Board of Education of the Township of Brick, Ocean County; Board of Education of the Township of Jackson, Ocean County; Board of Education of the Manalapan-Englishtown Regional School District, Monmouth County; Board of Education of the Toms River Regional School District, Ocean County; Board of Education of the Township of Lacey, Ocean County; Board of Education of the Freehold Regional High School District, Monmouth County; Board of Education of the Township of Weymouth, Atlantic County; Board of Education of the Township of Ocean, Monmouth County; the Township of Brick, Ocean County; the Township of Toms River, Ocean County; the Borough of South Toms River, Ocean County; the Borough of Beachwood, Ocean County; the Borough of Pine Beach, Ocean County; and Stephanie Wohlrab v. Lamont Repollet, Commissioner, New Jersey Department of Education and Elizabeth Maher Muoio, New Jersey State Treasurer, 10/31/19, (290-19)

290-19
New Jersey Commissioner of Education
Final Decision
Board of Education of the Township of
Brick, Ocean County, et. als.,
Petitioners,
v.
Lamont Repollet, Commissioner of Education, and
Elizabeth Maher Muoio, New Jersey State Treasurer,
Respondents.
Synopsis
Eight local boards of education, five municipalities and one individual taxpayer challenged recent
amendments to the School Funding Reform Act of 2008 (SFRA), N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-43 et. seq. Petitioners
asserted that the school funding formula as it is now written: requires that they pay more than their fair
share of local property taxes to financially support the public schools; has resulted in an underfunding of
State aid; and has created a funding formula that is neither equitable, predictable nor constitutional.
Petitioners further claim that they have been deprived of due process and equal protection under the law.
Respondents filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the petition fails to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted.
The ALJ found, inter alia, that: the five municipalities lack standing to bring claims on behalf of their
constituent taxpayers regarding whether the SFRA unfairly burdens those taxpayers or whether it
deprives children of a thorough and efficient education (T&E); municipalities do not have the legal
capacity to challenge State action based on equal protection grounds; boards of education lack standing
to bring claims on behalf of taxpayers or on equal protection grounds, but do have standing to raise
claims of educational inadequacy and inequality, though their claims are not viable; the school boards
herein cannot rely on Abbott v. Burke cases to support their contention that the SFRA as amended is
unconstitutional, as the educational disparity Abbott was concerned with readily dwarfs the claims
raised herein; as to the taxpayer petitioner in this matter, she does have standing to assert that the
SFRA amendments deny her children T&E, and to bring claims of unfair taxation as well as an equal
protection claim, but has failed to state a viable equal protection claim. 	Based on the foregoing, the
ALJ dismissed the petition.
Upon a comprehensive review of this matter, the Commissioner agreed with the ALJ – for the reasons
thoroughly analyzed and discussed in the Initial Decision – that the petition must be dismissed on the basis
of standing and for failure to state a claim. Accordingly, the Initial Decision of the OAL was adopted as
the final decision in this matter and the petition was dismissed.
This synopsis is not part of the Commissioner’s decision. It has been prepared for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither
reviewed nor approved by the Commissioner.
October 31, 2019

1
OAL Dkt. No. EDU 02207-19
Agency Dkt. No. 19-1/19
New Jersey Commissioner of Education
Final Decision
Board of Education of the Township of Brick,
Ocean 	County; 	Board 	of 	Education 	of 	the
Township of Jackson, Ocean County; Board of
Education 	of 	the 	Manalapan-Englishtown
Regional School District, Monmouth County;
Board 	of 	Education 	of 	the 	Toms 	River
Regional School District, Ocean County; Board
of Education of the Township of Lacey, Ocean
County; Board of Education of the Freehold
Regional 	High 	School 	District, 	Monmouth
County; Board of Education of the Township of
Weymouth, 	Atlantic 	County; 	Board 	of
Education 	of 	the 	Township 	of 	Ocean,
Monmouth County; The Township of Brick
Ocean County; The Township of Toms River,
Ocean County; The Borough of South Toms
River, 	Ocean 	County; 	The 	Borough 	of
Beachwood, Ocean County; The Borough of
Pine 	Beach, 	Ocean 	County; 	and 	Stephanie
Wohlrab,
Petitioners,
v.
Lamont Repollet, Commissioner,
New Jersey Department of Education
and Elizabeth Maher Muoio,
New Jersey State Treasurer,
Respondents.
The record of this matter and the Initial Decision of the Office of Administrative
Law (OAL) have been reviewed, as have the exceptions filed by petitioners pursuant to
N.J.A.C. 1:1-18.4, and the respondents’ reply thereto.

2
Petitioners in this matter are eight local boards of education, five municipalities,
and one individual taxpayer. 	Collectively, petitioners challenge the recent amendments to the
School Funding Reform Act of 2008 (SFRA), N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-43 et seq, alleging that the new
school funding formula is unconstitutional and inequitable as it results in an underfunding of
State aid and forces petitioners to pay more than their fair share in local property taxes.
The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) granted the respondents’ motion and
dismissed the petition. The ALJ found that the five municipalities lack standing to bring claims
on behalf of their constituent taxpayers regarding whether the SFRA unfairly burdens those
taxpayers or whether it deprives children of a thorough and efficient education (T&E); further,
municipalities do not have the legal capacity to challenge State action based on equal protection
grounds. Similarly, the ALJ found that the boards of education lack standing to bring claims on
behalf of taxpayers or on equal protection grounds, but found that they do have standing to raise
claims of educational inadequacy and inequality. Regarding the taxpayer petitioner, the ALJ
found that she has standing to assert that SFRA amendments will deny her children T&E and to
bring claims of unfair taxation, as well as an equal protection claim.
With respect to the T&E claim, the ALJ found that the school board petitioners
and taxpayer petitioner failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. 	Specifically,
the ALJ found that the petition does not demonstrate that “the students’ educational opportunities
are so deficient as to jeopardize their futures.” (Initial Decision at 12). The Abbott v. Burke line
of cases do not support their contention because the educational disparities in Abbott are of such
a high magnitude that they are not comparable to the educational concerns in this matter. 	119
N.J. 287 (1990) (Abbott II). 	Moreover, the ALJ found that claims involving “inequitable local

3
taxation cannot form the basis of a viable constitutional claim under the T&E clause.”
(Initial Decision at 13).
Additionally, the ALJ concluded that the petitioning boards have failed to state a
claim that the New Jersey constitution entitles them to the funding set forth by the pre-
amendment SFRA. The SFRA was declared constitutional in Abbott v. Burke, 199 N.J. 140
(2009) (Abbott XX) with respect to the educational inequality claims made only by Abbott
districts, and the petitioners here are not Abbott districts. Finally, the taxpayer petitioner’s equal
protection claim alleges that she suffers from an unequal tax burden because she is required to
pay more than her “fair share” in property taxes to support her local school district. 	The ALJ
found that New Jersey courts are unwilling to decide school funding disputes through the equal
protection clause, and therefore dismissed the claim, thus dismissing the entire petition.
In their exceptions, petitioners argue that the ALJ erred in failing to apply the
proper legal standard on a motion to dismiss because she did not afford petitioners every
reasonable inference of fact. For example, when the ALJ found that the educational deprivations
in Abbott “dwarf” those presented by petitioners, and that therefore petitioners’ claim could not
be sustained, the ALJ compared and contrasted the educational disparities. 	Petitioners contend
that “[e]ven if the educational inadequacies in Abbott were more extensive than Petitioner school
districts 	. 	. 	. 	that 	would 	not 	automatically 	render 	Petitioners[’] 	claims 	without 	merit.”
(Petitioners’ Exceptions at 3). 	Additionally, many issues of material fact were also presented,
and “whether Petitioners can ultimately prove their case (and demonstrate an entitlement to a
particular level of funding) is a factual determination, which can only be made after a full record
has been developed.” (Id. at 5). Further, to the extent that the ALJ found the pleadings were not

4
specific or needed clarity, petitioners maintain that the proper remedy would be to allow for an
amended petition, rather than dismissal.
Petitioners also take exception to the ALJ’s characterization of this case as one
about unequal taxation, rather than unequal education. 	The petition makes clear that due to
inadequate state aid, the petitioner school districts cannot deliver T&E without placing an
excessive burden on taxpayers. 	The educational deficiencies resulting from underfunding
include staff reductions, the reduction of course offerings, the discontinuance of extra-curricular
activities, and the inability to fund text book purchases, technology needs, or building and
grounds repairs. Petitioners emphasize that the real cause of action is one of unequal education,
and that unequal taxation is simply a consequence of that. Additionally, petitioners point out that
the goal of the legislature in enacting the SFRA was to create a funding formula that is fair,
equitable and predictable. The SFRA amendments are inconsistent with that goal as they result
in certain districts facing uneven and inequitable fiscal challenges. Further, petitioners argue that
because the SFRA amendments will result in an unequal and unpredictable funding pattern, it
violates petitioners’ equal protection rights.
Petitioners contend that the ALJ erred in relying on Stubaus v. Whitman, 339 N.J.
Super. 38 (App. Div. 2001) for the conclusion that petitioners lack standing.1 	While Stubaus,
only involved claims of disparate and burdensome tax rates, this matter involves educational
deprivations and the failure to comply with T&E requirements. 	Petitioners claim that the ALJ
should have placed more reliance on Elizabeth Board of Education v. New Jersey State
Department 	of 	Education, 	Division 	of 	Early 	Childhood 	Education, 	EDU 	09004-15,
Initial Decision 	(July 	14, 	2017), 	adopted 	Commissioner’s 	Decision 	No. 	251-17, 	decided
1 The Commissioner notes that the ALJ did, in fact, find that the taxpayer petitioner had standing, and
instead dismissed the petition on the basis that the taxpayer petitioner failed to raise a viable claim upon
which relief can be granted.

5
August 24, 2017, as it is substantially the same as this matter since both cases involve the
inability to deliver required services to students due to insufficient funding. 	In Elizabeth, the
ALJ 	made 	factual 	determinations 	only 	after 	hearing 	testimony 	and 	reviewing 	evidence,
ultimately finding that the budgetary shortfall was due to the board’s own conduct. Similarly, in
Abbott v. Burke, 206 N.J. 332 (2011) (Abbott XXI), a Special Master heard testimony from
Superintendents before determining whether the school districts could provide their students with
T&E, despite reduced levels of state aid. 	Here, petitioners contend that the ALJ made findings
of fact – such as that the allegations here differed from those in Elizabeth – without having
developed a factual record through testimony and evidence, and disregarding that allegations in
the petition are assumed to be true for the purposes of a motion to dismiss.
Petitioners point out that the ALJ failed to address their arguments regarding the
unconstitutionality of the SFRA amendments as it applies to petitioners. 	The funding formula
fails to account for municipal tax abatements, which skew the formula by artificially depressing
a municipality’s ratable property tax base. 	The ratable property base does not consider
improvements on a property that are subject to Payments in Lieu of Taxes (PILOTs), which
divert funds away from school districts to the municipality, thus cutting school districts out of the
revenue source. 	Essentially, the wealth of municipalities with an artificially depressed ratable
property tax base is distorted because the PILOTs are not considered in the funding formula.
Therefore, the local fair share of the petitioning districts is inequitably increased.
In reply, respondents urge the Commissioner to adopt the Initial Decision. First,
respondents argue that the ALJ properly found that the petitioner municipalities did not have
standing to bring T&E or equal protection claims on behalf of their residents, and that the
petitioner school boards did not have standing to raise claims involving an unequal tax burden on

6
behalf of taxpayers. Second, respondents maintain that “[p]etitioners’ ability to plead different,
more specific, facts will still not permit it to claim that inequitable local taxation is an actionable
equal-protection violation under the T&E Clause of the State Constitution.” (Respondents’ reply
at 4). 	Third, respondents contend that petitioners’ request to amend the petition is useless
because the ALJ found that their causes of action are unstainable as a matter of law. 	Finally,
respondents argue that the ALJ properly found that the case involves one of unequal tax burden,
and not unequal education, as petitioners have not alleged that students are being denied T&E
since they are still being provided a constitutional education.
Upon a complete review of the record in this matter, the Commissioner agrees
with the ALJ – for the reasons thoroughly analyzed and expressed in the Initial Decision – that
the petition must be dismissed on the basis of standing and for failure to state a claim. 	The
Commissioner concurs with the ALJ that the petition does not properly allege a claim that the
SFRA as amended denies students in the petitioning districts access to T&E, nor have the
petitioners raised a viable claim that their State aid was under-funded. 	The Commissioner
further agrees that since New Jersey courts have declined to decide school funding disputes
through the equal protection clause, the taxpayer petitioner’s claim that she has been required to
pay more than her fair share in property taxes must also fail.
The Commissioner does not find petitioners’ exceptions to be persuasive. 	The
ALJ applied the appropriate standard in deciding the motion to dismiss, and made determinations
on the basis of law regarding the issues of standing and whether petitioners alleged viable
claims; 	therefore, 	a 	full 	hearing 	with 	testimony is 	unnecessary. 	Additionally, 	although
petitioners allege that certain budget cuts will result from the decreased funding – and even
assuming that every educational deficiency alleged by petitioners is true – petitioners still fail to

7
demonstrate that the school districts cannot deliver T&E. 	Instead, petitioners argue that
taxpayers have to pay more than their fair share in property taxes in order to provide the
necessary funding for the local school districts. But as the ALJ found, such arguments on the
basis of equal protection have not been entertained by New Jersey courts.
Accordingly, the Initial Decision of the OAL is adopted as the final decision in
this matter for the reasons expressed therein, and the petition is hereby dismissed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.2
COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION
Date of Decision: 	October 31, 2019
Date of Mailing: 	October 31, 2019
2 This decision may be appealed to the Appellate Division of the Superior Court pursuant to P.L. 2008,
c. 36 (N.J.S.A 18A:6-9.1).

New Jersey is an Equal Opportunity Employer
State of New Jersey
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
INITIAL DECISION
MOTION TO DISMISS
OAL DKT. NO. EDU 02207-19
AGENCY DKT. NO. 19-1/19
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE TOWNSHIP
OF BRICK, OCEAN COUNTY, ET. ALS,
Petitioners,
v.
LAMONT REPOLLET, COMMISSIONER OF
EDUCATION, AND ELIZABETH MAHER MUOIO,
NEW JERSEY STATE TREASURER,
Respondents.
__________________________________________
Stephen Edelstein, Esq., and Mark Tabakin, Esq., for petitioners (Weiner Law Group,
attorneys)
Joan M. Scatton, Deputy Attorney General, for respondents (Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney
General of New Jersey, attorney)
Record Closed: June 12, 2019 	Decided: August 1, 2019
BEFORE ELLEN S. BASS, ALJ:
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Eight local boards of education, five municipalities and one individual taxpayer
challenge recent amendments to the School Funding Reform Act of 2008 (SFRA).

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 02207-19
2
N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-43 et. seq. 	They assert that the school funding formula as it is now
written requires that they pay more than their fair share of local property taxes to
financially support the public schools; has resulted in an “underfunding” of State aid;
and 	has 	created 	a 	funding 	formula 	that 	is 	neither 	equitable, 	predictable 	nor
constitutional. Petitioners claim that they have been deprived of due process and equal
protection under the law. 	Respondents have filed a Motion to Dismiss, urging that the
petition fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Petitioners filed their petition of appeal with the Commissioner of Education (the
Commissioner) on January 22, 2019 and filed a Motion for Emergent Relief on February 11,
2019. 	The contested case was transmitted to the Office of Administrative Law (OAL) as an
emergent matter on February 13, 2019. I conferred with counsel via telephone on February 20,
2019, at which time it was agreed, and memorialized in an order of the same date, that
respondents did not need to formally respond to the emergent application. Petitioners’ counsel
clarified that his goal simply was to obtain as expedited a review of his clients’ concerns as
possible. By consent, respondents were afforded additional time to file an answer or Motion to
Dismiss.
A Motion to Dismiss was filed on March 20, 2019. Petitioners opposed the motion on or
about April 12, 2019. Respondents replied to the opposition on April 26, 2019. Oral argument
took place on May 6, 2019. 	At oral argument I invited the parties to file supplemental briefs.
They did so on May 28, 2019, and June 12, 2019, at which time the record closed.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Respondents’ motion is filed in accordance with N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.5(g), which
permits the filing of a Motion to Dismiss in lieu of an Answer. 	For purposes of the
pending motion, “all facts alleged in the complaint and legitimate inferences drawn
therefrom are deemed admitted.” 	Smith v City of Newark, 136 N.J. Super. 107, 112
(App. Div. 1975). I thus FIND as follows:

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 02207-19
3
The petitioning school Boards are elected to supervise and direct the delivery of public
educational services to students domiciled in their Type II school districts. 	The named
municipalities are the governing bodies responsible for collecting the property taxes assessed
for their local school districts. Stephanie Wohlrab is a resident of Brick Township, President of
the Brick Township Board of Education, a parent of students who attend the public schools, and
a taxpaying property owner in Brick.
The petition shares the history of New Jersey’s struggle with constitutionally sound
school funding as the backdrop for its challenge to the recent amendments to the SFRA. 	The
SFRA was enacted in 2008 to provide a formula that would base State aid on needs of the
student population and local fiscal capacity. 	N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-44. 	The statutory goal was to
ensure that
Every child in New Jersey must have an opportunity for an education
based on academic standards that satisfy constitutional requirements
regardless of where the child resides, and public funds allocated to this
purpose must be expended to support schools that are thorough and
efficient in delivering those educational standards. In turn, school districts
must 	be 	assured 	the 	financial 	support 	necessary 	to 	provide 	those
constitutionally compelled educational standards. 	Any school funding
formula should provide State aid for every school district based on the
characteristics of the student population and up-to-date measures of the
individual district’s ability to pay.
[N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-44(d)]
The SFRA requires the adoption of an “adequacy budget” by each school district based on
criteria established by the Department of Education (DOE). 	The DOE then determines the
“local fair share;” or the amount that should be raised locally to support the schools, taking into
account the taxable property and the income of the residents of the municipalities that comprise
the school district. “Equalization aid” is the difference between the “adequacy budget” and the
“local fair share.” 	N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-53. 	Prior to the controverted amendments to the SFRA, a
State Aid Growth Limit capped the total percentage increase in State aid a district could receive
from year-to-year. N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-47 (repealed by P.L. 2018, c. 67, § 8, eff. July 24, 2018).

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 02207-19
4
In July 2018 the Legislature amended the SFRA by enacting P.L. 2018, c. 67. 	These
amendments eliminated Adjustment Aid3 and the State Aid Growth Limit beginning with the
2018-2019 school year; thus modifying the way a school district’s “local fair share” is calculated
when a district is spending below “adequacy.” 	See: N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-5d; N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-68.
The amendments introduced a concept of “State Aid Differential,” which is defined as
. . . the difference between the sum of a school district’s or county
vocational 	school 	district’s 	allocations 	of 	equalization 	aid, 	special
education categorical aid, security categorical aid, transportation aid,
adjustment aid, and non-SFRA aids in the prebudget year, and the sum of
equalization aid, special education categorical aid, security categorical aid,
and transportation aid as calculated for the budget year in each category in
accordance with the provisions of sections 11, 13, 14, and 15 of P.L. 2007,
c.260(C.18A:7F-53, 	C.18A:7F-55, 	C.18A:7F-56, 	and 	C.18A:7F-57),
respectively.
[N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-67]
Where State Aid Differential is positive, the excess aid would be phased out over a multi-year
period. N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-68. Where the differential is negative, the statute provides that districts
. . . shall receive State school aid in an amount equal to the sum of the
district’s State aid in the prior school year plus the district’s proportionate
share of the sum of any increase in State aid included in the annual
appropriations act for that fiscal year and the total State aid reduction
pursuant to subsection b. of this section based on the district’s State aid
differential as a percent of the Statewide total State aid differential among
all school districts and county vocational school districts for which the
State aid differential is negative.
[N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-68(a)]
3 Adjustment Aid was an amount designed “to ensure that the district receives the greater of the amount
of State aid calculated for the district pursuant to the provisions of the [SFRA] or the State aid received by
the district for the 2007-2008 school year multiplied by 102%.” N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-58. In subsequent years,
the SFRA provided for differing amounts of adjustment aid; for example, for 2009-2011 and 2010-2011
districts would “receive adjustment aid in such amount as to ensure that the district receives the greater of
the amount of State aid calculated for the district pursuant to the provisions of [the SFRA] or the State aid,
other than educational adequacy aid, received by the district for the 2008-2009 school year.” N.J.S.A.
18A:7F-58(a)(2).

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 02207-19
5
Under the amendments to the SFRA, if a district receives a reduction in State aid and is
spending below “adequacy,” the “required local air share shall equal 102% of the budgeted local
share for the prebudget year…” N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-5d.
Petitioners point out that the SFRA’s funding formula fails to account for the widespread
use of municipal tax abatements. 	This artificially depresses a municipality’s ratable property
base, thus skewing the formula and negatively impacting the availability of State aid for districts
located in municipalities that do not likewise use tax abatements. 	As part of the calculation of
the “local fair share”, the amended SFRA requires that values be inputted for a district’s
“equalized valuation” and income. N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-52(c). But the amended SFRA’s definition of
“equalized valuation” accounts for a municipality’s ratable property base, but does not consider
improvements on property subject to Payments in Lieu of Taxes (PILOT), which by their nature
divert funds from school districts to municipalities.4 	Petitioners thus urge that the amended
SFRA “still fails to account for the true wealth of a community in its funding formula.”
The petitioning Boards now receive less State aid. 	They cannot deliver necessary
educational services to their students without compelling taxpayers to pay more than their “local
fair share;” these amounts range from 100.05% to 100.99% of the “local fair share”. 	The
shortfall in funding is outlined below:
District 	2017-2018
State
Aid
2018-2019
Proposed
2018-2019
Actual
Shortfall
from 	2017-
2018
Shortfall
from
Proposed
Brick 	$35,304,821 	$36,055,619 	$34,142,597 	$1,162,224 	$1,913,022
Jackson 	$49,635,886 	$50,122,386 	$48,770,072 	$865,814 	$1,352,314
Manalapan-
Englishtown
$19,440,358 	$19,938,658 	$18,773,314 	$667,044 	$1,165,344
Toms River 	$66,975,394 	$$68,224,666 	$65,984,284 	$991,110 	$2,240,382
Lacey 	$21,204,577 	$21,556,936 	$20,970,400 	$234,177 	$586,536
4 Ninety-five percent of each PILOT payment is retained by the municipality, and 5% goes to the County,
thus essentially cutting the school districts out of this revenue source, unless the municipality and the
school district voluntarily enter into a tax revenue sharing agreement.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 02207-19
6
Freehold
Regional
$51,564,083 	$51,564,083 	$50,269,156 	$1,294,927 	$1,294,927
Weymouth 	$2,326,148 	$2,365,542 	$2,245,862 	$80,286 	$119,680
Ocean 	$7,614,796 	$8,079,720 	$7,472,792 	$142,004 	$606,928
In an effort not to unduly burden local taxpayers, the Boards have reduced staff and eliminated
programmatic and curricular offerings; they find themselves unable to afford new textbooks or
technology needs; and were forced to forego necessary investments in buildings and grounds.
In order to offset further property tax increases, a number of the petitioning districts have spent
down their Fund Balance levels.
By way of example and not by way of limitation, Brick has been forced to eliminate six
teachers and two supervisors. Elective programs, sports and co-curricular activities will be cut,
or participation fees will be imposed. 	Brick will be unable to meet the goals of its Long-Term
Technology Plan, and may have to eliminate its full-day kindergarten. Class sizes will increase.
Jackson will be forced to eliminate course offerings and discontinue courtesy bussing. 	It will
have to cut after-school enrichment programs and increase activity fees for sports; Jackson
fears that ultimately it will be impossible to continue these activities. 	It will have to reduce its
technology and custodial budgets; eliminate a total of 25 teaching positions; and increase class
size. Jackson anticipates closing one school building.
Manalapan-Englishtown has already been forced to cut a media specialist; three full-time
push-in enrichment specialists; pull-out enrichment teaching positions; one physical education
position; and staffing for extra-curricular programs at the elementary level. It will have to curtail
its technology plan. Manalapan-Englishtown will have to charge activity fees, anticipates future
staffing cuts, and the need to close its sixth-grade building. 	Lacy Township will be forced to
eliminate instructional, administrative, paraprofessional and athletic positions. 	It will have to
increase class size. Lacy will be unable to support its district-wide preschool program. It will be
forced to eliminate support programs it offers to at-risk students. 	Toms River will be forced to
reduce staff; will be unable to meet the goals in its Long-Range Technology Plan; and fears that
it might be forced to eliminate kindergarten.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 02207-19
7
Freehold Regional will be unable to comply with its Strategic Plan; will be forced to
reduce its student support systems; reduce its athletic offerings; and eliminate certain world
language options. 	It will have to eliminate personnel and increase class size. 	Freehold
anticipates reducing its buildings and grounds budget, and will be able to support only
mandatory health and safety repairs to its facilities. Weymouth is a small district with only one
classroom per grade. It will be unable to purchase needed instructional technology items, and
be unable to move forward with an initiative to establish a Library/Media Center. It will have to
consider the elimination of extra-curricular activities and courtesy bussing. The current full-day
pre-K and kindergarten programs will have to be reduced to half-day. 	Weymouth will need to
make staff cuts; to include instructional, custodial, and office staff, as well as, an assistant
assigned to at-risk students.
Ocean has already been forced to eliminate three faculty positions, two secretarial
positions, and defer the hiring of needed security guards. It has been forced to charge a fee for
its preschool program. It lacks sufficient funds to perform necessary routine maintenance of its
buildings and grounds, and will be unable to implement aspects of its Strategic and Technology
Plan. Ocean was in the midst of a district-wide solar panel project which it has now been forced
to defer.
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
In ruling on a Motion to Dismiss, my inquiry is limited to examining the legal
sufficiency of the facts alleged on the face of the petition. 	Printing Mart-Morristown v
Sharp Electronics, 116 N.J. 739, 746 (1989); see also R. 4:6-2(e). 	A reviewing forum
must search “the complaint 	in depth and with 	liberality to ascertain whether the
fundament of a cause of action may be gleaned even from an obscure statement of
claim . . . ,” Printing Mart-Morristown, 116 N.J. 739 at 746 (citing DiCistofaro v. Laurel
Grove Memorial Park, 43 N.J. Super. 244, 252 (App. Div., 1957)). 	The petitioners are
entitled “to every reasonable inference of fact. 	The examination of a complaint’s
allegations of fact . . . should be one that is at once painstaking and undertaken with a
generous and hospitable approach.” Id. 	But dismissal of a complaint “is mandated

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 02207-19
8
where the factual allegations are palpably insufficient to support a claim . . .” Rieder v
State of N.J. Dep’t of Transp., 221 N.J. Super. 547, 552 (App. Div. 1987). 	Under the
foregoing standard, I CONCLUDE that the petition of appeal must be dismissed.
The SFRA was enacted in 2008 as part of New Jersey’s ongoing effort to ensure that
public schools throughout the state receive the financial support needed to deliver a thorough
and efficient free public education (T & E) to our children. 	N.J. Const. art. VIII, § 4, para. 1;
N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-43 et seq. The statute sought to create a “clear, unitary, enforceable statutory
formula to govern appropriations for education.” N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-44(g). 	The New Jersey
Supreme Court found the SFRA facially constitutional in Abbott v. Burke, 199 N.J. 140 (2009)
(Abbott XX). Two years later, the Court again addressed school funding with its determination
that the action by the State in underfunding the SFRA could not be sustained, as “the shortfall in
appropriations purports to operate to suspend not a statutory right, but rather a constitutional
obligation. . .” Abbott v. Burke, 206 N.J. 332, 363 (2011) (Abbott XXI). Some seven years later,
the legislature amended the school funding law in a manner, petitioners contend, that is
inconsistent with the spirit and intent of the 2008 version of the SFRA. 	They posit several
reasons why their State aid must be restored to pre-amendment levels.
These petitioners contend that their petition is motivated by a desire to maintain strong
and vibrant public schools. I do not question the sincerity of their commitment to their students
for a moment. 	Nonetheless, at its essence, their petition is a challenge to a perceived unfair
local tax burden; this is a case about unequal taxation, not unequal education. The first count of
the petition contains the somewhat odd allegation that the amendments to the SFRA violate the
SFRA. 	As I am required to do, I have attempted to be hospitable to this claim, and I take this
count to actually allege that the petitioning Boards are entitled to the level of State funding
promised by the unamended SFRA; that the constitution demands nothing less. 	The second
count quite directly avers that “[t]he SFRA, as amended … is unconstitutional as applied.”
Count three of the petition asserts that the amendments to the SFRA render it
“unconstitutional 	as 	written,” 	because 	the 	widespread 	use 	of 	municipal 	tax 	abatements
inequitably impacts the availability of State aid, thus increasing the local burden in districts that

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 02207-19
9
do not use tax abatements. 	This count thus grounds its allegations of unconstitutionality
exclusively on local burden disparity. The fourth and final count of the petition alleges that “[b]y
placing a property tax burden on taxpayers in the Petitioning Districts which is greater than is
constitutionally approved, the methodology directed by the Legislature, the Commissioner and
the Treasurer, each in his/her official capacity, have caused violations of the Due Process rights
and the Equal Protection rights of taxpayers in the Petitioning Districts.” Again, the focal point of
this count is unfair and inequitable local taxation.
The Municipal Petitioners
The named petitioners include five local municipalities. 	Standing is a “threshold
justiciability determination whether the litigant is entitled to initiate and maintain an action before
a court or other tribunal.” In re Six-Month Extension of N.J.A.C. 5:91-1, 372 N.J. Super. 61, 85
(App. Div., 2004); Stubaus v. Williams, 339 N.J. Super. 38, 47 (App. Div. 2001). 	To have
standing, a party “must present a sufficient stake in the outcome of the litigation, a real
adverseness with respect to the subject matter, and a substantial likelihood that the party will
suffer harm in the event of an unfavorable decision.” 	In re Camden Cty., 170 N.J. 439, 449
(2002). 	A petitioner must show a direct impairment of his own constitutional rights, and must
have suffered a distinct injury or harm that was caused by the adverse party and that can be
remedied by the administrative forum. 	See Trombetta v. Atl. City, 181 N.J. Super. 203, 221
(Law Div. 1981), aff’d o.b., 187 N.J. Super. 351 (App. Div. 1982); New Jersey Turnpike Auth. v.
Parsons, 3 N.J. 235, 240 (1949); In re Ass’n of Trial Lawyers of Am., 228 N.J. Super. 180 (App.
Div. 1988). A desire to vindicate the public interest is insufficient to confer standing; there must
be a specific connection between the petitioner and the public interest he alleges to represent.
The municipal petitioners clearly seek only to vindicate the rights of their constituents
and thus lack standing. The claim that the amendments to the SFRA unfairly burden taxpayers
in their communities can be brought only by those taxpayers. 	And any allegations that the
SFRA amendments deprive the children in their communities of T & E is a claim that belongs to
those taxpayers and their children, and not to the municipalities in which those children reside.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 02207-19
10
Stubaus v. Whitman, 339 N.J. Super. 38 at 56. 	To the extent that the municipal petitioners
contend that they have asserted a direct impact or harm caused by the 2018 amendments to
the SFRA, I have scoured the petition and could find no facts to support such a contention.
Additionally, relative to the claims raised in the petition’s fourth count, our courts have
recognized that “political subdivisions of the State, including municipalities and local boards of
education, lack the legal capacity to challenge State action based on equal protection grounds.”
Stubaus v. Whitman, 339 N.J. Super. 38 at 48, citing Newark v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 192, 196
(1923); McKenney v. Byrne, 82 N.J. 304, 315, n. 4 (1980); In re Charter School Application of
Englewood, 320 N.J. Super. 174, 238 (App. Div. 1999). 	For this additional reason, I
CONCLUDE that as to Brick Township, Toms River Township, South Toms River Borough,
Beachwood Borough, and Pine Beach Borough, the petition must be dismissed.
The School Board Petitioners
Standing - The Unfair Taxation Claim
For the reasons expressed above, I CONCLUDE that the school Board petitioners
likewise lack standing to vindicate the rights of their taxpaying citizens. 	And local Boards, like
municipalities, cannot challenge State action on equal protection grounds. 	To reiterate,
“[b]ecause school districts are ‘creatures of the State,’ no school district can be the ‘subject of
discriminatory practice by the State’.” Stubaus v Whitman, 339 N.J. Super. 38 at 47, citing
Borough of Glassboro v Byrne, 141 N.J. Super. 19, 23 (App. Div., 1976). I CONCLUDE that the
claims by the Brick Township, Jackson, Manalapan-Englishtown, Toms River Regional, Lacey
Township, Freehold Regional, Weymouth Township, and Ocean Boards of Education likewise
must be dismissed.
The allegations of this petition stand in stark contrast to the claims made in Elizabeth Bd.
of Educ. v. N.J. State Dept. of Educ., Div. of Early Childhood Education, EDU 09004-15, Initial
Decision 	(July 	14, 	2017), 	aff’d, 	Comm’r 	(August 	24, 	2017),
<https://www.nj.gov/education/legal/>. 	There, an Abbott district (now referred to as an SDA
district) contended that early childhood funding provided by the Department was insufficient,

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 02207-19
11
asserting alternatively that the district did not receive what the SFRA promised, or that the
SFRA unconstitutionally offered it an insufficient amount of funding to permit it to deliver
mandated pre-school services to its students. 	Unfair local tax burdens were not the central
issue. Elizabeth thus offers these school district petitioners no solace.
The petitioners’ reliance on Abbott XXI is likewise misplaced. 	The petitioning Boards
urge that Abbott XXI reflects an evolution in the concept of standing, because in dicta the
decision references “the importance of a predictable stream of education funding for any school
district.” Abbott v. Burke, 206 N.J. 332 at 370. But Abbott XXI dealt only with the aftermath of a
legislative failure to fully fund the SFRA formula; it offers no precedential ruling concerning the
standing of local school Boards to assert unfair local taxation claims.5 I am accordingly unable
to agree that Abbott XXI supports the claims of these petitioning districts that “now…school
districts themselves have been granted entitlements adequate to form the basis for standing” for
a claim that centers on inequities in local funding of schools.
The T & E Claim
But I must afford every inference to these petitioners, and I of course acknowledge that
the petition does allege that programmatic cuts will flow from the controverted changes in the
SFRA funding formula. In Stubaus the petitioning school districts were held to lack standing in
large part because their petition did not allege that the funding system then at issue resulted in
program inadequacy or educational inequality. I CONCLUDE that the school board petitioners
have standing to raise claims of educational adequacy and inequality.
But their claims are not viable. 	The SFRA as amended, like any statute, is presumed
valid. 	Stubaus v. Whitman, 339 N.J. Super. 38 at 52, citing In re CVS Pharmacy Wayne, 116
N.J. 490 (1989). 	These petitioners carry a heavy burden. Ibid; Smith v Penta, 81 N.J. 65
5 The plaintiffs in Abbott were school children. Standing was addressed only vis-à-vis the request that the
relief sought extend to students outside the Abbott districts. 	The Court rejected the notion that its
jurisdiction extended beyond the rights of the plaintiff class before it.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 02207-19
12
(1979). 	And as respondents correctly urge, a properly pled deprivation of T & E would allege
that the students in the subject districts are not being equipped for their roles as citizens and
competitors in the marketplace. Abbott v. Burke, 119 N.J. 287, 313 (1990) (Abbott II).
This pleading makes no claims of constitutional dimension. 	These non-Abbott districts
allege that staff will be cut; courtesy bussing will be discontinued; half-day kindergarten would
be reinstituted; increases would be made in class size; course offerings reduced; and limitations
placed on some extra-curricular offerings as a result of the amendments to the SFRA. To their
constituents, and to these Boards, these cuts potentially affect the quality of the education that
is delivered to their children. 	It is not the intent of this decision to minimize or trivialize this
legitimate concern. But these Boards cannot rely on the Abbott v. Burke cases to support their
contention that the SFRA as amended is unconstitutional. The educational disparity Abbott was
concerned with readily dwarfs the claims raised here. 	The following excerpt from Abbott II
hammers home this point:
In an elementary school in Paterson, the children eat lunch in a small area
in the boiler room area of the basement; remedial classes are taught in a
former bathroom. In one Irvington school, children attend music classes in
a storage room and remedial classes in converted closets. At another
school in Irvington a coal bin was converted into a classroom. In one
elementary school in East Orange, there is no cafeteria, and the children
eat lunch in shifts in the first 1 floor corridor. In one school in Jersey City,
built in 1900, the library is a converted cloakroom; the nurse's office has no
bathroom or waiting room; the lighting is inadequate; the bathrooms have
no hot water (only the custodial office and nurse's office have hot water);
there is water damage inside the building because of cracks in the facade;
and the heating system is inadequate.
[Abbott v. Burke, 119 N.J. 287 at 363.]
Respondents argue that T & E “is student focused and to allege a deprivation of T & E requires
a demonstration that the students’ educational opportunities are so deficient as to jeopardize
their futures.” 	They assert that petitioners’ allegations “are insufficient for a T &E claim.” 	I
agree. 	I moreover concur that if the petitioning Boards would like more generous State aid,

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 02207-19
13
“their argument should more appropriately be made to the legislature.” Stubaus v. Whitman, 339
N.J. Super. 38 at 56.
Moreover, and importantly, inequitable local taxation cannot form the basis of a viable
constitutional claim under the T & E clause. Stubaus v Whitman, 339 N.J. Super. 38 at 52-57.
Our Supreme Court has “rejected the argument that T & E mandates statewide equality of tax
burdens and [has] interpreted T & E to ensure equal educational opportunity, but not taxpayer
equality.” 	Id. at 53, citing Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473 (1973)(Robinson I). 	The State is
obliged to provide public school children “an equal educational opportunity.” Robinson v. Cahill,
62 N.J. 473 at 513. But it can “meet its obligation by financing education either on a statewide
basis with funds provided by the State, or, in whole or in part, by delegating the fiscal obligation
to local taxation.” Robinson v. Cahill, 69 N.J. 133, 142 (1975) (Robinson IV), citing Robinson v.
Cahill, 62 N.J. 473 at 519.
If local funding for these schools was unavailable, there might be a different outcome
here. But the petitioning school Boards do not aver with any specificity that they will be unable
to raise the local taxes needed to deliver T & E. 	They allege, in passing, that “in some
instances” districts would be “unable to [raise local taxes] altogether because of the State-
imposed cap on property tax increases.” 	But the petition does not indicate whether or how a
cap would directly impact any of the named petitioners, or specifically how that cap would affect
the delivery of essential programming. I CONCLUDE that, to the extent the petition alleges that
the SFRA as amended denies students in the petitioning districts access to T & E, it fails to
state a claim and must be dismissed.
The Claim that the Funding Promised by the Pre-amendment SFRA is Likewise Promised by
the New Jersey Constitution
The petition alleges that the SFRA amendments have resulted in “underfunding,” and
that the petitioning Boards are entitled to the State aid that would have been available under the
version 	of 	the 	SFRA 	found facially 	constitutional 	in 	Abbott 	XX. 	They argue 	that 	the
amendments to the SFRA “on its face and as applied, [are] a repetition of the Legislature’s
failures highlighted in Abbott XXI …. [that the amendments] constitute a failure by the State to

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 02207-19
14
honor 	its Abbott XX obligations to fund its SFRA obligations.” 	But respondents reply
persuasively that the SFRA was declared constitutional relative only as to the claims of
educational inequality made by the Abbott districts. 	These petitioners are not Abbott districts;
accordingly, their reliance on Abbott XXI is once again misplaced. The Court held that
…plaintiffs can look in vain for support in Abbott XX for a finding that the
failure to provide full funding of SFRA to any district is the equivalent of the
constitutional violation previously litigated and found to exist for children in
the Abbott districts... in the prior application that led to the Abbott XX
holding, we specifically declined to recognize that pupils from any district
other than the Abbott districts were before us when taking up the question
of the SFRA’s facial constitutionality.
[Abbott v. Burke, 206 N.J. 332 at 370 (Abbott XXI).]
Abbott XXI thus lends no support to petitioners’ contention that they are constitutionally entitled
to the level of funding they would have received under the unamended SFRA.6 I CONCLUDE
that the school district petitioners have not raised a viable claim that their State aid was
“underfunded.”
The Taxpayer
Taxpayer Stephanie Wohlrab has standing to bring her claims of unfair taxation, and
standing 	to 	assert 	that 	the 	amendments 	to 	the 	SFRA 	will 	deny 	her 	children 	T 	& 	E.
Notwithstanding, she has failed to state a claim for the reasons discussed above. 	Unlike the
municipal and school board petitioners, as a citizen, Wohlrab may bring an equal protection
claim. Accordingly, it is necessary to address the allegations of the fourth count on its merits. I
CONCLUDE that Wohlrab has failed to state a viable equal protection claim.
6 The petition in paragraphs 32 and 33 avers that the State aid figures received by the petitioning districts
were less than those included in the Governor’s budget message. 	Respondents interpret these
paragraphs as alleging that moneys promised by the SFRA were not properly appropriated. If this indeed
is what the petition alleges, these claims “run directly into the holdings of” Camden v Byrne, 82 N.J. 133
(1980) and Karcher v Kean, 97 N.J. 483 (1984). Abbott v. Burke, 206 N.J. 332 at 370 (Abbott XXI). The
Court has confirmed that “even though local government might find itself ‘handcuffed’ by statutory fiscal
limitations, [the] Court is ‘powerless to remove those handcuffs’.” Camden v Byrne, 82 N.J. 133 at 157,
citing N.J. State Policemen’s Bene. Ass’n. Local 29 v. Irvington, 80 N.J. 271 (1979). The statutory fiscal
constraints imposed on these petitioners is a matter of legislative, not judicial prerogative. Ibid.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 02207-19
15
New Jersey’s equal protection clause provides that “[a]ll persons are by nature
free and independent, and have certain natural and unalienable rights, among which are
those of enjoying and defending life and liberty, of acquiring, possessing, and protecting
property, and of pursuing and obtaining safety and happiness.” 	N.J. Const. art. I, para.
1. 	The 	equal 	protection 	clause 	“prohibits 	the 	State 	from 	adopting 	statutory
classifications that treat similarly situated people differently.” Stubaus v. Whitman, 339
N.J. Super. 38 at 57, citing Sanchez v. Dep’t of Human Servs., 314 N.J. Super. 11 (App.
Div. 1998). 	Equal protection claims under the New Jersey Constitution are analyzed
using a “balancing test to determine whether there is an appropriate governmental
interest that is suitably furthered by the differential treatment.” Stubaus v. Whitman, 338
N.J. Super. 38 at 60, citing In re Charter School Application of Englewood, 320 N.J.
Super. 174, 237 (App. Div. 1999). 	Courts look to “the nature of the affected right, the
extent to which the governmental restriction intrudes upon it, and the public need for the
restriction.” Ibid., citing Greenberg v. Kimmelman, 99 N.J. 552 (1985). 	Here, Wohlrab
contends that the SFRA funding formula will cause an increase in her property taxes
and an unequal tax burden; that she will be required to pay more than her “fair share” to
support the public schools. 	Like the Stubaus plaintiffs, she contends that the “range of
property tax rates establishes a ‘present system of school funding [which] is irrational
and grossly discriminatory’.” Stubaus v. Whitman, 339 N.J. Super. 38 at 56-7.
Stubaus discusses at length the reluctance of the Robinson v. Cahill and Abbott v. Burke
Courts to analyze school funding disputes on equal protection grounds. Stubaus observes that
[t]he Court in Robinson I was unwilling to analyze the problem under equal
protection because such an approach could raise questions regarding the
delivery 	of 	all 	municipal 	services. 	In 	other 	words, 	if 	inequality 	in
educational services among the various school districts in the State
violated equal protection, it was an easy step to argue that so also would
be unconstitutional any inequality among municipalities delivering fire,
police and other services. The Court refused to mount this slippery slope,
and instead turned the case on the T & E clause.
[Stubaus v. Whitman, 339 N.J. Super. 38 at 57.]

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 02207-19
16
As Stubaus points out, thereafter, every court called upon to review the funding of public
education has relied exclusively on the T & E clause. 	Abbott II reiterated “the monumental
governmental upheaval that would result if the equal protection doctrine were held applicable to
the financing of education…” 	Stubaus v. Whitman, 339 N.J. Super. 38 at 58, citing Abbott v
Burke, 119 N.J. 287, 390 (1990). The Stubaus court thus declined to allow the case before it to
continue 	on 	equal 	protection grounds, 	stating 	“[w]e 	have 	unease about 	pronouncing 	a
willingness to decide the claim on an equal protection basis, and we conclude that we remain
bound by Robinson I and reject any attempt to project equal protection into the school funding
dispute.” Ibid. I accordingly will do likewise, and CONCLUDE that the equal protection claims of
the fourth count must be dismissed.
ORDER
Based on the foregoing, the petition of appeal is DISMISSED.
I 	hereby 	FILE 	this 	Initial 	Decision 	with 	the 	COMMISSIONER 	OF 	THE
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION for consideration.
This 	recommended 	decision 	may 	be 	adopted, 	modified 	or 	rejected 	by 	the
COMMISSIONER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, who by law is authorized
to make a final decision in this matter. 	If the Commissioner of the Department of
Education does not adopt, modify or reject this decision within forty-five days and unless
such time limit is otherwise extended, this recommended decision shall become a final
decision in accordance with N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 02207-19
17
Within thirteen days from the date on which this recommended decision was
mailed to the parties, any party may file written exceptions with the COMMISSIONER
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, ATTN: 	BUREAU OF CONTROVERSIES
AND DISPUTES, 100 Riverview Plaza, 4th Floor, P.O. Box 500, Trenton, New
Jersey 08625-0500, marked “Attention: 	Exceptions.” 	A copy of any exceptions must
be sent to the judge and to the other parties.
August 1, 2019
DATE 	ELLEN S. BASS, ALJ
Date Received at Agency: 	August 1, 2019
Date Mailed to Parties:
sej