May 20, 2019- CYFD v. Juan R., No. A-1-CA-37933

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Court of Appeals of New Mexico
Filed jo 9:01 AM

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STATE OF NEW MEXICO, ex rel.

CUT NnADAEAN VOT RWARATLIT

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| IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO | ~~.

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CHILUREIN, PUUTE & PAIVIIRIBS

DEPARTMENT,

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Petitioner-Appellee,

v. | No. A-1-CA-37933

JUAN R.,

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Respondent-Appellant,

and

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IN THE MATTER OF JACOB R.,

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Child.

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF LEA COUNTY

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Lee A. Kirksey, District Judge

Children, Youth & Families Department

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Rebecca J. Liggett, Chief Children’s Court Attorney
Santa Fe, NM
Kelly P. O’Neill, Children’s Court Attorney

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Albuquerque, NM

for Appellee

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The Law Offices of Nancy L. Simmons, P.C.
Nancy L. Simmons

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Albuquerque, NM

for Appellant

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MEMORANDUM OPINION
M. ZAMORA, Chief Judge.
{13 Respondent appeals from a district court judgment terminating his parental

rights to his young child. We -issued a calendar notice proposing to affirm.
Respondent has responded with a memorandum opinion. We affirm.

23 Respondent Juan R. continues to chalienge the sufficiency of the evidence to
support the termination of his parental rights to Jacob R. (Child). [MIO 1] In
reviewing the termination of Respondent’s parental rights, “Twle must determine
whether substantial evidence supports the trial court’s decision.” State ex rel.
Children, Youth & Families Dep’t v. Patricia H.,2002-NMCA-061, 421, 132 N.M.
299, 47 P.3d 859. “Substantial evidence is relevant evidence that a reasonable mind

would accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” /d. § 22 (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted). “Our role is to determine whether the fact[-]finder could
properly conclude that the proof requirement below was met.” Id. In doing so, we do
not reweigh the evidence or substitute our judgment for that of the district court on

factual matters or on matters of credibility; rather, we view the evidence in the light

most favorable to the district court’s judgment in determining whether the State has

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met the clear and convincing standard. See State ex rel. Children, Youth & Families
Dep't v. Vanessa C., 2000-NMCA-025, § 24, 128 N.M. 701, 997 P.2d 833.

3} In considering a neglect basis for termination, the district court determines

adjusted and will not in the foreseeable future cure the conditions that disable him or
her from properly caring for the child, despite reasonable efforts from the State
toward reunification of the family. See State ex rel. Children, Youth & Families Dep t
v. Mafin M., 2003-NMSC-015, q 13, 133 N.M. 827, 70 P.3d 1266; see also NMSA
1978, § 32A-4-28(B)(2) (2005). The district court’s decision to terminate parental
rights focuses primarily upon “ ‘the physical, mental and emotional welfare and needs
of the children, including the likelihood of the children being adopted.’ ” Vanessa C.,
2000-NMCA-025, § 24 (alteration omitted) (quoting § 32A-4-28(A)).

4) Here, Defendant continues to argue that Children, Youth and Families
Department (CYFD) did not take enough time to address his drug addiction and
parenting skills. [MIO 5] We conclude that the record and the district court’s findings
of fact and conclusions of law indicate that CYFD presented sufficient evidence that
the underlying conditions of neglect would not change in the foreseeable .future,
despite its reasonable efforts. [RP 160] Specifically, Child was born on October 25,

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2017, and was nine months old at the time of the termination hearing. [RP 161] Bot

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positive for benzos and opiods at birth. [RP 162] Child remained in intensive care

until December 30, 2017, and CYFD obtained custody in the interim. [RP 6, 162]

determination was entered [RP 68], and a treatment plan was established. [RP 163]

Respondent was instructed to get a psychological evaluation, participate in drug

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testing, and attend individual counseling and parenting classes; he did none of these.
[RP 163] Respondent informed CYFD that because of work he did not have time to |
participate in urinalysis testing or to visit Child. [RP 163] Respondent was ordered
to cooperate with CYFD so that his work schedule did not conflict with his treatment
obligations. [RP 113] Despite testifying that he had control over his work schedule,
Respondent made no efforts to comply with this earlier order. [RP 165] The
termination hearing was in July, and Respondent had not visited Child since February
or March. [RP 163] Although Respondent testified that he did not participate in most
of this treatment, he claimed CYFD did not tell him where to go; he also claimed that
he participated in half the parenting plan, although he provided no proof. [RP 164-65]
The district court, sitting as fact-finder, could reject this testimony. See Skeen v.

Boyles, 2009-NMCA-080, § 37, 146 N.M. 627, 213 P.3d 531 (stating that, when the

district court hears conflicting evidence, “we defer to its determinations of ultimate

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Civen Recnandent’s lack afnarticination we helieve that there were cifficien
{5} Given Responaent’s lack Of participation, we velieve that tnere were suilicient

grounds to conclude that the causes and conditions of the underlying abuse and
neglect would be cured in the foreseeable future. See In re Termination of Parental
Rights of Reuben & Elizabeth O., 1986-NMCA-031,
844 (interpreting the term “foreseeable future” to refer to corrective change at a

“reasonably definite time or within the near future”).

{6} For the reasons set forth above, we affirm.

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ICA ZAMOR(, Qhief Judge

1}. ITISSO ORDERED.

WE CONCUR:

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JU 7 J. VARGAS, Ju