Board of Education of the Village of Ridgefield Park, Bergen County v. Board of Education of the Borough of Little Ferry, Bergen County, and Frank R. Scarafile, Superintendent, 4/22/21, (#92-21)

92-21
New Jersey Commissioner of Education
Decision
Board of Education of the Village of
Ridgefield Park, Bergen County,
Petitioner,
v.
Board of Education of the Borough of
Little Ferry, Bergen County,
Respondent.
Synopsis
Petitioner, Ridgefield Park Board of Education (Ridgefield Park), and respondent, Little Ferry Board of
Education (Little Ferry), have a longstanding send-receive relationship whereby Little Ferry students attend
Ridgefield Park High School on a tuition basis. The two boards are parties to a formal written send-receive
agreement which historically has provided for a tuition rate that was lower than the certified tuition rate
based on Ridgefield Park’s actual cost per pupil. In 2019, Ridgefield Park proposed a contract in which it
reserved the right to charge the full certified tuition rate. Little Ferry refused to sign the contract. Ridgefield
Park subsequently filed the within petition, seeking to compel Little Ferry to execute the contract and
contending that the receiving district has the right to demand tuition in the full amount of the certified per
pupil cost as defined by statute and regulation, N.J.S.A. 18A:38-19; N.J.A.C. 6A:23A-1.1, et. seq.
Little Ferry contended that the tuition rate is negotiable; that the new contractual language is inconsistent
with the parties’ past practice; and that the requested increase in tuition rate is financially untenable for its
school district. The parties filed opposing motions for summary decision.
The ALJ found, inter alia, that: there are no material facts at issue here, and the matter is ripe for summary
decision; this case raises the purely legal question of whether the statutes and regulations allow Ridgefield
Park the discretion to demand that Little Ferry pay the full certified tuition amount for the students it sends
to Ridgefield Park High School; the affordability of that tuition is not at issue; the plain language of the
applicable statute gives the receiving district exclusive authority to insist on tuition payment from the
sending district of any amount up to the certified tuition rate; and Ridgefield Park’s claim is further
supported by the regulation that allows for tuition adjustments, through which the receiving district may
charge the sending district for any shortfall between the estimated tuition rate set upon entering into the
contract and the certified tuition rate that is calculated later. Accordingly, the ALJ granted summary
decision in favor of Ridgefield Park; ordered that Ridgefield Park may demand the full certified tuition
rate; and directed Little Ferry to execute the proposed contract.
Upon review of the record, the Commissioner affirmed the Initial Decision of the OAL as the final decision
in this matter. In so doing, the Commissioner found, inter alia, that Ridgefield Park may determine the
tuition rate between the parties, as long as it does not exceed the actual per pupil cost as determined by the
applicable statutes and regulations. Little Ferry was ordered to execute the contract proposed by Ridgefield
Park for the 2019-2020 and 2020-2021 school years.
This synopsis is not part of the Commissioner’s decision. It has been prepared for the convenience of the reader. It
has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Commissioner.

OAL Dkt. No. EDU 07868-20
Agency Dkt. No. 165-8/20
New Jersey Commissioner of Education
Final Decision
Board of Education of the Village of
Ridgefield Park, Bergen County,
Petitioner,
v.
Board of Education of the Borough of
Little Ferry, Bergen County, and
Frank R. Scarafile, Superintendent,
Respondent.
The record of this matter, the Initial Decision of the Office of Administrative Law
(OAL), the exceptions filed by respondent pursuant to N.J.A.C. 1:1-18.4, and petitioner’s reply
thereto, have been reviewed and considered.
This matter involves a sending-receiving relationship whereby students from
Little Ferry attend Ridgefield Park High School. Historically, the tuition rate that the Ridgefield
Park Board of Education charged the Little Ferry Board of Education was lower than the
certified tuition rate based on Ridgefield Park’s actual cost per pupil. However, in 2019,
Ridgefield Park proposed a contract in which it reserved the right to charge the full certified
tuition rate. When Little Ferry refused to sign the contract, Ridgefield Park appealed to the
Commissioner. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) granted Ridgefield Park’s motion for
summary decision, finding that the plain language of the applicable statute gives the receiving
district exclusive authority to insist on any amount up to the certified tuition rate. The ALJ noted
92-21

2
that Ridgefield Park’s claim is further supported by the regulation that allows for tuition
adjustments, through which the receiving district may charge the sending district for any shortfall
between the estimated tuition rate set upon entering into the contract and the certified tuition rate
that is calculated later. The ALJ rejected Little Ferry’s argument that because the regulation
does not require tuition adjustments, it contemplates negotiation of a lower rate, and concluded
that the regulation does not deprive Ridgefield Park of its clear statutory right to demand the full
certified tuition amount. Accordingly, the ALJ ordered that Ridgefield Park may demand the full
certified tuition rate and directed Little Ferry to execute the proposed contract.1 Finally, the ALJ
denied Ridgefield Park’s request for attorneys’ fees, as the Commissioner has no jurisdiction to
enter such an award.
In its exceptions, Little Ferry argues that the ALJ improperly determined that the
matter was ripe for summary decision, because there are disputed issues of material fact regarding
the accuracy and propriety of the methods and calculations Ridgefield Park used to determine the
tuition rate. Little Ferry also contends that the statutory and regulatory language affords discretion to
the parties to negotiate rates and does not indicate that the payment amount is to be unilaterally
decided by the receiving district. Little Ferry states that it seeks the opportunity to engage with
Ridgefield Park to negotiate a rate agreed upon by both parties.
In reply, Ridgefield Park argues that the sole issue before the Commissioner is a
matter of statutory interpretation – whether Ridgefield Park has the discretion to charge a tuition rate
up to the actual cost per pupil. Reiterating arguments set forth in its briefs below, as well as the
conclusions reached by the ALJ in the Initial Decision, Ridgefield Park contends that while
1 The ALJ noted that Ridgefield Park’s right to demand the full certified tuition rate is statutory and exists regardless
of the language of the contract.

3
negotiations between the districts are permitted, they are not required, and the ultimate authority to
set a rate when the parties cannot reach an agreement lies with the receiving district.
Upon review, the Commissioner concurs with the ALJ that this matter is ripe for
summary decision. The relief sought in the petition of appeal pertains to Ridgefield Park’s
ability to demand the full certified tuition rate and to require Little Ferry to enter into a contract
providing for payment of that rate. The calculation of the rate itself is not at issue in the petition
of appeal. Should Little Ferry wish to contest the calculation of the certified tuition rate, it is free
to file its own petition of appeal, but that issue is outside the scope of the matter now before the
Commissioner. The only issue before the Commissioner is whether Ridgefield Park may
demand for the full certified tuition rate, which is a legal question appropriate for resolution by
summary decision.
The Commissioner also concurs with the ALJ that Ridgefield Park may charge the
full certified tuition rate. N.J.S.A. 18A:28-19 provides that the receiving district “shall
determine” the tuition rate. As the ALJ correctly concluded, the plain language of the statute
gives the receiving district – Ridgefield Park – the discretion to set the tuition at any amount,
with the only limitation being that it cannot exceed the certified tuition rate. While nothing in
the statues or regulations precludes negotiations between the parties, and the receiving district is
free to accept a tuition rate lower than the full certified tuition rate, the statutory language clearly
provides for a specific outcome in the event that the receiving district does not wish to negotiate,
or negotiations are unsuccessful. In those circumstances, the receiving district is permitted to set
the tuition rate, as long as it is not more than the certified tuition rate.
Accordingly, the Initial Decision is affirmed, and Ridgefield Park’s motion for
summary decision is granted. Ridgefield Park may determine the tuition rate between the
parties, as long as it does not exceed the actual per pupil cost as determined by the applicable

4
statutes and regulations. Little Ferry is ordered to execute the contract proposed by Ridgefield
Park for the 2019-2020 and 2020-2021 school years. Ridgefield Park’s request for attorneys’
fees is denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED.2
ACTING COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION
Date of Decision:
Date of Mailing:
2 This decision may be appealed to the Appellate Division of the Superior Court pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:6-9.1.
Under N.J.Ct.R. 2:4-1(b), a notice of appeal must be filed with the Appellate Division within 45 days from the date
of mailing of this decision.
April 22, 2021
April 27, 2021

New Jersey is an Equal Opportunity Employer
State of New Jersey
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
INITIAL DECISION
SUMMARY DECISION
OAL DKT. NO. EDU 07868-20
AGENCY DKT. NO. 165-8/20
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE VILLAGE OF
RIDGEFIELD PARK, BERGEN COUNTY,
Petitioner,
v.
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE BOROUGH OF
LITTLE FERRY, BERGEN COUNTY, AND FRANK R.
SCARAFILE, SUPERINTENDENT,
Respondents.
________________________________________
Kerri A. Wright, Esq., for petitioner (Porzio, Bromberg and Newman, attorneys)
John G. Geppert, Jr. Esq., for respondent (Scarinci Hollenbeck, attorneys)
Record Closed: February 12, 2021 Decided: March 8, 2021
BEFORE ELLEN S. BASS, Acting Director & Chief ALJ:
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Petitioner, the Ridgefield Park Board of Education (“Ridgefield Park”), seeks an
order compelling respondent, Little Ferry Board of Education (“Little Ferry”), to execute
a sending-receiving contract which reserves to Ridgefield Park the right to demand

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 07868-20
2
tuition in the full amount of the certified per pupil cost, as defined by statute and
regulation. N.J.S.A. 18A:38-19; N.J.A.C. 6A:23A-1.1, et. seq. Little Ferry responds that
that the tuition rate is negotiable; that the new contractual language is inconsistent with
the parties’ past practice; and that it is financially untenable for its school district.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A petition of appeal was filed by Ridgefield Park with the Commissioner of
Education (“the Commissioner”) on August 7, 2020. An answer was filed by Little Ferry
and the matter was transmitted to the Office of Administrative Law (“OAL”) as a
contested case on August 21, 2020. Ridgefield Park filed a Motion for Summary
Decision on December 9, 2020, and Opposition to the Motion was filed by Little Ferry on
January 29, 2021. Ridgefield Park replied to the Opposition on February 12, 2021, and
the record closed.1
ISSUE PRESENTED
Can a receiving district, in its sole discretion, set the tuition amount charged to a
sending district, and can that tuition be in an amount up to and including the certified per
pupil cost as calculated in accordance with applicable law and regulations? If so, can
Ridgefield Park compel Little Ferry to execute a sending-receiving agreement that so
provides?
FINDINGS OF FACT
The submissions of the parties reveal that the salient facts are not in dispute. I
FIND:
1 Via letters dated February 18, 2021, and February 26, 2021, Little Ferry advised that it had retained an
accountant who had reviewed documents obtained via an Open Public Records (“OPRA”) request. That
accountant, via certification, raised questions regarding the validity of the certified tuition rate. Counsel
for Ridgefield Park has objected to these late submissions and challenges their relevance. As will be
more fully addressed below, I agree that these submissions are not pertinent to the issue presented by
the pleadings.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 07868-20
3
Pursuant to a longstanding sending-receiving relationship, Little Ferry students
attend Ridgefield Park High School on a tuition basis. The tuition amount is calculated
in accordance with a regulatory formula. Actual audited expenditures and average daily
enrollment numbers are not available until the school year has concluded, so the tuition
to be paid is calculated and adjusted over a three-year period. In year one of the cycle,
Little Ferry provides Ridgefield Park with the estimated number of Little Ferry students
who will attend Ridgefield Park High School the following year, and Ridgefield Park
provides an estimated tuition amount. Little Ferry includes this amount in its budget in
year two and pays Ridgefield Park based on this estimated amount during that year.
During year three, the Department of Education reviews Ridgefield Park’s audited
financials and issues “certified tuition rates,” which represent the actual cost per student
in year two. If the amount certified by the Department differs from the amount
Ridgefield provided as an estimate in year one, any deficits or credits are trued-up by
the districts in year three. This cycle is intended to ensure that Little Ferry pays tuition
based on the actual number of students received and based on Ridgefield Park’s actual
audited expenditures. This three-year cycle repeats on a rolling basis.
The two Boards are parties to a formal written sending-receiving agreement
which historically has provided for a tuition rate less than the certified rate yielded by the
regulatory formula. For example, the certified rate exceeded the parties’ contractual
rate by $309,626 in 2014; $332,593 in 2015; $589,723 in 2016; $194,786 in 2017 and
$277,373 in 2018. It is uncontroverted that Ridgefield Park did not attempt to recoup
the difference in the past. But in the spring of 2019, Ridgefield Park presented Little
Ferry with a contract that now provided for tuition adjustments, and that reserved
Ridgefield Park’s right to demand the full certified tuition amount. Little Ferry refused to
execute the agreement, and this dispute ensued.
On October 11, 2019, the parties met with the Interim Executive Bergen County
Superintendent of Schools to mediate their dispute. Adjustments to the tuition paid for
both the 2016-2017 and the 2019-2020 school years were discussed, but the parties
were unable to reach an accord. On February 13, 2020, the County Superintendent
advised Little Ferry that it owed Ridgefield Park the sum of $251,542 for the 2016-2017
school year. He moreover advised that Little Ferry “must sign the 2019-2020 tuition

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 07868-20
4
contract and reimburse Ridgefield Park for any corresponding tuition adjustments.”
Ongoing efforts were made to reach an accord, to include discussion of a payment plan
for back tuition. As a result of these efforts, the adjustment for the 2016-2017 school
year has been paid. And Little Ferry has agreed to pay the certified tuition rate for the
2020-2021 school year but continues to refuse to sign the proposed sending-receiving
agreements for the 2019-2020 and 2020-2021 school years.
Both Boards state that they are in precarious financial situations, with Ridgefield
Park asserting that a signed contract is its only assurance that the moneys expected
from Little Ferry will be paid. Little Ferry does not contest the facts set forth in the
petition, but rather, vigorously urges that it simply cannot afford the tuition adjustment
sought by Ridgefield Park. Little Ferry moreover points out that in the past, the two
Boards have cooperatively agreed to tuition charges, and have negotiated caps on
tuition adjustments. And it urges that financial mismanagement by Ridgefield Park has
resulted in the astronomical tuition increases which are presently at issue, and which
Little Ferry can ill afford. Little Ferry asserts in its Opposition to the Motion, for the first
time, that the tuition rate has been improperly calculated and that there has been a lack
of transparency by Ridgefield Park relative to how that tuition rate was calculated.
But the accuracy of the certified tuition amount is an issue raised nowhere in the
pleadings. And neither the financial situation of each of these Boards, nor the history of
their past efforts to agree on a tuition amount are pertinent to the narrow issue
presented; that is, whether the law permits Ridgefield Park to demand the full certified
tuition amount. Suffice it say, however, and I FIND, that Ridgefield will struggle to meet
its fiscal demands without the amount of tuition it seeks. And I further FIND that Little
Ferry has fiscal constraints of its own that have prompted it to protest payment of the full
tuition amount.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
N.J.A.C. 1:1-12.5(b) provides that summary decision should be rendered “if the
papers and discovery which have been filed, together with the affidavits, if any, show
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and that the moving

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 07868-20
5
party is entitled to prevail as a matter of law.” Our regulation mirrors R. 4:46-2(c), which
provides that “[t]he judgment or order sought shall be rendered forthwith if the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with
the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
challenged and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment or order as a matter of
law.”
A determination whether a genuine issue of material fact exists that precludes
summary decision requires the judge to consider whether the competent evidential
materials presented, when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party,
are sufficient to permit a rational fact finder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor
of the non-moving party. Our courts have long held that “if the opposing party . . . offers
. . . only facts which are immaterial or of an insubstantial nature, a mere scintilla,
‘Fanciful, frivolous, gauzy or merely suspicious,’ he will not be heard to complain if the
court grants summary judgment.” Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520,
529 (1995) (citing Judson v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co., 17 N.J. 67, 75 (1954)).
The “judge’s function is not himself [or herself] to weigh the evidence and
determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for
trial.” Brill, 142 N.J. at 540 (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 249
(1986)). When the evidence “is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of
law,” the trial court should not hesitate to grant summary judgment. Liberty Lobby, 477
U.S. at 252. I CONCLUDE that this matter is ripe for summary decision. The petition of
appeal raises a purely legal question, one which asks that I determine whether the
statutory and regulatory scheme affords Ridgefield Park the discretion to demand that
Little Ferry pay the full certified tuition amount for the students it sends to Ridgefield
Park High School. The affordability of that tuition is not at issue; nor it is pertinent that
Ridgefield Park may sorely need the full tuition amount. The facts raised by Little Ferry
in regard to the calculation of the certified tuition amount, while controverted, are a
proverbial “red herring.” 2 They are not material to the limited issue presented by the
2 A claim that the certified tuition amount was improperly calculated could be brought by Little Ferry in a
separate action. See also: N.J.A.C. 6A:23A-17.1(f)(5).

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 07868-20
6
pleadings. I CONCLUDE that the law supports Ridgefield Park’s demand for the full
certified tuition, and that it is entitled to the relief it seeks.
N.J.A.C. 6A:23A-1.2 defines a sending-receiving relationship as “an agreement
between two district boards of education, one of which does not have the facilities to
educate in-district an entire grade(s) or provide an entire program(s), and as an
alternative sends such students to a district board of education having such
accommodations and pays tuition, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:38-8 et seq.” The
calculation of tuition payments is governed by N.J.S.A. 18A:38-19, which provides as
follows:
Whenever the pupils of any school district are attending public
school in another district, within or without the State, pursuant to
this article [N.J.S.18A:38-8 through N.J.S.18A:38-24], the board of
education of the receiving district shall determine a tuition rate to
be paid by the board of education of the sending district to an
amount not in excess of the actual cost per pupil as determined
under rules prescribed by the commissioner and approved by the
State board… (emphasis supplied).
Relying on the words “shall determine,” Ridgefield Park urges that it may set any tuition
amount, so long as that amount does not exceed the “actual cost per pupil.” The “actual
cost per pupil” is defined at N.J.A.C. 6A:23A-17.1(b) as “the local cost per student in
average daily enrollment, based upon audited expenditures for that year for the purpose
for which the tuition rate is being determined and consistent with the grade/program
categories in N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-50 and 18A:7F-55…”
When interpreting a statute or regulation, our courts assume that the framers
intended to ascribe to words their ordinary meaning. Jablonowska v. Suther, 195 N.J.
91, 105 (2008). The intent of a statute or regulation should be gleaned from a view of
the whole and of every part of the statute, with the real intention prevailing over the
literal sense of its terms. Schierstead v. City of Brigantine, 29 N.J. 220, 230 (1959). I
CONCLUDE that the plain language of N.J.S.A. 18A:38-19 supports Ridgefield Park’s
view that it may insist on the full amount of tuition yielded by the regulatory scheme.
The statute clearly and unequivocally indicates that the receiving district “shall” set the

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 07868-20
7
tuition rate. It does not state that that the sending district has any power to dictate the
amount of tuition to be paid.
Ridgefield Park’s view is supported by the applicable regulations, which set forth
an express procedure for the payment and calculation of tuition. N.J.A.C. 6A:23A-17.1(f)
provides:
The receiving district board of education and the sending district
board of education shall establish by written contractual agreement
a tentative tuition charge for budgetary purposes. Such tentative
charge shall equal an amount not in excess of the receiving district
board of education's "estimated cost per student" for the ensuing
school year for the purpose or purposes for which tuition is being
charged, multiplied by the "estimated average daily enrollment of
students" expected to be received during the ensuing school year.
Such written contract shall be on a form prepared by the
Commissioner.
The districts must sign an agreement for the “ensuing school year,” and the sending
district must pay ten percent of the tentative tuition no later than the first of each month
from September through June of the contract year.” The agreement must specify that
all adjustments resulting from a difference in cost of number of students will be made
only during the second school year following the contract year. N.J.A.C. 6A:23-
17.1(f)(3). The regulations anticipate a need to reconcile the estimated and certified
amounts and provide that “[a]ll contracts must include a payment schedule for all
adjustments that may be made.” Ibid.
Once the Department of Education determines the actual cost per student, the
receiving district may charge for any shortfall.3 N.J.A.C. 6A:23-17.1(f)(7) provides as
follows:
If the Commissioner later determines that the tentative charge
established by written contractual agreement, except for a
contractual agreement for a student enrolled in a special education
class, was less than the actual cost per student during the school
year multiplied by the actual average daily enrollment received, the
3 The regulations also allow the sending district to recoup an overpayment. N.J.A.C. 6A:23A-7.1(f)(6).

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 07868-20
8
receiving district board of education may charge the sending district
board of education all or part of the amount owed by the sending
district board of education, to be paid during the second school
year following the school year for which the tentative charge was
paid. Such adjustment for a contractual agreement for a student
enrolled in a special education class shall be made no later than
the end of the second school year following the contract year. The
executive county superintendent of schools of the county in which
the sending district board of education is located may approve the
payment of the additional charge over another period, if the sending
district board of education can demonstrate that payment during the
second school year following the school year for which the tentative
charge was paid would cause a hardship.(emphasis supplied)
Ridgefield Park asserts, persuasively so, that the regulation does not require that it
demand the full actual cost per student; but it nonetheless grants it full discretion to do
so. An administrative regulation is subject to the same canons of construction as a
statute. In re N.J.A.C. 14A:20-1.1, 216 N.J. Super. 297, 306 (App. Div. 1987). A
regulation should be “construed in accordance with the plain meaning of its language . .
. and in a manner that makes sense when read in the context of the entire regulation.”
Medford Convalescent and Nursing Ctr. v. DMAHS, 218 N.J. Super. 1, 5 (App. Div.
1985). Here, the regulatory scheme envisions an adjustment of the estimated amount.
N.J.A.C. 6A:23A-17.1(f)(6) and (7). And by stating that the receiving district “may
charge all or part” of the difference between the estimated cost, the regulation plainly
permits Ridgefield Park to choose to demand the full amount.
Little Ferry argues that the use of the word “may” in the regulations reflects that
the parties may negotiate any tuition rate they like, and that both districts are equally
empowered players in the negotiation process. Little Ferry urges that had the rule
makers intended to give Ridgefield Park the authority it claims they would have used the
word “shall.” And since under N.J.S.A. 18A:38-19 the tentative charge is to be an
amount “not in excess of” the certified rate, Little Ferry asserts that the law provides for
an arm’s length negotiated rate that would allow the parties to determine a lesser
amount than the certified rate. These arguments are unpersuasive. The regulation is
intended to give breath and meaning to N.J.S.A. 18A:38-19; in other words, to allow the
regulated community to understand the mechanics of implementing the statute’s
requirements. And the statute could not be clearer. It provides that the receiving district

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 07868-20
9
“shall” determine the tuition rate, thus vesting in Ridgefield Park the exclusive authority
to forgive the difference between the estimated tuition rate and the certified rate, or not,
in its sole discretion. The parties obviously negotiate the tentative rate. But these
negotiations do not deprive Ridgefield Park of its clear right, ultimately, to demand the
full certified tuition amount.
The prior agreements between the parties did not expressly confirm Ridgefield
Park’s right to the full tuition amount, but this fact offers Little Ferry no solace. It is well
established that the statutory and regulatory scheme governs the sending-receiving
relationship relative to tuition payments, and not the parties’ contractual language. See:
Mountainside Bd. of Educ. v. Berkeley Heights Bd. of Educ., Dkt. No. EDU 09700-06,
Initial Decision (July 20, 2007), adopted, Comm’r (January 17, 2008),
<http://njlaw.rutgers.edu/collections/oal/>. Indeed, the Commissioner of Education has
broad powers to oversee sending-receiving agreements. Merchantville Bd. of Educ. v.
Pennsauken and Haddon Bds. of Educ., 204 N.J. Super. 508 (App. Div. 1985). While
the regulatory scheme demands execution of a formal agreement (N.J.A.C. 6A:23A-
17.1(f)), any contractual language or past practice that is at odds with the regulations is
unenforceable.
Finally, Little Ferry’s reliance on N.J.S.A. 18A:38-8.1 is misplaced. This statute
allows for sending district representation on the receiving district’s board of education
and permits its representative to participate in discussions on several delineated topics.
But N.J.S.A. 18A:38-8.1 makes it clear that there would be insufficient representation to
shift the balance of power in favor of the sending district. Little Ferry thus contends that,
“sending districts are deprived of virtually any opportunity to voice any meaningful
agreement or objection to decisions made by the receiving board that ultimately result in
significant increases to certified tuition rates.” But Little Ferry can meaningfully assert
that the tuition rate is improperly calculated via the filing of its own petition before the
Commissioner of Education.
In summary, I CONCLUDE that Ridgefield Park may seek the full certified tuition
amount from Little Ferry. Since N.J.A.C. 6A:23A-17.1(f) requires the execution of a
written contract, Little Ferry must execute a sending-receiving contract with Ridgefield

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 07868-20
10
Park. Having determined that Ridgefield Park has the legal right to demand the full
certified tuition amount once the tuition is reconciled in accordance with the regulatory
formula, I CONCLUDE that the agreement may so provide. But importantly, Ridgefield
Park has the right to full tuition regardless of the contractual language. Accordingly,
deleting that language would in no way abrogate its rights.
Ridgefield Park demands that Little Ferry reimburse the attorney’s fees it has
expended in asserting its claims. It is well established that the Commissioner of
Education is without jurisdiction to award attorneys’ fees. See: Balsley v. North
Hunterdon Reg. H.S. Bd. of Educ., 117 N.J. 434, 447 (1990) where the Court held that
“[t]he specialized remedy of counsel fees is not one within the statutory authority of the
Commissioner.” Accordingly, I CONCLUDE that the request for attorney’s fees must be
denied.
ORDER
Based on the foregoing, it is ORDERED that Summary Decision is GRANTED in
favor of Ridgefield Park. It is further ORDERED as follows:
1. Ridgefield Park may determine the tuition amount between the parties, so
long as that amount is not more than the actual cost per pupil as determined
by the statutory and regulatory scheme governing tuition payments in
sending-receiving relationships.
2. Little Ferry is directed to execute the contract proposed by Ridgefield Park for
2019-2020 and 2020-2021 school years.
3. The demand for attorneys’ fees is DENIED.
This recommended decision may be adopted, modified or rejected by the
COMMISSIONER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, who by law is authorized
to make a final decision in this matter. If the Commissioner of the Department of
Education does not adopt, modify or reject this decision within forty-five days and unless

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 07868-20
11
such time limit is otherwise extended, this recommended decision shall become a final
decision in accordance with N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10.
Within thirteen days from the date on which this recommended decision was
mailed to the parties, any party may file written exceptions with the COMMISSIONER
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, ATTN: BUREAU OF CONTROVERSIES
AND DISPUTES, 100 Riverview Plaza, 4th Floor, P.O. Box 500, Trenton, New Jersey
08625-0500, marked “Attention: Exceptions.” A copy of any exceptions must be sent to
the judge and to the other parties.
March 8, 2021
DATE ELLEN S. BASS, Acting Director & Chief ALJ
Date Received at Agency: March 8, 2021
Date Mailed to Parties: March 8, 2021
sej