Board of Education of the Village of Ridgefield Park, Bergen County v. Board of Education of the Borough of Little Ferry, Bergen County, and Frank R. Scarafile, Superintendent, 4/20/2023, (#117-23)

117-23
New Jersey Commissioner of Education
Decision
Board of Education of the Village of
Ridgefield Park, Bergen County,
Petitioner,
v.
Board of Education of the Borough of
Little Ferry, Bergen County, and
Frank R. Scarafile, Superintendent
Respondent.
Synopsis
Petitioner, Ridgefield Park Board of Education (Ridgefield Park), and respondent, Little Ferry Board of
Education (Little Ferry), have a longstanding send-receive relationship whereby Little Ferry students
attend Ridgefield Park High School on a tuition basis. The two boards are parties to a formal written send-
receive agreement which historically has provided for a tuition rate that was lower than the certified
tuition rate based on Ridgefield Park’s actual cost per pupil. For the 2018-2019 school year, the parties
executed a contract that provided an estimated tuition rate and indicated that “there shall be no certified
tuition adjustment.” Subsequently, in 2022, Ridgefield Park filed the within petition seeking to compel
Little Ferry to pay the difference between the estimated tuition cost listed in the contract and the actual
State-certified cost. Ridgefield Park filed a motion for summary decision, which Little Ferry opposed; the
ALJ considered Little Ferry’s opposition as a cross-motion for summary decision.
The ALJ found, inter alia, that: although N.J.A.C. 6A:23A-17.1(f) requires a receiving district to return an
overpayment to a sending district, a receiving district is not required to charge a sending district for an
underpayment caused by the difference between the estimated tuition rate in the contract and the State-
certified rate; the provision in the parties’ contract stipulating that there would be no certified tuition
adjustment did not contradict the regulation and was enforceable; although Ridgefield Park could have
negotiated contract language stating that it may seek to recoup tuition underpayments, it did not do so
in 2018-2019; 	in this matter, equitable principles favor Little Ferry, which relied upon the contract
agreement’s negotiated adjustment waiver. 	Accordingly, the ALJ granted Little Ferry’s motion for
summary decision and dismissed the petition.
Upon review, the Commissioner concurred with the ALJ that Ridgefield Park is not entitled to recoup any
underpayment by Little Ferry for the 2018-2019 school year, finding, inter alia, that: there was nothing
improper in the ALJ’s consideration of Little Ferry’s opposition as a cross-motion for summary judgment;
and the applicable statutes and regulations clearly permit a receiving district to waive its right to any
tuition underpayment from a sending district. Accordingly, the Initial Decision of the OAL was adopted as
the final decision in this matter and the petition was dismissed.
This synopsis is not part of the Commissioner’s decision. It has been prepared for the convenience of the reader.
It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Commissioner.

OAL Dkt. No. 02068-22
Agency Dkt. No. 27-2/22
New Jersey Commissioner of Education
Final Decision
Board of Education of the Village of
Ridgefield Park, Bergen County,
Petitioner,
v.
Board of Education of the Borough of
Little Ferry, Bergen County, and
Frank R. Scarafile, Superintendent,
Respondents.
The record of this matter, the Initial Decision of the Office of Administrative Law (OAL), the
exceptions filed by the petitioner pursuant to N.J.A.C. 1:1-18.4, and the respondent’s reply thereto,
have been reviewed and considered.
This matter involves a sending-receiving relationship whereby students from Little Ferry
attend Ridgefield Park High School. Historically, the tuition rate that the Ridgefield Park Board of
Education (Ridgefield Park) charged the Little Ferry Board of Education (Little Ferry) was lower than
the certified tuition rate calculated by the New Jersey Department of Education (State) based on
Ridgefield Park’s actual cost per pupil. For the 2018-2019 school year, the parties executed a
contract that provided an estimated tuition rate and indicated that “there shall be no certified
tuition adjustment.” In 2022, Ridgefield Park filed a petition of appeal seeking to compel Little Ferry
to pay the difference between the estimated tuition cost listed in the contract and the actual State-
certified cost.
117-23

2
Following Ridgefield Park’s motion for summary decision, and opposition thereto by
Little Ferry – which the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) considered as a cross-motion for summary
decision – the ALJ found that while N.J.A.C. 6A:23A-17.1(f) requires a receiving district to return an
overpayment to a sending district, a receiving district is not required to charge a sending district for
an underpayment caused by the difference between the estimated tuition rate in the contract and
the State-certified rate. Accordingly, the ALJ concluded that the provision in the parties’ contract
stipulating that there would be no certified tuition adjustment did not contradict the regulation and
was enforceable. The ALJ found that Ridgefield Park could have negotiated language stating that it
may seek to recoup underpayments, but it did not in 2018-2019. Additionally, the ALJ concluded
that equitable principles favored Little Ferry, which relied upon the agreement’s negotiated
adjustment waiver. The ALJ granted Little Ferry’s motion for summary decision and dismissed the
petition.
In its exceptions, Ridgefield Park argues that the Initial Decision in a prior case between
these parties held that the statutory and regulatory scheme governs the right to tuition payments,
not the parties’ contractual language, and that any contractual language or past practice that is at
odds with the regulations is unenforceable. Bd. of Educ. of the Village of Ridgefield Park, Bergen Co.
v. Bd. of Educ. of the Borough of Little Ferry, OAL Dkt. No. EDU 07868-20 (Initial Decision,
March 8, 2021),1 adopted, Commissioner Decision No. 92-21 (decided April 22, 2021).2 According to
Ridgefield Park, the ALJ erred in finding that the 2021 Initial Decision applied only in cases where
there was no signed tuition contract, when no such limitation is contained in that decision.
Ridgefield Park also contends that there is no basis for the ALJ’s conclusion that underpayments and
1 Hereafter, “2021 Initial Decision.”
2 Hereafter, “2021 Commissioner decision.”

3
overpayments should be treated differently, and that such a result is unfair to receiving districts.
Ridgefield Park further argues that while the regulation provides that a receiving district “may”
demand an underpayment, this language only means that the receiving district has the discretion to
demand or not demand that amount – not that the district can bargain away its right to demand it
in a tuition contract. Ridgefield Park notes that Little Ferry did not move for summary decision –
and in fact argued that the case should proceed to a hearing – and contends that it was therefore
inappropriate for the ALJ to award summary decision to Little Ferry.
In reply, Little Ferry argues that Ridgefield Park agreed to waive any claim for additional
tuition costs when it signed the tuition contract providing that “there shall be no certified tuition
adjustments for the 2018/2019 school year.” According to Little Ferry, the 2021 Commissioner
decision allows a receiving district to accept a tuition rate lower than the full certified tuition rate,
and that is what Ridgefield Park did in signing the tuition contract. Little Ferry notes that other
agreements between the parties either included no language regarding tuition adjustments or
expressly confirmed that Little Ferry would pay the adjusted amount, demonstrating that Ridgefield
Park was aware of its ability to negotiate the adjustment language. Little Ferry contends that the
current matter is factually distinct from the prior matter because of the inclusion of language
specifically waiving Ridgefield Park’s ability to demand any tuition adjustment. Little Ferry argues
that it successfully negotiated for a lower tuition rate, and that Ridgefield Park should be bound by
that negotiated term. According to Little Ferry, the ALJ correctly determined that overpayments
and underpayments should be treated differently, because while a receiving district can agree to
accept less than it is entitled to for the services it provides to the sending district, it should not be
unjustly enriched by being permitted to charge the sending district more than the cost the receiving
district incurred.

4
Upon review, the Commissioner concurs with the ALJ that Ridgefield Park is not entitled to
recoup any underpayment by Little Ferry for the 2018-2019 school year. Initially, the Commissioner
finds unpersuasive Ridgefield Park’s argument that it was inappropriate for the ALJ to award
summary decision to Little Ferry when Little Ferry had not moved for summary decision. In
opposition to Ridgefield Park’s motion for summary decision, Little Ferry asserts that its position
regarding Ridgefield Park’s ability to recoup any underpayments is correct as a matter of law.
Little Ferry also argued that there are issues of disputed material facts, but those issues pertain
solely to calculation of the tuition rate and the amount Ridgefield Park was seeking to collect.
However, in finding that Ridgefield Park is not entitled to recoup the underpayment, those issues of
fact become irrelevant, and a plenary hearing to address them would be a waste of judicial
resources. The Commissioner finds no basis to disturb the ALJ’s decision to view Little Ferry’s
opposition to Ridgefield Park’s motion for summary decision as a cross-motion for summary
decision.
Turning to the merits, Ridgefield Park relies heavily on the language in the 2021
Initial Decision that states, “[T]he statutory and regulatory scheme governs the sending-receiving
relationship relative to tuition payments, and not the parties’ contractual language. …. While the
regulatory scheme demands execution of a formal agreement, any contractual language or past
practice that is at odds with the regulations is unenforceable.” 2021 Initial Decision, supra.
Ridgefield Park appears to assume that the portion of the parties’ tuition agreement providing for
no tuition adjustments is at odds with the regulations, and – pursuant to the 2021 Initial Decision –
is therefore unenforceable. However, a board of education choosing to forego its ability to recoup
an underpayment is not at odds with the applicable statute or regulation. N.J.S.A. 18A:39-19
provides that “the board of education of the receiving district shall determine a tuition rate to be

5
paid by the board of education of the sending district . . .”. That is precisely what occurred between
the parties for the 2018-2019 school year. Ridgefield Park determined the estimated tuition rate,
and, by virtue of agreeing that it would not recoup any underpayment, also determined the final
tuition rate.
Furthermore, as the Commissioner indicated in the 2021 matter, “nothing in the statutes or
regulations precludes negotiations between the parties, and the receiving district is free to accept a
tuition rate lower than the full certified tuition rate. . .”. 2021 Commissioner Decision, supra.3 This
outcome is also consistent with Bd. of Educ. of the Borough of Spotswood, Middlesex Co. v. Bd. of
Educ. of the Borough of Milltown, Middlesex Co., Commissioner Decision No. 179-99 (decided
June 7, 1999). In Spotswood, the Commissioner noted, “the pertinent regulations permit, but do
not require, a receiving district to charge a sending district for either all or part of the money owed
when it is determined that the tentative charge established by written contractual agreement was
less than the actual cost per pupil during the school year.” Ibid. (citations omitted)4 (emphasis in
original). Spotswood and Milltown had signed a tuition agreement based on a form prepared by
the Commissioner in which they agreed that Milltown would pay the full amount of any
underpayment, and, accordingly, Milltown was required to pay that amount. However, the
Commissioner also noted that “the contract permits the parties the option to check [a box]
3 To the extent there is any conflict between the Initial Decision and the Commissioner Decision in the prior
matter, the Commissioner decision controls. However, the Commissioner does not find there to be any conflict, as
the Initial Decision addresses contractual language that is at odds with the regulation, and, as noted herein, a
receiving district forgoing its ability to recoup an underpayment is not at odds with the statute or the regulation.
4 The pertinent regulations were codified in a different section of the Administrative Code at the time of the
Spotswood decision but are substantially the same in content.

6
indicating that a sending district would not be charged with any tuition differential”5 and that the
applicable regulations permit the receiving district to forego charging the sending district where
tentative costs are found to be underestimated. Ibid.
Ridgefield Park did not have to forgo its right to recoup an underpayment, as the statute
gives the receiving district full discretion to set the rate, so long as it does not exceed the State-
certified rate. Ridgefield Park could have included language in its contract allowing it to recoup any
underpayment. The parties could have left the agreement silent on this issue, allowing Ridgefield
Park to set the rate once it learned of the State-certified rate later in the cycle. If Little Ferry
refused to sign either of such versions of the tuition agreement – which is what led to the prior case
between these parties – Ridgefield Park could have insisted that they do so. However, none of
those events occurred. The statutory and regulatory scheme clearly permits a receiving district to
waive its right to any underpayment, and such a waiver is not ineffective simply because it occurred
at the time the parties signed their tuition agreement.
Accordingly, the Initial Decision is adopted as the final decision in this matter, and the
petition of appeal is dismissed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.6
ACTING COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION
Date of Decision:
Date of Mailing:
5 The Commissioner notes that the form currently provided by the Department of Education for tuition contract
agreements also includes an option whereby the receiving district can forgo an underpayment or accept partial
payment. See https://www.nj.gov/education/finance/tuition/tuition1.pdf.
6 This decision may be appealed to the Appellate Division of the Superior Court pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:6-9.1.
Under N.J.Ct.R. 2:4-1(b), a notice of appeal must be filed with the Appellate Division within 45 days from the date
of mailing of this decision.
April 20, 2023
April 21, 2023

New Jersey is an Equal Opportunity Employer
State of New Jersey
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
INITIAL DECISION
SUMMARY DECISION
OAL DKT. NO. EDU 02068-22
AGENCY DKT. NO. 27-2/22
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE BOROUGH
OF RIDGEFIELD PARK, BERGEN COUNTY,
Petitioner,
v.
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE BOROUGH
OF LITTLE FERRY, BERGEN COUNTY, AND
FRANK R. SCARAFILE, SUPERINTENDENT
Respondents.
_____________________________________
Kerri Wright, Esq., (Porzio Bromberg & Newman, attorneys)
John Geppert, Esq., (Scarinici Hollenbeck, attorneys)
Record Closed: January 13, 2023 	Decided: February 7, 2023
BEFORE NANCI G. STOKES, ALJ:

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 02068-22
2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
For school year 2018-2019, respondent executed a contract with petitioner to
educate its high school-aged residents at an estimated tuition rate, agreeing that “there
shall be no certified tuition adjustment” for that year. 	Petitioner now seeks payment at
the higher State-certified tuition rate. 	Is additional reimbursement owed? 	No. 	While
statutes allow receiving districts to charge tuition up to the State-certified rate, the
parties can negotiate a lower rate. N.J.S.A. 18A:38-8; N.J.A.C. 6A:23A-17.1(f)7.
.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On February 24, 2022, the Township of Ridgefield Park Board of Education
(Ridgefield 	Park) 	filed 	this 	action 	with 	the 	Department 	of 	Education, 	Office 	of
Controversies 	and 	Disputes 	(DOE), 	seeking 	to 	compel 	the 	Little 	Ferry 	Board 	of
Education (Little Ferry) to pay the difference between the estimated tuition cost for
educating 	Little 	Ferry’s 	high 	school 	students 	and 	the 	actual 	State-certified 	cost.
Specifically, Ridgefield Park maintains that its agreement not to adjust the tuition rate
after the State calculated the exact cost and certified the rate is unenforceable under
the governing statute.
On March 11, 2022, Little Ferry submitted its answer to the petition.
On 	March 	16, 	2022, 	the 	DOE 	transmitted 	the 	contested 	case 	under 	the
Administrative Procedure Act, N.J.S.A. 52:14B-1 to -15, and the act establishing the
OAL, 	N.J.S.A. 	52:14F-1 	to 	-13, 	for 	a 	hearing 	under 	the 	Uniform 	Administrative
Procedure Rules, N.J.A.C. 1:1-1.1 to -21.6.
On November 16, 2022, Ridgefield Park filed a motion for summary decision. On
December 7, 2022, Little Ferry filed its opposition to the motion, which I now consider a
cross-motion for summary decision. See N.J.A.C. 1:1-14.6(d) (allowing an ALJ to
"convert any form of proceeding into another.”); see also N.J.A.C. 1:1-14.6(p) (providing

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 02068-22
3
that an ALJ may take action to ensure “the proper, expeditious and fair conduct of the
hearing or other proceeding, development of the record and rendering of a decision.")
Significantly, each party asserts they are correct under the law and entitled to a decision
in their favor. 	On December 19, 2022, Ridgefield Park submitted its reply. 	At Little
Ferry’s request, I scheduled oral argument on the motion for January 13, 2023, and I
closed the record.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Based on the documents submitted in support of and in opposition to the motions
for summary decision, I FIND the following as FACT for purposes of these motions only:
The Little Ferry School District has no high school. 	Little Ferry’s high school-
aged students attend Ridgefield Park High School on a tuition basis under a send-
receive agreement. The State calculates the tuition cost per student under a regulatory
formula. 	However, actual audited expenditures and average daily enrollment numbers
are unavailable until after the school year ends. 	Thus, the State calculates and adjusts
the tuition rate over a three-year period.
Under this scheme, Little Ferry estimates the number of students attending
Ridgefield Park High School the following year in year one, and Ridgefield Park
estimates a per-pupil tuition amount. 	Little Ferry budgets that estimated amount during
year two and pays Ridgefield Park. In year three, the Department of Education reviews
Ridgefield Park’s audited financials and issues “certified tuition rates,” representing the
actual cost per student in year two. 	After the State establishes the certified rate, Little
Ferry and Ridgefield Park can address or adjust deficits or credits if the State-certified
rate or the number of students differs from the estimated numbers. 	This three-year
cycle repeats continuingly.
Boards 	must 	prepare 	a 	written 	sending-receiving 	contract, 	including 	the
estimated students and cost per pupil. In 2018-2019, the parties’ negotiated sending-

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 02068-22
4
receiving contract included language stating that “there shall be no certified tuition
adjustment” for that year.
Little Ferry did not budget beyond the contract tuition cost. 	Historically, the
parties did not include this waiver, and the State-certified rate exceeded the estimated
figure. Only recently, Ridgefield Park sought to recoup the difference between the lower
estimated contract rate and the State-certified cost. 	Notably, the parties’ sending-
receiving agreement from 2016-2017 required Ridgefield Park to remit any overpayment
above the State-certified per-pupil cost to Little Ferry and for Little Ferry to pay any
underpayment below that rate to Ridgefield Park. 	Based on the 2018-2019 contract
tuition amount and Ridgefield Park’s inability to upwardly adjust the rate given the
agreed-upon waiver, Little Ferry budgeted tuition funds and paid them per the contract.
Undeniably, Little Ferry received a discounted price from the actual cost per
pupil. 	Specifically, Little Ferry remitted a payment to Ridgefield Park of $4,513,644.44
for tuition for the 2018-2019 school year per the contract. 	However, the State-certified
rate 	for 	the 	2018-2019 	school 	year 	was 	$5,556,369.71, 	leaving 	a 	difference 	of
$1,042,725.27, which Ridgefield Park now seeks.
Notably, in a prior case before the Hon. Ellen Bass, CALJ, for the 2019-2020 and
2020-2021 school years, Ridgefield Park refused to include the 2018-2019 adjustment
waiver language, and Little Ferry declined to sign the sending-receiving agreement. 	In
other words, Ridgefield Park wanted the ability to adjust tuition costs up to the State-
certified rate and to reserve Ridgefield Park’s right to demand that difference. 	That
Decision provides the basis for this litigation.
Before the earlier litigation, the Superintendent advised Little Ferry that it owed
Ridgefield Park the balance of the State-certified rate for the 2016-2017 school year,
absent any tuition waiver and Ridgefield’s stated right to the State-certified rate.
Indeed, Little Ferry expressly agreed that it owed Ridgefield Park the balance of the
certified tuition cost if the estimated cost was less for the 2016-2017 school year.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 02068-22
5
Further, the Superintendent told Little Ferry that it must sign the 2019-20 and 2020-21
school years’ sending-receiving contracts, allowing tuition adjustments up to the State-
certified rate. Little Ferry agreed to pay the State-certified tuition rate for the 2020-2021
school year and paid Ridgefield Park the 2016-2017 balance between the lower
estimated cost and the State-certified rate.
Despite the explicit language not to adjust for the certified rate in the 2018-2019
school year contract, on June 28, 2021, Ridgefield Park first demanded the difference
between the lower estimated rate and the higher State-certified actual cost per student.
Little Ferry refused, maintaining that it only owed what the parties negotiated for, which
it anticipated and included in its budget. Indisputably, the Boards negotiated that waiver
language in drafting the 2018-2019 sending-receiving contract, and Little Ferry relied
upon that adjustment waiver.
In making this demand, Ridgefield Park relies upon language from Judge Bass’
Initial Decision, stating that:
The statutory and regulatory scheme governs the sending-
receiving relationship relative to tuition payments, and not
the parties’ contractual language. 	See, Mountainside Bd. of
Educ. v. Berkeley Heights Bd. of Educ., OAL Dkt. No. EDU
09700-06, Initial Decision (July 20, 2007), adopted, Comm’r
(January 	17, 	2008), 	http://njlaw.rutgers.edu/collections/oal/
[affirmed 2010 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 545 (App. Div.
2010).] Indeed, the Commissioner of Education has broad
powers 	to 	oversee 	sending-receiving 	agreements.
Merchantville Bd. of Educ. v. Pennsauken and Haddon Bds.
of Educ., 204 N.J. Super. 508 (App. Div. 1985). While the
regulatory 	scheme 	demands 	execution 	of 	a 	formal
agreement 	(N.J.A.C. 	6A:23A-17.1(f)), 	any 	contractual
language or past practice that is at odds with the regulations
is unenforceable.
[Ridgefield Park Bd. of Educ. v. Little Ferry Bd. of Educ.,
OAL Dkt. No. EDU 07868-20, Initial Decision (March 8,
2021), 	adopted, 	Comm’r 	(April 	22, 	2021),
http://njlaw.rutgers.edu/collections/oal/.]

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 02068-22
6
Further, Judge Bass addressed the tuition rate-setting process, highlighting that
“while the parties obviously negotiate the tentative rate, these negotiations do not
deprive Ridgefield Park of its clear right, ultimately, to demand the full certified tuition
amount.” Ibid.
In turn, Little Ferry relies upon the Commissioner’s Final Decision in that case,
stating that:
The Commissioner also concurs with the ALJ that Ridgefield
Park 	may 	charge 	the 	full 	certified 	tuition 	rate. 	N.J.S.A.
18A:28-19 	provides 	that 	the 	receiving 	district 	“shall
determine” the tuition rate. 	As the ALJ correctly concluded,
the plain language of the statute gives the receiving district –
Ridgefield Park – the discretion to set the tuition at any
amount, with the only limitation being that it cannot exceed
the certified tuition rate. While nothing in the statues or
regulations precludes negotiations between the parties, and
the receiving district is free to accept a tuition rate lower than
the full certified tuition rate, the statutory language clearly
provides 	for 	a 	specific 	outcome 	in 	the 	event 	that 	the
receiving district does not wish to negotiate, or negotiations
are 	unsuccessful. 	In 	those 	circumstances, 	the 	receiving
district is permitted to set the tuition rate, as long as it is not
more than the certified tuition rate.
In 2022, the parties attempted to resolve the disputed tuition for 2018-2019 and
submitted the issue to the Interim Executive Bergen County Superintendent of Schools
(Superintendent) 	for 	mediation 	under 	N.J.A.C. 	6A:23A-17.1(f)(5). 	To 	date, 	the
Superintendent 	issued 	no 	guidance 	or 	pronouncement 	that 	would 	facilitate 	the
settlement of this dispute.
Both Boards stress understandable financial hardships.
Little Ferry also argues that the State improperly calculated the certified tuition
rate for the 2018-19 school year.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 02068-22
7
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Summary-Decision Standard
A party may move for summary decision upon all or any substantive issues in a
contested case. N.J.A.C. 1:1-12.5(a). A party must make the motion a party makes with
briefs, with or without affidavits. When the filed papers and discovery, together with any
affidavits, show that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the moving party is
entitled to prevail as a matter of law, the judge may grant the motion. N.J.A.C. 1:1-
12.5(b). When a party makes such a motion providing that support, an adverse party, to
prevail, must submit an affidavit setting forth specific facts showing that a genuine issue
of material fact exists that can only be determined in an evidentiary proceeding. Ibid.
Even though a statute calls for a “hearing,” where a motion for summary decision
is made and supported by documentary evidence and where the objector submits no
evidence to demonstrate that a genuine issue of material fact exists, the motion
procedure constitutes the hearing, and no trial-type hearing is necessary. 	Contini v.
Newark Bd. of Educ., 286 N.J. Super. 106, 120–21 (App. Div. 1995), certif. denied, 145
N.J. 372 (1996).
To determine whether a genuine issue of material fact exists that precludes
summary judgment, the motion judge must consider whether the competent evidential
materials presented, when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party,
are sufficient to demonstrate that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter
of law. Brill v. Guardian Life Ins., 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995).
Moreover, even if the non-movant comes forward with some evidence, the court
must grant summary judgment if the evidence is “so one-sided that [the movant] must
prevail as a matter of law.” 	Ibid. at 536 (citation omitted). 	If the non-moving party’s
evidence is “merely colorable or is not significantly probative,” the judge should not deny
summary judgment. Bowles v. City of Camden, 993 F. Supp. 255, 261 (D.N.J. 1998).

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 02068-22
8
In this case, no genuine issue exists as to the material facts. 	The only question
is whether Ridgefield Park has the statutory right to demand the State-certified tuition
rate for the 2018-2019 school year despite contractual language waiving the ability to
adjust tuition costs based on that rate. More pointedly, no genuine issue exists that the
parties negotiated a sending-receiving contract for the 2018-2019 school year setting
forth an estimated tuition rate for Ridgefield Park’s education of Little Ferry high school
students and agreeing that the parties would make no adjustments for the State-
certified rate. 	Yet, the State-certified tuition rate for 2018-2019 exceeded the tentative
cost per student. Further, no dispute exists that Little Ferry executed sending-receiving
contracts before and after the 2018-2019 school year, which included Ridgefield Park’s
ability to demand reimbursement up to the State-certified rate and no tuition adjustment
waiver. Lastly, there is no dispute that Ridgefield Park first sought the 2018-2019 tuition
underpayment 	from 	Little 	Ferry 	in 	June 	2021. 	Since 	these 	facts 	are 	clear 	and
undisputed, I CONCLUDE that this case is ripe for summary decision.
Notably, Little Ferry asserts that the actual tuition costs for 2018-2019 are
incorrect. 	Yet, I CONCLUDE that the calculation dispute is immaterial to whether
Ridgefield Park can demand the full certified rate under the 2018-2019 sending-
receiving agreement. 	Indeed, Little Ferry can file a petition with the Commissioner if it
believes there are errors in the tuition calculations.1
Timeliness
Under N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.3(d), a party must file an appeal with the Commissioner of
Education “no later than the 90th day from the date of receipt of the notice of a final
order, ruling, or other action by the district board of education, individual party, or
agency, that is the subject of the requested contested case hearing.” This rule "provides
a measure of repose, an essential element in the proper and efficient administration of
the school laws," giving school districts the “security of knowing” that an aggrieved party
1 Little Ferry raised the same “factual dispute” before Judge Bass, which she similarly dismissed as
immaterial. Notably, the Commissioner calculates the actual cost.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 02068-22
9
cannot challenge its actions after ninety days. Kaprow v. Board of Educ. of Berkeley
Twp., 131 N.J. 572, 582 (1993).
Courts 	strictly 	construe 	and 	consistently 	apply 	the 	ninety-day 	limitation
period. Kaprow, 131 N.J. at 588-89; Nissman v. Bd. of Educ., 272 N.J. Super 373, 380-
81, (App. Div. 1994); Riely v. Bd. of Educ., 173 N.J. Super. 109, 112-14, (App. Div.
1980). This period begins to run when the petitioner "learn[s] from the Local Board the
existence of that state of facts that would enable him to file a timely claim." Kaprow, 131
N.J. at 588-89. Indeed, the "notice of a final order, ruling or other action" is "sufficient to
inform an individual of some fact that he or she has a right to know and that the
communicating party has a duty to communicate." Id. at 587. Notably, petitioners need
not receive official and formal notification that they may have a valid claim to begin the
ninety days. Id. at 588. However, the regulations encourage the parties to resolve their
disputes before litigation, and a petitioner should receive notice of the “firm rejection” of
its claims before the statutory period begins. Gloucester Bd. of Educ. v. Lenape Bd. of
Educ., OAL Dkt. No. EDU 10120-98, Initial Decision, adopted and modified, Comm’r
(December 16, 1999), http://njlaw.rutgers.edu/collections/oal/.
Further, the Commissioner may exercise her authority under N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.1.6
to relax the application of the ninety-day rule where the Commissioner determines that
strict observance might be “inappropriate or unnecessary or may result in injustice."
Ibid. Yet, exceptions to the ninety-day rule are only appropriate where compelling
circumstances exist to justify the enlargement or relaxation of the time limit. 	See
Kaprow, 131 N.J. at 590; DeMaio v. New Providence Bd. of Educ., 96 N.J.A.R.2d (EDU)
449, 453.
In a similar sending-receiving contract dispute, the Commissioner agreed that the
petitioner knew its dispute with the respondent was at an impasse after an unsuccessful
mediation with the County Superintendent's offices. Mountainside Bd. of Educ. v.
Berkeley Heights Bd. of Educ., OAL Dkt. No. EDU 09700-06, Initial Decision (July 20,
2007), adopted, 	Comm’r 	(January 	17, 	2008),

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http://njlaw.rutgers.edu/collections/oal/, affirmed 2010 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 545
(App. Div. 2010) (emphasis added). Even though Mountainside filed its claim more than
ninety days later, the Commissioner concluded that the petition was not time-barred.
The 	Commissioner 	relaxed 	the 	time 	requirement 	because 	the 	parties' 	tuition
disagreement spanned years, and resolving the issue was in the public interest. Id.
Similar public interest considerations exist here. 	This case is the second one
addressing 	tuition 	reimbursement 	under 	sending-receiving 	contracts 	between 	the
parties. 	Notably, Ridgefield Park did not make its demand until June 2021, after
receiving Judge Bass’ decision, and learning it may have a claim to the 2018-2019
actual tuition costs. 	Significantly, the parties attempted mediation as in the other case,
including involving the Superintendent in January 2022. 	When it became clear that the
Superintendent would not step in to resolve the issue, Ridgefield Park filed its petition of
appeal in February 2022. 	Thus, I CONCLUDE that Ridgefield’s claim against Little
Ferry is not time-barred.
Sending-Receiving Agreements
Through 	N.J.S.A. 	18A:38–19, 	New 	Jersey 	school 	districts 	may 	enter 	into
sending-receiving agreements whereby the sending district sends its students to the
receiving district’s schools, N.J.S.A. 18A:38– 8, in return for a tuition payment set by the
receiving district that cannot exceed the “actual cost” of the students enrolled. 	Ibid.
Further, regulations govern the Commissioner’s calculation of the “actual cost” per pupil.
N.J.A.C. 6A:23A–17.1(b).
To allow for appropriate budgeting, the sending and receiving districts must
execute a yearly written contract setting the tentative tuition charge, which cannot
exceed “the receiving district board of education’s ‘estimated cost per student’ for the
ensuing school year . . . 	multiplied by the estimated average daily enrollment of
students expected to be received during the ensuing school year.” N.J.A.C. 6A:23A-

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17.1(f). 	Indeed, the receiving district calculates the estimated cost per pupil with an
appropriate supporting schedule. N.J.A.C. 6A:23-17.1(f)(1).
Under 	N.J.A.C. 	6A:23A-17.1(f), 	receiving 	school 	districts 	have 	differing
obligations for overpayment and underpayment of tuition charges compared to the
actual certified cost per student. When the Commissioner determines that the tentative
tuition charge under the contract exceeds the actual cost per student, the “receiving
district board of education shall return to the sending district board of education . . . the
amount by which the tentative charge exceeded the actual charge.” 	N.J.A.C. 6A:23A-
17.1(f)(6) (emphasis added).
However, when the Commissioner determines that the tentative tuition charge
under the contract was less than the actual cost per student, the “receiving district board
of education may charge the sending district board of education all or part of the amount
owed by the sending district board of education.” N.J.A.C. 6A:23A-17.1(f)(7) (emphasis
added). 	In other words, an overpayment by the sending district must be returned to it
by the receiving district, but an underpayment request is not mandatory. 	The parties
could not contract otherwise when action is compulsory under a regulation.
Notably, the decision cited by Judge Bass, addressing unenforceable tuition
contract provisions, involved overpayments by the sending district that the receiving
district refused to reimburse. See, Mountainside Bd. of Educ. v. Berkeley Heights Bd. of
Educ., OAL Dkt. No. EDU 09700-06, Initial Decision (July 20, 2007), adopted, Comm’r
(January 17, 2008), http://njlaw.rutgers.edu/collections/oal/, affirmed 2010 N.J. Super.
Unpub. LEXIS 545 (App. Div. 2010). 	Indeed, the parties sending-receiving agreement
set a maximum tuition rate without consideration of the Commissioner’s actual tuition
cost determination and the mandatory overpayment reimbursement requirement. Ibid.
(emphasis added). 	In the last case between these parties, Judge Bass concluded, and
the Commissioner agreed, that Ridgefield Park had the right to demand the total
certified tuition cost where the parties could not resolve the terms of the sending-
receiving agreement.

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To be sure, Ridgefield Park has no obligation to accept a lower tuition payment
than the State-certified rate in a sending-receiving contract, even if it did so in the past.
Instead, the regulation allows Ridgefield Park to demand the State-certified per pupil
tuition cost in its contract. Yet, Judge Bass had no agreement like the 2018-2019
contract wherein Ridgefield Park, aware of the ability to demand the actual cost, chose
not to. 	Indeed, her decision addressed Ridgefield Park’s authority to insist upon the
State-certified rate should it wish to include that provision in the sending-receiving
agreement. 	Significantly, the regulation only allows districts to negotiate a potential
underpayment of the difference between the anticipated and actual tuition costs once
the Commissioner determines that rate. 	Thus, I CONCLUDE that because this case
involves an underpayment, in line with the parties’ prior history, the parties’ contract
provision does not contradict N.J.A.C. 6A:23A-17.1(f)(7), nor is it unenforceable.
Notably, a court has no right “to rewrite the contract merely because one might
conclude that it might well have been functionally desirable to draft it differently.”
Levison v. Weintraub, 215 N.J. Super. 273, 276, (App. Div.), certif. denied, 107 N.J.
650, (1987); Brick Tp. Mun. Util. Auth. v. Diversified R.B. & T., 171 N.J. Super. 397,
402, (App.Div.1979). Nor may the courts remake a better contract for the parties than
they have seen fit to enter or to alter it for the benefit of one party and to the detriment
of the other. James v. Federal Ins. Co., 5 N.J. 21, 24, (1950).
To determine the intention of the parties to a contract, the court must consider
the relations of the parties, the attendant circumstances, and the objects they were
trying to attain. Tessmar v. Grosner, 23 N.J. 193, 201, (1957). An agreement must be
construed in the context of the circumstances under which it was entered, and it must
be accorded a rational meaning in keeping with the express general purpose. Id.
While Ridgefield Park maintains an absolute right to demand the balance,
despite 	its 	contract 	precluding 	adjustments, 	the 	Commissioner’s 	Final 	Decision
recognized that the parties could negotiate a lower rate than the actual cost per pupil.
The 	only 	limit 	to 	the 	sending-receiving 	contracts 	relates 	to 	overpayments, 	not

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underpayments. 	Had this been a case of overpayment by Little Ferry, Ridgefield Park
would have to return the overpayment as that amount exceeds the statutory maximum.
Yet, importantly, the parties did not experience that situation. 	Instead, the parties’
sending-receiving agreements historically resulted in Little Ferry’s underpayment of the
State-certified actual cost to Ridgefield Park. 	Thus, the parties’ tuition circumstances
when entering the 2018-2019 contract were clear. 	Based on earlier sending-receiving
agreements, Ridgefield Park was well aware it could negotiate language stating that it
could seek such underpayments, but it did not in 2018-2019.
Here, 	equitable 	principles 	favor 	Little 	Ferry. 	Equitable 	considerations 	are
appropriate in assessing governmental conduct, Skulski v. Nolan, 68 N.J. 179, 198
(1975), and in trying to prevent manifest injustice, Vogt v. Borough of Belmar, 14 N.J.
195, 205 (1954). The New Jersey Supreme Court has defined equitable estoppel as:
The effect of the voluntary conduct of a party whereby he is
absolutely 	precluded, 	both 	at 	law 	and 	in 	equity, 	from
asserting rights which might otherwise have existed ..., as
against another person, who has in good faith relied upon
such conduct, and has been led to change his position for
the worse. . . .
[County of Morris v. Fauver, 153 N.J. 80, 104 (1998).]
The doctrine of equitable estopped is invoked when one party changes its
position in reliance on the conduct of another party, and the repudiation of that conduct
would prejudice the relying party. Amir v. D'Agostino, 328 N.J. Super. 141 (Ch. Div.
1998). The claiming party may rely on conduct, inaction, or representations of the actor.
Miller v. Miller, 97 N.J. 154, 163 (1984). 	Further, the claiming party must show that the
other party made the representation intentionally or under such circumstances that it
would likely induce action. 	Ibid. 	Then, the claiming party must act in a way that is to
their detriment. Id. (citing to Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Essex Cty. Mortgage Co.,
130 N.J. Eq. 351, 353 (E. & A.1941)).

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14
Undeniably, Little Ferry did not anticipate or budget for the difference between
the tentative cost and the State-certified actual cost for 2018-2019. Instead, Little Ferry
relied upon the agreement's negotiated adjustment waiver. 	Although Ridgefield Park
asserts that cost is irrelevant, it goes to Little Ferry's detrimental reliance on the
contract's tuition payment provision when creating the budget for such costs. 	On the
contrary, 	Ridgefield 	Park 	had 	no 	legitimate 	expectation 	of 	receiving 	such
underpayments when it negotiated and agreed not to seek tuition adjustment payments.
Significantly, Ridgefield Park argues it only learned that it might be able to claim such
reimbursement after Judge Bass ruled in its favor in the earlier case. 	Certainly,
Ridgefield Park knew its prior experience under these contracts or underpayments and
that it had the right to demand the total tuition costs, having included this provision in an
earlier agreement. 	Thus, I CONCLUDE that Little Ferry reasonably relied upon the
negotiated contract provision for the 2018-2019 tuition, and Ridgefield Park may not
now demand the State-certified tuition cost. 	As such, I CONCLUDE that Little Ferry is
entitled to summary decision in its favor, and Ridgefield Park is not.
ORDER
Given my findings of fact and conclusions of law, I ORDER that the Little Ferry
Board of Education be GRANTED summary decision and that the Ridgefield Park
Board of Education be DENIED summary decision. 	I further ORDER that Ridgefield
Park Board of Education’s petition be and is hereby DISMISSED.
I 	hereby 	FILE 	this 	initial 	decision 	with 	the 	COMMISSIONER 	OF 	THE
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION for consideration.
This recommended decision may be adopted, modified, or rejected by the
COMMISSIONER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, who by law is authorized
to make a final decision in this matter. 	If the Commissioner of the Department of
Education does not adopt, modify, or reject this decision within forty-five days and

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 02068-22
15
unless such time limit is otherwise extended, this recommended decision shall become
a final decision in accordance with N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10.
Within thirteen days from the date on which this recommended decision was
mailed to the parties, any party may file written exceptions with the COMMISSIONER
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, ATTN: 	BUREAU OF CONTROVERSIES
AND DISPUTES, 100 Riverview Plaza, 4th Floor, PO Box 500, Trenton, New Jersey
08625-0500, marked “Attention: Exceptions.” A copy of any exceptions must be sent to
the judge and to the other parties.
February 7, 2023
DATE 	NANCI G. STOKES, ALJ
Date Received at Agency: 	February 7, 2023
Date Mailed to Parties: 	February 7, 2023
ljb

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DOCUMENTS RELIED ON
- 	Ridgefield Park’s motion for summary decision, dated November 16, 2022
- 	Little Ferry’s opposition to the motion, dated December 7, 2022
- 	Ridgefield Park’s reply, dated December 19, 2022