Barbara Holstein v. Tacia Raftopoulos-Johnson, Montague Board of Education, Sussex County, 6/22/21, (#129-21SEC) SEC APPEAL

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SEC Dkt Nos. C14-15 and C08-16 (Consolidated)
OAL Dkt. Nos. EEC 15030-15 and EEC 15136-16 (Consolidated)
Agency Dkt. No. 2-3/20A
New Jersey Commissioner of Education
Final Decision
Barbara Holstein,
Complainant,
v.
Tacia Raftopoulos-Johnson, Montague Board
of Education, Sussex County,
Respondent.
In the Matter of Tacia Raftopoulos-Johnson,
Montague Board of Education,
Sussex County.
This matter involves an appeal of the School Ethics Commission’s (Commission)
February 26, 2020 decision that appellant Tacia Raftopoulos-Johnson, a member of the
Montague Board of Education (Board), violated the School Ethics Act (Act) in connection with
her attendance at a meeting of the Port Jervis Board of Education to speak about the sending-
receiving relationship between the two districts (PJBOE Meeting), and her vote in support of a
resolution obligating the Board to pay for students, including her own child, to attend school in
Port Jervis after the sending-receiving relationship had been terminated (Resolution). The
Commission recommended a penalty of censure for the violation. Having carefully reviewed the
129-21SEC

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Commission’s decision and the record in its entirety, the Commissioner finds that the
Commission’s decision is supported by sufficient, credible evidence, and that appellant failed to
establish that the decision is arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law. N.J.A.C. 6A:4-1.1(a). The
Commissioner also finds that a penalty of censure is appropriate.
Two complaints were filed with the Commission in this matter. The first
complaint, C14-15, concerned the PJBOE Meeting, as well as an email sent by appellant to her
child’s guidance counselor and blind copied to parents in the district. The complaint alleged that
appellant violated N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(a), N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(b), N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(c),
N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(d), N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(e), N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(f), and N.J.S.A. 18A:12-
24.1(j). Following a motion to dismiss by appellant, the Commission dismissed some allegations
and transmitted the remainder of the matter to the Office of Administrative Law (OAL). The
matter was held in abeyance when a second complaint (C08-16) was filed concerning the
Resolution, and alleging that appellant violated N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24(a), N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24(b),
N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24(c), N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24(f), N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(a), N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(c),
and N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(f). Following a motion to dismiss by appellant, the Commission
dismissed the allegations that appellant violated N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24(a) and transmitted the
remainder of matter to the OAL, where the complaints were consolidated.
Following hearings, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) concluded that appellant
did not personally and unethically try to benefit herself and thus that the charges had not been
sustained. In its February 26, 2020 decision, the Commission found that appellant violated
N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(c), N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(e), and N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(f) in connection
with her attendance at the PJBOE Meeting, and N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24(b), N.J.S.A. 18A:12(c),
N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24(f), N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(a), N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(c), and N.J.S.A. 18A:12-

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24.1(f) in connection with her vote on the Resolution.1 The Commission recommended a penalty
of censure, and noted that it would have recommended a penalty of removal, but appellant was
no longer serving on the Board.
On appeal, appellant argues that all of her actions were in furtherance of
protecting the children of Montague, who had a right to continue their secondary education in
Port Jervis, even after the severance of the sending-receiving agreement, pursuant to
N.J.S.A. 18A:38-21.1. According to appellant, any directives to the contrary from the
Department of Education (DOE) were inconsistent with the law, and appellant was placed in the
difficult position of ignoring her obligations to the students of her district or ignoring the DOE’s
directives. Additionally, appellant notes that all decisions were made by the board as a whole.
Appellant contends that all board members who have children who attend school or who pay
taxes in their district have some sort of financial relationship with the district, and that this
relationship does not automatically create a conflict of interest. According to appellant,
N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24(h) is a defense to her actions, because she did not receive any greater gain
than the other 35 parents whose children were also permitted, pursuant to the Resolution, to
continue to attend school in Port Jervis at Montague’s expense.2
Appellant also alleges that fraud was committed by someone, because the
Commission has stated that complaint C08-16 was filed on March 15, 2016, despite the fact that
that it was not signed and notarized until March 16, 2016. Appellant contends that there were
other procedural irregularities, including that the Commission failed to provide her with a copy
1 The Commission adopted the ALJ’s conclusion that appellant’s actions related to the email she sent to her child’s
guidance counselor did not violate the Act. The Commission also adopted the ALJ’s conclusion that appellant’s
actions related to the PJBOE Meeting did not violate N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(b) or N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(d).
2 Appellant also reviews the individual provisions of the Act at issue in this matter, arguing that she did not violate
any of them based on N.J.S.A. 18A:38-21.1 and N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24(h).

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of the complaint. For these reasons, appellant urges the Commissioner to dismiss complaint
C08-16, investigate the matter, or refer it to appropriate authorities.
In reply, the Commission argues that appellant improperly engaged in self-help,
in defiance of DOE decisions and directives, rather than using the proper legal channels to
challenge the DOE’s directive that Montague parents who continued to send their children to
Port Jervis would be responsive for tuition payments. According to the Commission, appellant
improperly secured a benefit for her family when she used her position on the Board to enable
her child to continue to attend school in Port Jervis at the Board’s expense, rather than her own.
The Commissioner also contends that appellant exceeded her authority by making
representations at the PJBOE Meeting about the relationship between the districts. The
Commission argues that each of its findings that appellant violated the Act was supported by
sufficient, credible evidence and was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. Furthermore, the
Commission maintains that its penalty was reasonable, because appellant bore special
responsibility for the Board’s actions as its president, and she played a significant role in leading
the Board to defy the DOE’s decisions and directives.
Regarding appellant’s claims of fraud, the Commission argues that those claims
are without merit. The Commission notes that the initial complaint was timely filed, and even
if it had not been, the Commission has discretion to extend the limitations period. The
Commission contends that it did not fraudulently alter any dates, and that the record
demonstrates that date stamps were changed so that the dates on hard copy filings comported
with the dates on faxed copies that were received earlier by the Commission, as the Commission
considers the date of the first copy received to be the date of filing. The Commission argues that

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its actions were in compliance with its procedures for the filing of complaints, and that
appellant’s accusations to the contrary do not support a finding of fraud or criminal activity.
Upon a thorough review of the record, the Commissioner concludes that the
Commission’s decision was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. The majority of
appellant’s arguments in this matter are based on N.J.S.A. 18A:38-21.1(a)(3), which provides
that when a sending-receiving relationship is terminated, secondary school students shall be
permitted to continue their education in the receiving district. According to appellant, all of her
actions pertaining to Montague’s continuing tuition obligations to Port Jervis were required by
this statute. However, those issues are not before the Commissioner as part of this appeal.3
Appellant’s violations of the Act result not from her interpretation of the law, or
her opinion that the DOE’s directives were incorrect, but rather from her decision to make
statements at the PJBOE Meeting and to vote on the Resolution without seeking recourse
through proper legal channels. Even board members who believe that their actions are consistent
with the law and their duties can be held accountable when those actions are in violation of the
Act. See In the Matter of Lorenzo Richardson, Jersey City Board of Education, Hudson County,
Commissioner Decision No. 19-21SEC (January 26, 2021) (finding a violation of the Act when a
board member filed a petition of appeal before the Commissioner to attempt to enforce his
interpretation of the law, without authorization from the Board).
3 The Commissioner notes that neither she nor any former Commissioner has addressed the applicability of
N.J.S.A. 18A:38-21.1(a)(3) following the termination of a sending-receiving relationship authorized by
N.J.S.A. 18A:38-10, such as the one between Montague and Port Jervis that existed prior to 2013. The settlement
agreement referred to throughout the proceedings, under which Montague paid tuition for its middle school students
to continue attending high school in Port Jervis, was approved by Commissioner Hespe. However, approval of the
settlement agreement does not constitute a determination that appellant’s interpretation of N.J.S.A. 18A:38-
21.1(a)(3) was correct or that Montague was required to make such tuition payments. It is the nature of settlement
agreements that parties may exceed their legal obligations in order to resolve litigation.

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At the time it voted on the Resolution, the Board, including appellant, had
received two directives from the DOE, indicating that parents who wanted their children to
continue to attend school in Port Jervis would have to bear the expense of tuition. Moreover,
appellant was specifically advised in an email from the Executive County Superintendent that the
Board should follow the process outlined in N.J.A.C. 6A:3 to challenge the Commissioner’s
decision. Exhibit R-13. Appellant herself indicated in her testimony that the outcome of
meetings between Board members and DOE employees was that the Board should reach out to
the Commissioner with a petition. Tr. June 17, 2019, p. 87, lines 5-7. But instead of seeking a
legal remedy through established pathways, the Board chose to vote in defiance of
Commissioner decisions and DOE directives – and appellant admitted as much in her testimony.4
Tr. June 17, 2019, page 155, lines 12-17.
Additionally, appellant participated in that vote, rather than recusing herself,
despite the fact that she would receive a personal financial benefit from the Resolution – the
ability to send her child to school in Port Jervis at Montague’s expense, rather than her own. The
Commissioner does not find persuasive appellant’s argument that N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24(h)
provides a defense for her actions. This provision states, “No school official shall be deemed in
conflict with these provisions if, by reason of his participation in any matter required to be voted
on, no material or monetary gain accrues to him as a member of any . . . group, to any greater
extent than could reasonably be expected to accrue to any other member of that . . . group.”
Appellant has not identified any statute, regulation, or policy requiring her to vote on the
Resolution. Furthermore, the Commissioner notes that even if this provision precludes a finding
that appellant violated N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24, appellant’s actions regarding both the PJBOE
4 Appellant is not absolved by the fact that other members of the Board may also have violated the Act by voting in
the same manner. See Cheng v. Rodas, Commissioner Decision No. 22-17 (Jan. 20, 2017) (noting that board
members are responsible for their own actions).

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Meeting and the Resolution also violated multiple provisions of N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1, for which
N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24(h) provides no defense. Three of those provisions - N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(a),
N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(c), N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(e) – do not require any evidence of a conflict of
interest or a personal benefit.5
Appellant’s arguments are primarily focused on her participation in the vote for
the Resolution, but the Commissioner also concludes that appellant’s attendance and statements
at the PJBOE Meeting violated the Act, for the reasons detailed in the Commission’s decision.6
In particular, the Commissioner emphasizes that appellant’s attendance at the PJBOE Meeting to
discuss the various sending-receiving relationships, when appellant clearly understood that those
relationships might require further litigation to resolve, exceeded the scope of her authority and
had the potential to compromise the board. N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(e);7 N.J.A.C. 6A:28-6.4(a)(5);
see also Persi v. Woska, 2017 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 625, *7 (App. Div. Mar. 10, 2017)
(finding that action taken by a board member that is beyond the scope of his authority and duties
as a board member meets the definition of “private action” and is sufficient to demonstrate a
violation); Cheng, supra (finding a violation of N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(e) when a board member
5 The ALJ appears to have disregarded these provisions when she dismissed the charges based on her conclusion
that appellant did not take personal action to achieve an unwarranted personal benefit.
6 The Commissioner notes that the ALJ and the Commission made different findings regarding appellant’s
statements at the PJBOE Meeting, but a recording of the meeting was entered into evidence as Exhibit R-20, and it
speaks for itself. Appellant indicated that the Board “can take corrective action” and “revisit maybe long-term plans
on how the relationship with Port Jervis could be continued as much as possible given some of the hasty actions the
Board has taken in the past.” Suggesting that the Board could continue a sending-receiving relationship with Port
Jervis, when that relationship had been explicitly terminated by the Commissioner and no legal challenge had been
made to the Commissioner’s decision or any other issues surrounding the various sending-receiving relationships,
cannot reasonably be held to be within the scope of appellant’s authority – even if appellant had the permission of
the other Board members to speak at the meeting.
7 Appellant contends that the Commission did not argue in its exceptions to the Initial Decision that appellant
violated N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(e), and that it therefore waived, forfeited, and procedurally defaulted this argument.
Respondent points to no authority for this proposition, and the Commissioner finds that it is unfounded. Agency
heads have the authority under N.J.A.C. 1:1-18.6(b) to modify conclusions of law – as the Commission did here in
rejecting the ALJ’s conclusion that appellant did not violate N.J.S.A. 18A:24.1(e) – regardless of whether exceptions
were filed regarding those conclusions.

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acted on his own rather than seeking an Advisory Opinion from the Commission after receiving
uncertain legal advice from counsel).
The Commission’s decision thoroughly details the individual provisions of the
Act at issue and the reasons the Commission concluded that appellant violated each of them.
The Commissioner concludes that the Commission was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable
when it determined that appellant’s conduct was in violation of the Act. Furthermore, the
Commissioner concurs with the Commission that the appropriate penalty is censure. The
Commissioner has previously imposed a penalty of reprimand when board members violated the
Act but did not receive a benefit from their actions. See IMO Carvalho, Neron, Nina, and
Rodriguez, Commissioner Decision No. 168-18A (June 1, 2018) (violation of N.J.S.A. 18A:12-
24.(c)); Richardson, supra (violation of N.J.SA. 18A:12-24(g) and N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(e);
Cheng, supra (violation of N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(e)). Here, because appellant violated multiple
provisions of the Act – and received a benefit – the Commissioner concludes that the
Commission’s recommendation of censure was appropriate.
Finally, following a comprehensive review of the record, the Commissioner
determines that there was no impropriety in the Commission’s acceptance of Complaint C08-16.
First, the Commissioner finds that the complaint was timely filed. The meeting at issue in the
complaint occurred on August 25, 2015.8 According to N.J.A.C. 6A:28-6.5, complaints must be
filed within 180 days of notice of the events which form the basis of the alleged violation. Here,
8 The complainant argued that the minutes for the August 25, 2016 meeting were not approved until
September 23, 2015, and that the time period to file did not begin to run until that date. The Commissioner notes
that the time period begins to run from notice of the events at issue. While the approval of meeting minutes is one
method by which the public could receive notice of actions taken by a board member, it is not the only method – for
example, a member of the public present at the August 2, 2016 meeting would have notice on that date of the events
that had occurred. As the record does not reflect when the complainant was actually on notice of the events at issue,
the Commissioner finds that it is most appropriate to use the date of the meeting as the commencement of the time
period to file.

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the expiration of the 180-day time period was February 21, 2016, which was a Sunday. It is
standard in legal practice that a deadline falling on a weekend is extended to the next business
day. See, e.g., N.J. Ct. R. 1:3-1; N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.2. Complaint C08-16 was initially filed on
February 22, 2016, the first business day after February 21, 2016, meeting the 180-day deadline.
The complaint was deficient, and the complainant was given an opportunity to cure any defects,
which she did by filing an amended complaint in March 2016. The Commissioner finds any
issues regarding the precise date of filing of the amended complaint to be irrelevant, as the
Commission’s rules clearly provide that a complainant may amend a complaint to “cure
technical defects, clarify or amplify allegations made in the original complaint and such
amendments will relate back to the date the complaint was first received by the Commission for
the purposes of determining timeliness.” N.J.A.C. 6A:28-6.7(b).9
Moreover, there is no evidence that appellant has been prejudiced by any alleged
issues related to the filing of Complaint C08-16. She has been ably represented by counsel
throughout the proceedings, submitted numerous briefs and items of evidence, and had the
opportunity to present and cross-examine witnesses during multiple days of hearings at the OAL.
Additionally, the Commissioner concludes that appellant’s violations of the Act related to
Complaint C14-15 are sufficient to warrant a penalty of censure, even in the absence of any
violations related to Complaint C08-16.
9 Notwithstanding the Commissioner’s conclusion that the precise filing date of the amended complaint is irrelevant
because it relates back to the date of the initial filing, the Commissioner does not find any fraud or impropriety in
the Commission’s explanation for any date discrepancies on the amended complaint. The record demonstrates that a
faxed copy of the amended complaint was received on March 15, 2016, and when a hard copy was received and
stamped on March 18, 2016, the date stamp was modified to reflect the first date on which the amended complaint
was received – March 15, 2016. While the amended complaint was not notarized until March 16, that technical
defect does not alter the date of the faxed filing.

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Accordingly, appellant is hereby censured as a school official found to have
violated the School Ethics Act.
IT IS SO ORDERED.10
ACTING COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION
Date of Decision:
Date of Mailing:
10 This decision may be appealed to the Appellate Division of the Superior Court pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:6-9.1.
Under N.J.Ct.R. 2:4-1(b), a notice of appeal must be filed with the Appellate Division within 45 days from the date
of mailing of this decision.
June 22, 2021
June 22, 2021