State v. Munford

This decision of the Supreme Court of New Mexico was not selected for publication in
the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Refer to Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO

Filing Date: November 20, 2025

No. S-1-SC-40399

STATE OF NEW MEXICO,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

DEVIN M. MUNFORD,

Defendant-Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BERNALILLO COUNTY
Joseph A. Montano, District Judge

Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender
Kimberly M. Chavez Cook, Appellate Defender
MJ Edge, Assistant Appellate Defender
Santa Fe, NM

for Appellant

Raúl Torrez, Attorney General
Santa Fe, NM
Michael J. Thomas, Assistant Solicitor General
Albuquerque, NM

for Appellee

DECISION

VIGIL, Justice.

{1} Defendant Devon Munford was found guilty by a jury of first-degree willful and
deliberate murder, NMSA 1978, § 30-2-1(A)(1) (1994); aggravated assault with a deadly
weapon, NMSA 1978, § 30-3-2(A) (1963); armed robbery, NMSA 1978, § 30-16-2
(1973); conspiracy to commit armed robbery, NMSA 1978, § 30-28-2 (1979); tampering
with evidence, NMSA 1978, § 30-22-5 (2003); and criminal damage to property, NMSA
1978, § 30-15-1 (1963). Defendant received a life sentence plus twenty-five years, and
now appeals directly to this Court pursuant to Article VI, Section 2 of the New Mexico
Constitution and Rule 12-102(A)(1) NMRA.

{2} Defendant raises two specific issues: (1) whether the district court erred by failing
to suppress Defendant’s statements to law enforcement on the basis that they were
involuntary, and (2) whether sufficient evidence supports the special verdict for
tampering with evidence related to the first-degree murder charge.1 We conclude that
Defendant’s statements to law enforcement were voluntary and Defendant’s tampering
with evidence charge is supported by sufficient evidence. We affirm the judgment and
sentence, and exercise our discretion to decide this appeal by nonprecedential decision.
See Rule 12-405(B)(1) NMRA.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

{3} In light of the limited nature of Defendant’s challenge to his convictions, we
provide the following brief summary of the trial evidence supporting the convictions.
Defendant and Devon Heyborne met while they were both being held at the Bernalillo
County jail, and they would go to the gym and make rap videos together. When
Defendant and a friend broke into Heyborne’s apartment and stole a rifle, Heyborne
reported Defendant to the police. Then, on April 23, 2021, when Heyborne opened his
apartment door to Defendant’s knock, Defendant shot Heyborne with a shotgun in the
chest and wrist, killing him. While investigating the homicide scene, police recovered
spent shotgun shells from the area outside of the apartment.

{4} About forty minutes after the shooting, Defendant posted a video on Snapchat
rapping the song “Back in Blood” in which he changed part of the lyrics to refer to
shooting someone with a shotgun, and tagged the video “for real, I dropped my first
body tonight. Gauged him in the face.” Defendant also messaged a friend saying,
“Mando, I killed Devon” and posted “somebody got killed by my shotgun tonight” on
Snapchat.

{5} A few minutes after posting the video, Defendant was with his mother at an
apartment complex parked next to a car owned by Susan Sloan. Sloan went to her car
to retrieve her cell phone, and Defendant asked her what she was doing. Defendant’s
mother said, “let’s go,” and Defendant answered, “no, I’m going to kill this bitch.”
Defendant then got out of his car with a shotgun and shot over Sloan’s head. Sloan
went into her car to hide, and Defendant fired a second shot before getting back in his
car and leaving.

1Without elaboration, Defendant also states in his brief that the district court also allowed the State to
present evidence of “Snapchat messages that the State attributed to [Defendant] without adequate
foundation.” Defendant merely makes this assertion without developing an argument to support it, and
therefore we do not address it. See Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 2013-NMSC-040, ¶ 70, 309 P.3d
53 (explaining that the appellate court does not review unclear or undeveloped arguments).
{6} Next, on April 25, 2021, Defendant and two other men discussed the possibility
of “hitting a lick,” or committing a robbery, after they had made the arrangements. Later
that day, while he was armed with a shotgun, Defendant and the two other men robbed
a Seven-Eleven convenience store. They took money from the cash registers,
demanded money from the employees and customers, and took bottles of liquor.
Defendant and his cohorts fled on foot when Albuquerque police entered the store’s
parking lot. Defendant threw the shotgun and bottles in a dumpster in the store parking
lot and ran down the street for about a block and a half. The police caught Defendant
and arrested him. Shotgun shells were found in Defendant’s pocket and the police
retrieved the shotgun from the dumpster. After the police presented Defendant to the
store employees for identification as one of the robbers, he was taken to the police
station. In light of this brief background, we now turn to Defendant’s arguments on
appeal.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Motion to Suppress

{7} Defendant filed a motion to suppress statements he made in an interview to
Officer Zachary Formento related to the Seven-Eleven robbery and statements he
subsequently made to Detective Ana Bruciaga related to Heyborne’s murder. Whether
Defendant waived his Miranda rights was not at issue in the district court, nor is it an
issue on appeal. The basis for the motion was that the statements were not voluntary
because Defendant was under the influence of the narcotic Xanax when he was
interviewed. After the State responded, an evidentiary hearing was held. At the
evidentiary hearing on the motion, the State presented three witnesses: Timothy
McCarson, a drug recognition expert; Officer Formento, together with the body camera
video of him interviewing Defendant; and Detective Bruciaga, and the video of her
interview of Defendant.

{8} McCarson testified that “Xanax is a central nervous system depressant, basically
a sedative,” and that he “has interacted numerous times with people who claimed to
have taken it.” A person abusing Xanax to get intoxicated or “high” would appear to be
drunk—exhibiting poor coordination, slurred and garbled speech, and having difficulty
understanding what people are saying, much like someone intoxicated on alcohol. On
the other hand, someone using Xanax therapeutically, on normal doses, would behave
normally. Based on his review of the videos of Defendant’s interviews, Defendant did
not show signs of being “high” on Xanax. Defendant appeared to be “very articulate”
and coherent and to understand what was occurring.

{9} Officer Formento testified that he interacted with and monitored Defendant for
four to five hours, which included his arrest, the time spent interviewing him, waiting with
him at the prisoner transport center, and then waiting for Defendant to be booked.
Sometime during this interaction, Defendant claimed he had taken about six Xanax pills
throughout the day. However, Defendant had no difficulty giving responsive answers to
Officer Formento’s questions, and he did not exhibit any behaviors such as being
sluggish or slow to answer questions indicating he was under the influence of anything
during that entire time.

{10} Detective Bruciaga likewise testified that she did not observe any indications that
Defendant was under the influence of Xanax in any way. In fact, Defendant told
Detective Bruciaga that he knew she was there to talk to him about the murder, and he
was coherent, appeared to understand her questions, and provided relevant answers to
her questions. At one point during the interview, Defendant said something about 90
Xanax, and that he was “high.” Detective Bruciaga jokingly said that if he had taken that
many, he would not “be here” meaning he would be dead. Defendant then clarified that
he had been holding them for sale, and did not ingest that many. However, Defendant
never said when he ingested Xanax.

{11} The district court denied the motion to suppress in a detailed written order. The
district court found that at the time of his arrest through the time that he was interviewed
by Officer Formento and Detective Bruciaga, Defendant exhibited no symptoms
whatsoever consistent with being under the influence of Xanax. “Specifically” the district
court found, “Defendant was coherent, articulate and exhibited complex thought
processes.” Further, the district court determined, “Defendant was walking, talking,
coherent and did not exhibit slurred speech or any symptomology of impairment.” In
addition, the district court found that Defendant exhibited knowledge and understanding
of court procedure; in particular, Defendant requested Officer Formento call his pre-trial
officer and asked Detective Bruciaga about whether he would be given bond for
release. The district court ultimately concluded that Defendant knowingly and voluntarily
waived his Miranda rights, and because there was no police overreaching or other
coercion by law enforcement in obtaining Defendant’s statements, the statements were
voluntarily given.

{12} This Court reviews the voluntariness of a confession de novo. State v. Evans,
2009-NMSC-027, ¶ 32, 146 N.M. 319, 210 P.3d 216. In so doing, the Court “examine[s]
the entire record and the circumstances under which the confession was made, and . . .
make[s] an independent determination of the ultimate question of voluntariness.” Aguilar
v. State, 1988-NMSC-004, ¶ 7, 106 N.M. 798, 751 P.2d 178 (emphasis omitted). In
other words, to make its determination, the Court “examine[s] the ‘totality of the
circumstances’ surrounding the confession . . . .” State v. Fekete, 1995-NMSC-049, ¶
34, 120 N.M. 290, 901 P.2d 708 (citation omitted). Presented with a claim that a
confession is involuntary, the State “has the burden of proving the voluntariness of a
defendant’s statement by a preponderance of the evidence.” Id.

{13} Relevant evidence of voluntariness includes evidence of the confessor’s personal
characteristics. See State v. Gutierrez, 2011-NMSC-024, ¶ 23, 150 N.M. 232, 258 P.3d
1024 (citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973)). As applicable here,
relevant characteristics include whether the confessor was impaired or suffering from
mental illness. Id.; State v. Montano, 2019-NMCA-019, ¶ 17, 458 P.3d 512. However,
the confessor’s troubled state of mind or impairment levels are independently
“insufficient to render a confession involuntary without accompanying police misconduct
or overreaching.” Montano, 2019-NMCA-019, ¶ 17. The State must have seized upon
and exploited the confessor’s vulnerable characteristics or conditions to render the
confession involuntary. See Evans, 2009-NMSC-027, ¶ 38. Moreover, “Case law makes
it clear that when interrogators are unaware of, and therefore cannot exploit, the mental
or emotional vulnerabilities of a suspect, the crucial link between the confession and
official action is missing.” Id. We can only conclude that a confession is involuntary
when “official coercion” occurs such that “a defendant’s will has been overborne and his
capacity for self-determination has been critically impaired.” Id. ¶ 33 (brackets, internal
quotation marks, and citation omitted).

{14} The totality of the foregoing circumstances here do not support a determination
of involuntariness. Initially, Defendant fails to produce any evidence of his impairment
aside from his own testimony. See Evans, 2009-NMSC-027, ¶ 37 (rejecting an
involuntary confession claim when “there is little in the record, apart from [the
d]efendant’s own words” suggesting the defendant was impaired). Furthermore, the
evidence unambiguously demonstrates that Defendant did not exhibit signs of drug
impairment at any time during the interviews. Defendant was walking, talking, and
coherent. The State’s drug recognition expert opined that Defendant did not exhibit
symptoms consistent with someone being high on Xanax. Specifically, Defendant was
coherent, articulate, and exhibited complex thought processes. Additionally, Defendant
fabricated facts. A defendant under the influence of narcotics is still capable of making a
voluntary confession. See State v. Lobato, 2006-NMCA-051, ¶ 11, 139 N.M. 431, 134
P.3d 122 (“A claim that a defendant was . . . suffering from the effects of alcohol is not,
in the absence of coercive law enforcement activity, sufficient to characterize his
confession as involuntary.” (brackets, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted)).

{15} Moreover, there was no overreaching or coercion by law enforcement in
obtaining Defendant’s statements. There is no evidence whatsoever that Officer
Formento or Detective Bruciaga did anything to overreach, or coerce Defendant into
giving his statements.

{16} Our de novo review of the record leads us to conclude that the evidence fails to
demonstrate that Defendant was under the influence of Xanax when he was interviewed
by Officer Formento and later by Detective Bruciaga. Even if Defendant was under the
influence of Xanax to any degree, the officers did nothing to seize upon or exploit
Defendant’s condition, thereby rendering his statements involuntary. We therefore affirm
the district order denying Defendant’s motion to suppress.

B. Sufficiency of the evidence related to tampering with evidence on the
murder and aggravated assault charges

{17} Defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to support the jury’s finding
that the shotgun Defendant threw into the dumpster, which he used in the armed
robbery of the Seven-Eleven, is the same gun used in the murder of Heyborne. He
therefore contends that the evidence fails to support the jury’s finding that Defendant
tampered with evidence as related to murder and aggravated assault. The issue is
raised by Defendant pursuant to State v. Franklin, 1967-NMSC-151, 78 N.M. 127, 428
P.2d 982 and State v. Boyer, 1985-NMCA-029, 103 N.M. 655, 712 P.2d 1. The district
court addressed this issue prior to sentencing and determined that the tampering with
evidence charge “goes to the heart of the armed robbery case where he’s ditching the
firearm . . .” and correctly applied the tampering charge to the armed robbery charge.
We therefore reject this argument.

{18} The test for sufficiency of the evidence “is whether substantial evidence of either
a direct or circumstantial nature exists to support a verdict of guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt with respect to every element essential to a conviction.” State v. Duran, 2006-
NMSC-035, ¶ 5, 140 N.M. 94, 140 P.3d 515 (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). In addition, “we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the guilty
verdict, indulging all reasonable inferences and resolving all conflicts in the evidence in
favor of the verdict.” State v. Cunningham, 2000-NMSC-009, ¶ 26, 128 N.M. 711, 998
P.2d 176. In our determination of the sufficiency of the evidence, we are required to
ensure that “a rational jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt the essential
facts required for a conviction.” Duran, 2006-NMSC-035, ¶ 5 (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted). Under our standard of review, the evidence clearly supports a
finding that Defendant committed tampering with evidence as it relates to the armed
robbery of the Seven-Eleven. Video surveillance admitted at Defendant’s trial showed
Defendant throwing the shotgun used in the armed robbery into the dumpster in the
store parking lot. Police retrieved, photographed and swabbed the shotgun.

{19} Even if the evidence fails to show that the shotgun thrown into the dumpster
outside the Seven-Eleven is the same shotgun used in Heyborne’s murder, there is
nevertheless sufficient evidence to prove tampering with evidence. Defendant was
correctly convicted and sentenced for one count of tampering with evidence as a third-
degree felony for the armed robbery of the Seven-Eleven.

{20} In separate special verdicts, the jury unanimously found beyond a reasonable
doubt that Defendant committed tampering with evidence related to the first-degree
murder of Heyborne, and tampering with evidence related to the armed robbery of the
Seven-Eleven. Because a person is guilty of a third-degree felony when the highest
crime for which tampering with evidence is committed is a capital or first-degree felony
or a second-degree felony, Section 30-22-5(B)(1), Defendant committed a third-degree
felony for tampering with evidence related to either the murder or the armed robbery.
First-degree murder is a capital felony, Section 30-2-1(A)(1); and armed robbery is (for
the first offense) a second-degree felony, Section 30-16-2. Furthermore, although the
jury found that tampering with evidence was committed as related to both crimes, it only
found Defendant guilty of the one count in the indictment charging tampering with
evidence, and Defendant received a single sentence of three years for committing a
single offense of tampering with evidence. This is the correct sentence for a third-
degree felony. NMSA 1978, Section 31-18-15(A) (2025).

{21} We reject Defendant’s argument under this point because the evidence supports
Defendant’s conviction for tampering with evidence.
III. CONCLUSION

{22} We affirm the judgment and sentence.

{23} IT IS SO ORDERED.

MICHAEL E. VIGIL, Justice

WE CONCUR:

DAVID K. THOMSON, Chief Justice

C. SHANNON BACON, Justice

JULIE J. VARGAS, Justice

BRIANA H. ZAMORA, Justice