Jamie Sterlacci v. Board of Education of the Township of Woodbridge, Middlesex County, 12/3/19, (#319-19)

New Jersey Commissioner of Education
Decision
Jamie Sterlacci,
Petitioner,
v.
Board of Education of the Township of
Woodbridge, Middlesex County,
Respondent.
Synopsis
Petitioner – a tenured teacher – filed a petition of appeal in 2018 seeking an order that the Board did not
have reasonable suspicion to require her to undergo drug testing, despite the fact that she had exhibited
signs of use; 	she further requested that the drug testing agency refuse to provide the results of the
screening to the Board. 	Subsequently, the parties reached an agreement, titled a “Last Chance
Agreement” (LCA), to fully resolve the matter in lieu of proceeding with litigation and the ultimate filing
of tenure charges by the Board. In June 2019, however, the Board terminated petitioner’s employment –
without 	following 	the 	process 	required 	under 	the 	Tenure 	Employees 	Hearing 	Law 	(TEHL),
N.J.S.A. 18A:6-10 et seq. – after it alleged that she failed a drug test. Petitioner filed the within appeal,
claiming that she was terminated in violation of her tenure rights under TEHL. The Board filed a motion
to dismiss and a motion to seal the record; petitioner filed a motion for summary decision.
The ALJ found, inter alia, that: this matter arises under the school laws because petitioner alleged in her
petition that the Board fired her in violation of her rights under the TEHL; the LCA is a contract between
the Board and petitioner, an interpretation of the LCA is not the primary issue herein; 	the TEHL and
N.J.A.C. 6A:3-5.1 to 5.7 set forth specific procedural steps that must be followed before a tenured teacher
may be dismissed; the LCA did not provide for petitioner’s termination without resort and adherence to
the procedural requirements of the TEHL; as such, the Board improperly fired petitioner and violated her
tenure rights under the TEHL. The ALJ denied the Board’s motion to dismiss, granted the petitioner’s
motion for summary decision, and granted, in part, the Board’s request to seal the record. 	The ALJ
concluded that petitioner is entitled to return to the Board’s employ in a teaching position for which she is
qualified, and is further entitled to back pay, less mitigation, and the benefits and emoluments she would
have received had the Board not improperly fired her on June 13, 2019.
Upon review, the Commissioner concurred with the findings and conclusions of the ALJ, for the reasons
thoroughly expressed in the Initial Decision. Accordingly, the Initial Decision of the OAL was adopted
as the final decision in this matter. Petitioner is entitled to return to a teaching position with the Board, as
set forth in the Initial Decision.
This synopsis is not part of the Commissioner’s decision. It has been prepared for the convenience of the reader. It
has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Commissioner.
December 3, 2019
319-19

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OAL Dkt. No. EDU 11503-19
Agency Dkt. No. 145-6/19
New Jersey Commissioner of Education
Final Decision
Jamie Sterlacci,
Petitioner,
v.
Board 	of 	Education 	of 	the 	Township 	of
Woodbridge, Middlesex County,
Respondent.
The record of this matter and the Initial Decision of the Office of Administrative
Law (OAL) have been reviewed, as have the exceptions filed by the Board pursuant to
N.J.A.C. 1:1-18.4, and the petitioner’s reply thereto.1
By way of background, on June 6, 2018, the Board ordered petitioner – a tenured
teacher – to undergo a drug test; 	petitioner complied with the order, but refused to permit the
testing agency to release the results to the Board. 	Thereafter, the petitioner filed a petition
challenging the Board’s authority to require a drug test, and the Board filed a petition to compel
petitioner to release the results. 	While the matters were pending before the Commissioner,
petitioner and the Board entered into a Last Chance Agreement (LCA) on November 28, 2018.
Under the LCA, the petitioner agreed to submit to random alcohol and drug testing in exchange
for her return to work and in lieu of the Board taking more serious action, including the filing
tenure charges against her. 	The LCA also stated that if petitioner was under the influence of
1 	The 	Board’s 	supplemental 	exceptions 	and 	petitioner’s 	sur-reply were 	not 	considered 	by the
Commissioner because such filings are not permitted by N.J.A.C. 1:1-18.4.

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drugs or alcohol on Board property, it “would constitute ‘just cause,’ per se, for the termination
of her tenured employment with the Board.” (LCA at ¶6).
On June 13, 2019, the Board terminated petitioner after it alleges that she failed a
drug test. Petitioner filed a petition before the Commissioner, claiming that she was terminated
from her employment with the Board in violation of her tenure rights under the Tenure
Employees Hearing Law (TEHL), N.J.S.A. 18A:6-10 et seq. 	The Administrative Law Judge
(ALJ) agreed with petitioner, finding that the Board improperly terminated her from her position
without certifying tenure charges.2 The ALJ noted that the terms of the LCA deprived petitioner
of her tenure protections, as it did not indicate that petitioner was waiving or relinquishing her
tenure rights. The ALJ further explained that the LCA did not force petitioner to resign from her
position upon testing positive for drugs or alcohol. 	As such, the ALJ found that petitioner is
entitled to return to her teaching position, along with back pay, benefits and emoluments.3
In its exceptions, the Board argues that the ALJ erred in failing to discuss the
merits of the case – specifically by failing to include an interpretation of the LCA and the
Board’s 	primary argument 	that 	the agreement 	equated 	to 	a voluntary relinquishment 	of
petitioner’s employment. The Board maintains that common sense would indicate that it would
not have entered into the LCA but for petitioner’s consent to waive her tenure rights if she tested
positive again for alcohol or drugs. 	The Board would not have bargained for the right to file
tenure charges if petitioner failed a drug test, as the Board already has the right to file tenure
2 The Commissioner notes that the ALJ inadvertently stated that the State Board of Education certifies
tenure charges to the Commissioner, when his statement should have indicated that this is the
responsibility of district boards of education. N.J.S.A. 18A:6-11; N.J.A.C. 6A:3-5.1.
3 The ALJ also granted the Board’s motion to seal the record with respect to: (1) any of petitioner’s
medical records that the Board provided with its motion to dismiss; and (2) the LCA, to the extent that it
includes certain information deemed confidential under the school laws. The Commissioner agrees with
the ALJ and orders that those records remain sealed.

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charges. As such, the ALJ ignores that the basic principles of contract law require consideration
in a valid contract, and the only consideration given to the Board in exchange for allowing
petitioner to continue her employment is that it would be able to terminate petitioner without the
filing of tenure charges.
In reply, petitioner contends that the ALJ correctly addressed the central issue in
this matter – that petitioner did not waive her tenure rights under the TEHL by signing the LCA.
Petitioner maintains that – while it was not necessary for the ALJ to reach this issue – a tenured
teacher can relinquish a tenured position but cannot waive her tenure rights to a position that she
still holds. 	Therefore, the petitioner contends that the Initial Decision should be adopted as the
final decision.
Upon review, the Commissioner agrees with the ALJ that the Board improperly
terminated petitioner without certifying tenure charges against her. Petitioner did not waive her
tenure rights by virtue of the LCA. The LCA did not reference the TEHL and did not explicitly
indicate that petitioner was agreeing to forfeit her tenure rights or resign from her position if she
tested positive for drugs or alcohol. The Commissioner does not find the Board’s exceptions to
be persuasive. 	The ALJ discussed the LCA to the extent necessary to determine that petitioner
had not waived her tenure rights. 	The LCA indicated that petitioner’s presence on school
property while under the influence of drugs or alcohol “would constitute ‘just cause,’ per se, for
the termination of her tenured employment with the Board.” 	(LCA at ¶6). 	Such a statement
does not provide the Board with the ability to bypass petitioner’s tenure rights, nor does it
indicate that petitioner would be forced to resign from her position. Further, the LCA stated that
it should remain in petitioner’s personnel file “and may be used as evidence of progressive
discipline in any future proceedings against [petitioner] initiated by the Board or District

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Administration.” (LCA at ¶7). Contrary to the Board’s argument, such a statement indicates that
the Board had contemplated the need to initiate future proceedings against petitioner – such as
the filing of tenure charges – if she tested positive for drugs or alcohol.
Accordingly, the Initial Decision of the OAL is adopted – for the reasons
thoroughly expressed in the Initial Decision. Petitioner is entitled to return to a teaching position
with the Board, with back pay, less mitigation, and the benefits and emoluments she would have
received had the Board not improperly terminated her on June 13, 2019.
IT IS SO ORDERED.4
COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION
Date of Decision: 	December 3, 2019
Date of Mailing: 	December 4, 2019
4 This decision may be appealed to the Appellate Division of the Superior Court pursuant to P.L. 2008,
c. 36 (N.J.S.A 18A:6-9.1).

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State of New Jersey
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
INITIAL DECISION
SUMMARY DECISION
OAL DKT. NO. EDU 11503-19
AGENCY DKT. NO. 145-6/19
JAMIE STERLACCI,
Petitioner,
v.
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE
TOWNSHIP OF WOODBRIDGE,
Respondent.
Edward Cridge, Esquire, for petitioner (Mellk O’Neill, attorneys)
Ari Schneider, Jr., Esquire, for respondent (Busch Law Group, LLC)
Record closed: September 24, 2019 	Decided: October 25, 2019
BEFORE DEAN J. BUONO, ALJ:
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In 2018, Jamie Sterlacci, (petitioner or Sterlacci), filed a petition of appeal with the
Commissioner of the New Jersey Department of Education, seeking an order that the
Board did not have reasonable suspicion to require her to undergo drug testing despite
exhibiting signs of use. 	She requested that the testing agency refuse to provide the

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results of the screening to the Board. 	The parties were able to reach an agreement to
fully resolve the matter in lieu of proceeding with litigation of the petition and the ultimate
filing of tenure charges by the Board. 	The agreement was titled a “Last Chance
Agreement.” 	However, 	on 	June 13, 2019, 	the 	Board 	unilaterally and 	summarily
terminated Ms. Sterlacci’s employment, without following the process required by the
Tenure 	Employees 	Hearing 	Law. 	She 	again 	filed 	a 	petition 	of 	appeal 	with 	the
Commissioner of the Department of Education appealing her termination by Woodbridge
Board of Education (Board) as a violation of her rights under the Tenure Employees
Hearing Law (TEHL), N.J.S.A. 18A:6-10 to -18.1. 	As part of this matter, the Board has
filed a motion to dismiss in lieu of an answer to Sterlacci’s petition and a motion to seal
the record, and Sterlacci has filed a motion for summary decision. 	It was subsequently
transmitted to the Office of Administrative Law (OAL) on August 19, 2019.
The questions for me to decide are whether: 1. I should grant the Board’s motion
to dismiss petitioner’s petition for failure to advance a cause of action; 2. 	whether, I
should grant the Board’s motion to seal the record, which contains certain sensitive
and/or confidential information pertaining to petitioner; and, 	3. finally, whether I should
grant petitioner’s motion for summary decision by finding that the Board violated her
rights as a tenured teacher by firing her without following the requirements of the
Tenure Employees Hearing Law, N.J.S.A. 18A:6-10 to -18.1.
FACTUAL DISCUSSION
The following facts are not in dispute and as such I FIND AS FACT that Sterlacci
began her employment as a teacher for the Board in 2001. 	Schneider Cert., ¶ 2. 	She
subsequently acquired tenure. 	On June 6, 2018, school officials ordered Sterlacci to
take a drug test. 	Id. at ¶ 3. 	Although she took the test, she refused to release the
results to the Board. 	Id. at ¶ 4. 	Instead, Sterlacci filed with the Commissioner of
Education (Commissioner) a petition challenging the Board’s authority to compel the
test. 	Id. 	at 	¶ 	5. 	In 	response, 	the 	Board 	answered 	Sterlacci’s 	petition 	and

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simultaneously filed with the Commissioner a cross-petition to compel Sterlacci to
provide the Board with the results of the drug test. Id. at ¶¶ 6-7.
The 	Commissioner 	subsequently 	transmitted 	the 	matter 	to 	the 	Office 	of
Administrative Law (OAL) as a contested case. However, while the matter was pending
at the OAL, Sterlacci and the Board entered a “Last Chance Agreement (LCA).” 	Id. at
Ex. D.
Under the terms of the LCA, which the parties executed on November 28, 2018,
Sterlacci agreed to certain conditions for her continued employment “in lieu of the Board
taking more serious action against her, up to and including the certification of tenure
charges.” 	Ibid. 	Those conditions included Sterlacci’s submission to random alcohol
and drug testing upon her return to work on January 2, 2019, and until June 30, 2020.
Ibid.
The terms of the LCA further provided that, if in the future, Sterlacci were under
the influence of alcohol or drugs while on Board property or if she refused to submit to
random testing, such conduct “would constitute ‘just cause,’ per se, for the termination
of her tenured employment with the Board.” Ibid.
Over Sterlacci’s objections, the Board asserts that Sterlacci failed a drug test
after she returned to work and that, “consistent with [the LCA], [the Board] had per se
just cause to terminate Ms. Sterlacci.” 	Id. at ¶¶ 15-20. 	On June 13, 2019, the Board
terminated Sterlacci’s employment. Id. at ¶ 21.
On June 21, 2019, Sterlacci filed the instant petition with the Commissioner. 	In
her petition, Sterlacci asserts that, “notwithstanding her tenured status,” the Board “took
action to summarily and unilaterally terminate” her employment, and that such action
violates her rights under the TEHL. Petition, ¶¶ 1-4.
As relief, Sterlacci seeks an order from the Commissioner “[d]eclaring and
adjudging [the Board’s] summary termination of [her] employment to be null and void;”

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“[r]einstating [her] in her tenured teaching position;” and, “[a]warding [her] all lawful back
pay, benefits, and emoluments to which [she] is entitled.” Id. at ¶¶ B-D.
On August 1, 2019, the Board filed with the Commissioner a motion to dismiss in
lieu of an answer to Sterlacci’s petition.5 	In support of its motion, the Board maintains
that Sterlacci violated the terms of the LCA by failing a subsequent drug test and that,
as a result, the LCA “both permits and requires [her] termination, without the filing of
formal tenure charges.” 	Brief, p. 8. 	The Board argues that “in exchange for her
continued employment, [Sterlacci] agreed that, in the event she again tested positive for
any controlled dangerous substance and/or alcohol during the school day, the Board
would have just cause, per se, to terminate her employment.” Id. at pp. 1-2. The Board
reasons that “[i]f the [LCA] required [Sterlacci] to forfeit her position and resign in the
event of a subsequent positive drug test, surely such a resignation would be deemed
lawful” and that “[t]he herein matter, though worded slightly differently, achieves the
same result and a result which both parties negotiated for and understood would occur.”
Id. at p. 2. 	In essence, the Board asserts that Sterlacci’s petition should be dismissed
because she has failed to advance a cause of action.
The Board also moves to seal the entire record in this matter due to the sensitive
and/or confidential nature of certain documents pertaining to Sterlacci.
On August 19, 2019, the Commissioner transmitted the matter to the OAL as a
contested case. 	On September 9, 2019, Sterlacci filed a brief in opposition to the
Board’s motion, and in support of a cross-motion for summary decision. 	Sterlacci
argues that the Board violated the TEHL by firing her without filing tenure charges or
otherwise following the procedural requirements of that act. According to Sterlacci, “the
LCA [does] not empower the Board to unilaterally and summarily determine that the
LCA 	had 	been 	violated, 	and 	to 	terminate 	Ms. 	Sterlacci,” 	but 	instead 	“it 	merely
prescribed the consequence in the event that such a violation was ultimately proven
through the appropriate procedural mechanisms, i.e., by way of tenure charges certified
5 The Board characterized its motion as a “motion for summary decision” pursuant to N.J.A.C. 1:1-12.5;
however, because the Board never filed an answer to Sterlacci’s petition, the Commissioner properly
transmitted the motion as a “motion to dismiss in lieu of an answer” pursuant to N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.5.

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and litigated as per the TEHL.” Brief, pp. 1-2. Sterlacci further maintains that “[t]he LCA
contains no waiver, explicit or implicit, of [her] rights under the [TEHL].” 	Id. at p. 2. 	I
agree.
LEGAL DISCUSSION
As a threshold jurisdictional matter, it appears that the parties’ motions—which
involve contractual claims involving the LCA—may be considered in this forum. 	The
Commissioner generally has “jurisdiction to hear and determine . . . all controversies
and disputes arising under the school laws[.]” 	N.J.S.A. 18A:6-9. 	Thus, “[a]lthough the
Commissioner does not have jurisdiction over disputes which are purely contractual in
nature, he does have jurisdiction over contractual claims which are incidental to his
obligation to resolve education claims that are the subject of litigation.”6 	B.P. ex rel.
B.P. v. Bd. of Educ. of the Lenape Reg’l High Sch. Dist., 2003 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 1198,
EDU 2782-02, State Bd. of Educ. (December 3, 2003). 	Indeed, “the Commissioner will
not rule on the enforceability of a contract” in cases in which “the interpretation of the
contract is the primary issue at hand and not merely implicated in a question of the
school laws.” 	Smith v. Bd. of Educ. of the Twp. of Willingboro, 97 N.J.A.R.2d (EDU)
205.
This matter arises under the school laws because Sterlacci alleges in her petition
that the Board fired her in violation of her rights under the TEHL. 	While the LCA is a
contract between Sterlacci and the Board, and the parties differ on their respective
rights under the terms of the LCA, an interpretation of the LCA is not the primary issue
in this matter, but instead the LCA is merely implicated in a question regarding the
TEHL. 	Thus, the parties’ claims regarding the LCA may be appropriately considered
here in determining whether or not the Board fired Sterlacci in violation of the TEHL.
6 Since, “[f]or example, contract claims against [school] boards do not arise under the school laws but
rather from statutory or common law,” such claims are “typically and appropriately adjudicated in the
courts.” Archway Programs, Inc. v. Pemberton Twp. Bd. of Educ., 352 N.J. Super. 420, 424-25 (App. Div.
2002) (citations omitted).

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The purpose of teacher tenure laws is “to aid in the establishment of a competent
and efficient school system by affording teachers ‘a measure of security in the ranks
they hold after years of service.’” 	Carpenito v. Rumson Bd. of Educ., 322 N.J. Super.
522, 528-29 (App. Div. 1999) (quoting Viemeister v. Prospect Park Bd. of Educ., 5 N.J.
Super. 215, 218 (App. Div. 1949)); N.J.S.A. 18A:28-1 to -18; N.J.S.A. 18A:6-10 to -18.1.
As such, a tenured teacher may not be dismissed except for inefficiency, incapacity,
unbecoming 	conduct, 	or 	other 	just 	cause, 	and 	then 	only 	after 	the 	procedural
requirements of the TEHL have been met. N.J.S.A. 18A:28-5; N.J.S.A. 18A:6-10.
The TEHL and its implementing regulations, N.J.A.C. 6A:3-5.1 to -5.7, set forth
specific procedural steps that must be followed before a tenured teacher may be
dismissed. 	For instance, any charge against a tenured teacher must be filed with the
Secretary of the State Board of Education and sworn evidence supporting such charge
shall be presented to the State Board. 	N.J.S.A. 18A:6-11. 	The “[c]harges shall be
stated with specificity as to the action or behavior underlying the charges.” 	N.J.A.C.
6A:3-5.1(b)(1).
If the State Board determines that probable cause exists for dismissal, the State
Board shall certify the charges to the Commissioner. N.J.S.A. 18A:6-11; N.J.A.C. 6A:3-
5.1. 	In such case, “the [local] board may suspend the person against whom such
charge is made, with or without pay[.]” N.J.S.A. 18A:6-14.
The Commissioner “shall determine whether the charge(s) are sufficient, if true,
to warrant dismissal.” 	N.J.A.C. 6A:3-5.5(a); N.J.S.A. 18A:6-16. 	If the Commissioner
disagrees with the board’s determination, he shall dismiss the charges; however, if the
Commissioner determines that the charges are sufficient to warrant dismissal, “the
matter shall be transmitted immediately to an arbitrator for further proceedings.” Ibid.
Thus, while a tenured teacher may be involuntarily removed from her position for
several reasons, including inefficiency, incapacity, unbecoming conduct, or other just
cause, 	the 	TEHL 	guarantees 	a 	tenured 	teacher 	certain 	procedural 	rights 	and
protections, prior to her dismissal.

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Of course, notwithstanding the procedural requirements of the TEHL, a tenured
teacher may voluntarily relinquish her position, N.J.S.A. 18A:28-8, voluntarily resign in
lieu of a school board’s filing of tenure charges, see, e.g., Camden City Sch. Dist. v.
Pitts, 2019 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1686 (App. Div. July 26, 2019) (holding that
tenured teacher agreed to resign in exchange for school board’s agreement not to
pursue tenure charges for inefficiency), or voluntarily resign prior to adjudication under
the TEHL, N.J.A.C. 6A:3-5.6.
Here, Sterlacci did not voluntarily resign from her position under any of these
scenarios. 	The Board concedes as much through its argument that “[i]f the [LCA]
required [Sterlacci] to forfeit her position and resign in the event of a subsequent
positive drug test, surely such a resignation would be deemed lawful” and that the LCA,
“though worded slightly differently, achieves the same result . . . the cessation of
[Sterlacci’s] employment with the Board.” Thus, by the Board’s own admission, the LCA
did not require Sterlacci to resign upon a subsequent positive drug test. And contrary to
the Board’s assertion, the LCA did not provide for Sterlacci’s termination without resort
and adherence to the procedural requirement of the TEHL.
Instead, the LCA simply provided thatifSterlacci failed another drug test, such a
circumstance “would constitute ‘just cause,’ per se, for the termination of her tenured
employment with the Board.” 	These terms did not deprive Sterlacci of the TEHL’s
protections. 	In fact, the LCA does not even mention the TEHL. 	As a result, the LCA
cannot be interpreted as a relinquishment of Sterlacci’s rights under the TEHL or as
authority for the Board to terminate Sterlacci without adherence to the requirements of
the TEHL. Simply put, the LCA does not trump the TEHL.
The TEHL clearly states that a tenured teacher may not be dismissed “except for
inefficiency, incapacity, unbecoming conduct, or other just cause, and only after a
hearing held pursuant to this subarticle, by the commissioner, or a person appointed by
him to act in his behalf, after a written charge or charges, of the cause or causes of
complaint, shall have been preferred against such person, signed by the person or

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persons making the same, who may or may not be a member or members of a board of
education, and filed and proceeded upon as in this subarticle provided.” 	N.J.S.A.
18A:6-10. 	As such, the Board improperly fired Sterlacci from her position and violated
her tenure rights by failing to follow the procedural requirements of the TEHL.
In light of the Board’s violation, I CONCLUDE that Board’s motion to dismiss is
hereby DENIED and Sterlacci’s motion for summary decision is GRANTED. 	The
Board’s motion to dismiss is denied because Sterlacci has clearly advanced a cause of
action for the Board’s violation of the TEHL.
Sterlacci’s motion for summary decision is GRANTED because there are no
issues of fact that the Board violated Sterlacci’s rights. 	Under N.J.A.C. 1:1-12.5, “[a]
party may move for summary decision upon all or any of the substantive issues in a
contested case.” 	N.J.A.C. 1:1-12.5(a). 	Such motion “shall be served with briefs and
with or without supporting affidavits” and “[t]he decision sought may be rendered if the
papers and discovery which have been filed, together with the affidavits, if any, show
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and that the moving
party is entitled to prevail as a matter of law.” 	N.J.A.C. 1:1-12.5(b). 	Here, summary
decision in favor of Sterlacci is appropriate because there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and Sterlacci is entitled to prevail as a matter of law. 	The Board violated
Sterlacci’s tenure rights by firing her without following the requirements of the TEHL. As
such, Sterlacci is entitled to return to the Board’s employ in a teaching position for which
she is qualified and she is further entitled to back pay, less mitigation, and the benefits
and emoluments she would have received had the Board not improperly fired her on
June 13, 2019.
Finally, the Board’s request to seal the record should be granted in part for the
following reasons. Under the Uniform Administrative Procedure Rules, N.J.A.C. 1:1-1.1
to -21.6, “[t]he record of all hearings [and motion proceedings] shall be open to public
inspection, but the judge may, for good cause shown, order the sealing of the record or
any part thereof.” 	N.J.A.C. 1:1-14.1(a). 	In deciding whether to seal a record or a part
thereof, “the judge shall consider the requirements of due process of law, other

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constitutional and statutory standards and matters of public policy” and “the need to
protect 	against 	unwarranted 	disclosure 	of 	sensitive 	financial 	information 	or 	trade
secrets, to protect parties or witnesses from undue embarrassment or deprivations of
privacy[.]” 	N.J.A.C. 1:1-14.1(b). 	In order to protect Sterlacci from undue deprivation of
her privacy, it is appropriate to proceed with caution and Iam partially granting the
Board’s motion to seal the record by ordering that (1) any of Sterlacci’s medical records
that the Board provided with its motion to dismiss; and (2) the LCA, to the extent that it
includes certain information deemed confidential under the school laws, shall be sealed,
except for the purpose of any review of my order on the parties’ motions.
Therefore, I FIND AS FACT that there are no genuine issues of material fact
requiring a hearing. 	Based on the foregoing, I CONCLUDE that the Board’s motion to
dismiss is hereby DENIED. 	I FURTHER CONCLUDE the Board’s motion to seal the
record 	is 	GRANTED 	IN 	PART. 	I 	FURTHER 	CONCLUDE 	Sterlacci’s 	motion for
summary decision is GRANTED. 	Sterlacci is entitled to return to the Board’s employ in
a teaching position for which she is qualified, and she is further entitled to back pay,
less mitigation, and the benefits and emoluments she would have received had the
Board not improperly fired her on June 13, 2019.
It is hereby ORDERED that the respondent’s request for summary decision be
DENIED. 	It is FURTHER ORDERED that the following records be sealed (1) any of
Sterlacci’s medical records that the Board provided with its motion to dismiss; 	and (2)
the LCA, to the extent that it includes certain information deemed confidential under the
school laws, shall be sealed. 	It is hereby further CONCLUDED that there are no genuine
issues of material fact to be determined on petitioner’s cross-motion for summary decision,
and petitioner is entitled to summary decision, it is hereby FURTHER ORDERED that the
petitioner’s motion be GRANTED.
I 	hereby 	FILE 	this 	initial 	decision 	with 	the 	COMMISSIONER 	OF 	THE
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION for consideration.

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This 	recommended 	decision 	may 	be 	adopted, 	modified 	or 	rejected 	by 	the
COMMISSIONER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, who by law is authorized
to make a final decision in this matter. 	If the Commissioner of the Department of
Education does not adopt, modify or reject this decision within forty-five days and unless
such time limit is otherwise extended, this recommended decision shall become a final
decision in accordance with N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10.
Within thirteen days from the date on which this recommended decision was
mailed to the parties, any party may file written exceptions with the COMMISSIONER
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, ATTN: 	BUREAU OF CONTROVERSIES
AND DISPUTES, 100 Riverview Plaza, 4th Floor, PO Box 500, Trenton, New Jersey
08625-0500, marked “Attention: Exceptions.” A copy of any exceptions must be sent to
the judge and to the other parties.
October 25, 2019
DATE 	DEAN J. BUONO, ALJ
Date Received at Agency:
Date Mailed to Parties:
mph