Israel Torres V. New Jersey Department of Education, Office of Student Protection, 8/23/2024, (#308-24)

308-24
New Jersey Commissioner of Education
Final Decision
Israel Torres,
Petitioner,
v.
New Jersey Department of Education,
Office of Student Protection,
Respondent.
Synopsis
Petitioner – a school bus driver – appealed the Department’s determination to suspend his school bus
endorsement for six months pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:39-28 et seq. after an incident on March 24, 2024,
in which an elementary school student remained on petitioner’s bus beyond the end of his assigned bus
route. 	Petitioner did not dispute that a sleeping child remained on the bus but contended that the
student was never left alone, as he noticed the child while proceeding back to his base location. The
Department filed a motion to dismiss in lieu of an answer, requesting that the motion be converted to a
motion for summary decision upon transmittal of the matter to the Office of Administrative Law (OAL).
The ALJ found, inter alia, that: there are no material facts at issue in this case, and the matter is ripe for
summary decision; 	petitioner admitted that after completing his bus route on March 24, 2024, he
noticed that a sleeping child remained on the bus; petitioner then located a safe place to stop, notified
dispatch of the situation, and returned the child to the George S. Hess Elementary School; pursuant to
N.J.S.A. 18A:39-28, petitioner had an affirmative duty to visually inspect the school bus at the end of the
transportation route to determine that no pupil had been left on the bus; “end of the transportation
route” under N.J.S.A. 18A:39-28 means when the children are dropped off at the assigned destination,
or the last bus stop; in accordance with N.J.S.A. 18A:39-29, if a school bus driver is found to have left a
child on the bus at the end of a route, the driver’s school bus endorsement shall be suspended for six
months for the first offense. 	Accordingly, the ALJ granted summary decision to the respondent and
affirmed the petitioner’s six-month suspension for leaving a child on the school bus at the end of a
route.
Upon full review, the Commissioner concurred with the ALJ that the respondent is entitled to summary
decision. Accordingly, the petition was dismissed; respondent was directed to notify the Motor Vehicle
Commission 	of 	its 	obligation 	to 	suspend 	petitioner’s 	school 	bus 	endorsement 	pursuant 	to
N.J.S.A. 18A:39, and to notify petitioner’s employer that he is ineligible for the period of suspension for
continued employment as a school bus driver.
This synopsis is not part of the Commissioner’s decision. It has been prepared for the convenience of the reader.
It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Commissioner.

308-24
OAL Dkt. No. EDU 05575-24
Agency Dkt. No. 90-4/24
New Jersey Commissioner of Education
Final Decision
Israel Torres,
Petitioner,
v.
New Jersey Department of Education,
Office of Student Protection,
Respondent.
The record of this matter and the Initial Decision of the Office of Administrative Law (OAL)
have been reviewed and considered. The parties did not file exceptions.
Upon review, the Commissioner concurs with the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) that the
“end of the transportation route” under N.J.S.A. 18A:39-28 is when the children are dropped off
at the assigned destination. 	Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:39-28, school bus drivers have an
affirmative duty to visually inspect the bus at the end of the transportation route to determine
that no pupil remains on the bus. Here, the petitioner did not visually inspect the school bus
before departing George L. Hess Elementary School, the end of his transportation route, and as
a result a child was left on the bus. 	Thus, the ALJ correctly concluded that petitioner violated
N.J.S.A. 18A:39-28.
Accordingly, the Initial Decision is adopted as the final decision in this matter, and the
petition of appeal is hereby dismissed. Petitioner’s “S” endorsement is hereby suspended for six

2
months from the date of this decision. 	Respondent is directed to notify the Motor Vehicle
Commission of its obligation to suspend petitioner’s school bus endorsement pursuant to
N.J.S.A. 18A:39-26 et seq., and to notify petitioner’s employer that he is ineligible during the
period of suspension for continued employment as a school bus driver.
IT IS SO ORDERED.1
ACTING COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION
Date of Decision: 	August 23, 2024
Date of Mailing: 	August 26, 2024
1 This decision may be appealed to the Appellate Division of the Superior Court pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:6-
9.1. Under N.J.Ct.R. 2:4-1(b), a notice of appeal must be filed with the Appellate Division within 45 days
from the date of mailing of this decision.

New Jersey is an Equal Opportunity Employer
State of New Jersey
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
INITIAL DECISION
SUMMARY DECISION
OAL DKT. NO. EDU 05575-24
AGENCY DKT. NO. 90-4/24
ISRAEL TORRES,
Petitioner,
v.
NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF
EDUCATION, OFFICE OF STUDENT
PROTECTION,
Respondent.
____________________________
Israel Torres, petitioner pro se
Michael Lombardi, Deputy Attorney General, for respondent (Matthew J. Platkin,
Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney)
Record Closed: June 26, 2024 	Decided: July 11, 2024
BEFORE KATHLEEN M. CALEMMO, ALJ:
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Petitioner, Israel Torres (Torres), challenges the suspension of his bus driver “S”
endorsement. 	The Office of Student Protection (OSP) determined that Torres violated
N.J.S.A. 18A:39-28, et seq., in allegedly leaving a pupil on a school bus assigned to him

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 05575-24
2
at the end of his transportation route. As a first offense of this kind, the penalty is a six-
month suspension of his “S” endorsement to operate a school bus.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Petitioner filed his Petition of Appeal with the Department of Education, Bureau of
Controversies and Disputes (Department) on April 5, 2024. On April 23, 2024, the New
Jersey Department of Education, Office of Student Protection (OSP) filed a motion to
dismiss in lieu of an answer, pursuant to N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.10.1 The matter was transferred
to the Office of Administrative Law (OAL), where it was filed on April 24, 2024, as a
contested case under N.J.S.A. 52:14B-1 to -15 and N.J.S.A. 52:14F-1 to -13.
The matter was assigned to me on June 4, 2024. I held a telephone conference
on June 17, 2024, and set a briefing schedule. Torres submitted his opposition to OSP’s
motion to dismiss on June 18, 2024. On June 25, 2024, OSP filed a letter brief in reply.
On June 26, 2024, Torres filed a statement replying to OSP’s reply, which I accepted and
considered. The record closed on June 26, 2024.
FINDINGS OF FACT
On March 25, 2024, after departing George L. Hess Elementary School en route
to the base location for Sheppard Bus, Torres visually scanned his student mirrors and
noticed a sleeping student several rows behind him. After locating a safe place to stop,
Torres notified dispatch for his bus company. 	Dispatch advised him to return to school
with the student. 	Torres never left the student unattended and returned the student to
school as instructed.
1 OSP had initially filed a Motion to Dismiss in Lieu of an Answer with the Commissioner under N.J.A.C.
6A:3-1.10. 	Upon transmittal to the OAL, the motion was converted to a summary-decision motion under
N.J.A.C. 1:1-12.5.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 05575-24
3
LEGAL ANALYSIS
The School Bus Safety Act, N.J.S.A. 18A:39-26 to -33, requires that the school-
bus driver “shall visually inspect the school bus to which he is assigned at the end of the
transportation route to determine that no pupil has been left on the bus.” N.J.S.A. 18A:39-
28. 	A violation of N.J.S.A. 18A:39-28 results in a mandatory penalty. 	N.J.S.A. 18A:39-
29. The statute dictates that “[i]n the event that, after notice and opportunity to be heard,
a school bus driver is found to have left a pupil on the school bus at the end of his route,
his school bus endorsement shall be: (a) suspended for six months, for a first offense
. . . .” N.J.S.A. 18A:39-29(a).
The issue in this case is whether the Department established by a preponderance
of the credible evidence that Torres failed to comply with the statutory requirement that
the driver “shall visually inspect the school bus to which he is assigned at the end of the
transportation route to determine that no pupil has been left on the bus.” N.J.S.A. 18A:39-
28. Torres acknowledged in his written statement that he discovered a sleeping student
after departing the elementary school when he visually scanned his student mirrors.
When Torres discovered the student, he was proceeding to the base location of Sheppard
Bus, where he intended to perform the “mandated visual inspection in a safe and timely
manner.” 	(Petitioner’s Opposition Statement.) 	Torres discovered the child before he
reached his base location and upon notifying dispatch, returned the child to school.
Therefore, the heart of the instant controversy lies in the interpretation of the “end of
transportation route” phrase, which is not defined in the statute or regulations.
In Klein v. Department of Education, Criminal History Review Unit, EDU 00852-11,
the Commissioner of Education (Commissioner) concluded that the “end of the route” as
used in N.J.S.A. 18A:39-26 “terminates at the point where all of the children in that group
leave the bus . . . and the bus is empty of riders, and before the driver moves on to her
next route. 	At that point, the driver shall inspect the bus for any remaining students.”
Klein, Comm’r decision (February 21, 2012), <http://njlaw.rutgers.edu/collections/oal/>, at
2. The Commissioner explained that

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 05575-24
4
[t]he record show[ed] that the driver by walking to the back of
the bus on that day, turning off the “Child Minder” button,
taking the keys out of the ignition, letting the children out, and
locking the doors, fulfilled all indicia of “end of the route”
activities save one: 	She did not inspect the bus. 	Accepting
[the driver’s] argument that the inspection did not have to take
place until the bus returned to the depot at the end of the day
defies reason and eviscerates the fundamental purpose of the
statute – to protect our children and ensure their safety.
[Id. at 2-3.]
In 2015, in Herman v. Department of Education Criminal History Review Unit, EDU
10473-14, Initial Decision (June 23, 2015), <http://njlaw.rutgers.edu/collections/oal/>,
rev’d, 	Comm’r 	(July 	30, 	2015), 	<https://www.nj.gov/education/legal/decisions/>, 	the
Commissioner again rejected the argument that the “end of transportation route” means
at the end of the workday, once the bus is dropped off at the bus depot lot. 	The
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) concluded that N.J.S.A. 18A:39-28’s requirement of a
visual inspection at the end of the route did not apply. The ALJ determined that the route
had not ended as long as the bus driver had not left the vicinity of the bus; and that the
visual inspection would be performed when she did depart the vicinity of the bus at the
bus depot. 	Herman, Initial Decision, <https://www.nj.gov/education/legal/decisions/>.
Upon review, the Commissioner rejected the ALJ’s initial decision. 	Citing Klein, the
Commissioner reiterated that the bus driver violated the School Bus Safety Act when she
failed to visually inspect the school bus at the end of her route – that is, following the
departure of the students from the bus, and before returning to the depot. 	Herman,
Comm’r Decision, <https://www.nj.gov/education/legal/decisions/>, at 5. Concurring with
what he described as the “well-reasoned definition” of “end of the transportation route”
provided by the Commissioner in Klein, the Commissioner declared the ALJ’s rejection of
the Commissioner’s holding in Klein “undermines the purpose and intent of the School
Bus Safety Act.” Id. at 7. He explained:
[a]s the Commissioner stated in Klein, “Accepting petitioner’s
argument that the inspection did not have to take place until
the bus returned to the depot at the end of the day defies
reason and eviscerates 	the 	fundamental purpose 	of 	the
statute – to protect our children and ensure their safety.”
Klein, supra, at 2. 	To hold otherwise would excuse – if not

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 05575-24
5
promote – inefficiency (by endorsing needless rides to the bus
depot for our students) and place children at unnecessary risk
of harm. 	It is nonsensical to delay visual inspection of the
school bus until arrival at the bus depot when, in fact, any
heightened 	safety 	risk 	to 	the 	children 	can 	be 	avoided
altogether if they are discovered on the bus while still present
on school grounds or prior to leaving the route. While it may
be true that [the student] was never left unattended, and it is
not known from the present record whether he suffered any
harm or distress, the visual inspection required by N.J.S.A.
18A:39-28 	should 	have 	occurred 	prior 	to 	departing 	the
[school] at the end of the transportation route – when all of the
other children had exited the bus.
[Id. at 7-8.]
In his decision, the Commissioner also cited Vickery v. Department of Education
Criminal 	History 	Review 	Unit, 	EDU 	00083-15, 	Initial 	Decision 	(June 	2, 	2015),
<http://njlaw.rutgers.edu/collections/oal/>, 	adopted, 	Comm’r 	(July 	9, 	2015),
<https://www.nj.gov/education/legal/decisions/>, which he stated “reinforces the Act’s
requirement that the visual inspection of the school bus should have occurred before
departing the [school] at the end of the transportation route – when all of the other children
had 	exited 	the 	bus.” 	Herman, 	Comm’r 	Decision, 	<https://www.nj.gov/education
/legal/decisions/> at 6.
In Vickery, a school bus driver similarly failed to complete the required visual
inspection of the school bus following his departure at the last bus stop on route and
consequently found a sixteen-year-old student, who had fallen asleep and failed to exit
the bus, at the bus yard. The driver averred he had not violated the Act because he did
not leave the child alone on the bus and conducted a visual inspection upon his return to
the bus yard, which was the end of his route. The ALJ determined that pursuant to Klein
the Act requires that an inspection be conducted when the last child is dropped off during
the route, and not after the vehicle has finished its drop-offs and has returned to its garage
or depot. 	Vickery, Initial Decision, <https://www.nj.gov/education/legal/decisions/>. 	On
review, the Commissioner adopted the findings and determinations of the ALJ. Vickery,
Comm’r Decision, <https://www.nj.gov/education/legal/decisions/>.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 05575-24
6
Following Klein, Herman and Vickery, the Commissioner has consistently held that
the “end of the transportation route” means at the end of a student drop-off point. 	See
Arcos v. Dep’t of Educ., Crim. Hist. Rev. Unit, EDU 01752-18, Initial Decision, (November
7, 	2018), 	adopted, 	Comm’r 	(September 	20, 	2018), 	<http://njlaw.rutgers.edu/
collections/oal/> (“the end of the transportation route” triggering the school bus driver’s
affirmative duty to inspect the school bus under N.J.S.A. 18A:39-28 occurs when the
driver drops off the children at the assigned destination and not when the bus driver
competes all of her assigned routes for the day.); Pedi v. Dept. of Educ., Office of Student
Protection, 	EDU 	04317-21, 	Initial 	Decision 	(October 	13, 	2021), 	adopted, 	Comm’r
(November 	18, 	2021), 	(bus 	driver 	violated 	N.J.S.A. 	18A:39-28 	when 	she 	merely
conducted a “turnaround view” and not a full visual inspection of the bus after her first
student drop off, continued onto her second route, and subsequently found a child from
her first route.); and Severe v. Dept. of Educ., Office of Student Protection, EDU 01502-
21, Initial Decision (September 19, 2022), 2022 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 794, adopted, Comm’r
(October 	31, 	2022), 	<http://njlaw.rutgers.edu/collections/oal/> 	(the 	“end 	of 	the
transportation route” under N.J.S.A. 18A:39-28 is when the children are dropped off at
the assigned destination, that triggers the school-bus driver’s affirmative duty to inspect
the school bus under N.J.S.A. 18A:39-28, not when the bus driver competes all of her
assigned routes for the day.)
Here, Torres contends that it was unsafe to pull over on the premises of George L
Hess Elementary School and perform a student check. 	In his opposition, Torres
explained the traffic at the designated area for arriving and departing school buses. He
explained that “he planned to perform my student check, and post trip inspection upon
arrival to base” because that was the safest place to perform those duties. 	(Opposition
Brief.) Torres failed to mention whether he performed a visual inspection of his bus after
the students departed and prior to driving away. (emphasis mine.) 	According to Torres,
after he drove off the premises, he noticed the sleeping student while visually scanning
his student mirrors. As a result, Torres found a child on the bus as he was proceeding to
his base location, having left the school. 	Regardless of Torres’ intentions, visual
inspection was required to be performed at the school prior to departure.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 05575-24
7
The statute requires the driver to visually inspect the bus at the end of his
transportation route. N.J.S.A. 18A:39-28. There can no longer be any doubt that the end
of the transportation route was George L. Hess Elementary School. 	Herein, there is no
dispute to the material fact that Torres discovered the student after leaving the school en
route to Sheppard Bus’s base location. For that reason, he violated N.J.S.A. 18A: 39-28.
After OSP determines that a child was indeed left behind at the end of the route, a
mandatory penalty is imposed due to the safety implications of such a violation. Garner
v. N.J. Dep’t of Educ., Crim. Hist. Rev. Unit, 2009 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 173 (April 3, 2009),
adopted, Comm’r (May 1, 2009), https://www.nj.gov/education/legal/. 	Thus, “[i]n the
event that . . . a school bus driver is found to have left a pupil on the school bus . . ., his
school bus endorsement shall be: (a) suspended for six months, for a first offense . . . .”
N.J.S.A. 18A:39-29(a). 	Here, since Torres violated the statute, the penalty imposed is
mandatory, and there is no discretion to impose anything less than a six-month
suspension of his “S” endorsement. 	Where the violation has been established, no
circumstances of the event or of the driver may be considered in determining the penalty.
Garner, 2009 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 173 at *5–6.
I CONCLUDE that the “end of the transportation route” under N.J.S.A. 18A:39-28
is when the children are dropped off at the assigned destination, that triggers the school-
bus driver’s affirmative duty to inspect the school bus under N.J.S.A. 18A:39-28, not a
safe and convenient location away from the designated route.
The Department seeks relief pursuant to N.J.A.C. 1:1-12.5(b), which provides that
summary decision should be rendered “if the papers and discovery which have been filed,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact challenged and that the moving party is entitled to prevail as a matter of law.” This
provision mirrors the summary judgment language of R. 4:46-2(c) of the New Jersey
Court Rules. 	The motion judge must “consider whether the competent evidential
materials presented, when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, are
sufficient to permit a rational factfinder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of
the non-moving party.” 	Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995).
The “judge’s function is not himself [or herself] to weigh the evidence and determine the

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 05575-24
8
truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” 	Ibid.
(quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 242, 249 (1986)). 	When the
evidence “is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law,” the trial court
should not hesitate to grant summary judgment. Ibid. (quoting Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S at
252).
I CONCLUDE that the evidence presented by the parties does not establish any
material facts in dispute. 	Given the limited facts that must be established to support a
violation of the duty imposed by the Legislature on a school-bus driver to properly inspect
the bus at the end of a route to assure that no child is left on the bus, the arguments
offered by OSP amply support summary decision in its favor. And given the mandatory
nature of the penalty for a first-time violator of the mandate, the six-month suspension is
the only outcome when the violation is proven. N.J.S.A. 18A:39-29(a). OSP’S motion for
summary decision must be GRANTED.
ORDER
It is hereby ORDERED that OSP’s motion for summary decision is hereby
GRANTED, and it is further ORDERED that the petitioner’s “S” endorsement shall be
suspended for six months.
I hereby FILE this initial decision with the ACTING COMMISSIONER OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION for consideration.
This recommended decision may be adopted, modified, or rejected by the ACTING
COMMISSIONER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, who by law is authorized
to make a final decision in this matter. If the Acting Commissioner of the Department of
Education does not adopt, modify, or reject this decision within forty-five days and unless
such time limit is otherwise extended, this recommended decision shall become a final
decision in accordance with N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10.
Within thirteen days from the date on which this recommended decision was
mailed 	to 	the 	parties, 	any 	party 	may 	file 	written 	exceptions 	with 	the 	ACTING

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 05575-24
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COMMISSIONER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION. Exceptions may be filed
by email to ControversiesDisputesFilings@doe.nj.gov or by mail to Office of
Controversies and Disputes, 100 Riverview Plaza, 4th Floor, PO Box 500, Trenton,
New Jersey 08625-0500. A copy of any exceptions must be sent to the judge and to the
other parties.
July 11, 2024
DATE 	KATHLEEN M. CALEMMO. ALJ
Date Received at Agency:
Date Mailed to Parties:
KMC/tat