J.V., on behalf of minor child, G.I. v. Board of Education of the Township of Jackson, Ocean City, 3/7/25 (#78-25E)

78-25ENjcommned

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78-25E
OAL Dkt. No. EDU 01143-25
Agency Dkt. No. 13-1/25
New Jersey Commissioner of Education
Order on Emergent Relief
J.V., on behalf of minor child, G.I.,
Petitioner,
v.
Board of Education of the Township of Jackson,
Ocean County,
Respondent.
The record of this emergent matter and the recommended Order of the Administrative Law Judge
(ALJ) have been reviewed and considered.
Upon such review, the Commissioner concurs with the ALJ that petitioner has failed to
demonstrate entitlement to emergent relief pursuant to the standards enunciated in Crowe v. DeGioia,
90 N.J. 126, 132-34 (1982) and codified at N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.6.
Accordingly, the recommended Order denying petitioner’s application for emergent relief is
adopted for the reasons stated therein. This matter shall continue at the Office of Administrative Law
with such proceedings as the parties and the ALJ deem necessary to bring it to closure.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION
Date of Decision: 	March 7, 2025
Date of Mailing: 	March 7, 2025
New Jersey is an Equal Opportunity Employer
State of New Jersey
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
ORDER DENYING
EMERGENCY RELIEF
OAL DKT. NO. EDU 01143-25
AGENCY DKT. NO. 13-1/25
J.V. ON BEHALF OF MINOR CHILD, G.I.,
Petitioner,
v.
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE
TOWNSHIP OF JACKSON, OCEAN CITY
Respondent.
Daniel R. Roberts, Esq., appearing for petitioner (Kenney, Gross, Kovats & Parton,
attorneys)
Marc H. Zitomer, Esq., appearing for respondent (Schenck, Price, Smith and King,
LLP, attorneys)
BEFORE KIM C. BELIN, ALJ:
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
By request for emergent relief, petitioner J.V. challenges the disciplinary decision
of the respondent, the Jackson Township Board of Education (Board or respondent), to
transfer G.I. from one high school to another high school for physically assaulting another
student. Is petitioner entitled to emergent relief and immediate return to her former high
OAL DKT. NO. EDU 01143-25
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school? No, N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.6(b) requires proof of irreparable harm, which is not present
in this case.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On January 13, 2025, the petitioner filed a petition of appeal challenging
respondent’s determination that G.I. engaged in behavior warranting removal from the
high school. The director of the Office of Controversies and Disputes within the
Department of Education transmitted the petition and motion for emergent relief to the
Office of Administrative Law (OAL), where it was filed on January 16, 2025. N.J.S.A.
52:14B-1 to -15; N.J.S.A. 52:14F-1 to -13; N.J.A.C. 1:1-8.2. Oral argument was held and
the record on the motion for emergent relief closed on January 31, 2025.
FACTUAL DISCUSSION AND FINDINGS
The following FACTS are undisputed, and I therefore FIND:
For the 2024–25 school year, G.I. was a tenth-grade student at Jackson Liberty
High School. She was a general education student. On October 11, 2024, G.I. initiated
a fight against another student with whom she had a longstanding acrimonious
relationship. G.I. walked up to the other female student, bumped into the other student,
and began hitting the other student repeatedly in the face and head. The altercation
continued until a teacher intervened. G.I. was suspended for physically assaulting
another student during the school day. (Certification of Nicole Pormilli, Exhibit C.)
J.V. was notified of the charges against G.I. and the Board hearing by letter dated
October 14, 2024 (Exhibit B, Petitioner’s Brief). The hearing to consider G.I.’s long-term
suspension or expulsion was scheduled for October 16, 2024, but delayed until November
11, 2024, at petitioner’s request. By letter dated November 12, 2024, J.V. was provided
with the Board’s decision to transfer G.I. from Jackson Liberty High School (JLHS) to
Jackson Memorial High School (JMHS) “until further notice.” (Exhibit A, Petitioner’s
Brief.) G.I.’s prior disciplinary record consisted of a detention, but no other short or long-
term suspensions. (Petitioner’s Verified Petition.)
OAL DKT. NO. EDU 01143-25
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LEGAL ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION
Emergent Relief
The regulations governing controversies and disputes before the Commissioner of
Education provide that “[w]here the subject matter of the controversy is a particular course
of action by a district board of education . . ., the petitioner may include with the petition
of appeal, a separate motion for emergent relief or a stay of that action pending the
Commissioner’s final decision in the contested case.” N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.6(a). The
regulations further provide that the Commissioner may “[t]ransmit the motion to the OAL
for immediate hearing on the motion.” N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.6(c)(3).
At such a hearing, a petitioner must show that the following four standards are met:
1. The petitioner will suffer irreparable harm if the
requested relief is not granted;
2. The legal right underlying petitioner’s claim is settled;
3. The petitioner has a likelihood of prevailing on the
merits of the underlying claim; and
4. When the equities and interests of the parties are
balanced, the petitioner will suffer greater harm than
the respondent will suffer if the requested relief is not
granted.
[N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.6(b) (citing Crowe v. DeGioia, 90 N.J. 126
(1982)).]
Thus, the purpose of emergent relief is “to ‘prevent some threatening, irreparable
mischief, which should be averted until opportunity is afforded for a full and deliberate
investigation of the case.’” Crowe, 90 N.J. at 132 (citing Thompson ex rel. Bd. of Chosen
Freeholders v. Paterson, 9 N.J. Eq. 624, 625 (Sup. Ct. 1854)). The petitioner has the
burden of establishing all the above requirements in order to warrant relief in their favor
and must prove each of these Crowe elements “clearly and convincingly.” Waste Mgmt.
OAL DKT. NO. EDU 01143-25
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of N.J. v. Union Cnty. Utils. Auth., 399 N.J. Super. 508, 520 (App. Div. 2008); D.I. & S.I.
ex rel. T.I. v. Monroe Twp. Bd. of Educ., 2017 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 814 at *7.
Irreparable Harm
Here, J.V. asserts that her daughter, G.I., is suffering irreparable harm because
she was removed from JLHS to JMHS. Specifically, there is a negative impact on her
continuity of instruction and a psychological impact of being moved to another school
during the middle of the school year that includes loss of relationships. J.V. contends that
G.I. suffers from high anxiety in the new environment; however, there was no evidence
to substantiate this claim, such as a psychologist, physician, or guidance counselor
report.
In an emergent-relief case in which the student was expelled from the high school
for violating the student code of conduct, the administrative law judge (ALJ) stated:
“[i]rreparable harm is also rooted in the quality of the education” received by the student.
K.C. & S.C. ex rel. K.C. v. Board of Educ. of Englewood Cliffs, 2011 N.J. AGEN LEXIS
100 at *7. The ALJ concluded that the petitioners had satisfied the first prong of the
Crowe test because “the education provided at [the petitioner’s specialized high school
was] distinctly different, by design, intent and expectation,” from that offered at the local
high school. Id. at *8.
In the current controversy, transferring to another school may impact the continuity
of instruction, however, there is no showing that the education provided at JMHS is
distinctly different from that offered at JLHS. According to counsel for J.V., both schools
are similar in course offerings and teacher support. Counsel could not identify what
educational loss G.I. had experienced. There was no evidence produced that JLHS
offered courses that were not available at JMHS. Both schools offered teacher support,
including guidance counselors. The only difference offered by counsel was that the
teachers and guidance counselors were different; G.I. had not developed the same
rapport with the new staff as she had at JLHS.
OAL DKT. NO. EDU 01143-25
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Without question, established friendships and relationships are important in the life
of a high school student, and it may well be that as the facts in this matter are developed
J.V. may show that G.I.’s needs are best met by attending JLHS. However, the facts
presented to date do not definitively show that such is the case. I CONCLUDE that the
petitioner has not satisfied the first prong of the Crowe test. The petitioner has not shown
by clear and convincing evidence that irreparable harm will result if G.I. is not permitted
to return immediately to JLHS.
Because J.V. has not satisfied the first prong, discussion of the other prongs is
unwarranted.
Conclusion
To justify the granting of emergent relief, all four of the Crowe standards as codified
in N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.6 must be met and, for the reasons detailed above, the first prong has
not been met in this matter. I CONCLUDE, therefore, that the petitioner has not met
these required standards, and the petition for emergent relief therefore must be denied.
ORDER
I ORDER that the petitioner’s motion for emergent relief is DENIED and the case
will proceed with the underlying due process petition.
OAL DKT. NO. EDU 01143-25
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This order on application for emergency relief may be adopted, modified or
rejected by COMMISSIONER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, who by law is
authorized to make a final decision in this matter. The final decision shall be issued
without undue delay, but no later than forty-five days following the entry of this order. If
COMMISSIONER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION does not adopt, modify or
reject this order within forty-five days, this recommended order shall become a final
decision on the issue of emergent relief in accordance with N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10.
February 3, 2025
DATE KIM C. BELIN, ALJ
KCB/am
C.C.: Clerk
OAL DKT. NO. EDU 01143-25
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APPENDIX
Exhibits
For petitioner:
Letter Brief dated January 13, 2025, with exhibits in support of petitioner’s
application for emergent relief
For respondent:
Letter Brief dated January 27, 2025, with Certification of Nicole Pormilli in
opposition to petitioner’s application for emergent relief

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