January 21, 2020- Leo L. Padilla v. Coreslab Structures, No. A-1-CA-36776

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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO
Court of Appeals of New Mexico

LEO L. PADILLA, We: 9:14 AM
Worker- Appellant, ~fe4
Ppel Mark Reynolds

v. No. A-1-CA-36776

CORESLAB STRUCTURES and
VALLEY FORGE INSURANCE
COMPANY,

Employer/Insurer-A ppellees.

APPEAL FROM THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION ADMINISTRATION
Reg C. Woodard, Workers’ Compensation J udge

Patrick Larkin Fogel
Albuquerque, NM

for Appellant

Elmore Law, LLC
Christopher T. Elmore

Albuquerque, NM
for Appellees
MEMORANDUM OPINION
M. ZAMORA, J udge.
41} Worker Leo L. Padilla filed for workers’ compensation benefits following a

work-related accident while employed with Coreslab Structures Inc. (Employer). The

workers’ compensation judge (WCJ) granted Worker temporary total disability

2
(TTD) benefits from October 4, 2011 to February 2, 2012 for his right shoulder, but	1
denied benefits for any other alleged injury. The WCJ also denied Worker any	2
permanent partial disability (PPD) benefits. Worker appeals the WCJ’s order,	3
contending that it is not supported by substantial evidence and that the WCJ	4
misapplied the law. We affirm.	5
BACKGROUND	6
{2} 	On October 4, 2011, Worker was injured when he fell off a scaffold while	7
acting within the course and scope of his employment with Employer. Worker filed	8
for workers’ compensation benefits. The parties do not dispute the accident itself, but	9
rather dispute the nature, extent, and causation of Worker’s alleged injuries. The	10
parties waived trial on the merits and agreed that the WCJ would adjudicate the case	11
on the previously admitted evidence and evidence presented through the addendum	12
to the pre-trial order.	13
{3} 	On appeal, Worker’s arguments can be categorized into three points of error:	14
(1) substantial evidence does not exist to support the WCJ’s finding that the right	15
shoulder was the sole compensable injury because there are other compensable	16
injuries; (2) the WCJ failed to apply the correct legal standard in determining whether	17
to award medical benefits; and (3) the WCJ failed to apply the correct legal standard	18
in determining whether to award PPD benefits. We address each issue in turn.1
19
1 Worker raises many new arguments for the first time in his reply brief, which

3
DISCUSSION	1
{4} 	We review workers’ compensation claims under a whole record standard of	2
review by determining whether substantial evidence in the record as a whole supports	3
the WCJ’s conclusion. See Dewitt v. Rent-A-Center, Inc., 2009-NMSC-032, ¶ 12, 146	4
N.M. 453, 212 P.3d 341. Substantial evidence is credible evidence in light of the	5
whole record “that is sufficient for a reasonable mind to accept as adequate to support	6
the conclusion[.]” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). We give	7
deference to the WCJ as fact-finder and view the evidence in the light most favorable	8
to the decision without disregarding contravening evidence. Id.	9
{5} 	“While we generally may not weigh the evidence, even under whole record	10
review, such review allows the reviewing court greater latitude to determine whether	11
a finding of fact was reasonable based on the evidence.” Maez v. Riley Indus., 2015-	12
NMCA-049, ¶ 10, 347 P.3d 732 (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation	13
omitted). Such review “has even greater latitude when reviewing an issue for which	14
the evidence is documentary in nature.” Id. As in this case, “when all or substantially	15
all of the evidence on a material issue is documentary or by deposition, an appellate	16
court may examine and weigh it.” Id. (alteration, internal quotation marks, and	17
we do not address. See Mitchell-Carr v. McLendon, 1999-NMSC-025, ¶ 29, 127 N.M.
282, 980 P.2d 65 (stating that, generally, the Court will not consider an argument
raised for the first time in a reply brief, unless it is directed to new arguments or
authorities presented in the answer brief).

4
citation omitted). That is because “[w]here the issue to be determined rests upon	1
interpretation of documentary evidence, [appellate courts are] in as good a position as	2
the trial court to determine the facts and draw [their] own conclusions.” Flemma v.	3
Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc., 2013-NMSC-022, ¶ 13, 303 P.3d 814 (internal	4
quotation marks and citation omitted); see Pena v. Westland Dev. Co., 1988-NMCA-	5
052, ¶ 34, 107 N.M. 560, 761 P.2d 438 (explaining that ordinarily the district court is	6
the “proper arbiter of the credibility of witnesses and the testimony,” except where	7
the testimony is by deposition, in which case this Court may evaluate testimony and	8
credibility). Still, we will not disturb the WCJ’s findings unless they are “manifestly	9
wrong or clearly opposed to the evidence.” Maez, 2015-NMCA-049, ¶ 10 (internal	10
quotation marks and citation omitted).	11
{6} 	Here, the WCJ found that Worker is entitled to TTD benefits for his right	12
shoulder injury from October 4, 2011 until February 2, 2012, the date of Dr. Reeve’s	13
finding of Medical Maximum Improvement (MMI). 2 The WCJ also found that	14
Worker is not entitled to PPD benefits following February 2, 2012, seemingly also	15
2 We note some discrepancy in the record regarding the date of MMI. Dr.
Reeve’s report and deposition state that he found Worker at MMI on February 17,
2012. The WCJ’s order bases its finding on MMI on Dr. Reeve’s recommendation,
but states the date is February 2, 2012. We also note that Worker seeks medical
treatment after February 2, 2012, but the pre-trial order states that the parties
stipulated that Worker was paid indemnity benefits from October 2, 2011 to February
15, 2012. In any event, Worker does not challenge this discrepancy and the dates do
not affect our analysis.

5
based at least in part on Dr. Reeve’s assessment. Further, the WCJ concluded that	1
“Worker’s established lack of credibility irreversibly taints any medical testimony in	2
support of medical benefits by health care providers following February 2, 2012.” The	3
WCJ determined that medical care Worker sought after February 2, 2012, was “based	4
in large part [] upon false, inaccurate[,] and exaggerated medical claims.” Ultimately,	5
the WCJ determined that Worker failed to meet his burden of proof by credible	6
medical testimony that he has a permanent impairment as a result of the October 4,	7
2011 accident, and as a consequence, Worker is not entitled to PPD benefits.	8
{7} 	We first address whether there was substantial evidence to support the WCJ’s	9
finding that the right shoulder was the sole compensable injury. Concluding that there	10
is substantial evidence that the right shoulder is the only compensable injury, we	11
review whether the WCJ misapplied the law when it did not grant Worker medical	12
benefits after February 2, 2012, and PPD benefits for the right shoulder.	13
I. 	Substantial 	Evidence 	Supports 	the 	WCJ’s 	Finding 	That 	the 	Right	14
Shoulder is the Sole Compensable Injury	15
{8} 	In order to receive benefits under the Workers’ Compensation Act (the Act),	16
NMSA 1978, §§ 52-1-1 to -70 (1929, as amended through 2017), a worker must	17
“sustain[ 	] 	an 	accidental 	injury 	arising 	out 	of 	and 	in 	the 	course 	of 	his	18
employment[.]” 	Section 52-1-28(A)(1). In cases where the employer disputes a	19
causal connection between the accident and disability, Section 52-1-28(B) requires	20
the worker to establish causation “as a probability by expert testimony of a health care	21

6
provider.” “The testimony of a qualified health care provider must establish, to a	1
reasonable medical probability, that a causal relationship exists between the accident	2
and disability.” Trujillo v. Los Alamos Nat’l Lab., 2016-NMCA-041, ¶ 17, 368 P.3d	3
1259. The language required to convey a reasonable medical probability “need not	4
[be offered] in positive, dogmatic language or in the exact language of the statute[,]”	5
but it must permit “a reasonable inference that the disability is the natural and direct	6
result, as a medical probability, of the accident.” Gammon v. Ebasco Corp., 1965-	7
NMSC-015, ¶¶ 22-23, 74 N.M. 789, 399 P.2d 279. “Causation exists within a	8
reasonable medical probability when a qualified medical expert testifies as to his	9
opinion 	concerning 	causation 	and, 	in 	the 	absence 	of 	other 	reasonable 	causal	10
explanations, it becomes more likely than not that the injury was a result of its	11
action.” Sanchez v. Molycorp, Inc., 1985-NMCA-067, ¶ 16, 103 N.M. 148, 703 P.2d	12
925.	13
{9} 	“While Sections 52-1-28(A)(3) and (B) appear to require a single causation	14
analysis (between the accident and the disability), embedded within that analysis is	15
the requirement that there be an injury that is causally connected to both the accident	16
and the disability.” Molinar v. Larry Reetz Constr., Ltd., 2018-NMCA-011, ¶ 21, 409	17
P.3d 	956, 	cert. 	denied, 	2018-NMCERT-___ 	(No. 	S-1-SC-36739, 	Dec. 	2017).	18
“Thus, Section 52-1-28 must be understood as requiring the worker to establish that	19
(1) a work-related accident caused an injury or injuries, and (2) the injury resulted in	20

7
disability.” Id. In this case, we are focused on the first requirement—whether the	1
work-related accident caused each of Worker’s claimed injuries.	2
{10} 	The WCJ found the right shoulder to be the only compensable injury. On	3
appeal, Worker argues that substantial evidence does not exist to support this finding	4
that the right shoulder was the sole compensable injury. We understand Worker’s	5
argument on appeal to be that there was substantial evidence that Worker sustained	6
other compensable injuries to his “neck, both shoulders, low back, left wrist, left hip,	7
brain, left eye, vestibular system[,] and both knees.” Thus, we turn to whether Worker	8
established a causal connection between the accident and his injuries. See Molinar,	9
2018-NMCA-011, ¶ 21 (“Where a worker sustains multiple injuries as a result of one	10
accident, a causal connection between the accident and 	each 	injury must be	11
established in order for the injury to be compensable.” (emphasis added)).	12
{11} 	Dr. Reeve, board certified in physical medicine and one of Worker’s treating	13
physicians, first saw Worker on October 17, 2011. Dr. Reeve examined Worker and	14
concluded 	Worker suffered 	a closed-head 	trauma resulting in 	post-concussive	15
syndrome. Based on this initial examination, Dr. Reeve ordered MRIs of Worker’s	16
hip, 	shoulder, 	head, 	cervical 	spine, 	and 	lumbar 	spine, 	and 	requested 	a	17
neuropsychologic evaluation with Dr. Chiulli for cognitive deficits. Dr. Reeve	18
testified to the results of the MRIs. The left shoulder MRI showed tendinitis with a	19
full thickness tear in the supraspinatus, but no muscle atrophy. The right shoulder	20

8
MRI showed “severe AC arthrosis with periarticular osteopenia, pericapsular edema,	1
soft swelling, subscapularis tendinopathy, a longitudinal interstitial split tear, and	2
medially perched, long head biceps tendon, and . . . a split tendon tear in the long head	3
of the biceps.” After reviewing the MRI of both shoulders, Dr. Reeve believed within	4
a reasonable degree of medical probability that Worker had bilateral rotator cuff tears	5
and would need to see a shoulder specialist. Dr. Reeve related the right shoulder	6
conditions to the October 4, 2011 accident. The MRI of the low back gave Dr. Reeve	7
the 	impression 	that 	Worker 	had 	radiculopathy 	with 	probable 	S1 	nerve 	root	8
compression which he also found on the physical exam. Dr. Reeve testified that the	9
anterolisthesis with the defect was related to the October 4, 2011 accident. After	10
reviewing the MRI of the cervical spine, Dr. Reeve believed Worker had suffered a	11
disc herniation with stenosis, and stenosis with ventral cord impingement which	12
probably resulted in radiculopathy. Dr. Reeve testified he believed those conditions	13
to be related to the October 4, 2011 accident. Dr. Reeve testified that the MRI of the	14
left knee showed degenerative conditions and fraying of the meniscus that may have	15
been work-related and may have been due to the accident. Dr. Reeve opined that he	16
did not see anything in the hip MRI that he could directly relate to the fall except for	17
stress reaction at the left SI joint. Regarding the left wrist MRI, Dr. Reeve testified	18
that based on the fall, Worker had bled into the wrist joint, had swelling throughout	19
the area and had a cartilage tear of his TFCC. The brain MRI completed on November	20

9
1, 2011, showed that the brain was normal. Dr. Reeve referred Worker to Dr. Pachelli,	1
an orthopedist, Dr. Rice for his spine, Dr. Cannon for vision, and Dr. Chiulli for a	2
neuropsychological evaluation.	3
{12} 	Dr. Pachelli, an orthopedic surgeon, first evaluated Worker on December 7,	4
2011. Dr. Pachelli performed a physical examination and assessed that Worker	5
suffered a left rotator cuff tear, right AC arthritis/pain, right rotator cuff degeneration,	6
myofascial pain syndrome, and cervicalgia. Dr. Pachelli concluded that surgery was	7
not recommended at the time because “[h]e needs to get all of the problems with his	8
neck, etc. resolved before dealing with his shoulder.” On January 6, 2012, Dr. Pachelli	9
had a follow-up visit with Worker and concluded that Worker’s gait and station were	10
normal, and his muscle strength and sensation were normal. Dr. Pachelli’s assessment	11
was that Worker had internal derangement of knee and chondromalacia of patella	12
bilateral and recommended continued use of a left knee brace and a conditioning	13
program. On February 6, 2012, Dr. Pachelli on another follow-up visit with Worker	14
regarding the left shoulder concluded that surgery is not recommended because he did	15
not think any surgical intervention would help.	16
{13} 	Dr. Rice, a pain specialist, treated Worker for cervical and lumbar pain on	17
December 8, 2011. Dr. Rice completed a physical examination and determined that	18
Worker was a candidate for cervical epidural steroid injection. Dr. Pachelli reported	19
that after Dr. Rice’s injections, Worker stated his pain was not improving.	20

10
{14} 	Dr. Cannon, an ophthalmologist, certified in neuro-ophthalmology, examined	1
Worker on December 13, 2011. Worker presented to Dr. Cannon complaining of	2
“increased visual acuity with floaters . . . and light sensitivity in the left eye.” Dr.	3
Cannon concluded that he saw “no reason for his visual loss on the left side” and that	4
“in the future this will resolve itself and [] will be [] 20/20.”	5
{15} 	On January 24, 2012, Dr. Chiulli, Ph.D., a clinical neuropsychologist, saw	6
Worker for a neuropsychological evaluation. Worker completed four tests and Dr.	7
Chiulli concluded that “[a]ll of the tests administered indicate the probability of	8
intentionally 	produced 	impairment 	of 	performance” 	and 	that 	Worker 	was	9
malingering.	10
{16} 	Dr. Reeve’s final visit with Worker was on February 17, 2012, when he	11
discharged Worker, concluding that Worker was at MMI. Dr. Reeve’s report revealed	12
that Dr. Chiulli’s neuropsychological test indicated “fained illness.” Additionally, Dr.	13
Reeve was persuaded by Dr. Pachelli’s determination that Worker was not a surgical	14
candidate. Dr. Reeve concluded “based upon these reports, [he had] nothing further	15
to offer [Worker] with regards to his closed head injury” and that Worker had reached	16
MMI. Dr. Reeve reported that his final impression of Worker included: a rotator tear,	17
cervical strain, non-surgical 	candidate, and 	exaggerated 	responses with 	fained	18
behavior.	19

11
{17} 	Later that year in the summer of 2012, Worker began receiving medical care	1
for cognitive issues. On 	June 22, 2012, Worker presented to the emergency	2
department at UNM with complaints of intermittent memory loss, syncope, dizziness,	3
and headache. Worker denied any new head trauma since the injury of October 4,	4
2011. A head CT was obtained and it revealed no abnormality and no MRI	5
explanation for memory loss. An MRI of the brain on July 8, 2012, at UNM revealed	6
posterior 	changes 	with 	encephalomalacia 	and 	gliosis. 	Dr. 	Thoma, 	Ph.D., 	a	7
neuropsychologist 	in 	the 	UNM 	neuropsychology 	department 	completed 	a	8
neuropsychological 	evaluation 	of 	Worker 	on 	November 	7, 	2012. 	Dr. 	Thoma	9
identified “global impairment across measures, with severe to profound impairment	10
noted on measures of executive functioning and motor function Dr. Seelinger, a	11
neurologist, reported, after speaking with Dr. Rupp, a neuroradiologist, that there	12
must have been an intervening event between October 4, 2011, and the June 2012 CT	13
scan. Dr. Seelinger explained that there was no full blown encephalomalacia on the	14
June 2012 CT scan, as there was on the October 2012 MRI at UNMH. Dr. Seelinger	15
stated 	that 	this 	fits 	with 	the 	consideration 	of 	an 	additional 	injury 	since	16
encephalomalacia takes weeks to months to develop in the form as demonstrated on	17
the October 2012 MRI.	18
{18} 	Dr. Berger, a neurologist, opined to a reasonable degree of medical certainty	19
that the October 4, 2011 fall did not cause the CT and MRI findings of the summer	20

12
2012, but rather, “something else must have happened.” Dr. Berger concluded that	1
another trauma probably occurred after February 2012 to cause the brain injury. Dr.	2
Whalen, board certified in internal medicine and anesthesiology, disagreed with this	3
conclusion and opined that the brain injury stemmed from the October 4, 2011 injury,	4
and any other falls causing trauma were the result of the October 4, 2011 injury. Dr.	5
Whalen testified that encephalopathy can show up anywhere from six weeks to a year	6
afterward so an MRI three or four months after the accident might not necessarily tell	7
the whole story.	8
{19} 	Dr. Taghizadeh, an ear, nose, and throat doctor, opined that Worker had	9
damage to the vestibular system and that the traumatic brain injury from October 4,	10
2011, contributed to the dysfunction. In reaching his conclusion, Dr. Taghizadeh	11
explicitly relied on Worker giving truthful information.	12
IME Panels	13
{20} 	Two Independent Medical Evaluation (IME) panels were conducted. The first	14
IME report (First IME Panel) was reported on December 15, 2014. Worker filed a	15
motion to strike the First IME Panel opinion in part because, he alleged, the panel did	16
not have three hundred and nine pages of medical records submitted by Worker. On	17
October 23, 2015, the WCJ did not strike the First IME Panel report, but rather, sua	18
sponte ordered a second IME (Second IME Panel) to take place. This Second IME	19
Panel reported on March 25, 2016.	20

13
{21} 	The First IME Panel reviewed most of Worker’s medical records, performed	1
examinations on Worker, and administered tests for a neuropsychological exam. The	2
panel concluded that it was “unable to attribute any physical injury to October 4, 2011	3
workplace injury.” The panel stated: “It is our professional opinion that with	4
[Worker’s] bizarre reports of symptoms and examination that [Worker’s] presentation	5
is 	either 	a 	psychological 	diagnosis 	[or] 	fraudulent.” 	Dr. 	Granados, 	a	6
neuropsychologist, of the panel also concluded: “Given the current and available	7
medical record, the neuroimaging findings obtained at UNM in June 2012 and	8
confirmed in October 2014 are not considered related to the work injury of [October	9
4, 	2011]. 	Therefore, 	neuropsychological 	impairment 	related 	to 	those	10
neuroradiological findings are not considered work-related.” The panel concluded	11
that Worker was at MMI on February 17, 2012, as Dr. Reeve’s records indicated.	12
{22} 	Worker argues on appeal, as he did below, that “[s]ince the [F]irst [IME]	13
[P]anel was missing 309 pages of medical records from UNMH, all of Dr. Whalen’s	14
records, did not review the MRI and [CT] scans taken at UNMH in 2012 through	15
2014, and did not perform a complete physical examination, the [F]irst [IME] [P]anel	16
does not meet the standards of §52-1-28(B) and the opinion is not admissible.”	17
However, as we have held, our case law does not impose a requirement that a	18
testifying expert have reviewed all of a worker’s prior medical records in order to	19
provide a competent causation opinion. See Molinar, 2018-NMCA-011, ¶ 40. Section	20

14
52-1-28(B)’s requirement is simply that the worker must establish, by expert	1
testimony of a healthcare provider, causal connection as a probability. The healthcare	2
providers of the First IME Panel were provided with the pertinent information to reach	3
an expert opinion. Thus, the WCJ did not err in rejecting Worker’s motion to strike	4
the First IME Panel, and we are not persuaded that the First IME Panel’s lack of all	5
of Worker’s medical records negatively affects the First IME Panel’s opinion. See	6
Molinar, 2018-NMCA-011, ¶ 40 (holding that the weight of a testifying doctor’s	7
testimony was not negatively impacted by the fact that he had not reviewed all of the	8
worker’s medical records prior to rendering his causation opinion “because the record	9
ma[de] clear that he possessed pertinent information about [the w]orker’s prior injury	10
when he gave his opinion”).	11
{23} 	The Second IME Panel’s report from March 25, 2016, is harder to review, as	12
there is not a singular opinion of the panel, but rather, different healthcare providers	13
answered different questions. As part of the Second IME Panel, the healthcare	14
providers issued the following opinions. Dr. Romanelli, an orthopedic surgeon,	15
opined—to a reasonable medical probability—that Worker’s (1) left shoulder rotator	16
cuff tear; (2) right shoulder mild AC joint sprain; (3) left hip gluteal contusion; and	17
(4) left wrist diffuse sprain with capsulitis were caused by the October 4, 2011	18
accident. Dr. Saiz, an orthopedic spine surgeon, opined—to a reasonable medical	19
probability—that Worker’s low back strain/sprain was caused by the October 4, 2011	20

15
accident. Dr. Berger, a neurologist, opined—to a reasonable medical probability—	1
that Worker’s persistent cognitive problems were unrelated to the October 4, 2011	2
accident. 	Dr. 	Naimark, 	a 	psychologist, 	opined—to 	a 	reasonable 	degree 	of	3
psychological probability—that Worker’s diagnoses of somatic symptom disorder	4
and unspecified anxiety disorder were a result of the October 4, 2011 accident. Dr.	5
Swanda, 	a 	clinical 	neuropsychologist, 	opined—to 	a 	reasonable 	degree 	of	6
neuropsychological 	certainty—that 	Worker’s 	diagnosis 	of 	mild 	neurocognitive	7
disorder due to TBI was caused by the October 4, 2011 accident. Dr. Delahoussaye,	8
board certified in physical medicine and rehabilitation, opined—to a reasonable	9
medical 	probability—that 	Worker’s 	(1) 	concussion 	and 	resulting 	cognitive	10
impairments; (2) left shoulder full thickness rotator cuff tear; (3) left knee class 2-3	11
chondral ulcer; (4) cervical sprain; (5) thoracic sprain; (6) lumbar sprain; (7) left wrist	12
sprain; (8) right shoulder A-C joint arthropathy; (9) major depressive disorder; (10)	13
anxiety disorder; and (11) post-traumatic headaches were related to the October 4,	14
2011 fall.	15
{24} 	The WCJ considering both panels, concluded that the Second IME Panel was	16
“worthless” as it was infused with falsehoods from Worker. The WCJ concluded that	17
the Second IME Panel “reviewed medical records infused with Worker’s falsehoods,	18
misrepresentations and exaggerations so as to render the opinions of the panelists	19
unreliable for purposes of this matter.” The WCJ also concluded that the Second IME	20

16
Panel was “unreliable taken as a whole” because the panel lacks an “opinion of the	1
panel” but rather consists of different doctors answering different IME questions.	2
Rather, the WCJ, concluded: “Upon review of the medical evidence, the observations	3
of the [First IME Panel] during their examination (which are not dependent upon any	4
medical records) of Worker have considerable weight.”	5
Credibility	6
{25} 	The WCJ also looked to the credibility of the witnesses and determined that	7
Worker was not credible. The WCJ found that “Worker established a pattern of lying	8
to his doctors about his abilities and extent of injury[.]” For example, as the WCJ	9
explained, Worker gave varying descriptions of his fall over time. First, Worker	10
reported that he fell ten to twelve feet from the ladder to the ground. Six days later,	11
he told his doctor that he fell twelve feet. On October 17, 2011, Worker reported to	12
Dr. Reeve that he fell thirteen feet. On October 15, 2012, Worker told the UNMH	13
neuropsychology department that he fell sixteen to nineteen feet. Worker’s recitation	14
of the distance he fell increased over time until on December 19, 2012, he reported to	15
the UNMH neuropsychology department that he fell three stories	16
{26} 	Worker also presented inconsistent information regarding his physical abilities	17
and injuries. Worker claimed to multiple doctors and testified in his deposition that	18
he was unable to work and that he has not worked since the October 4, 2011 accident.	19
However, surveillance video entered into evidence by Employer revealed that Worker	20

17
was able to work on-site construction during the times he explicitly claimed he was	1
not.	2
{27} 	Notably, Dr. Chiulli concluded that Worker was malingering and indicated a	3
probability 	of 	intentionally 	produced 	impairment 	of 	performance. 	Indeed, 	the	4
neurologists from both IMEs opined that Worker’s encephalomalacia was not related	5
to the work-accident.	6
{28} 	Based on the above, the WCJ concluded that “[t]he evidence supports finding	7
Worker has repeatedly and intentionally provided false testimony and discovery	8
responses in the course of this matter[.]” The WCJ concluded that “Worker’s lies and	9
exaggerations undermine the opinions of any of Worker’s healthcare providers” and	10
“[m]edical opinions based upon incorrect or incomplete history are not binding on the	11
finder of fact.” Accordingly, the WCJ determined that the opinion of the Second IME	12
Panel was “unreliable for purposes of this matter” because the panel “reviewed	13
medical 	records 	infused 	with 	Worker’s 	falsehoods, 	misrepresentations 	and	14
exaggerations.” Based on the above, we agree with the WCJ’s conclusion that Worker	15
is not credible.3 See Maez, 2015-NMCA-049, ¶ 10 (“[W]e will not disturb the WCJ’s	16
findings unless they are manifestly wrong or clearly opposed to the evidence.”).	17
3 Worker also takes issue with the WCJ’s credibility determination, contending
that because he has a brain injury, he cannot form the scienter to lie and therefore this
credibility determination is incorrect. We do not address this argument because it is
undeveloped and lacks cited authority. See Corona v. Corona, 2014-NMCA-071,
¶ 28, 329 P.3d 701 (“This Court has no duty to review an argument that is not

18
{29} 	Nevertheless, Worker points to the testimony of Dr. Reeve, Dr. Berger, and Dr.	1
Taghizadeh as evidence of causation of the accident and the injuries. Specifically,	2
Worker argues these doctors reveal that reviewing these records, a reasonable man	3
“would reasonabl[y] conclude that Worker sustained compensable injuries to his	4
neck, both shoulders, low back, left wrist, left hip, brain, left eye, vestibular system[,]	5
and both knees.” Worker contends that the medical testimony of these doctors was	6
“uncontroverted” and thus falls into the uncontradicted medical evidence rule. See	7
Banks v. IMC Kalium Carlsbad Potash Co., 2003-NMSC-026, ¶ 35, 134 N.M. 421,	8
77 P.3d 1014 (“The [uncontradicted medical evidence] rule is based on [Section] 52-	9
1-28(B), which requires the worker to prove causal connection between disability and	10
accident as a medical probability by expert medical testimony. Because the statute	11
requires a certain type of proof, uncontradicted evidence in the form of that type of	12
proof is binding on the trial court.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).	13
However, the uncontradicted medical evidence rule “is not applicable when a	14
worker’s evidence is in fact contradicted by other evidence.” Banks, 2003-NMSC-	15
026, ¶ 35. Additionally, “[u]ncontradicted testimony need not be accepted as true if	16
[] the witness is shown to be unworthy of belief[.]” Hernandez v. Mead Foods, Inc.,	17
adequately developed.”); ITT Educ. Servs., Inc. v. Taxation & Revenue Dep’t, 1998-
NMCA-078, ¶ 10, 125 N.M. 244, 959 P.2d 969 (explaining that this Court will not
consider propositions that are unsupported by citation to authority).

19
1986-NMCA-020, ¶ 14, 104 N.M. 67, 716 P.2d 645. The rule does not apply in this	1
case because, as we have discussed, the evidence Worker relies on is contradicted by	2
other evidence of healthcare providers based on Worker’s testimony and explanations	3
about his condition which have been shown to be not credible. Additionally, Worker’s	4
argument that the WCJ erred because a reasonable man could reasonably conclude	5
his injuries were compensable misstates the law. The WCJ was presented with	6
conflicting expert evidence from healthcare providers of the injuries’ causation. The	7
job of the WCJ is to weigh this conflicting testimony. See Turner v. N.M. State	8
Highway Dep’t, 1982-NMCA-097, ¶ 13, 98 N.M. 256, 648 P.2d 8 (“Although the	9
opinions of the expert medical witnesses were conflicting, and the evidence cited by	10
plaintiff could have supported a different conclusion by the trial court, it is not a	11
prerogative of this [C]ourt on appeal to weigh the testimony of medical experts, but	12
rather to ascertain whether there is substantial evidence to support the trial court’s	13
evaluation of the evidence and determination of where the truth lies[.]” (internal	14
quotation marks and citation omitted)). There was substantial evidence to support the	15
WCJ’s determination that the other injuries were not compensable because they were	16
not causally linked to the October 4, 2011 accident. Accordingly, we hold there is	17
substantial evidence to support the WCJ’s determination that the right shoulder was	18
the only compensable injury.	19

20
II. 	The WCJ Did Not Misapply the Law When it Did Not Grant Worker	1
Medical Benefits for Treatment After February 2, 2012	2
{30} 	Worker seeks indemnity benefits for medical treatment after January 1, 2013.	3
Worker argues on appeal that the WCJ misapplied the law when it failed to award	4
medical treatment to Worker after February 2, 2012. Worker contends that the WCJ	5
was “without authority to limit or restrict future medical benefits once a compensable	6
injury is established.”	7
{31} 	Under the Act, Worker has the burden to establish that the requested medical	8
care is reasonable, necessary, and causally connected to the work accident. See § 52-	9
1-28(B); § 52-1-49(A) (providing that “[a]fter an injury to a worker . . . and continuing	10
as long as medical or related treatment is reasonably necessary, the employer shall . . .	11
provide the worker in a timely manner reasonable and necessary health care services	12
from a health care provider”); Davis v. Los Alamos Nat’l Lab., 1989-NMCA-023, ¶ 4,	13
108 N.M. 587, 775 P.2d 1304 (“Claimant has the burden of showing that the [medical]	14
expenses were both reasonable and necessary.”); Hernandez v. Mead Foods, Inc.,	15
1986-NMCA-020, ¶ 23, 104 N.M. 67, 716 P.2d 645 (holding that “the medical	16
benefits for which recovery is sought must be incidental to and a concomitant part of	17
the injury sustained in a work-related accident”). Worker has only demonstrated that	18
one injury is causally connected to the work accident: the right shoulder. Thus, we	19
review Worker’s claims for medical benefits for this injury only. See Vargas v. City	20
of Albuquerque, 1993-NMCA-136, ¶ 9, 116 N.M. 664, 866 P.2d 392 (affirming the	21

21
WCJ’s denial of medical benefits where the WCJ found that the worker “did not	1
sustain any injury” in the work-related accident because an employer “is only	2
obligated to provide services after an injury”).	3
{32} 	The First IME Panel concluded that no more medical treatment was reasonable	4
and necessary. Specifically, the panel stated that Worker does not require any ongoing	5
future treatment to treat causally related physical work-related injuries. The panel	6
determined that there were no medical conditions causally related that would worsen.	7
The WCJ concluded that Employer is not liable for medical bills incurred by Worker	8
after February 2, 2012.	9
{33} 	Our review of the record does not reveal any evidence regarding any reasonable	10
and necessary medical treatment Worker has incurred for the right shoulder from	11
February 2, 2012 to present. Worker does not point us to any such evidence, nor did	12
he seek future medical expenses. We therefore cannot conclude that the WCJ	13
misapplied the law by failing to award medical treatment to Worker from February 2,	14
2012 to present.	15
{34} 	To the extent Worker argues that the WCJ misapplied the law in denying him	16
future medical benefits, Worker misconstrues the record. It is true that the WCJ “is	17
without authority to limit or restrict in advance future medical benefits once a	18
compensable injury is established.” Graham v. Presbyterian Hosp. Ctr., 1986-	19
NMCA-064, ¶ 3, 104 N.M. 490, 723 P.2d 259. “Since the trial court cannot practically	20

22
determine the worker’s future medical needs at the time of entry of a judgment finding	1
disability, Section 52-1-49 authorizes entry of a judgment directing the payment of a	2
worker’s reasonable and necessary future medical expenses and invests the court with	3
continuing jurisdiction to enforce such orders.” St. Clair v. Cty. of Grant, 1990-	4
NMCA-087, ¶ 14, 110 N.M. 543, 797 P.2d 993. It follows logically that Worker is	5
not entitled to relief for any future medical benefits for the uncompensable injuries.	6
Graham, 1986-NMCA-064, ¶¶ 5-6 (affirming our rule that a plaintiff is not entitled	7
to a judgment for future medical benefits which have no relation to the work-related	8
injury). Otherwise, the WCJ concluded that Worker’s lack of credibility irreversibly	9
tainted any medical benefits sought after February 2, 2012, and that Employer is not	10
liable for medical bills incurred by Worker after February 2, 2012. We note that there	11
is nothing in the WCJ’s order to prohibit Worker from requesting reasonable and	12
necessary medical benefits for the right shoulder in the future. We conclude the WCJ	13
did not misapply the law by not granting Worker previous or future medical benefits	14
for the right shoulder.	15
III. 	The WCJ Did Not Misapply the Law When it Denied Worker PPD	16
Benefits	17
{35} 	The WCJ concluded that Worker is not entitled to PPD benefits following	18
February 2, 2012, citing Dr. Reeve’s opinion that no impairment rating was	19
appropriate as of February 2, 2012. The WCJ concluded that “Worker failed to meet	20
his burden [of] proof by credible medical testimony that he has a permanent	21

23
impairment as a result of the October 4, 2011 fall, and as a consequence, Worker is	1
not entitled to [PPD] benefits.” On appeal, Worker argues that the WCJ misapplied	2
the law when it denied him PPD benefits.	3
{36} 	Section 52-1-26(B) defines “partial disability” as “a condition whereby a	4
worker, by reason of injury arising out of and in the course of employment, suffers a	5
permanent impairment.” “[PPD] is calculated pursuant to a statutory formula, § 52-1-	6
26(C), and not in accordance with the worker’s ability or inability to function at	7
work.” Smith v. Arizona Pub. Serv. Co., 2003-NMCA-097, ¶ 15, 134 N.M. 202, 75	8
P.3d 418. “In cases where a worker claims PPD, the relevant question is whether the	9
worker has established a causal connection between his accident and a permanent	10
impairment.” Molinar, 2018-NMCA-011, ¶ 25. Again, we only examine whether the	11
WCJ misapplied the law in not granting PPD for the compensable right shoulder	12
injury.	13
{37} 	We first note that the only evidence regarding the right shoulder and PPD that	14
Worker points us to is Dr. Romanelli’s testimony whereby he opined that Worker’s	15
right shoulder rotator cuff tear was not related to the October 4, 2011 accident, but	16
rather was “more of a genetic . . . degenerative process.” Moreover, Dr. Reeve opined	17
that Worker had no impairment rating. Without an impairment of a compensable	18
injury, Worker cannot receive PPD benefits. The WCJ did not misapply the law in	19

24
denying the PPD benefits because Worker showed no causal connection between his	1
accident and a permanent impairment. See Molinar, 2018-NMCA-011, ¶ 25.	2
{38} 	Worker also contends, with no citation to the record, that the WCJ was “without	3
authority to assign an average weekly wage, and compensation rate that was different	4
than the stipulated rate offered by the [p]arties through the [p]re[-t]rial order.” With	5
no impairment finding, the calculation rate does not make an impact and we need not	6
reach this argument.	7
IV. 	Worker’s Additional Arguments	8
{39} 	Any additional arguments that Worker makes that we have not addressed	9
assume that Worker’s other injuries are compensable. Because we hold there is	10
substantial evidence to support the WCJ’s determination that the right shoulder was	11
the only compensable injury, we need not address these arguments.	12
CONCLUSION	13
{40} 	For the foregoing reasons we affirm the WCJ’s order.	14
{41} 	IT IS SO ORDERED.	15
_____________________________	16
M. MONICA ZAMORA, Judge	17

1
WE CONCUR:
Connie 4. Vargar
2 3
JULIE J. VARGAS, Judge
4 5
Jacqueline R. Medina
JACQUELINE R. MEDINA, Judge
25