R.W., on behalf of minor child, J.W. v. Board of Education of the Township of Jackson, Ocean County and Jonathon Siering, 7/11/25 (#347-25)

347-25
OAL Dkt. No. EDU 10606-24
Agency Dkt. No. 147-5/24
New Jersey Commissioner of Education
Final Decision
R.W., on behalf of minor child, J.W.,
Petitioner,
v.
Board of Education of the Township of Jackson,
Ocean County, and Jonathon Siering1,
Respondents.
The record of this matter and the Initial Decision of the Office of Administrative Law (OAL)
have been reviewed and considered. The parties did not file exceptions.
Upon review, the Commissioner concurs with the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) that
petitioner’s claims against respondents must be dismissed pursuant to the 90-day rule because
the petition was not filed within 90 days of the challenged decision. N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.3(i); Kaprow
v. Bd. of Educ. of Berkeley Twp., 131 N.J. 572, 582 (1993). Moreover, petitioner has not offered
any compelling reason that would warrant relaxation of the 90-day limitation period, and none
can be gleaned from the record.
Additionally, irrespective of the untimely nature of the petition, the Commissioner
concurs with the ALJ that Counts I and III must be dismissed for failure to state a claim under the
1 The record reflects that Mr. Siering’s first name is Justin, not Jonathon as identified by petitioner.

2
school laws upon which relief may be granted by the Commissioner, and that Count II must be
dismissed because it asserts violations of the School Ethics Act, N.J.S.A. 18A:12-21 to -34, which
fall under the jurisdiction of the School Ethics Commission.
Accordingly, the Initial Decision is adopted as the final decision in this matter,
respondents’ motion for summary decision is granted, and the petition of appeal is hereby
dismissed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.2
COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION
Date of Decision: 	July 11, 2025
Date of Mailing: 	July 14, 2025
2 This decision may be appealed to the Appellate Division of the Superior Court pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:6-
9.1. Under N.J.Ct.R. 2:4-1(b), a notice of appeal must be filed with the Appellate Division within 45 days
from the date of mailing of this decision.

New Jersey is an Equal Opportunity Employer
State of New Jersey
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
INITIAL DECISION
SUMMARY DECISION
OAL DKT. NO. EDU 10606-24
AGENCY DKT. NO. 147-5/24
R.W., ON BEHALF OF MINOR CHILD,
J.W.,
Petitioner,
v.
TOWNSHIP OF JACKSON BOARD OF
EDUCATION, OCEAN COUNTY, AND
JONATHON SIERING,
Respondents.
R.W., petitioner, pro se
Marc H. Zitomer, Esq., (on the briefs), and Christopher J. Sedefian, Esq., (oral
argument), for respondents (Schenck, Price, Smith and King, LLP,
attorneys)
Record Closed: February 27, 2025 Decided: May 29, 2025
BEFORE SARAH H. SURGENT, ALJ:

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 10606-24
2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In this matter involving an allegation of academic dishonesty, petitioner, R.W., on
behalf of his minor child, J.W., filed a petition with the New Jersey Department of
Education (DOE) on May 18, 2024, alleging that honors physics teacher Jonathan1
Siering (Siering): (1) violated J.W.’s due process rights under N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.4 by not
providing a “fair hearing”; (2) committed educational negligence and an ethical breach
under the School Ethics Act (SEA), N.J.S.A 18A:12-24, by “prematurely impos[ing]
disciplinary measures without a comprehensive review or adequate factual basis;2 and
(3) performed an inadequate investigation of the alleged academic dishonesty.”
As for relief sought, R.W. states:
We hereby respectfully petition for a comprehensive and
impartial investigation into the allegations against Mr.
Jonathon Siering, conducted in accordance with the
procedural safeguards outlined in N.J.A.C. 6A:3. Should the
investigation substantiate the claims of procedural
misconduct and ethical violations, we insist on the imposition
of appropriate disciplinary measures against Mr. Siering,
commensurate with the gravity of the infractions, as
delineated under New Jersey’s School Ethics Act (N.J.S.A.
18A:12-24). Furthermore, we demand the annulment of all
academic sanctions previously levied against [J.W.] and
request corrective actions that realign the district’s disciplinary
protocols with statutory mandates and educational best
practices. This realignment should ensure a transparent, fair,
and consistent approach in handling all future allegations of
academic dishonesty, thereby upholding the integrity of the
educational process and safeguarding student rights.
Additionally, [J.W.] should receive a corrected grade for
the [honors physics] assignment, which should NOT be
recorded as “0” since the unfair “deal” offered by Mr.
Siering was not accepted by [J.W.].
1 Respondents’ counsel explained that Mr. Siering’s first name is actually Justin, not Jonathan, as
captioned.
2 On April 1, 2024, R.W. filed his petition with the School Ethics Commission (SEC), one count of which is
being held in abeyance pending the outcome of this matter. On April 3, 2024, R.W. was advised by the
SEC that the other two counts of his petition were not within the SEC’s jurisdiction. R.W. then filed his
petition with the DOE on May 20, 2024, which was deficient, and refiled on June 3, 2024.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 10606-24
3
[Petition of Appeal to DOE, dated May 18, 2024) (bold in
original.]
On June 24, 2024, respondents Township of Jackson Board of Education (BOE)
and Siering filed a motion to dismiss the petition in lieu of an answer with the DOE,
pursuant to N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.5(g). The BOE and Siering maintain that the petition must
be dismissed because: (1) R.W.’s petition is time-barred under N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.3(i), as it
was filed well in excess of ninety days beyond the district Superintendent’s last email to
R.W. on February 9, 2024, declaring the topic closed, and thus the petition was due no
later than May 9, 2024; (2) R.W. failed to state causes of action in petition counts I and III
upon which relief can be granted; and (3) the New Jersey Commissioner of Education
(Commissioner) does not have jurisdiction to adjudicate the alleged violations of the SEA
in Count II.
On July 8, 2024, R.W. filed his opposition to respondents’ motion claiming: (1) the
petition was timely because the Superintendent’s February 9, 2024 email declaring the
topic closed “did not represent receipt of ‘notice’ of a ‘final order, ruling, or other action,”
notwithstanding the district’s non-responses to R.W.’s subsequent communications about
the topic; (2) the Commissioner has jurisdiction to adjudicate this matter under N.J.S.A.
18A:6-9; and (3) counts I and III of the petition are viable because causes of action are
“suggested” by the facts and [o]nce the Petition is searched in depth and liberality, it
should become clear and apparent that the fundamental of a cause of action may be
gleaned even from an obscure statement of claim and Petitioner should be given an
opportunity to amend said Petition if necessary.”
On July 23, 2024, respondents filed a reply to R.W.’s opposition to the motion to
dismiss, asserting that: (1) the Superintendent’s email was crystal clear that the
exchange on the topic was closed, and R.W.’s subsequent attempts to negotiate which
were not responded to by the district did not toll the statute of limitations; (2) again, the
Commissioner does not have jurisdiction over SEA matters, which are reserved for the

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 10606-24
4
SEC; and (3) R.W. “has not presented any factual allegations which would support a
claim, even if the Amended Petition3 is read liberally.”
On July 24, 2024, the DOE transmitted the matter to the Office of Administrative
Law (OAL) to be heard as a contested case pursuant to pursuant to N.J.S.A. 52:14B-1 et
seq. and N.J.S.A. 52:14F-1 et seq. On November 21, 2024, respondents filed an
objection to R.W.’s August 24, 2024 reply brief in response to respondents’ July 23, 2024
reply brief, which respondents did not receive until November 20, 2024. Respondents
also objected to R.W.’s November 21, 2024 submission entitled “Who is [J.W.].” I
sustained both objections, and do not consider those documents in my deliberations.
Respondents requested oral arguments on the motion to dismiss, which were
heard on February 27, 2025, with R.W. appearing pro se. R.W. claimed at oral arguments
that he had also filed a Hate, Bullying, and Intimidation (HIB) complaint, and that the
District’s response was slow, but he conceded that is not part of this case, and is
irrelevant, because that claim was not included in his present petition against
respondents. The District ultimately dismissed the HIB complaint as unfounded.
R.W. also conceded that he received final notice that the matters raised in his
petition was conveyed by the Superintendent’s February 9, 2024 email declaring the topic
closed. He conceded that his May 20, 2024 petition was clearly out of time, but claimed
that he was trying to “be nice to the District” by not taking legal action through an attorney.
R.W., a physician, thus conferred with attorneys but elected not to retain them and took
full “responsibility” for his pro se legal errors.
As to failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted on counts I and III of
the petition, R.W. argued that the District’s policy should be “revisited and upheld.” R.W.
claimed that the District’s and Siering’s “policies” were “unfair,” and that there was no
“true justice,” because J.W. was not allowed to represent herself, notwithstanding offers
to allow her to do so, because she “felt uncomfortable and threatened by the teacher,”
3 R.W.’s “Amended Petition” dated June 3, 2024 is identical to his original petition dated May 18, 2024,
which was originally rejected by the DOE for filing deficiencies.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 10606-24
5
notwithstanding that she was an Advanced Placement student. J.W. did not explain
which “policies” he was referring to.
LEGAL ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS
While the Uniform Administrative Procedure Rules (UAPR) governing motions,
N.J.A.C. 1:1-12.1 to -12.7, do not specifically limit the types of motions that may be made
in administrative hearings or otherwise preclude a “motion to dismiss,” the more common
method for resolving a case on the papers without a plenary hearing is by a motion for
summary decision pursuant to N.J.A.C. 1:1-12.5.
Under N.J.A.C. 1:1-12.5, “[a] party may move for summary decision upon all or
any of the substantive issues in a contested case.” N.J.A.C. 1:1-12.5(a). Such a motion
“shall be served with briefs and with or without supporting affidavits” and “[t]he decision
sought may be rendered if the papers and discovery which have been filed, together with
the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged
and that the moving party is entitled to prevail as a matter of law.” N.J.A.C. 1:1-12.5(b).
However, a motion for summary decision shall be denied if, by responding affidavit, an
adverse party “set[s] forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue which can
only be determined in an evidentiary proceeding.” Ibid.
Summary judgment is analyzed in accordance with the principles established by
the Supreme Court in Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995):
[A] determination whether there exists a “genuine issue” of
material fact that precludes summary judgment requires the
motion judge to consider whether the competent evidential
materials presented, when viewed in the light most favorable
to the non-moving party, are sufficient to permit a rational
factfinder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of the
non-moving party. The “judge’s function is not . . . to weigh
the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to
determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.”
[Ibid. ; See also Nat’l Transfer, Inc. v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot.,
347 N.J. Super. 401, 408–09 (App. Div. 2002).]

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 10606-24
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R.W. offered no cogent legal arguments either in his opposition brief or in oral
arguments. The gist of his argument is “it’s not fair.” The BOE, however, thoroughly
briefed and argued its motion, and I adopt their arguments in their entireties.
The Entire Petition is Time-Barred
N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.3(i) requires a petitioner to “file a petition no later than the 90th day
from the date of receipt of the notice of a final order, ruling, or other action by the district
board of education, individual party, or agency, that is the subject of the requested
contested case hearing.” In Kaprow v. Board of Education of Berkeley Township, 131
N.J. 572 (1993), the New Jersey Supreme Court held that the Commissioner and the
State Board of Education have the authority to establish a time limitation for the resolution
of disputes arising under the school laws and addressed the public policy reasons behind
the ninety-day rule:
The limitations period provides a measure of repose, an
essential element in the proper and efficient administration of
the school laws. It stabilizes the relationship between the
teachers and the administration. [. . .] The limitation period
gives school districts the security of knowing that the
administrative decisions regarding the operation of the school
cannot be challenged after ninety days.
[Id. at 582.]
According to Kaprow, the notice requirement set forth in the regulation should
accommodate the dual purposes of the ninety-day limitations period:
The first is to stimulate litigants to pursue a right of action
within a reasonable time so that the opposing party may have
a fair opportunity to defend, thus preventing the litigation of
stale claims. The second purpose is “to penalize dilatoriness
and serve as a measure of repose” by giving security and
stability to human affairs.
[Id. at 587 (citations omitted).]

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 10606-24
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See also Kous. v. Old Bridge Twp. Bd. of Educ., Middlesex County, et al., Agency
Docket No. 26-2/12, aff’d. Commissioner (2012) (“Time-bars in litigation before the
Commissioner are promulgated for a reason and are uniformly enforced. These time
limitations are strictly enforced—at times to the detriment of a litigant filing an action two
days too late.”); Coles v. Bayonne Bd. of Educ., 2008 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2593
(“The 90-day rule for petitions to the Commissioner has been strictly construed.”).
By R.W.’s own admission and even accepting all of R.W.’s allegations as true, his
petition is time-barred. See Petition at 3–6, where R.W. identifies the purported timeline
of relevant events. Based on R.W.’s own reported timeline and giving him every benefit
of the doubt by using the latest possible date in that timeline as to when the statute of
limitations began to run on February 9, 2024, R.W. would have been required to file the
petition by May 9, 2024. However, he did not attempt to file the petition until May 20,
2024, which was deficient, and was then re-submitted on June 3, 2024. There are also
no circumstances which would justify relaxing the ninety-day rule.
Although R.W. argues in his opposition brief that the petition was not time-barred
because the Superintendent’s February 9, 2024 email to him did not constitute a final
determination even though it clearly stated that the matter was closed, R.W. continued to
attempt to negotiate with the District, notwithstanding its “unresponsiveness.” That is not
a basis for tolling the statute of limitations. It is well-established that “[t]he ninety-day time
period for filing a petition is not tolled by an individual’s attempt to resolve the issue
through negotiation.” Snow v. Bd. of Educ. of Twsp. of Moorestown, Burlington Cnty.,
Agency Docket No. 255-7/06 (Initial Decision 2007), aff’d., Comm’r (citing Kaprow, 131
N.J. at 588). Accordingly, I CONCLUDE that the petition is time-barred and must be
dismissed.
Counts I and III of the Petition Must be Dismissed for Failure to State Claims
Upon Which Relief May be Granted
R.W. claims in his first “allegation of misconduct:”
Violation of Due Process (N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.4): Mr. Siering’s
actions in handling the accusations against [J.W.] notably

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 10606-24
8
failed to meet the procedural standards mandated by New
Jersey’s educational statutes. By not providing a transparent
and equitable process, Mr. Siering breached the provisions of
N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.4, which specifically requires that all students
accused of violations such as academic dishonesty receive a
fair hearing where they can contest the allegations and
present a defense.
[Petition at 1–2.]
Similarly, he claims under the third “allegation of misconduct,” that “[t]he
investigation into the alleged academic dishonesty was cursory at best, lacking in depth
and dismissive of critical exculpatory evidence that [J.W.] had not intentionally shared her
work for copying purposes. Such oversight is in direct violation of procedural fairness
and does not align with the investigative rigor required by educational law.” Id., at 2.
Pursuant to N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.10, “the Commissioner may dismiss the petition on
the grounds that the petitioner has advanced no cause of action, even if the petitioner’s
factual allegations are accepted as true.” R.W.’s contention that respondents violated
N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.4 does not form the basis for a cause of action because that regulation
pertains simply to the formatting requirements for petitions of appeal. The regulation does
not “require that all students accused of violations such as academic dishonesty receive
a fair hearing where they can contest the allegations and present a defense,” as alleged
by R.W. Petition at 2. The regulation also does not identify any investigative
requirements that school districts must follow when analyzing issues pertaining to
academic dishonesty or violations of class requirements. Ibid.
R.W. does not cite to any other statute or regulation which provides the basis for
a cause of action, nor are respondents or this Tribunal aware of any such legal
requirements. The substance of R.W.’s allegations pertain to Siering’s handling of an
academic dishonesty/class guideline matter involving J.W. and the grade that he
assessed her for the related assignment. R.W. alleges, in sum, that the District did not
“adher[e] to the requisite investigatory protocols mandated by education law,” that
“Siering’s actions . . . failed to meet the procedural standards mandated by New Jersey’s
educational statutes,” and that “[b]y not providing a transparent and equitable process,
Mr. Siering breached the provisions of N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.4, which specifically require that

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 10606-24
9
all students accused of violations such as academic dishonesty receive a fair hearing
where they can contest the allegations and present a defense.” Petition at 1–2.
N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.4 provides, in relevant part:
(a) A petition shall include the name, address, telephone
number, and, if available, email address of each petitioner; the
name, address, telephone number, and, if available, email
address of each party respondent; a statement of the specific
allegation(s) and essential facts supporting the specific
allegation(s) that have given rise to a dispute pursuant to the
school laws; the relief petitioner is seeking; and a statement
of verification or certification in lieu of affidavit for each
petitioner. The petition should also cite, if known to petitioner,
the section(s) of the school laws under which the controversy
has arisen. A petition should be presented in substantially the
following form:
. . . . [form omitted]
(b) A petition submitted by a pro se petitioner that
substantially includes the requisite information as set forth in
(a) above shall be accepted for filing notwithstanding that the
petition does not conform to the prescribed technical format.
However, where a petition does not meet minimal standards
regarding parties, allegations, or relief sought, the petitioner
shall be sent a letter noting the date of the submission’s
receipt and identifying the deficiencies deemed to constitute
substantial noncompliance. The matter will not be filed until
the noted deficiencies are corrected.
(c) Any party to a controversy or dispute before the
Commissioner who is a party to another action before any
other administrative agency, arbitration proceeding, or court
involving the same or similar issue of fact or law shall indicate
the existence of such action or complaint within the petition of
appeal or the answer to the Commissioner, as may be
appropriate. Failure to so certify may be deemed to be
sufficient cause for dismissal of the petition of appeal when,
in the judgment of the Commissioner and/or the ALJ, such
failure results in the duplication of administrative procedures
for the resolution of a controversy or dispute.
(d) Whenever such duplicate filing is discovered, and after the
filing of the answer by the respondent, the case will be
transmitted to the OAL for initial determination of which

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 10606-24
10
agency, if any, has the predominant interest in the outcome of
the case.
[N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.4.]
The regulation does not “require that all students accused of violations such as
academic dishonesty receive a fair hearing where they can contest the allegations and
present a defense,” nor are respondents aware of any other statute or regulation which
requires a hearing every time a student is accused of academic dishonesty or violation of
a class guideline. That would be a local policy decision. There are specific circumstances
where school districts are required to hold hearings, such as in instances of short-term
suspensions,4 long-term suspensions,5 expulsions,6 HIB matters,7 and due process
hearings for students with disabilities.8 R.W. has not alleged that any of these
circumstances apply to J.W. He also does not allege that he requested a HIB hearing
and was denied the same. Rather, he simply alleges that his daughter “was wrongfully
implicated by . . . Siering in a case of academic dishonesty, based on accusations of
submitting lab reports that were identical to those of her classmates,” and that Siering
“initiated punitive actions against [J.W.] without adhering to the requisite investigatory
protocols mandated by education law, effectively circumventing the established due
process rights owed to [J.W.].” Petition at 1. However, there are no “requisite
investigatory protocols mandated by education law” in such circumstances. In other
words, there is no basis in law to allege that the District was required to hold a hearing in
this matter, or that Siering was required to follow any specifically enumerated
“investigatory protocols.” Therefore, even accepting all of R.W.’s alleged facts as true
for the purpose of this motion, counts I and III of the petition must be dismissed for failure
to state a cause of action.
Although R.W. argues that “a Court must determine the adequacy of the pleading
and decide whether a cause of action is ‘suggested’ by the facts,” (Pb at 5), “a dismissal
is mandated where the factual allegations are palpably insufficient to support a claim upon
4 See N.J.A.C. 6A:16-7.2(a)(2).
5 See N.J.A.C. 6A:16-7.3(a)(2).
6 See N.J.A.C. 6A:16-7.4(a)(1).
7 See N.J.A.C. 6A:16-7.7(a)(xi).
8 See N.J.A.C. 6A: 14-2.7.

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11
which relief can be granted.” Rieder v. State, 221 N.J. Super. 547, 552 (App. Div. 1987).
As articulated by the BOE, R.W. has not presented any factual allegations which would
support a claim, even if the petition is read liberally. At most, R.W. alleges ethics
violations which are within the purview of the SEC, not the Commissioner.
Accordingly, I CONCLUDE that counts I and III of the petition must be dismissed
for failure to state claims upon which relief can be granted.
Count II of the Petition Must Be Dismissed Because the DOE Commissioner Does
Not Have Jurisdiction Over SEC Matters
Arising Under the New Jersey School Ethics Act
Pursuant to N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.10, “upon motion to dismiss filed in lieu of answer, the
Commissioner may dismiss the petition . . . for lack of jurisdiction.” R.W. alleges that “[i]n
his dealings with [J.W.], Mr. Siering transgressed the ethical standards enshrined in New
Jersey’s School Ethics Act (N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24).” Petition at 2. Petitioner “insist[s] on
the imposition of appropriate disciplinary measures against Mr. Siering, commensurate
with the gravity of the infractions, as delineated under New Jersey’s School Ethics Act
(N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24).” Ibid.
However, it is well-established that the Commissioner does not have jurisdiction to
adjudicate claims arising pursuant to the New Jersey SEA, which are reserved for the
New Jersey SEC. See, e.g., Coyle v. Bd. of Educ. of Jersey City, Hudson Cnty. and
Jersey City Educ. Ass’n, 2019 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 646 (Sept. 10, 2019), where the
petitioner “allege[d] certain violations of the School Ethics Act.” The respondent moved
to dismiss the petition, and the Honorable Thomas R. Betancourt, ALJ, stated that “[t]he
threshold question in this matter is . . . one of jurisdiction: Does the Commissioner, and
therefore, the OAL, have jurisdiction to consider the petition herein?” Judge Betancourt
determined that the answer was definitively “no”:
The answers to both questions clearly [are] no. The
Commissioner, and therefore the OAL, does not have
jurisdiction as the claims set forth in the petition all hinge upon
alleged violation[s] of the School Ethics Act, N.J.S.A. 18A:12-

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 10606-24
12
21, et seq. The proper venue for the within matter would be
the School Ethics Commission (SEC). N.J.S.A. 18A:12-27.
The Commissioner affirmed Judge Betancourt’s initial decision, stating, in relevant
part: “Upon review, the Commissioner agrees with the ALJ that he does not have
jurisdiction over this matter as the claims set forth in the petition do not arise out of New
Jersey School Law as required by N.J.S.A. 18A:6-9; instead, they involve alleged
violations of the School Ethics Act.” Coyle, 2019 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 1122 (Dec. 3, 2019).
See also Zywicki v. Bd. of Educ. of Mount Olive, Morris Cnty., 2024 N.J. AGEN LEXIS
220 (Feb. 20, 2024) (holding that:
“[w]hile the Commissioner of Education has jurisdiction over
‘all controversies and disputes arising under the school laws,’
it is also clear that jurisdiction over School Ethics matters
belongs with the School Ethics Commission (i.e., that ethics
matters are to be initiated by a complaint filed with the S.E.C.,
not with the Commissioner, and then the S.E.C. decides the
threshold issue of probable cause).
. . . .
Since it is clear that Zywicki himself has characterized this
matter as an ethics matter, it follows that pursuant to N.J.S.A.
18A:12-28 and 29, jurisdiction lies with the S.E.C., rather
tha[n] the Commissioner of Education.”)
Similarly, in this case R.W. himself characterizes count II of his petition as an ethics
matter. See Petition at 2 (“In his dealings with [J.W.], Mr. Siering transgressed the ethical
standards enshrined in New Jersey’s School Ethics Act (N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24).”).
Additionally, the Commissioner has specifically stated that the Commissioner does not
have jurisdiction to adjudicate allegations arising pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24. See
e.g., Borough of Chesilhurst v. Bd. of Educ. of Chelhurst, 2009 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 531
(Aug. 12, 2009) (holding that “there are significant jurisdictional issues with regard to this
petition. For example, petitioners seek relief pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24 for alleged
violation of the School Ethics Act, of which the Commissioner does not have jurisdiction.”);
Bd. of Educ. of Englewood, Bergen County v. David, 2022 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 487 n.4
(Aug. 15, 2022) (holding Commissioner does not have jurisdiction to address alleged
violations of SEA because “jurisdiction lies with the School Ethics Commission”);

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 10606-24
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Castriotta v. Bd. of Educ. of Roxbury, Morris County, EDU 09217-10 Final Decision (May
18, 2011), 2011 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 182 (Apr. 4, 2011), rev’d on other grounds, 427 N.J.
Super (App. Div. 2012) (holding that “review and adjudication of allegations of Code of
Ethics for School Board Members violations is solely within the jurisdictional purview of
the School Ethics Commission.”).
Accordingly, petitioner’s allegations regarding an alleged violation of the New
Jersey SEA, N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24, must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
It is therefore ORDERED that respondent’s motion for summary decision is
GRANTED and R.W.’s petition off appeal is hereby DISMISSED with prejudice.
I hereby FILE this initial decision with the COMMISSIONER OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION for consideration.
This recommended decision may be adopted, modified, or rejected by the
COMMISSIONER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, who by law is authorized
to make a final decision in this matter. If the Commissioner of the Department of
Education does not adopt, modify, or reject this decision within forty-five days and unless
such time limit is otherwise extended, this recommended decision shall become a final
decision in accordance with N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10.
Within thirteen days from the date on which this recommended decision was
mailed to the parties, any party may file written exceptions with the COMMISSIONER OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION. Exceptions may be filed by email to
ControversiesDisputesFilings@doe.nj.gov or by mail to Office of Controversies

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 10606-24
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and Disputes, 100 Riverview Plaza, 4th Floor, PO Box 500, Trenton, New Jersey
08625-0500. A copy of any exceptions must be sent to the judge and to the other parties.
May 29, 2025
DATE SARAH H. SURGENT, ALJ
Date Received at Agency:
Date Mailed to Parties:
SHS/nn

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 10606-24
15
APPPENDIX
WITNESSES
For petitioner:
None
For respondents:
None
EXHIBITS
For petitioner:
R.W.’s petition of appeal with attached exhibits, file stamped July 24, 2024
For respondent:
None