State v. Sanders

This decision of the Supreme Court of New Mexico was not selected for publication in
the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Refer to Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO

Filing Date: November 3, 2025

No. S-1-SC-40725

STATE OF NEW MEXICO,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

JOSEPH SANDERS,

Defendant-Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF OTERO COUNTY
John P. Sugg, District Judge

Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender
Allison H. Jaramillo, Assistant Appellate Defender
Santa Fe, NM

for Appellant

Raúl Torrez, Attorney General
Henry Chynoweth, Assistant Solicitor General
Santa Fe, NM

for Appellee

DECISION

BACON, Justice.

I. INTRODUCTION

{1} Defendant Joseph Sanders shot and killed Laura McCormick (Victim) while she
was working alone at a convenience store. Defendant appeals his convictions of first-
degree willful-and-deliberate murder, contrary to NMSA 1978, Section 30-2-1(A)(1)
(1994), and attempted armed robbery, contrary to NMSA 1978, Sections 30-28-1 (1963,
amended 2024) and 30-16-2 (1973), arguing the State failed to produce sufficient
evidence. We affirm Defendant’s convictions and exercise our discretion to decide this
appeal by nonprecedential decision. See Rule 12-405(B)(1), (2) NMRA (permitting
disposal of a case by nonprecedential decision where the issues presented have been
previously decided or where the presence of substantial evidence disposes of the
issues).

II. BACKGROUND

{2} Defendant entered a convenience store located in Weed, New Mexico, at 7:54
a.m. Victim was working alone at the store. Defendant asked Victim to accept a gun as
collateral for gasoline. Victim informed Defendant she was not authorized to do so but
that her boss would arrive in about an hour. Defendant stated he would return in an
hour and drove away from the store.

{3} At 8:12 a.m., Defendant returned to the store but remained in his car for a short
period, reentering the store around 8:17 a.m. and greeting Victim. Another customer
entered the store shortly thereafter, and the men had a brief interaction. The customer
left, and Defendant remained in the store.

{4} Defendant brought coffee and a candy bar to the counter. Victim instructed him
to leave his cash on the counter. Defendant exited the store, stating he would get his
cash, and returned moments later. Defendant brought additional food items to the
counter. Victim again instructed Defendant to leave his cash on the counter and to go
and pump his fuel. Defendant asked Victim about finding trail mix in the store. Victim
pointed Defendant toward a portion of the store. Defendant brought additional items to
the counter. Victim once again asked Defendant to leave cash and to go and pump his
fuel. Instead, Defendant walked outside to his vehicle.

{5} Defendant again reentered the store, this time with a gun concealed under his
shirt. Defendant pointed the gun at Victim and attempted to shoot her two times, but no
bullets were in the relevant chambers. Victim pushed the gun away. Defendant regained
control of the gun and fired again. Victim cried out for her boss as Defendant shot her
twice. At this point, approximately 8:27 a.m., Defendant fled the store and drove away.
Victim later died as a result of her wounds.

{6} By the time law enforcement located Defendant, he had changed his shirt,
hidden his truck, and stolen a vehicle. Defendant gave false stories to law enforcement
about his truck and “playing around” with his gun earlier in the day. Defendant was
searched, and officers located a “substance consistent with methamphetamine” and
drug paraphernalia on his body. Officers testified that Defendant did not appear to be
under the influence of drugs. Eventually, Defendant’s blood was tested, revealing 0.11
mg/L of methamphetamine.

{7} Defendant was convicted of one count of first-degree murder (willful and
deliberate), one count of attempt to commit a felony (armed robbery), one count of
tampering with evidence, one count of unlawful taking of a motor vehicle, one count of
unlawful carrying of a deadly weapon, and one count of possession of drug
paraphernalia. He now appeals his convictions of first-degree murder and attempted
armed robbery.

III. DISCUSSION

{8} Defendant argues there was insufficient evidence (1) to establish deliberate
intent necessary to sustain his conviction of first-degree murder and (2) to prove
attempted armed robbery. With regard to his first-degree murder conviction, Defendant
argues the evidence shows the killing of Victim was rash and impulsive and he was
unable to form deliberate intent because of his voluntary intoxication. With regard to his
conviction of attempted armed robbery, Defendant appears to argue the State failed to
prove he committed a requisite overt act and his voluntary intoxication similarly
interfered with his ability to form the specific intent required for attempt.

A. Standard of Review

{9} The sufficiency of the evidence is measured against the jury instructions, which
“become the law of the case against which the sufficiency of the evidence is to be
measured.” State v. Arrendondo, 2012-NMSC-013, ¶ 18, 278 P.3d 517 (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). Evidence is sufficient when substantial evidence,
direct or circumstantial, “exists to support a verdict of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt
with respect to every element essential to a conviction.” State v. Duran, 2006-NMSC-
035, ¶ 5, 140 N.M. 94, 140 P.3d 515 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v.
Sutphin, 1988-NMSC-031, ¶ 21, 107 N.M. 126, 753 P.2d 1314).

{10} When considering the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court “does not evaluate
the evidence to determine whether some hypothesis could be designed which is
consistent with a finding of innocence.” State v. Graham, 2005-NMSC-004, ¶ 13, 137
N.M. 197, 109 P.3d 285 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Instead, “We
view the evidence as a whole and indulge all reasonable inferences in favor of the jury’s
verdict,” id., while at the same time asking whether “any rational trier of fact could have
found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt,” id. ¶ 7 (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted).

B. Sufficient Evidence Supported the First-Degree Deliberate Murder
Conviction

{11} The parties agree Defendant killed Victim. However, Defendant contends that the
State did not meet its burden to prove deliberate intent beyond a reasonable doubt, as
required for first-degree willful-and-deliberate murder. Defendant argues killing Victim
was rash and impulsive, stating that his decisions were made in a short amount of time.
Further, he argues he was unable to form deliberate intent because his use of
methamphetamine at some point during the day amounted to voluntary intoxication.

{12} Murder in the first-degree consists of “the killing of one human being by another
without lawful justification or excuse . . . by any kind of willful, deliberate, and
premeditated killing.” Section 30-2-1(A)(1). Requisite deliberation and premeditation for
first-degree murder means that a defendant’s conduct must have been “arrived at or
determined upon as a result of careful thought and the weighing of the consideration for
and against the proposed course of action.” State v. Cunningham, 2000-NMSC-009, ¶
25, 128 N.M. 711, 998 P.2d 176 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting UJI 14-201
NMRA).

{13} The jury instruction stated the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
Defendant killed Victim with “the deliberate intention to take away [Victim’s] life.” The
jury instruction further stated that “deliberate” means the “result of careful thought and
the weighing of the consideration for and against the proposed course of action. . . . To
constitute a deliberate killing, the slayer must weigh and consider the question of killing
and his reasons for and against such a choice.” Additionally, the jury instruction stated
“[a] mere unconsidered and rash impulse, even though it includes an intent to kill, is not
a deliberate intention to kill.” The jury was also instructed on second-degree murder as
a lesser included offense.

{14} Defendant is correct in asserting that if the State fails to prove deliberate intent,
the appropriate charge would be second-degree murder. See State v. Adonis, 2008-
NMSC-059, ¶ 16, 145 N.M. 102, 194 P.3d 717 (holding the facts only support second-
degree murder “if the State merely proves that the accused acted rashly or impulsively,
rather than deliberately, and if the accused acted intentionally and without justification or
provocation”); see also Duran, 2006-NMSC-035, ¶ 10 (explaining first-degree murder
cannot be adequately supported when no evidence presented “could reasonably lead
the jury to infer that the defendant had acted with deliberation rather than rashly and
impulsively”).

{15} But this Court must determine that evidence of deliberate intent is sufficient when
substantial evidence, direct or circumstantial, supported a verdict of guilt. “Intent is
subjective and is almost always inferred from other facts in the case, as it is rarely
established by direct evidence.” State v. Sosa, 2000-NMSC-036, ¶ 9, 129 N.M. 767, 14
P.3d 32 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Vigil, 1990-NMSC-066, 110
N.M. 254, 794 P.2d 728). Substantial evidence of deliberation can include “earlier
confrontation[s] . . . or other common areas of friction leading to violence,” State v.
Tafoya, 2012-NMSC-030, ¶ 52, 285 P.3d 604; fleeing the scene, disposing of evidence,
or concocting false alibis, State v. Flores, 2010-NMSC-002, ¶¶ 22-23, 147 N.M. 542,
226 P.3d 641 (overruled on other grounds by State v. Martinez, 2021-NMSC-002, ¶ 87,
478 P.3d 880); or firing the fatal shot after the victim was incapacitated and
defenseless, Cunningham, 2000-NMSC-009, ¶ 28.

{16} A reasonable jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant
had the necessary deliberate intent to kill Victim. The State presented substantial
evidence through the various interactions between Defendant and Victim on the
surveillance footage that Defendant had little or no money; learned Victim would be
alone at the store for an hour; crafted a plan to rob the store, which included killing
Victim; gathered items from the store he would like; waited for other customers to leave;
ignored Victim’s repeated requests that he produce money; retreated to his truck to
retrieve his gun to execute his plan; reentered the store; and immediately approached
the register, aimed a gun at Victim, and attempted to fire to deliberately end her life.

{17} Additionally, not only may Defendant’s acts before and during the crime provide
evidence of intent, but “[e]vidence of flight” or “an attempt to deceive the police” may
prove consciousness of guilt. State v. Martinez, 1999-NMSC-018, ¶¶ 29-30, 127 N.M.
207, 979 P.2d 718 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Here, the jury was
presented with evidence that, after fatally shooting Victim, Defendant changed his
clothing, concealed his truck, stole a vehicle, and fabricated a story for police regarding
his whereabouts, as well as the type of truck he owned and the location of the truck.

{18} To the extent Defendant argues the evidence in his case is only sufficient to find
a rash and impulsive killing occurred or his alleged voluntary intoxication negated any
deliberate intent, we do not consider such claims when determining the sufficiency of
the evidence. We have stated in a review of the sufficiency of the evidence “[w]e do not
search for inferences supporting a contrary verdict or re-weigh the evidence because
this type of analysis would substitute an appellate court’s judgment for that of the jury.”
Graham, 2005-NMSC-004, ¶ 13. Further, we have held “[c]ontrary evidence supporting
acquittal does not provide a basis for reversal because the jury is free to reject [a
d]efendant’s version of the facts.” Duran, 2006-NMSC-035, ¶ 5 (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted). As a result, our sufficiency review weighs only the evidence
supporting Defendant’s plan to kill Victim and rob the store. However, we note that with
regard to his voluntary intoxication, the evidence is limited to a toxicology report,
observations of red eyes, and drug paraphernalia and a substance consistent with
methamphetamine found on Defendant at the time of his arrest. Furthermore,
Defendant seemingly referred to his intoxication for the first time in closing arguments
and did not request a jury instruction on voluntary intoxication. As a result, the jury
would have been justified in reasoning from the evidence that Defendant formed the
requisite deliberate intent and is guilty of first-degree willful-and-deliberate murder.

C. Attempted Armed Robbery

{19} Defendant contends the State failed to prove attempted armed robbery.
Defendant seems to imply the State did not prove he committed a requisite overt act
because it did not present evidence that he took or attempted to take anything from
Victim or the store or that he made any demands. Defendant also similarly suggests his
alleged voluntary intoxication negated any necessary intent. We do not agree.

{20} “Attempt to commit a felony consists of an overt act in furtherance of and with
intent to commit a felony and tending but failing to effect its commission.” Section 30-28-
1. The jury instruction required the jury to find Defendant “intended to commit the crime
of armed robbery” and “began to do an act which constituted a substantial part of the
armed robbery but failed to commit the armed robbery.”

{21} The Court of Appeals has previously affirmed a conviction of attempted armed
robbery in which a co-conspirator pulled a gun on the manager of a liquor store and
lounge. State v. Paul, 1972-NMCA-043, ¶ 2, 83 N.M. 619, 495 P.2d 797. In that case,
the co-conspirator ordered the manager to get down but was startled by a witness and
as a result made no demands for money or goods before he fled. Paul, 1972-NMCA-
043, ¶¶ 2, 6-7. The Court of Appeals found substantial evidence under those facts to
support the verdict in light of its duty to view the evidence and “all reasonable inferences
that flow therefrom in the light most favorable to [the jury’s] verdict.” Id. ¶ 7.

{22} Here, Defendant brought multiple items to the counter at the convenience store
and continually failed to pay before pulling out his gun and aiming directly at Victim.
After Defendant shot Victim, she cried out for her boss by name. Despite the lack of
demands, a reasonable jury would be justified in reasoning from this evidence that
Defendant intended to rob Victim or the store and began to do so when he pointed his
gun at Victim, but was startled by her cries for help before he fled.

{23} As discussed previously, to the extent Defendant argues his alleged voluntary
intoxication negated any specific intent, we do not consider such claims when
determining the sufficiency of the evidence. To do so would be to search for an
inference supporting a contrary verdict or to reweigh the evidence. We decline to go
beyond our sufficiency review of the evidence supporting Defendant’s conviction of
attempted armed robbery. Therefore, we conclude the evidence supporting the jury’s
verdict for attempted armed robbery was sufficient.

IV. CONCLUSION

{24} For the reasons stated herein, we affirm Defendant’s convictions of both first-
degree murder and attempted armed robbery.

{25} IT IS SO ORDERED.

C. SHANNON BACON, Justice

WE CONCUR:

DAVID K. THOMSON, Chief Justice

MICHAEL E. VIGIL, Justice

JULIE J. VARGAS, Justice

BRIANA H. ZAMORA, Justice