J.B., on behalf of minor child, J.B. v. Board of Education of the Northern Valley Regional High School District, Bergen County, 4/13/2021, (#84-21)

84-21
New Jersey Commissioner of Education
Decision
J.B., on behalf of minor child, J.B.,
Petitioner,
v.
Board of Education of the Northern Valley
Regional High School District, Bergen County,
Respondent.
Synopsis
Petitioner alleged that on multiple occasions, the soccer coach for the Northern Valley Regional High
School (NVRHS) bullied her son, J.B., because of his commitment to academics, in violation of
New Jersey’s Anti-Bullying Bill of Rights Act (ABRA), N.J.S.A. 18A:37-13 to -37. Upon review of the
HIB specialist’s report of the incidents in question, the Board concluded that the HIB investigation failed
to show that petitioner was a protected class member or possessed an actual or perceived distinguishing
characteristic which served as motivation for the alleged bullying. 	Petitioner asserted that both J.B.’s
commitment to academics and his status as a student are distinguishing characteristics. The parties filed
cross motions for summary decision.
The ALJ found, inter alia, that: 	there are no material facts at issue here, and the matter is ripe for
summary decision; the petitioner, J.B.’s mother, has standing in this case; petitioner’s assertion that the
District did not follow the 2016 Annual Report of the New Jersey Anti-Bullying Task Force (ABTF) is
without merit, as failing to follow the ABTF does not provide a basis for appeal in this forum, and no
evidence supports a finding that the Board’s HIB Policy failed to include all required provisions; review
of the alleged incidents in this case fail to reveal that the coach targeted J.B. for his academic
commitment, as the now-former coach’s questionable treatment of his players was largely universal; and
J.B.’s status as a student alone is not a distinguishing characteristic under ABRA. 	The ALJ concluded
that the Board did not act in an arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable manner in finding that no HIB
occurred against J.B. Accordingly, the ALJ granted summary decision in favor of the Board and
dismissed the petition.
Upon review, the Commissioner concurred with the ALJ findings and conclusion, for the reasons thoroughly
detailed in the Initial Decision. Accordingly, the Initial Decision of the OAL was affirmed and the petition was
dismissed.
This synopsis is not part of the Commissioner’s decision. It has been prepared for the convenience of the reader. It
has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Commissioner.
April 13, 2021

OAL Dkt. No. EDU 04618-20
Agency Dkt. No. 51-2/20
New Jersey Commissioner of Education
Decision
J.B., on behalf of minor child, J.B.,
Petitioner,
v.
Board of Education of the Northern Valley
Regional High School District, Bergen County,
Respondent.
The record of this matter and the Initial Decision of the Office of Administrative Law
(OAL) have been reviewed. The parties did not file exceptions.
Upon 	review, 	for 	the 	reasons 	thoroughly 	detailed 	in 	the 	Initial 	Decision, 	the
Commissioner concurs with the ALJ that the Board’s decision was not arbitrary, capricious, and
unreasonable. 	Accordingly, the Initial Decision is adopted as the final decision in this matter, and the
petition of appeal is hereby dismissed.
IT IS SO ORDERED. 1
ACTING COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION
Date of Decision: 	April 13, 2021
Date of Mailing: 	April 13, 2021
1 This decision may be appealed to the Appellate Division of the Superior Court pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:6-9.1.
Under N.J.Ct.R. 2:4-1(b), a notice of appeal must be filed with the Appellate Division within 45 days from the date
of mailing of this decision.

New Jersey is an Equal Opportunity Employer
State of New Jersey
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
INITIAL DECISION
SUMMARY DECISION
OAL DKT. NO. EDU 04618-20
AGENCY DKT. NO. 51-2/20
J.B. ON BEHEALF OF MINOR CHILD J.B.,
Petitioners,
v.
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE NORTHERN
VALLEY REGIONAL HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT,
BERGEN COUNTY,
Respondent.
_______________________________________
J.B., parent and power of attorney of J.B., pro se
Isabel Machado, Esq., for respondent (Machado Law Group, attorneys)
Record Closed: January 28, 2021 	Decided: March 8, 2021
BEFORE NANCI G. STOKES, ALJ:

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 04618-20
2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Petitioner, JB, alleges that, on multiple occasions, the Northern Valley Regional
High School (NVRHS) soccer coach bullied her son, J.B., because of his commitment to
academics in violation of the Anti-Bullying Rights Act (ABRA), N.J.S.A. 18A:37-13 to -
37. 	Yet, none of the coach’s actions can be reasonably perceived as motivated by any
actual or perceived distinguishing characteristic as required under ABRA. Is respondent
entitled to summary decision? 	Yes. 	Under N.J.A.C. 1:1-12.5(b), summary decision is
appropriate if no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to
prevail as a matter of law.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On February 27, 2020, petitioner filed a Verified Petition with the Commissioner
of Education (Commissioner) challenging the Northern Valley Regional High School
Board of Education’s (Board or District) conclusion that no “harassment, intimidation, or
bullying” (“HIB”) violation occurred against her son, J.B.
The petition maintains that the Board improperly concluded that J.B. was not a
protected class member and did not possess an actual or perceived distinguishing
characteristic serving as motivation for bullying. 	Although the Board did not conclude a
HIB violation under ABRA occurred, the Board found evidence of the impingement of
J.B.’s rights, and a substantial disruption existed.
Specifically, the petition alleges that J.B., a senior in the District, was the
systematic victim of verbal harassment, intimidation, and bullying at the hands of his
varsity soccer coach, Jeremy Truppi, in violation of the ABRA. 	Petitioner also alleges
that Coach Truppi was in a position of authority over J.B. as a coach and abused that
power.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 04618-20
3
Moreover, 	petitioner disputes 	that 	J.B. has 	no distinguishing characteristics
worthy of protection under ABRA and maintains that the District did not follow ABRA
guidelines. Instead, petitioner asserts that both J.B.’s commitment to academics and his
student status are distinguishing characteristics.
The petition seeks a finding that:
1. 	J.B. was the target of HIB.
2. 	The process that allowed Coach Truppi to remain in his position despite other
HIB violations must be changed.
3. 	The District did not take appropriate measures to address the abuse.
On March 18, 2020, the Board answered the petition, denying any wrongdoing
on its part.
Soon after, the New Jersey Department of Education (NJDOE), Bureau of
Controversies and Disputes, transmitted this case to the Office of Administrative Law as
a contested case under the Administrative Procedure Act, N.J.S.A. 52:14B-1 to -15, and
the act establishing the OAL, N.J.S.A. 52:14F-1 to -13, for a hearing under the Uniform
Administrative Procedure Rules, N.J.A.C. 1:1-1.1 to -21.6. 	The OAL filed the case on
May 11, 2020.
On June 16, 2020, I held a pre-hearing conference wherein I requested that
petitioner further explain the relief sought. 	The Board also provided documentation
requested by the petitioner. 	The parties attempted to resolve this case but were not
successful, and I scheduled hearings on January 19, and 20, 2021.
On November 5, 2020, I conducted a pre-hearing conference, and the Board
requested leave to file a motion for a summary decision.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 04618-20
4
On December 3, 2020, the Board filed its motion.
On December 23, 2020, petitioner filed her opposition, and on January 4, 2021,
the Board replied.
Petitioner requested to submit an additional response, and I granted that request.
On January 14, 2021, petitioner responded to the District’s reply, and on January
28, 2021, thce Board presented its sur-reply.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Based on the documents submitted in support of and in opposition to the motions
for summary decision, when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party,
I FIND the following as FACT for purposes of these motions only:
J.B. is a former student of the District. 	At the time his mother, J.B., filed the
petition on his behalf, J.B. was seventeen. J.B. is now eighteen and graduated in June
2020. After turning eighteen, J.B. provided his mother, J.B., with a power of attorney to
act on his behalf in this case ”conveying all the powers necessary to represent me and
my interests” and to act in his name.
On October 8, 2019, the District received a verbal report of an alleged HIB
violation against J.B. by Jeremy Truppi, the Varsity soccer coach at NVRHS.
On October 10, 2019, the District received a written complaint against Coach
Truppi. 	Petitioner alleged that her son, then a senior, was “bullied, ostracized and
singled out” because of his “bad behavior and commitment to academics.” 	J.B. was
enrolled in honors classes. 	J.B. quit the soccer team in the fall of 2019, in the last
month of the soccer season.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 04618-20
5
The petition supplies instances of alleged bullying against J.B. because of his
being intellectual and committed to academics:
• 	On several occasions, J.B. told Coach Truppi that he had a college-related
meeting and would miss practice. In turn, Coach Truppi mocked J.B. and told
him school should not be a priority. The Coach often told students that athletics
should come first.
• 	Coach Truppi would blame JB for joining the team huddle last when he clearly
wasn’t the last one, for showing up to practice late when he had been there, and
for being disrespectful when he was only asking questions. When another player
got angry and threw a bottle, J.B. told the player to calm down. Coach Truppi
told J.B. not to make other players feel bad encouraging poor behavior.
• 	During a drill, J.B. of running with his group onto the field at the wrong time,
Coach Truppi looked at J.B. in anger and walked off the field, and other team
members blamed J.B. J.B. texted Coach Truppi an apology, and Coach Truppi
responded, “Let’s talk tomorrow at 3:15. Bring your uniform.” J.B. believed he
would be kicked off the team.
• 	J.B. texted Coach Truppi that he could not attend practice due to a religious
holiday and school closure. Coach Truppi texted the entire team that “Any
freshman players who want to practice with varsity today, we would be happy to
have you.” J.B. asserts Coach Truppi repeatedly told the players he would
replace them with freshman. J.B. was only permitted to play for thirty seconds in
the game on the following day, unlike other games. J.B. felt punished.
The District no longer employs Coach Truppi. 	However, the District did retain
Coach 	Truppi 	through 	at 	least 	November 	2019 	and 	the 	championship 	awards

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 04618-20
6
ceremony. Other allegations regarding another student led to a finding of HIB violations
against Coach Truppi in or around October 2019.2
At the time of the complaint, the District operated under an Anti-Bullying Policy
(Policy) and had the appropriate personnel conduct HIB investigations to determine
whether the alleged acts were a HIB violation.
Upon 	being 	notified 	of 	petitioner’s 	complaint, 	Michael 	O’Malley, 	the 	lead
counselor 	and 	NVRHS’s 	Anti-Bullying 	Specialist, 	commenced 	a 	HIB 	investigation.
O’Malley met with student witnesses, three coaches and reviewed written statements.
On Friday, October 18, 2019, O’Malley completed his investigation. On Monday,
October 21, 2019, O’Malley issued his written report concluding that Coach Truppi’s
actions did not meet the definition of a HIB. 	Specifically, interviews and written
statements were not “evidence to reasonably substantiate a distinguishing characteristic
serving as motivation behind [Coach Truppi’s] actions.” (emphasis added). 	Thus,
O’Malley noted that a key component to finding a HIB violation against J.B. was missing
“despite there being evidence of substantial disruption due to the allegations.”
O’Malley summarized the witness interviews as revealing consensus that Coach
Truppi is “passionate” about “motivating his players to reach full potential as individuals
and a team.” However, at times, Coach Truppi was overly emotional, focusing “more on
negatives than positives which can, at times, undermine the trust and confidence the
players have in Coach Truppi as well as the team environment and culture.” Yet, “there
was also consensus among witnesses that Coach [Truppi] has not conducted himself in
a manner different from the other coaches the players have played for in the past.”
Further, “there was growth in these areas” [of concern] throughout the three years of
Coach [Truppi’s] tenure leading up to the present.”
2 Petitioner maintains the Board sustained one HIB, and for purposes of this motion, I viewed the facts in
the light most favorable to petitioner. 	The Board did not address the nature of or the imposed
consequences of other HIB violations and, arguably, cannot do so. See N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1 (information
regarding grievances filed against a public employee are not public records); see also Family Educational
Rights and Privacy Act, 20 U.S.C. 1232g, 34 C.F.R. Part 99 (a school district cannot release a student's
personal identifying information absent specific exception). Yet, HIB violations against other students are
not relevant to whether Coach Truppi bullied J.B.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 04618-20
7
The Superintendent prepared a report noting that no HIB occurred against J.B.
The Board met and accepted that conclusion.
On October 31, 2019, the Board mailed the “NOT HIB” report to petitioner, noting
the findings and identifying no imposition of discipline or penalty.
Petitioner challenged that determination, and on November 26, 2019, she and
her son, J.B., appeared and provided testimony. 	Still, the Board denied the appeal
affirming the finding that J.B. was not a target of HIB. However, the Board advised that
it took appropriate measures to address the concerns raised.
The 2016 Annual Report of the New Jersey Anti-Bullying Task Force (ABTF)3
recommended, in part, that the NJDOE provide guidance to assist practitioners in
understanding the significance of power imbalance between adults and students in HIB.
The Legislature established the ABTF to:
1. 	Provide guidance to school districts on available resources to assist in the
implementation of the ABR.
2. 	Examine the implementation of the ABR.
3. 	Draft model regulations and submit them to the Commissioner of
Education for use in promulgating regulations to implement provisions of
the act.
4. 	Present any recommendations regarding the ABR deemed to be
necessary and appropriate.
5. 	Prepare a report within 180 days of its organizational meeting and
annually for the following three years on the effectiveness of the act in
addressing bullying in schools.
3 https://www.nj.gov/education/students/safety/behavior/hib/task.shtml.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 04618-20
8
The 	NJDOE’s 	2011 	Guidance 	for 	Parents 	on 	ABRA4 	acknowledges 	that
“students who appear to be intellectual or introverted” may be at greater risk for being
bullied.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Summary-Decision Standard
A party may move for summary decision upon all or any of the substantive issues
in a contested case. 	N.J.A.C. 1:1-12.5(a). 	The motion shall be served with briefs, with
or without affidavits. 	When the filed papers and discovery, together with any affidavits,
show that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the moving party is entitled to
prevail as a matter of law, the judge may grant the motion. N.J.A.C. 1:1-12.5(b). When
such a motion is made and supported, an adverse party, to prevail, must submit an
affidavit setting forth specific facts showing that a genuine issue of material fact exists
that can only be determined in an evidentiary proceeding. Ibid.
Even though a statute calls for a “hearing,” where a motion for summary decision
is made and supported by documentary evidence and where the objector submits no
evidence to demonstrate that a genuine issue of material fact exists, the motion
procedure constitutes the hearing and no trial-type hearing is necessary. 	Contini v.
Newark Bd. of Educ., 286 N.J. Super. 106, 120–21 (App. Div. 1995), certif. denied, 145
N.J. 372 (1996). Disputes as to the conclusions drawn from the facts, as opposed to
disagreements regarding the facts themselves, will not defeat a motion for summary
judgment. 	Lima & Sons, Inc. v. Borough of Ramsey, 269 N.J. Super. 469, 478 (App.
Div. 1994)).
To determine whether a genuine issue of material fact exists that precludes
summary judgment, the motion judge must consider whether the competent evidential
materials presented, when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party,
4 https://www.nj.gov/education/students/safety/behavior/hib/ParentGuide.pdf

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 04618-20
9
are sufficient to demonstrate that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter
of law. Brill v. Guardian Life Ins., 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995).
Moreover, even if the non-movant comes forward with some evidence, the court
must grant summary judgment if the evidence is “so one-sided that [the movant] must
prevail as a matter of law.” 	Ibid. at 536 (citation omitted). 	If the non-moving party’s
evidence is “merely colorable or is not significantly probative,” the judge should not deny
summary judgment. Bowles v. City of Camden, 993 F. Supp. 255, 261 (D.N.J. 1998).
The questions presented are whether the petitioner has standing, whether the
case is moot, and if there is standing and the issue is not moot, whether the Board’s “No
HIB’ determination was arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. 	Petitioner also asserts
that this tribunal must determine whether the District failed to follow the 2016 ABTF
report recommendations. 	In this case, no genuine issue as to the material facts exists.
More pointedly, no genuine issue exists that petitioner is the parent of J.B. and has a
power of attorney from J.B., that J.B. is now eighteen years of age, and graduated from
NVHRS in June 2020. 	Moreover, the District no longer employs the coach accused of
committing a HIB against J.B., and the District found other HIB violations against Coach
Truppi concerning other students. 	J.B. took honor and A.P. classes while attending
NVHRS 	and 	pursued 	college. 	Since 	these 	facts 	are 	clear 	and 	undisputed, 	I
CONCLUDE that this case is ripe for summary decision.
Standing
A party must have standing to have the “ability or entitlement to maintain an
action before the court.” In re Baby T., 160 N.J. 332, 340 (N.J.,1999). Standing is "a
threshold 	justiciability 	determination 	whether 	the 	litigant 	is 	entitled 	to 	initiate 	and
maintain an action before a court or other tribunal." In re Six Month Extension of
N.J.A.C. 5:91-1 et seq., 372 N.J. Super 61, 85 (App. Div. 2004).

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 04618-20
10
New Jersey Courts set a relatively low threshold for standing that is more
expansive than in the federal courts. In re Six Month Extension of N.J.A.C. 5:91-1 et
seq., 	372 	N.J. 	Super. 	at 	85. 	Standing 	is 	even 	more 	liberal 	within 	the 	State's
administrative system. Steven L. Lefelt, Anthony Miragliotta, & Patricia Prunty, 37 New
Jersey Practice, Administrative Law and Practice § 7.4, (rev. 2d ed. 2000); see Osborne
v. Township of Lakewood Board of Education, EDU 6348-02, Initial Decision (May 16,
2003), modified, 	Comm'r. 	(August 	26, 	2003), 	http://njlaw.rutgers.edu/collections/oal
(finding petitioner demonstrated a sufficient stake in the outcome of the proceedings to
confer standing to pursue his claims).
Moreover, ABRA contemplates that a parent or guardian is involved in the HIB
investigation process and disputes regarding a HIB determination. Specifically, parents
or guardians are entitled to information about the investigation after the school district
reports its investigation results to the board. N.J.S.A. 18A:37-15(b)(6)(d). The parent or
guardian may then request a hearing before the board. 	Id. 	After the board determines
whether to affirm, reject, or modify the superintendent’s decision, parents or guardians
may appeal the board’s decision to the Commissioner of Education, under procedures
outlined in law and regulation, “no later than 90 days after issuance of the board’s
decision.” N.J.S.A. 18A:37-15(b)(6)(e).
Notably, when petitioner filed the case for J.B., her son was not eighteen years of
age and enrolled in NVHRS. Petitioner asserts deficiencies in the investigation process
and 	District’s 	failure 	to 	consider 	her 	son’s 	distinguishing 	characteristics 	in 	its
determination through the “lens [of the] power imbalance” between the coach and her
son.
Respondent primarily relies upon A.B. o/b/o/ E.R. v. Paterson Bd. of Educ. and
Passaic County Technical Institute, EDS 16337-16, Final Decision (July 10, 2018),
http://njlaw.rutgers.edu/collections/oal/, to support its position. 	In concluding that A.B.
did not have standing for her eighteen-year-old son, E.R., the ALJ noted that A.B. would
not have standing “unless she has in her position (sic) a transfer of those rights to her.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 04618-20
11
A.B. has submitted no such evidence in response to his (sic) motion or this proceeding.
E.R.’s interests, in this case, may very well differ from those of his mother.” 	Here, J.B.
testified at the Board hearing disputing the determination that Coach Truppi committed
no HIB violation against him and took significant steps to provide his mother J.B. with all
powers necessary to litigate this case.
Similarly, respondent relies upon I.C.W. o/b/o J.W. v. Board of Education of The
Borough of Mountain Lakes, Morris County, EDU 05838-11, Comm’r Decision 432-11
(October 14, 2014), http://njlaw.rutgers.edu/collections/oal/. In I.C.W., the Commissioner
concurred that where a parent files a matter for their minor child who turns eighteen
before the case concludes, the ALJ can afford the now 18-year-old adult the option to
file a Certificate of Substitution or appear before the ALJ. 	Such an appearance would
inform the ALJ that he/she would like his parents to proceed as his agents on his/her
behalf. Further, a signed statement by the child was not enough. 	Here, the District did
not challenge standing until the motion for summary decision making those options
unavailable to date. 	Moreover, J.B. presents a notarized power of attorney specific to
this case, endeavoring to provide his mother all powers and authority to act in his name.
J.B. participated at the Board hearing, evidencing his disagreement with the Board’s
determination 	and 	that 	his 	interests 	are 	not 	different 	from 	those 	of 	his 	mother.
Therefore, I CONCLUDE that petitioner, J.B.'s mother, has standing in this case and for
purposes of this motion.
Mootness
An action is moot when it no longer presents a justiciable controversy because
the issues raised have become academic. 	For judicial economy and restraint, it is
appropriate to refrain from decision-making when an issue presented is hypothetical,
when judgment cannot grant effective relief, or the parties do not have concrete
adversity of interest. Anderson v. Sills, 143 N.J. Super 432, 437 (Ch. Div. 1976); Fox v.
Twp. of E. Brunswick Bd. of Educ., EDU 10067-98, Initial Decision (March 19, 1999),
aff’d, Comm’r (May 3, 1999),; https://njlaw.rutgers.edu/collections/oal/ S.J. v. Bd. of

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 04618-20
12
Educ. of Mountain Lakes, EDU 07081-03, Initial Decision (October 7, 2003), aff’d,
Comm’r 	(Nov. 	17, 	2003), 	aff’d, 	St. 	Bd. 	(Feb. 	3, 	2004).
https://njlaw.rutgers.edu/collections/oal/.
In R.S. o/b/o G.M. v. State-Operated School District of the City of Paterson,
Comm’r Decision 17-17, (January 13, 2017), https://njlaw.rutgers.edu/collections/oal/,
the Commissioner determined that a student’s graduation from school does not make
the issue hypothetical. Petitioner challenged the HIB investigation on behalf of her minor
child and sought to reverse the District’s finding. Indeed, as here, “the challenge to the
District’s finding that the alleged conduct did not rise to the level of harassment or
bullying” remained. See also, J.M. o/b/o T.M. v. Board of Education of the Town of
Tinton Falls, Monmouth County, Comm’r Decision No. 39-14, (January 23, 2014),
https://www.nj.gov/education/legal/commissioner/ (finding that although the district no
longer 	employed 	the 	coach 	accused 	of 	HIB 	conduct, 	petitioner’s 	request 	for 	a
determination that the coach committed acts of HIB was not moot).
Similarly, in M.D.G. ex rel. C.J. v. Board of Education of Atlantic City, EDU 6450-
04, 	Initial 	Decision 	(April 	27, 	2005), 	adopted, 	Comm’r 	(May 	26, 	2005),
https://njlaw.rutgers.edu/collections/oal/, the ALJ concluded that a school board violated
the HIB statute in failing to investigate an incident of bullying properly. 	During the
appeal, the student was withdrawn from the school and enrolled in another school within
the same district. While the ALJ noted that “there is no immediate remedy readily
available to [the bullied student],” he ordered the board to comply with ABRA by
“conducting staff in-service programs" to assure that district's students "will be protected
from harassment, intimidation or bullying in the future.”
Although the District does not employ Coach Truppi and J.B. graduated for
NVRHS, these facts do not make the case moot. 	Whether petitioner’s son has
graduated from the District is not relevant to the issue of whether the alleged conduct
constituted 	HIB 	or 	whether 	the 	District 	followed 	NJDOE 	guidelines 	for 	HIB
determinations. Therefore, I CONCLUDE the issues, in this case, are not moot.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 04618-20
13
ABRA
The Legislature designed ABRA “to strengthen the standards and procedures for
preventing, 	reporting, 	investigating, 	and 	responding 	to 	incidents 	of 	harassment,
intimidation, and bullying of students that occur in school and off school premises.”
N.J.S.A. 18A:37-13.1(f).
Under the ABRA, “harassment, intimidation or bullying” (HIB) is defined as:
“Harassment, intimidation or bullying” means any gesture,
any 	written, 	verbal 	or 	physical 	act, 	or 	any 	electronic
communication, whether it be a single incident or a series of
incidents, that is reasonably perceived as being motivated
either by any actual or perceived characteristic, such as
race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, gender, sexual
orientation, gender identity and expression, or a mental,
physical or sensory disability, or by any other distinguishing
characteristic, that takes place on school property, at any
school-sponsored function, on a school bus, or off school
grounds as provided for in section 16 of P.L.2010, c.122
(C.18A:37-15.3), that substantially disrupts or interferes with
the orderly operation of the school or the rights of other
students and that:
a. 	a 	reasonable 	person 	should 	know, 	under 	the
circumstances, 	will 	have 	the 	effect 	of 	physically 	or
emotionally harming a student or damaging the student's
property, or placing a student in reasonable fear of physical
or emotional harm to his person or damage to his property;
b. has the effect of insulting or demeaning any student or
group of students; or
c. creates a hostile educational environment for the student
by interfering with a student’s education or by severely or

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 04618-20
14
pervasively 	causing 	physical 	or 	emotional 	harm 	to 	the
student.
[N.J.S.A. 18A:37-14]
As such, an incident must satisfy all four separate elements to meet the definition
of HIB under the ABRA. 	ABRA protects against HIBs directed at students regardless if
“such conduct emanates from students, teachers, or school administrators.” DeFalco v.
Bd. of Educ. of the Twp. of Hamilton, Mercer County, EDU 2365-18, Initial Decision
(June 25, 2019), adopted, Comm’r (July 26, 2019).
Each school district must adopt a HIB policy that meets minimum statutory
requirements but generally has “control over the content of the policy.” N.J.S.A. 18A:37-
15(a) and (b). The statutory requirements for a HIB policy include “a procedure for
prompt investigation of reports of violations and complaints.” N.J.S.A. 18A:37-15(b)(6).
Under this procedure, “the investigation shall be initiated by the principal or the
principal’s designee within one school day of the report of the incident and shall be
conducted 	by 	a 	school 	anti-bullying 	specialist,” 	and 	“[t]he 	investigation 	shall 	be
completed as soon as possible, but not later than 10 school days from the date of the
written report of the incident of [HIB].” N.J.S.A. 18A:37-15(b)(6)(a). The school anti-
bullying specialist reports the investigation results to the superintendent who, in turn,
must reports the results to the board of education “no later than the date of the board of
education 	meeting 	next 	following 	the 	completion 	of 	the 	investigation, 	along 	with
information on any services provided, training established, discipline imposed, or other
action taken or recommended by the superintendent.” N.J.S.A. 18A:37-15(b)(6)(b) and
(c).
If parents request and participate in a hearing before the board, the board must
issue a decision at the first meeting after its receipt of the investigation report. N.J.S.A.
18A:37-15(b)(6)(e). 	The 	board 	may 	affirm, 	reject, 	or 	modify 	the 	superintendent’s

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 04618-20
15
decision. 	Ibid. 	A 	parent 	or 	guardian 	may 	appeal 	the 	board’s 	decision 	to 	the
Commissioner. Ibid.
Petitioner bears the burden of proof by a preponderance of the credible. Atkinson
v. Parsekian, 37 N.J. 143, 149 (1962); DYFS v. M.R., 314 N.J. Super. 390, 414 (App.
Div. 1998); In re Allegations of Sexual Abuse at E. Park High Sch., 314 N.J. Super. 149,
168 (App. Div. 1998). This tribunal must decide in favor of the party on whose side the
weight of the evidence preponderates, and according to a reasonable probability of
truth. Jackson v. Del., Lackawanna and W. R.R., 111 N.J.L. 487, 490 (E.&A. 1933).
Evidence is said to preponderate “if it establishes ‘the reasonable probability of the
fact.’” Jaeger v. Elizabethtown Consol. Gas Co., 124 N.J.L. 420, 423 (Sup. Ct. 1940)
(citation omitted). The evidence must “be such as to lead a reasonably cautious mind to
the given conclusion.” Bornstein v. Metro. Bottling Co., 26 N.J. 263, 275 (1958).
Significantly, an action by a board of education “is entitled to a presumption of
correctness and will not be upset unless there is an affirmative showing that such
decision was arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable.” 	Thomas v. Morris Twp. Bd. of
Educ., 89 N.J. Super. 327, 332 (App. Div. 1965). The Commissioner will not substitute
his judgment for that of the board of education, whose exercise of its discretion may not
be disturbed unless shown to be “patently arbitrary, without rational basis or induced by
improper motives.” 	Kopera v. W. Orange Bd. of Educ., 60 N.J. Super. 288, 294 (App.
Div. 1960). Indeed, the Commissioner will not overturn a local board's decision in the
absence of a finding that the action below was arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable.
T.B.M. v. Moorestown Bd. of Educ., EDU 2780-07, Initial Decision (February 6, 2008),
http://njlaw.rutgers.edu/collections/oal/ (citing Thomas v. Morris Twp. Bd. of Educ., 89
N.J. Super. 327, 332 (App. Div. 1965), aff’d, 46 N.J. 581(1966)).
Our courts have held that “[w]here there is room for two opinions, action is not
arbitrary or capricious when exercised honestly and upon due consideration, even
though it may be believed that an erroneous conclusion has been reached.” Bayshore
Sewage Co. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 122 N.J. Super. 184, 199–200 (Ch. Div. 1973),

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 04618-20
16
aff’d, 131 N.J. Super. 37 (App. Div. 1974). Thus, to prevail, the petitioner must
demonstrate that the Board “acted in bad faith, or utter disregard of the circumstances
before it.” G.H. & E.H. ex rel. K.H. v. Bd. of Educ. of Franklin Lakes, EDU 13204-13,
Initial Decision (February 24, 2014), (citation omitted), adopted, Comm’r (April 10,
2014), www.njlaw.rutgers.edu/collections/oal/.
O’Malley, who has no stake in finding HIB, conducted a thorough investigation
but 	concluded 	that 	bullying 	was 	unsubstantiated 	against 	J.B. 	The 	superintendent
recommended this finding to the Board. 	J.B. and his parents appealed, and the Board
afforded a hearing but affirmed the conclusion that no HIB occurred. 	Thus, the Board
argues that it correctly followed all necessary procedures and determined that the
conduct described and investigated did not rise to a HIB.
Initially, to satisfy the statutory definition of HIB, the conduct must be “reasonably
perceived as being motivated either by any actual or perceived characteristic, such as
race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, gender, sexual orientation, gender identity
and 	expression, 	or 	a 	mental, 	physical 	or 	sensory 	disability, or 	by 	any 	other
distinguishing characteristic.” N.J.S.A. 18A:37-14 (emphasis added). Yet, “[t]he statute
has not limited ‘distinguishing characteristic’ to those specifically enumerated, but it has
consistently required such a perceived motivation.” K.L. v. Evesham Twp. Bd. of Educ.,
423 N.J. Super. 337, 351 (App. Div. 2011). “The Legislature intentionally included a very
open-ended phrase, ‘any other distinguishing characteristic,’ to signal that the Act would
apply to a broad, unlimited range of distinguishing characteristics, so long as the
distinguishing characteristic motivated the bully to harass the targeted student.” L.P.
and H.P. ex rel. L.P., EDU 04462-16, Initial Decision (June 10, 2016), adopted, Comm’r
(July 25, 2016), http://njlaw.rutgers.edu/collections/oal/.
As the court reiterated in Evesham, the offending conduct must be motivated by
a distinguishing characteristic for purposes of HIB. 	However, the statutory definition of
HIB “does not include all violent or aggressive conduct against a student,” but it has

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 04618-20
17
consistently required that the perceived motivation be a distinguishing characteristic. Id.
at 350–51. The court also provided a summation of what does not constitute HIB:
Thus, 	harmful 	or 	demeaning 	conduct 	motivated 	only 	by
another reason, for example, a dispute about relationships or
personal 	belongings, 	or 	aggressive 	conduct 	without
identifiable motivation, does not come within the statutory
definition of bullying.
[Id. at 351.]
The category “any other distinguishing characteristic” has been interpreted to
include 	a 	variety 	of 	traits. 	For 	example, 	appearance 	and 	body 	type 	may 	be
“distinguishing 	characteristics” 	under 	the 	HIB 	statute. 	See 	R.G.B. 	v. 	Village 	of
Ridgewood 	Board 	of 	Education, 	EDU 	14213-12, 	Initial 	Decision 	(May 	15,
2013), adopted, 	Comm’r 	(June 	24, 	2013), 	http://njlaw.rutgers.edu/collections/oal/
(finding a HIB violation occurred when a student called another student a “horse” and a
“fat-ass” because it was reasonable to perceive those comments as motivated by the
“distinguishing characteristic” of appearance or body-type). Similarly, in C.C. ex rel. S.C.
v. Board of Education of Jefferson, EDU 10872-14, Initial Decision (April 6, 2015),
http://njlaw.rutgers.edu/collections/oal/, adopted, 	Comm’r 	(May 	12, 	2015),
http://www.nj.gov/education/legal/, a 	student’s 	comments 	that 	another 	student 	was
“short” and “sucks at basketball” constituted HIB because it was reasonable to perceive
those comments as motivated by the “distinguishing characteristic[s]” of height and
sports proficiency.
Still, a “distinguishing characteristic” must be the motivation for the alleged
bullying, even when the alleged bully is a teacher, coach, or staff member. In M.R. ex
rel. M.R. v. Bd. of Educ. of the Ramapo Indian Hills Regional Sch. Distr., EDU 05308-
16, Initial Decision (November 7, 2016), modified in part, Comm’r (December 21, 2016),
http://njlaw.rutgers.edu/collections/oal/, a parent alleged that his daughter and three
other cheerleaders were bullied by their cheerleading coach. The alleged HIB stemmed
from an incident in which the cheerleader sent a text message to her coach stating that

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 04618-20
18
she would be unable to attend the night’s basketball game because she had other
plans. In turn, the coach responded with a “strong bullying tone” informing her that she
and any other cheerleader who missed the game would be off the team. 	The HIB
investigation concluded that the coach did not engage in HIB against the cheerleader,
and the board affirmed the findings. 	Importantly, no evidence supported that the
coach’s 	alleged 	actions' 	motivation 	was 	a 	distinguishing 	characteristic 	of 	the
cheerleader.
Petitioner maintains that the question here is not whether the Board acted in an
arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable manner. Instead, petitioner asserts the central issue
is that the District did not follow the 2016 Annual Report of the New Jersey Anti-Bullying
Task Force (ABTF). Specifically, petitioner contends that the 2016 ABTF reiterated
conclusions of the 2014 ABTF that addressed the broadness of the term “any other
distinguishing characteristic” noting,
By 	adding, 	‘any 	other 	distinguishing 	characteristic,’ 	the
Legislature’s intent was clearly not to limit HIB to an incident
that takes place because the HIB target has one of the
specified characteristics. By viewing alleged HIB incidents
through the lens of power differential, practitioners will be
better able to identify those distinguishing characteristics that
are less obvious and emerge only when considering the
relative positions of the aggressor and the target, in terms of
popularity, social standing, social awkwardness, or other less
tangible characteristics.”
[Ibid.]
No statutory amendment incorporated the ABTF recommendations or inclusion of
language addressing an “imbalance of power” or similar terms. Indeed, the last revision
to ABRA occurred in 2012. 	See P.L.2012, c.15.The NJDOE published no formal
guidance for schools or practitioners relating to the 2016 ABTF recommendation and
last issued “Guidance to Schools on Implementing ABRA”6 in 2011.
5 https://www.njleg.state.nj.us/2012/Bills/PL12/1
6 https://www.nj.gov/education/students/safety/behavior/hib/guidance.pdf

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 04618-20
19
Significantly, the alleged failure to follow recommendations of the ABTF does not
provide a separate cause of action or an issue appealable to the Commissioner.
Indeed, petitioner cites no Policy provision that is contrary to the law or that the Policy
does not include all items required under the ABRA, as enacted. 	Notably, the Policy
includes a HIB definition explaining that “bullying is unwanted, aggressive behavior that
may involve a real or perceived power imbalance.” (emphasis added). The Policy also
defines HIB mirroring the ABRA as an incident or incidents “reasonably perceived as
being 	motivated 	either 	by 	any 	actual 	or 	perceived 	characteristic” 	to 	include
“distinguishing characteristics” not covered by delineated traits. 	Petitioner suggests the
Policy does not have distinct repercussions for those staff members committing HIB
violations 	and 	the 	uneven 	relationship 	between 	staff 	members 	and 	students 	is
insufficiently covered. 	However, the Policy includes all items required under N.J.S.A.
18A:37-15b, and identifies consequences for HIB violations. The Policy also advises
staff members that “consequences and remedial action” could entail discipline. 	Thus, I
CONCLUDE that failing to follow the ABTF does not provide a basis for appeal in this
forum, and no evidence supports that the Policy fails to include required provisions.
Petitioner suggests that the investigator and the Board did not review the alleged
HIB incidents “through the lens [of the] power differential.” Further, the investigator was
unable to identify those distinguishing characteristics of J.B. Had O’Malley followed the
ABTF guidelines requiring him to view the “relative positions of the aggressor and the
target,” J.B.’s distinguishing characteristics would be evident.
Yet, 	O’Malley’s 	report 	did 	not 	conclude 	that 	J.B. 	was 	not 	“committed 	to
academics” or that he did not have a distinguishing characteristic worthy of protection.
Instead, there was insufficient evidence that J.B. was the victim of an alleged HIB
because he was committed to academics or intellectual. 	Under ABRA, the misconduct
must be “reasonably perceived as being motivated either by any actual or perceived
characteristic" to qualify as a HIB violation. N.J.S.A. 18A:37-14. (emphasis added).

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 04618-20
20
A careful review of the incidents does not reveal that Coach Truppi targeted J.B.
for his academic commitment. 	Undeniably, Coach Truppi felt the players should make
the team and the team’s success their most important responsibility and was aggressive
in his tactics to motivate the team. 	He discouraged any player missing practices,
“focused on the negatives,” and this “undermine[d] the trust and confidence the players
have in Coach Truppi as well as the team environment and culture.” In other words, his
questionable treatment of the players was largely universal. 	Still, since the incidents
complained 	of 	do 	not 	support 	that 	Coach 	Truppi 	targeted 	J.B. 	because 	of 	his
commitment to academics, I CONCLUDE that a preponderance of the evidence does
not exist that Coach Truppi committed a HIB violation against J.B. 	Moreover, having
determined that Coach Truppi did not commit a HIB against J.B., the Board was not
required to impose discipline.
Petitioner also argues that J.B.’s status as a student might be considered a
second “distinguishing characteristic” under ABRA. Petitioner suggests that as an adult
coach, Coach Truppi was “in a position of power using his authority control to harass,
haze, and bully a subordinate student under his care.”
Yet, ABRA only applies to HIB committed against students; its intention is not to
address HIB committed against adults. If status as a student alone were sufficient to
substantiate 	an 	HIB 	finding, 	the 	additional 	requirement 	that 	the 	misconduct 	be
motivated by a “distinguishing characteristic” would be superfluous. Undeniably, ABRA
requires something more.
For example, in Elrhard v. Bd. of Educ. of the Hunterdon Central Regional Sch.
Dist., 	EDU 	00188-14, 	Initial 	Decision 	(September 	28, 	2017), 	adopted, 	Comm’r
(December 21, 2017), http://njlaw.rutgers.edu/collections/oal/, the alleged acts by the
baseball Coaches included “unfair playing time, favoritism, profanity, and being too hard
on the players.” Moreover, the Coaches purportedly threatened to demote the player to
the junior-varsity team and guilted the player into coming to practice during a family
vacation. Yet, there was no link between the alleged conduct and the distinguishing
characteristic of weakness or meekness to demonstrate that the actions were motivated

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 04618-20
21
by said characteristic, as required under ABRA. 	The Commissioner also agreed that
the distinguishing characteristic under ABRA must be more specific than merely the
imbalance of power that exists by nature of the position of an adult teacher or Coach
and the minor child. 	Indeed, not all aggressive, harmful, or demeaning conduct
constitutes a HIB. 	Evesham, 423 N.J. Super. at 351. 	Thus, I CONCLUDE that J.B.’s
status as a student alone is not a distinguishing characteristic under ABRA. Therefore, I
CONCLUDE that the Board and District did not act in an arbitrary, capricious, or
unreasonable manner in finding that no HIB occurred against J.B. and that, as a matter
of law, summary judgment is appropriate in their favor.
ORDER
Given my findings of fact and conclusions of law, I ORDER that the District be
GRANTED summary decision, and that the Petition of Appeal be DISMISSED.
I 	hereby 	FILE 	this 	initial 	decision 	with 	the 	COMMISSIONER 	OF 	THE
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION for consideration.
This recommended decision may be adopted, modified, or rejected by the
COMMISSIONER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, who by law is authorized
to make a final decision in this matter. 	If the Commissioner of the Department of
Education does not adopt, modify, or reject this decision within forty-five days and
unless such time limit is otherwise extended, this recommended decision shall become
a final decision in accordance with N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 04618-20
22
Within thirteen days from the date on which this recommended decision was
mailed to the parties, any party may file written exceptions with the COMMISSIONER
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, ATTN: 	BUREAU OF CONTROVERSIES
AND DISPUTES, 100 Riverview Plaza, 4th Floor, PO Box 500, Trenton, New Jersey
08625-0500, marked “Attention: Exceptions.” A copy of any exceptions must be sent to
the judge and to the other parties.
March 8, 2021
DATE 	NANCI G. STOKES, ALJ
Date Received at Agency: 	March 8, 2021
Date Mailed to Parties: 	March 8, 2021
ljb
.