April 6, 2020- State of New Mexico v. Joseph Kanizar, No. A-1-CA-37469

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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO
Court of Appeals of New Mexico
STATE OF NEW MEXICO, ML 9:40 AM
we es
Plaintiff-Appellee, Fe
Mark Reynolds

V. No. A-1-CA-37469
JOSEPH KANIZAR,

Defendant-Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF SAN JUAN COUNTY

Karen L. Townsend, District Judge
Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General
Santa Fe, NM
John Kloss, Assistant Attorney General
Albuquerque, NM
for Appellee
Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender
Gregory B. Dawkins, Assistant Appellate Defender
Santa Fe, NM
for Appellant
MEMORANDUM OPINION
BOGARDJUS, Judge.
(43 Following his conditional, no contest plea to aggravated driving under the

influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs (DUI), NMSA 1978, § 66-8-102(D)(1)

(2016), Defendant Joseph Kanizar appeals the district court’s denial of his motion

2
to suppress evidence of his intoxication collected during a traffic stop. Defendant	1
argues that the traffic stop violated his right to protection from an unreasonable	2
seizure under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and its	3
corollary, Article II, Section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution. We affirm.	4
BACKGROUND	5
{2} 	Officer Hunter Weaver was patrolling the streets of Farmington, New Mexico	6
after midnight when he began following a car driven by Defendant. Defendant was	7
driving toward an intersection and from there turned right. Officer Weaver observed	8
what he believed were three traffic violations committed by Defendant: coming to a	9
stop on the crosswalk at the intersection; not turning as close as practicable to the	10
right-hand curb; and, after the turn, straddling the left-side, solid line of the middle	11
lane. 	Seeing 	this, 	Officer 	Weaver 	pulled 	Defendant 	over. 	Officer 	Weaver	12
approached Defendant’s passenger side initially. When the passenger opened the	13
door, Officer Weaver was “overcome with the odor of alcoholic beverages” coming	14
from the cab. Defendant then submitted to field sobriety tests, and Officer Weaver	15
arrested him for DUI.	16
{3} 	In addition to aggravated DUI, the State charged Defendant with committing	17
the first two traffic violations Officer Weaver observed: failing to stop or yield at an	18
intersection, contrary to NMSA 1978, Section 66-7-345(D) (2003), and improper	19
turning at an intersection, contrary to NMSA 1978, Section 66-7-322(A) (1978).	20

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{4} 	Defendant moved to suppress the evidence leading to the DUI charge, arguing	1
that he did not commit the traffic violations. Without reasonable suspicion for the	2
stop, he said, it was illegal, and so the evidence resulting from it could not be used	3
against him.	4
{5} 	The district court held a hearing on the motion. Officer Weaver testified at the	5
hearing, and a video recording of the incident taken from his patrol car’s dash camera	6
was played. The court withheld its decision until after the hearing, but ultimately	7
denied the motion.	8
DISCUSSION	9
{6} 	The denial of a motion to suppress presents us with a mixed question of fact	10
and law. 	State v. Martinez, 2018-NMSC-007, ¶ 8, 410 P.3d 186. Regarding	11
questions of fact, we defer to the district court’s factual findings, viewing them in	12
the light most favorable to the prevailing party, and upholding them if they are	13
supported by substantial evidence. See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 3, 8. “Substantial evidence is	14
relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a	15
conclusion.” 	State v. Grubb, 2020-NMCA-003, ¶ 18, 455 P.3d 877 (internal	16
quotation marks and citation omitted). Where, as here, a district court in a	17
suppression hearing receives evidence in the form of both witness testimony and	18
video, “we must review the totality of the circumstances and must avoid reweighing	19
individual factors in isolation.” Martinez, 2018-NMSC-007, ¶ 12.	20

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{7} 	We then review the application of the law to the facts supported by substantial	1
evidence de novo—in this case by “making a de novo determination of the	2
constitutional reasonableness of the . . . seizure.” Id. ¶ 8 (internal quotation marks	3
and citation omitted). We note, as relevant here, that there is no Fourth Amendment	4
or Article II, Section 101 violation when a police officer stops a driver whom the	5
officer reasonably suspects has violated a traffic law. See id. ¶¶ 10-11; see also State	6
v. Farish, 2018-NMCA-003, ¶ 16, 410 P.3d 239 (“Our obligation as a reviewing	7
court is to objectively judge the circumstances known to the officer to determine	8
whether from the circumstances a reasonable person would believe that criminal	9
activity occurred or was occurring.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).	10
{8} 	On appeal, Defendant maintains that the evidence does not show that he	11
committed any of the traffic violations that Officer Weaver allegedly witnessed and	12
which served as the basis for the stop. Defendant also takes issue with the legal	13
conclusion—that the stop was supported by reasonable suspicion of impairment—	14
drawn by the district court in its order denying the motion. The district court found	15
as follows.	16
[U]nder 	the 	totality 	of 	the 	circumstances 	Officer 	Weaver 	had	17
reasonable suspicion to stop . . . Defendant’s vehicle. Officer Weaver	18
1Although Defendant cites Article II, Section 10, he does not argue that “the
New Mexico Constitution . . . require[s] more than a reasonable suspicion that the
law is being or has been broken to conduct a temporary, investigatory traffic stop[,]”
nor has our Constitution been interpreted to require such. Martinez, 2018-NMSC-
007, ¶ 10 n.1 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

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observed, and the video of the incident confirms, that . . . Defendant	1
made a wide turn after leaving an intersection. Accordingly, it is	2
presumed that the tires cross over or straddle the double yellow line	3
painted on the roadway. The observed violation, in addition to the other	4
driving behavior observed by the officer, provided Officer Weaver with	5
reasonable suspicion that the driver of the vehicle was impaired. The	6
reasonable 	suspicion 	for 	the 	stop 	is 	a 	reasonable 	suspicion 	of	7
impairment, not because the officer observed three distinct crimes in	8
the officer’s presence.	9
Aside from contesting the evidence of traffic violations, Defendant argues that the	10
district court could not have found that Officer Weaver had reasonable suspicion of	11
impairment. That is, Defendant argues, if he did not commit the traffic violations	12
and otherwise did not drive in a way indicating impairment, then the court could not	13
have found reasonable suspicion to justify the stop.	14
{9} 	Before we reach the merits of Defendant’s first argument—that he committed	15
no traffic violation, we address his second argument—that the district court’s	16
reasonable suspicion of impairment conclusion was error. We need not consider	17
whether the evidence and law support the conclusion that there was reasonable	18
suspicion Defendant was committing DUI, an explanation not given by Officer	19
Weaver. This is because we uphold the district court’s ruling on alternative	20
grounds—i.e., that Officer Weaver had reasonable suspicion Defendant committed	21
a traffic violation. Cf. Farish, 2018-NMCA-003, ¶¶ 5, 16, 19 (holding that, under	22
the right for any reason doctrine, the defendant’s traffic stop was justified on a	23
statutory basis different from that relied on by the district court). There being	24

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reasonable suspicion to support the initial stop, and Defendant making no claim that	1
the scope of the stop was unreasonably expanded into a DUI investigation, our	2
analysis is complete and we need not evaluate the district court’s conclusion that	3
there was reasonable suspicion of impairment. See State v. Neal, 2007-NMSC-043,	4
¶ 20, 142 N.M. 176, 164 P.3d 57 (observing that “a police officer making a lawful	5
stop may conduct an investigation reasonably related to the circumstances that gave	6
rise to the officer's reasons for the stop” and “[t]he officer may expand this	7
investigation if the officer has reasonable and articulable suspicion that other	8
criminal activity has been or may be afoot” (internal quotation marks and citation	9
omitted)).	10
{10} 	Having reviewed Officer Weaver’s testimony and the dash camera video, we	11
conclude that substantial evidence supports the finding that Defendant violated at	12
least one traffic law. Specifically, the evidence is sufficient to support the district	13
court’s finding that “Officer Weaver observed, and the video of the incident	14
confirms, that . . . Defendant made a wide turn after leaving an intersection[,]” a turn	15
that constituted a violation of Section 66-7-322.	16
{11} 	Section 66-7-322(A) requires a driver intending to turn at an intersection, both	17
on approach for the turn and in making the turn, to keep “as close as practicable to	18
the right-hand curb or edge of the roadway[.]” Defendant argues he did this. He	19
reasons as follows: the dash camera did not pick up the turn (and so it cannot be	20

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relied on for evidence to disprove Defendant’s allegation); the turn “may have been	1
necessarily wide[] as a matter of physics”; and there were discrepancies in Officer	2
Weaver’s subsequent testimony about Defendant’s straddling the solid line (and so	3
his testimony about the turn should not be believed).	4
{12} 	Defendant’s arguments falter, and the district court’s finding prevails, for the	5
following reasons. First, as Defendant acknowledges, the video does not capture the	6
full turn. Its utility to Defendant is thus negligible at best. The video essentially	7
would 	have 	to 	“squarely 	contradict[]” 	Officer 	Weaver’s 	testimony 	for 	it 	to	8
undermine the district court’s finding, see Martinez, 2018-NMSC-007, ¶¶ 16-17,	9
and it does not.	10
{13} 	Second, to the extent that Defendant tries to defeat this testimony by offering	11
explanations why the turn was necessarily wide and offering reasons Officer Weaver	12
should not be believed, we disregard Defendant’s pleas. Inferences and evidence	13
contrary to the district court’s finding have no place in our analysis. See id. ¶ 15.	14
{14} 	Last, and importantly, Officer Weaver supplied substantial evidence that	15
Defendant’s turn was wider than necessary. He testified at the hearing that he pulled	16
Defendant over for, among other reasons, “making a wide right-hand turn.” He	17
added that the turn was “far from” being as close to the curb as possible, that he	18
recalled no observable reason to make such a wide turn, that Defendant’s car	19
straddled the solid line of the middle lane after the turn, and that when he made the	20

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same turn, he was able to avoid such straddling and maintain his lane. We credit this	1
testimony, since it supports the district court’s conclusion that Defendant violated	2
Section 66-7-322(A). See Martinez, 2018-NMSC-007, ¶ 15 (presuming that the	3
district court, which found reasonable suspicion for a traffic violation-based stop,	4
credited an officer’s testimony that the defendant committed the violation).	5
{15} 	All in all, Officer Weaver’s testimony provides substantial evidence that	6
Defendant’s turn was not as close as practicable to the right-hand curb. We therefore	7
accept the district court’s finding that Defendant was seen to have committed a	8
traffic violation. The violation gave Officer Weaver reasonable suspicion to pull	9
Defendant over, and so the stop was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment and	10
Article II, Section 10. Accordingly, the district court’s denial of Defendant’s	11
suppression motion was proper.	12
CONCLUSION	13
{16} 	We affirm.	14
{17} 	IT IS SO ORDERED.	15
_________________________________	16
KRISTINA BOGARDUS, Judge	17

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WE CONCUR:
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Conle 4. Vargas
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JULIE J. VARGAS, Judge
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SALA2
JENNIFER L. ATTREP, Judge
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