
3. 	The petitioner has a likelihood of prevailing on the merits
of the underlying claim; and
4. 	When the equities and interests of the parties are
balanced, the petitioner will suffer greater harm than the
respondent 	will 	suffer 	if 	the 	requested 	relief 	is 	not
granted.
[N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.6(b).]
Indeed, the moving party must demonstrate each element of Crowe “clearly and
convincingly.” 	Waste Management of N.J. v. Union County Utilities Authority, 399 N.J.
Super. 508, 520 (App. Div. 2008).
Irreparable harm or injury
Irreparable harm is a "substantial injury to a material degree coupled with the
inadequacy of money damages." Judice's Sunshine Pontiac v. General Motors corp., 418
F. Supp. 1212, 1218 (D.N.J. 1976). An injunctive relief award requires a "clear showing
of irreparable injury" or a "presently existing actual threat." 	Cont'l Grp. v. Amoco
Chemicals Corp., 614 F.2d 351, 359 (D.N.J. 1980). More than a risk of irreparable harm
must be demonstrated. Id.
Here, J.R., who has been determined by the District to have committed the two
HIBs is not entitled to have in effect all the school records concerning the investigation
and its determination of HIB vacated or expunged pending the outcome of the underlying
appeal. 	The idea that J.R. will be subject to incremental discipline and injury to his
scholastic reputation and educational opportunities pending the hearing is to begin with
fanciful. 	Further I agree with respondent that HIB determinations under the ACT are
properly subject to appeals, and possible modifications, remands or reversals by the OAL
or by the Commissioner of Education. If petitioner ultimately prevails, the ACT provides
adequate relief at that time. In any event, It’s evident that the time of harm described by
G.P. is not only not serious but is certainly subject to adequate remedial action in the
event she prevails. There exist adequate remedy or remedies “after the fact.” L.J. o/b/o
minor child S.J. et al. v. Bd. of Educ. Of the Twp of Manchester, Ocean Cty, OAL Docket

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 14431-25
6
No. EDU 2437-03 (2003) (Respondent’s Exhibit L). As indicated infra,, I gave additional
time to both parties to clarify by citing specifically to cases or other law that supports
reversing a Board’s decision on a finding of HIB for procedural defects. 	I agree with
respondent that the cases cited by petitioner in her supplemental briefs, to the extent they
are relevant actually support the Board’s position that if procedural defects are found the
most a court would order ultimately is a remand to the Board. 	Hence it is less likely to
support the extraordinary remedy of emergent relief especially as to what petitioner seeks
here.
Right to the underlying claim must be settled
A board of education's actions are entitled to a presumption of lawfulness and good
faith. In challenges to board actions, the challenger bears the burden of proving that such
acts were unlawful, arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. 	Schuster v. Bd. of Educ.
Montgomery Twp., 96 N.J.A.R.2d (EDU) 670, 676 (citing Schnick v. Westwood Ed. of
Educ., 60 N.J. Super. 448 (App. Div. 1960), and Quinlan v. Bd. of Educ. of North Bergen
Twp., 73 N.J. Super. 40 (App. Div. 1962). The "arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable"
standard of review imposes a heavy burden on challengers of board actions, and is
defined as follows:
In the law, “arbitrary” and “capricious” means having no
rational 	basis. 	Arbitrary 	and 	capricious 	action 	of
administrative bodies means willful and unreasoning action,
without consideration and in disregard of circumstances.
Where there is no room for two opinions, action is not arbitrary
or 	capricious 	when 	exercised 	honestly 	and 	upon 	due
consideration, 	even 	though 	it 	may 	be 	believed 	that 	an
erroneous conclusion has been reached . . . 	Moreover, the
court 	should 	not 	substitute 	its 	judgment 	for 	that 	of 	an
administrative 	or 	legislative 	body 	if 	there 	is 	substantial
evidence to support the ruling.
[Piccoli v. Ed. of Educ. of Ramapo Indian Hills Regional
School District, EDU 1839-98, Initial Decision, (January 22,
1999) 	http://lawlibrary.rutgers.edu/oal/search.html 	(citing
Bayshore Sewage Co. v. Dent. of Envir. Protection,122 N.J.
Super. 184, 199-200 (Ch. Div. 1973), aff'd 131 N.J. Super. 37
(App. Div. 1974).]

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 14431-25
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In the absence of a clear showing of abuse of discretion, the Commissioner of
Education will not substitute his or her own judgment for that of the board of education.
Massaro v. Bd. of Educ. of the Boro. of Bergenfield, 1 965 S.L.D. 84, 85. In Kopera v. Bd.
of Educ. of West Orange, 60 N.J. Super. 288, 294 (App. Div. 1960), the Appellate Division
stated, "the well-established rule that action of the local board [of education] which lies
within the area of its discretionary powers may not be upset unless patently without
rational basis or induced by improper motives."
I specifically directed the parties to cite the law that specifically ordered the
prophylactic ones sought here, where certain procedural defects are alleged. I am
unconvinced by any authority cited that the emergent relief is based in a well settled legal
right. I also agree with Respondent that the Act involved here could have but does not
provide for a right to have HIB findings stayed or vacated on an emergent basis
Likelihood of prevailing on the merits
In an appeal of a HIB or disciplinary finding, the burden of proof rests with the
petitioner. Emergent relief requires petitioner to demonstrate a likelihood of prevailing on
the merits of the underlying claim, and when significant factual issues exist, petitioner
cannot.
Underlying the prediction of success of the merits lies the well settled principle that
decisions of local boards of education must stand unless shown to be arbitrary, capricious
or unreasonable. I understand that the parents here are upset with their reading of the
law, which appears incorrect in stating as petitioner repeated in oral argument that they
were entitled to same day notice regarding the HIB investigation. I agree with respondent
that it appears the Act only requires that the “principal inform the parents or guardians of
all students involved in the alleged incident.” N.J.S.A. 18A:37-15(b)(5). Further no other
timeline is established by any other cited and definitely not by Board Policy. 	The
notification of the parents of the HIB# 29233 investigation report by the principal on May
12, 2025, and on HIB # 293608 on May 21, 2025, appears to satisfy the only requirements
of the ACT and other applicable law.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 14431-25
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Petitioner’s 	here 	also 	argue 	a 	procedural 	violation 	regarding 	the 	Board’s
affirmance of the substantiation of HIB prior to their HIB appeal. However, it appears, a
HIB hearing prior to the Board’s action is not required. To the contrary, the Act provides
for a procedure whereby the results of the investigation get reported to the Board at their
next meeting after the investigation is completed. Only after that report to the Board is it
required that the parents be notified within five days.N.J.S.A.18A:37-15 (b)(6)(c). 	As
described succinctly by the Board in its Initial September 3, 2025, page 8, the Board
appears from the proofs submitted so far, to have done more to notify the parents than is
required by the Act and by any applicable school policy, at least in regard to any serious
possible violation regarding any timeline. 	I therefore cannot agree that petitioner has
demonstrated a likelihood of prevailing on the merits.
Balancing of the Equities
As the undersigned indicated during argument, granting pre-hearing relief to
petitioner would tend to reverse the process that is intended by the Act and would mean
Boards which make findings of HIB should never record their findings officially, much less
take disciplinary action until an appeal to the OAL or the Commissioner is concluded. 	I
am sure that is not what the Act intends. I agree with respondent, that if the kind of relief
sought here was to be granted “local boards of education would be required to pause all
HIB reports and votes…until a parent requests and attends a hearing before the Board.
This would create a nonsensical outcome as the [Act] establishes clear and district
timelines so delays in resolutions do not occur.”
Further, as stated before, the alleged harm to the J.R. is fanciful, or better put
speculative. Therefore, the balance of the equities rests with the Board.
Based on the above discussion and anaylis, I CONCLUDE that petitioner has
failed to establish the existence of irreparable harm, that petitioner is likely to prevail on
the merits, that petitioner’s claim is based on a well settled right or that the equites favor
petitioner. Accordingly, under N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.6 the application for Emergent Relief must
be and is DENIED.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 14431-25
9
ORDER
Based on the discussion and analysis as hereinabove stated, I ORDER that
petitioner's request for emergent relief be and is hereby DENIED.
This order on application for emergency relief may be adopted, modified, or
rejected by the COMMISSIONER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, who is
authorized by law to make the final decision in this case. 	The final decision shall be
issued without delay but no later than forty-five days from the entry of this order. 	If the
COMMISSIONER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION does not adopt, modify, or
reject this order within those forty-five days, this recommended order shall become the
final decision on the issue of emergency relief under N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10.
September 12, 2025
______
DATE 	ERNEST M. BONGIOVANNI, ALJ
Emb/id