Janet Aponte-Pagan, Aruthur Pinkney, Bernadette Pinkney, Karina Olivier, Angel Hernandez, and Hansel Perez v. Board of Trustees of the Robert Treat Academy Charter School, Essex County, 6/25/26 (#223-26)

223-26
OAL Dkt. No. EDU 00849-26
Agency Dkt. No. 425-12/25
New Jersey Commissioner of Education
Final Decision
Janet Aponte-Pagan, Arthur Pinkney, Bernadette
Pinkney, Karina 	Olivier, Angel 	Hernandez, 	and
Hansel Perez,
Petitioners,
v.
Board of Trustees of the Robert Treat Academy
Charter School, Essex County,
Respondent.
The record of this matter and the Initial Decision of the Office of Administrative Law (OAL) have
been reviewed and considered. The parties did not file exceptions.
Upon review, the Commissioner concurs with the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) that the
Commissioner lacks jurisdiction to address petitioners’ claims because they arise under municipal traffic
ordinances and not New Jersey’s school laws.
Accordingly, the Initial Decision is adopted as the final decision in this matter, and the petition of
appeal is hereby dismissed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.1
COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION
Date of Decision: 	June 25, 2026
Date of Mailing: 	June 25, 2026
1 This decision may be appealed to the Appellate Division of the Superior Court pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:6-9.1. Under
N.J.Ct.R. 2:4-1(b), a notice of appeal must be filed with the Appellate Division within 45 days from the date of mailing
of this decision.

New Jersey is an Equal Opportunity Employer
State of New Jersey
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
INITIAL DECISION ON
MOTION TO DISMISS
OAL DKT. NO. EDU 00849-26
AGENCY DKT. NO. 425-12/15
JANET APONTE-PAGAN, ARTHUR PINKNEY,
BERNADETTE PINKNEY, KARINA OLIVIER,
ANGEL HERNANDEZ, AND HANSEL PEREZ,
Petitioners,
v.
BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE ROBERT
TREAT ACADEMY CHARTER SCHOOL,
ESSEX COUNTY,
Respondent.
Janet Aponte-Pagan, Arthur Pinkney, Bernadett Pinkey, Karina Olivier, Angel
Henandez, and Hansel Perez, pro se, petitioners
Courtney M. Gaccione, Esq. (Chiesa, Shahinian & Giantomasi, PC, attorneys),
for respondent
Record Closed: April 2, 2026 	Decided: May 8, 2026
BEFORE JULIO C. MOREJON, ALJ:

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 00849-26
2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Janet Aponte-Pagan, Arthur Pinkney, Bernadette Pinkney, Karina Olivier, Angel
Hernandez, and Hansel Perez (collectively “Petitioners”), all residents of Clifton Avenue
in Newark, initiated the instant action against the Board of Trustees (the “Board”) of the
Robert Treat Academy Charter School (“RTA”), seeking to compel compliance with local
municipal traffic and safety ordinances.
The Board filed a Motion to Dismiss the instant action, arguing that the New Jersey
Department of Education lacks jurisdiction over City of Newark ordinances.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On December 8, 2025, Petitioners, initiated this matter by filing a Pro Se Petition
of 	Appeal 	(“petition”) 	with 	the 	New 	Jersey 	Department 	of 	Education, 	Office 	of
Controversies and Disputes (“NJDOE”). Therein, Petitioners allege that RTA’s Stephen
N. Adubato Campus, located at 443 Clifton Avenue, Newark, has failed to comply with
Newark Ordinance §23:5-16.
Specifically, Petitioners allege that: (1) during drop-off and pick-up, RTA permits
unsafe practices such as illegal parking, double parking, and excessive idling; (2) RTA
only utilizes a Class 2 Officer during pick-up on weekdays, while §23:5-16 requires a
Class 3 Officer during all pick-up and drop-off hours; (3) RTA’s Traffic Safety Plan is out
of date and is not actively enforced; and (4) RTA’s Traffic Safety Plan continues to
erroneously assert that a portion of Clifton Avenue is closed to through traffic during pick-
up hours when this practice ceased in 2022. (Pro Se Petition, Section II).
On January 5, 2026, the Board filed a Motion to Dismiss with the NJDOE in
response to the petition. 	Therein, the Board argues that: (1) RTA is in full compliance
with municipal traffic laws; (2) pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:6-9, NJDOE jurisdiction is limited
to controversies and disputes arising under the school laws; and (3) the appropriate forum
for the instant action is the municipal authority (of Newark) and not the NJDOE.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 00849-26
3
On 	January 	6, 	2026, 	the 	NJDOE 	transferred 	this 	matter 	to 	the 	Office 	of
Administrative Law (OAL), as a contested matter. On January 9, 2026, the within matter
was filed at the OAL, and the parties were notified therein.
A prehearing conference was held on February 19, 2026, which resulted in the
filing of a Prehearing Order, providing among other things, a motion briefing schedule
herein.
On February 25, 2026, Petitioners filed a brief in opposition to the Board’s motion.
Therein, Petitioners argue that: (1) disputes regarding municipal ordinances that govern
school-based safety procedures, traffic management, and the hiring of law enforcement
personnel for school operations fall within NJDOE jurisdiction; (2) the requirements of
Ordinance 	§23:5-16 	create 	legally 	enforceable 	duties; 	(3) 	Ordinance 	§23:5-16 	is
functionally similar to mandatory safety and operational duties under Title 6A; and (4) the
Board misstates the Department of Education’s jurisdiction pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:6-9,
which includes controversies arising under “the rules of the State board or of the
commissioner” in addition to the school laws. (Pet. Opp. Br. at 1-3).
On April 2, 2026, the Board filed a reply brief to Petitioners’ opposition. Therein,
the Board argues that: (1) NJDOE jurisdiction does not extend to all issues involving
schools or school personnel, only those arising under the school laws; (2) there is no
overlap between N.J.S.A. 18A:6-9 and Newark Ordinance §23:5-16, as Petitioners
contend; and (3) the Newark City Code specifies that violations for parking or traffic
offenses require appearance before the Newark Municipal Court. (Resp. Reply Br. at 2-
6).
The Board seeks to have the instant matter dismissed with prejudice. Petitioners
seek to have the instant Motion to Dismiss denied, and proceed with their Petition.
FINDINGS
Upon reviewing the petition and exhibits attached therein, and reviewing the
moving papers submitted, I FIND the following as FACT herein:

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 00849-26
4
Petitioners all reside on Clifton Avenue, in the City of Newark, New Jersey. The
RTA is located at 443 Clifton Avenue, Newark, New Jersey. Parents having students
attend RTA drop-off and pick up their children at or near the RTA school campus, during
school hours. RTA’s Traffic Safety Plan states that a portion of Clifton Avenue is closed
to traffic during pick-up hours when this practice ceased in 2022. (Petition, Section II).
RTA only utilizes a Class 2 Officer during pick-up on weekdays, while local municipal
Ordinance §23:5-16 requires a Class 3 Officer during all pick-up and drop-off hours. Id.
LEGAL ANAYALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS
A Motion to Dismiss is not specifically enumerated under the Administrative Code;
however, administrative law judges are explicitly granted the discretion to use procedures
that are not expressly granted, and to relax rules in the interest of justice. The
Administrative Code explicitly directs that “[i]n the absence of a rule, a judge may proceed
in accordance with the New Jersey Court Rules, provided the rules are compatible with
[the] purposes” of achieving “just results, simplicity in procedure, fairness in administration
and the elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay.” N.J.A.C. 1:1-1.3(a).
An administrative law judge may relax or disregard “procedural rules … if the judge
determines that adherence would result in unfairness or injustice.” N.J.A.C. 1:1-1.3(b).
The New Jersey Court Rules state that a motion to dismiss based on “lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter” shall be made “by motion, with briefs” and “before pleading if a
further pleading is to be made.” R. 4:6-2. Such motion “shall be heard and determined
before trial.” R. 4:6-3. Furthermore, while generally applicable prior to transmittal to the
OAL, the Administrative Code provides that petitions before the Commissioner may be
dismissed “on the grounds that the petitioner has advanced no cause of action even if the
petitioner’s factual allegations are accepted as true or for lack of jurisdiction, failure to
prosecute, or other good reason.” N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.10.
I CONCLUDE that the Board’s motion to dismiss filed with the NJDOE may be
heard before the OAL as the same pertains to a request for the dismissal of the petition
based upon the NJDOE’s lack of jurisdiction regarding the allegations contained in the
petition.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 00849-26
5
The NJDOE Commissioner’s jurisdiction is defined by statute and is limited to
“controversies and disputes arising under the school laws, excepting those governing
higher education, or under the rules of the State board or of the commissioner.” N.J.S.A.
18A:6-9. Our courts have held that, “[w]here the controversy does not arise under the
school laws, it is outside the Commissioner’s jurisdiction even though it may pertain to
school personnel.” Bd. of Educ. of E. Brunswick v. Twp. Council of E. Brunswick, 48 N.J.
94, 102 (1966).
It is further recognized that “the sweep of the Department’s interest and the
Commissioner’s jurisdiction does not extend to all matters involving boards of education.”
Archway Programs, Inc. v. Pemberton Twp. Bd. of Educ., 352 N.J. Super. 420, 424–25
(App. Div. 2002). In this regard, the Appellate Division has held that claims against a local
board of education that “do not arise under the school laws but rather from statutory or
common law [are] typically and appropriately adjudicated in the courts.” Id. at 425; see
Picogna v. Bd. of Educ. of Cherry Hill, 249 N.J. Super. 332, 335 (App. Div. 1991) (holding
that the “contract claim of a nontenured school employee does not arise under the school
laws simply because its outcome may later enable him to attain tenure under the school
laws,” and “[w]hether petitioner’s employment was wrongfully terminated under the
contract . . . is for the court, not the Commissioner, to decide”); S. Orange-Maplewood
Educ. Ass’n v. Bd. of Educ. of the Sch. Dist. of S. Orange and Maplewood, 146 N.J.
Super. 457, 463 (App. Div. 1977) (holding that the Commissioner did not have jurisdiction
over a dispute involving the interpretation of a sabbatical-leave provision set forth in an
agreement between the board of education and the teachers’ association).
Similar to the contract disputes described above, the NJDOE Commissioner does
not have jurisdiction to review a board of education’s hiring decisions. See Farmer v. Bd.
of Educ. of Camden, EDU 6789-01 & 6790-01, Initial Decision, (November 17, 2003),
adopted, Comm’r. (December 20, 2003) <http://njlaw. rutgers.edu/collections/oal/>. In
Farmer, 	two 	unsuccessful 	applicants 	sought 	to 	have 	the 	successful 	candidate’s
appointment rescinded and demanded to be awarded both the position and backpay as
damages. Id. 	The tribunal found that while the petitioners could have appropriately
requested that the Commissioner review the appointment to determine if the board of

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 00849-26
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education had acted in an arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable manner, the fact that they
instead sought to “have the Commissioner usurp the power of the Board and award
appointment” meant that the “authority of the Commissioner [did] not comport with the
relief sought.” Id. at 7-8.
The NJDOE Commissioner likewise does not have jurisdiction over all conflict-of-
interest disputes involving schools. See Gardner v. Bd. of Educ. of Hackensack, EDU
09421-12, 	Initial 	Decision, 	(May 	1, 	2013) 	<http://njlaw.rutgers.edu/collections/oal/>
adopted, Comm’r. (June 7, 2013) <http://www.nj.gov/education/legal/commissioner/>.
“The scope of the Commissioner’s jurisdiction regarding conflict-of-interest disputes is
limited to those involving N.J.S.A. 18A:12-2” and does not extend to “a conflict of interest
under the School Ethics Act, a violation of the Code of Ethics for School Board Members
established by that Act, or claims concerning a common-law-grounded conflict of interest”
as such matters would “fall within the jurisdictional ambit of either the School Ethics
Commission 	or 	the 	Superior 	Court.” 	Id. 	at 	*4. 	The 	ALJ 	in 	Gardner 	granted 	the
respondent’s jurisdiction-based motion to dismiss after concluding that the claims raised
in the petition “do not sufficiently implicate the school laws or necessitate an interpretation
of the school laws, requiring the expertise of the Commissioner, to warrant the exercise
of the Commissioner’s dispute-resolution jurisdiction.” Id. at *5.
Under the Uniform Administrative Procedure Rules, “pleading requirements are
governed by the agency with subject matter jurisdiction over the case.” N.J.A.C. 1:1-6.1.
The Administrative Code dictates that a petition before the Department of Education shall
include, inter alia:
[A] 	statement 	of 	the 	specific 	allegation(s) 	and 	essential 	facts
supporting the specific allegation(s) that have given rise to a dispute
pursuant to the school laws; the relief petitioner is seeking; and a
statement of verification or certification in lieu of affidavit for each
petitioner. The petition should also cite, if known to petitioner, the
section(s) of the school laws under which the controversy has arisen.
[N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.4.]

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 00849-26
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While not a strict requirement, especially for pro se petitioners, the petition in this
matter does not reference any portion of the school laws under Title 18A of the New
Jersey Annotated Statutes or any regulation promulgated thereto under Title 6A of the
New Jersey Administrative Code. Instead, the petition is premised exclusively on a
Newark Municipal Traffic Ordinance. (Petition, Section II at 1).
In their Brief in Opposition to the motion to dismiss, Petitioners’ reference N.J.S.A.
18A:6-9 specifically and Title 6A generally. (Pet. Opp. Br. at 1). Petitioners argue that
“because the ordinance governs school-based safety procedures, traffic management,
and the hiring of law enforcement personnel for school operations, disputes arising from
its implementation fall within the Commissioner’s jurisdiction.” Id. 	This argument is
premised on a misunderstanding of the NJDOE’s jurisdiction. Merely pertaining to schools
or involving schools is insufficient to transform a dispute arising under statutory or
common law (or in this case, municipal law) into one of school law. RTA’s alleged failure
to comply with a municipal traffic ordinance neither sufficiently implicates the school laws
nor necessitates an interpretation thereof requiring the expertise of the Commissioner.
In an appendix to their Brief in Opposition, Petitioners reference three specific
regulations and one entire chapter from Title 6A: N.J.A.C. 6A:11, 6A:32-12.1, 6A:27-11.1,
and 6A:16-5.1. The same will be addressed below.
N.J.A.C. 6A:11
In raising Chapter 11, Petitioners allege that it “establishes that charter schools are
not exempt from municipal safety ordinances and must adhere to the same operational
standards as district schools.” (Pet. Opp. Br. at 5). Chapter 11 nowhere contains a
reference to “municipal safety ordinances.” The only provision even remotely related to
Petitioners’ contention merely states that a “charter school shall operate in accordance
with its charter and the provisions of law and regulation that govern other public schools.”
N.J.A.C. 6A:11-4.13(a). This is essentially a reference to the school laws and in no way
“provides the legal bridge [to] Newark Ordinance 23:5-16” as Petitioners contend. (Pet.
Opp. Br. at 5).

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 00849-26
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N.J.A.C. 6A:32-12.1
Petitioners contend that this regulation “defines the [chief school administrator’s]
overarching duty to implement all applicable statutes, administrative code provisions, and
State Board rules.” Id. 	Instead, this regulation is titled “Kindergarten programs” and
describes the obligations for school districts offering such programs. See N.J.A.C. 6A:32-
12.1. Further exploration of Chapter 32 shows that the defined term “chief school
administrator” only includes “charter school . . . lead persons” at “N.J.A.C. 6A:32-7, 8, and
13.” N.J.A.C. 6A:32-2.1. Those chapters deal with student records, student attendance
and accounting, and virtual or remote instruction respectively and nowhere contain the
“central provision . . . making failure [to] implement [Newark Ordinance 23:5-16] a
controversy ‘arising under the school laws.’” (Pet. Opp. Br. at 5).
N.J.A.C. 6A:27-11.1
Petitioners contend that this regulation “governs student transportation safety,
including safe loading and unloading, traffic flow, pedestrian safety, and supervision
during arrival and dismissal.” Id. This regulation nowhere addresses these topics and is
instead exclusively devoted to school bus transportation operations1 and requirements
such as driver licensure, vehicle registration/insurance, and bus inspections. N.J.A.C.
6A:27-11.1(a-c).
N.J.A.C. 6A:16-5.1
Petitioners contend that this regulation requires schools to “develop, implement,
and maintain a comprehensive school safety and security plan” inclusive of “safety
procedures during arrival and dismissal.” (Pet. Opp. Br. at 5). This regulation does
mandate that schools have written plans and procedures which, at a minimum, provide
for “the protection of the health, safety, security and welfare of the school population.”
N.J.A.C. 6A:16-5.1(a)(1). It further directs that the requisite plans “be reviewed annually
1 This regulation is particularly inapposite to the instant proceeding given Petitioners acknowledgement that
RTA does not provide bus transportation to pupils. (Petition, Ex. F).

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 00849-26
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and updated as appropriate.” N.J.A.C. 6A:16-5.1(b)(2). However, instead of the “traffic
related procedures” that Petitioners seek, this regulation is instead concerned with the
prevention of, response to and recovery from emergencies and crises “ranging from bomb
threats, fires and gas leaks, to an active shooter situation.” NJDOE, School Preparedness
and Emergency Planning, < https://www.nj.gov/education/security/plan>; see also School
Safety and Security Plan Annual Review Statement of Assurance, <https://www.nj.gov/
education/security/plan/SSSPAnnualStatementofAssurance-QSAC.pdf>.
While NJDOE guidance on the minimum requirements of the regulatory mandate
does 	include 	discussion 	of 	“parent 	drop-off 	and 	pick-up 	zones” 	and 	“Student
Transportation 	Security,” 	these 	are 	discussed 	exclusively 	as 	“Target-Hardening
Initiatives.”2 The fact that student transportation may be relevant to both municipal traffic
ordinances and school emergency response initiatives simply does not render the two
synonymous and does not provide the jurisdictional grant that Petitioners seek.
Petitioners premised their petition on a municipal ordinance and framed their
requested relief as matter of traffic congestion. They raised no school laws or regulations
in their petition and, when they did eventually raise such, it was in a mere appendix in
their opposition, and none of the cited regulations stood for the premises contended. To
now argue that their dispute is a matter of student safety and welfare is disingenuous and
still premised on a misapplication of the relevant school regulations.
The specific allegations, which are required, similarly demonstrate that this dispute
is one of traffic regulation and not school law. Petitioners’ primary allegation is that RTA
“has failed to fully comply with the City of Newark’s most basic traffic and safety
ordinances.” Id. Even the specific complaint regarding RTA’s failure to update its Traffic
Safety Plan and Agreement in the most recent edition of the Parent Handbook exclusively
premises that action as violating “fundamental traffic regulations and safety ordinances,
2 Target hardening is a principle of crime and terrorism prevention wherein “the goal is to strengthen the
defenses of a school site and deter criminal activity by increasing the perceived risk to an offender.” New
Jersey School Boards Association, Final Report: School Security Task Force, “What Makes Schools Safe?”,
<https://www.njsba.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/news-security-task-force-VI-Physical-Security.pdf>.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 00849-26
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thereby compromising established ordinances designed to ensure public safety and order
on the roads.”
The relief requested in the petition exclusively consist of an order compelling RTA
to “comply[] with municipal ordinances and regulations” and “address the high volume of
traffic.” Id. at 2. Viewed in concert, the specific allegations stated, relief requested, and
citations made in the petition clearly demonstrate that this dispute is one of municipal law
and not school law. 	As such, I CONCLUDE that the NJDOE lacks jurisdiction in this
matter, as the petition fails to articulate a basis for dispute that arises under the school
laws, and Board’s motion to dismiss the petition is GRANTED.
ORDER
IT IS hereby ORDERED that for the reasons set forth herein, the Board’s motion
to dismiss Petitioners petition filed herein is GRANTED and the petition is DISMISSED.
I 	hereby 	FILE 	this 	initial 	decision 	with 	the 	COMMISSIONER 	OF 	THE
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION for consideration.
This recommended decision may be adopted, modified, or rejected by the
COMMISSIONER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, who by law is authorized
to make a final decision in this matter. 	If the Commissioner of the Department of
Education does not adopt, modify, or reject this decision within forty-five days and unless
such time limit is otherwise extended, this recommended decision shall become a final
decision in accordance with N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 00849-26
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Within thirteen days from the date on which this recommended decision was
mailed to the parties, any party may file written exceptions with the COMMISSIONER OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, ATTN: 	BUREAU OF CONTROVERSIES AND
DISPUTES, 100 Riverview Plaza, 4th Floor, PO Box 500, Trenton, New Jersey 08625-
0500, marked “Attention: 	Exceptions.” 	A copy of any exceptions must be sent to the
judge and to the other parties.
May 8, 2026
DATE 	JULIO C. MOREJON, ALJ
Date Received at Agency: 	May 8, 2026
Date E-Mailed to Parties: 	May 8, 2026
JCM/lr