State v. Salinas

This decision of the Supreme Court of New Mexico was not selected for publication in
the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Refer to Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO

Filing Date: May 21, 2026

No. S-1-SC-40474

STATE OF NEW MEXICO,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

MICHAEL SALINAS,

Defendant-Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BERNALILLO COUNTY
Brett R. Loveless, District Judge

Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender
Kimberly Chavez Cook, Appellate Defender
Mallory E. Harwood, Assistant Appellate Defender
Santa Fe, NM

for Appellant

Raúl Torrez, Attorney General
Ellen Venegas, Assistant Solicitor General
Santa Fe, NM

for Appellee

DECISION

VARGAS, Chief Justice.

{1} Defendant Michael Salinas was convicted of first-degree murder in violation of
NMSA 1978, Section 30-2-1(A)(1) (1994), and three counts of shooting at or from a
motor vehicle in violation of NMSA 1978, Section 30-3-8(B) (1993), with a firearm
enhancement for each count of shooting at or from a motor vehicle, in accordance with
NMSA 1978, Section 31-18-16 (2020, amended 2022). Defendant appeals his
convictions arguing: (1) the firearm enhancements for each of his sentences for
shooting at or from a motor vehicle (a) resulted in an illegal sentence because the
district court imposed a longer enhancement than was statutorily authorized for
Defendant as a serious youthful offender, (b) violate double jeopardy, and (c) are
unsupported by sufficient evidence; (2) his conviction must be overturned based on
ineffective assistance of trial counsel; and (3) his sentence constitutes cruel and
unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and Article II, Section 13 of the New Mexico Constitution.

{2} We affirm Defendant’s convictions by nonprecedential decision. See Rule 12-
405(B) NMRA. However, we remand to the district court for resentencing to correct the
length of Defendant’s three firearm enhancements. Because of Defendant’s status as a
serious youthful offender, the district court’s authority to enhance his sentence is limited
to only one year. See § 31-18-16(A) (2020) (“[W]hen the offender is a serious youthful
offender . . . the sentence imposed by this subsection may be increased by one year.”).

I. BACKGROUND

{3} Defendant’s convictions stem from an ongoing dispute between two high school
friend groups which culminated in Defendant and four teenage boys (Victims) agreeing
to meet up at a park. Defendant arrived at the park first, armed with an AR-15 rifle, and
waited for Victims. As Victims drove into the park, Defendant ducked behind his car,
raised his rifle over the hood, and fired sixteen shots in the direction of Victims’ car.
Defendant struck all four occupants in the car, killing one of them. Defendant was fifteen
years old at the time of the shooting.

{4} Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder and three counts of shooting at
or from a motor vehicle. The district court included a three-year firearm enhancement
for each count of shooting at or from a motor vehicle, nine-years total, because the jury
found that Defendant brandished a firearm in the commission of the crimes. The district
court sentenced Defendant to a total term of fifty-four years in prison with sixteen years
suspended. We provide additional facts when necessary to our analysis.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Firearm Enhancement

{5} Defendant raises three arguments regarding the firearm enhancements to his
convictions for shooting at or from a motor vehicle: (1) his sentence is illegal because
the district court imposed a longer enhancement than was statutorily authorized for
Defendant, based on his status as a serious youthful offender, see NMSA 1978, § 31-
18-15.2 (1996) (defining “serious youthful offender” as “an individual fifteen to eighteen
years of age who is charged with and indicted or bound over for trial for first degree
murder”); (2) the enhancements violate double jeopardy; and (3) the State presented
insufficient evidence of Defendant brandishing a firearm.
1. Defendant’s sentence is illegal in light of his serious youthful offender
status

{6} “A trial court’s power to sentence is derived exclusively from statute.” State v.
Chavarria, 2009-NMSC-020, ¶ 12, 146 N.M. 251, 208 P.3d 896 (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted). A district court possesses inherent discretion to sentence a
defendant but must do so “within the framework of our sentencing laws.” State v. Cates,
2023-NMSC-001, ¶ 13, 523 P.3d 570. When a defendant claims that a sentence is not
authorized by statute and thus illegal, our review is de novo. State v. Brown, 1999-
NMSC-004, ¶ 8, 126 N.M. 642, 974 P.2d 136.

{7} As a threshold matter, the State concedes that Defendant’s sentence is illegal
and does not oppose remand so that the district court can correctly impose a one-year
enhancement for each applicable offense, instead of the three-year enhancements
imposed by the district court. Though the Court is “not bound by the State’s
concessions,” State v. Montoya, 2015-NMSC-010, ¶ 58, 345 P.3d 1056, we agree that
the district court applied the wrong term of years for Defendant’s firearm enhancements
under Section 31-18-16(A) (2020).

{8} Section 31-18-16(A) (2020) states that when a jury finds that a defendant
“brandished a firearm in the commission of a noncapital felony, the basic sentence of
imprisonment . . . shall be increased by three years, except that when the offender is a
serious youthful offender . . . the sentence imposed by this subsection may be
increased by one year.” Id. (emphasis added). This Court recently reversed the
imposition of a four-year sentencing enhancement for a serious youthful offender under
Section 31-18-16 (2020), reasoning that “the district court only had statutory authority to
enhance [the defendant’s] sentence by one year.” State v. Revels, 2025-NMSC-021, ¶¶
52-53, 572 P.3d 974. Revels compels the same result here as Defendant was fifteen
years old when he shot victims, making him a serious youthful offender. See § 31-18-
15.2. Thus, like in Revels, the district court only had statutory authority to enhance
Defendant’s sentence by one year. 2025-NMSC-021, ¶ 53. We therefore vacate
Defendant’s three-year enhancements and remand for resentencing under Section 31-
18-16(A) (2020), consistent with his status as a serious youthful offender. We address
Defendant’s remaining arguments related to the firearm enhancements in turn.

2. Defendant’s firearm enhancements for shooting at or from a motor vehicle
do not violate double jeopardy

{9} Defendant next contends that applying firearm enhancements to his convictions
for shooting at or from a motor vehicle violates double jeopardy. Double jeopardy
challenges raise questions of law that we review de novo. State v. Lorenzo, 2024-
NMSC-003, ¶ 5, 545 P.3d 1156.

{10} One of the protections of the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment to
the United States Constitution is the prohibition of “multiple punishments for the same
offense.” Swafford v. State, 1991-NMSC-043, ¶ 6, 112 N.M. 3, 810 P.2d 1223 (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). There are two types of multiple punishment
double jeopardy cases: “those cases in which a defendant is charged with multiple
violations of a single statute based on a single course of conduct (‘unit of prosecution’
cases) and those cases in which a defendant is charged with violating different statutes
in a single course of conduct (‘double-description’ cases).” State v. Sena, 2020-NMSC-
011, ¶ 44, 470 P.3d 227.

{11} Defendant raises a double-description claim, arguing his convictions violate
double jeopardy because he was charged with violating two different statutes: (1)
Section 30-3-8 (shooting at or from a motor vehicle) and (2) Section 31-18-16 (2020)
(firearm enhancement), for a single course of conduct. To determine whether Defendant
was twice put in jeopardy for a single course of conduct, we apply a two-step inquiry.
See State v. Baroz, 2017-NMSC-030, ¶ 22, 404 P.3d 769 (applying the double
description analysis to determine whether a firearm enhancement to the defendant’s
conviction for assault with a deadly weapon violated double jeopardy). First, we
determine “whether the conduct underlying the offense is unitary, i.e., whether the same
conduct violates both statutes.” Id. (quoting Swafford, 1991-NMSC-043, ¶ 25). “[I]f the
conduct is unitary . . . we proceed to the second step . . . to determine whether the
[L]egislature intended to create separately punishable offenses.” Id.

{12} Under the first step, neither party disputes that the conduct underlying
Defendant’s convictions for shooting at or from a motor vehicle and his firearm
enhancements was unitary. Although we are not bound by their concession, Montoya,
2015-NMSC-010, ¶ 58, we assume without deciding that the conduct was unitary and
proceed to the second step.

{13} Under the second step, if “a legislature specifically authorizes cumulative
punishment under two statutes, regardless of whether those two statutes proscribe the
‘same’ conduct under Blockburger, a court may impose cumulative punishment under
such statutes in a single trial.” Baroz, 2017-NMSC-030, ¶ 26 (text only) 1 (quoting
Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 368-69 (1983)). In reviewing previous versions of the
firearm enhancement statute, this Court has held that Section 31-18-16 expressly
“authorizes multiple punishments for the commission of a noncapital felony with a
firearm,” even if the conduct supporting the underlying offense and the enhancement is
unitary. Baroz, 2017-NMSC-030, ¶¶ 23-27 (reviewing Section 31-18-16 (1993)); see
also State v. Griffin, 1993-NMSC-071, ¶ 31, 116 N.M. 689, 866 P.2d 1156 (“Section 31-
18-16 [(Cum. Supp. 1993)] is a clear expression that the [L]egislature intends increased
punishment when a firearm is used in a robbery or burglary.”). This Court reasoned that
the legislative policy of Section 31-18-16 authorizes multiple punishments for noncapital
crimes committed with a firearm because such crimes are “more reprehensible” than
those committed without a firearm and “should be subject to greater punishment.”
Baroz, 2017-NMSC-030, ¶ 27. Therefore, this Court has held that imposing a firearm
enhancement to a defendant’s sentence for a noncapital felony involving the use of a

1“(Text only)” indicates the omission of nonessential punctuation marks—including internal quotation
marks, ellipses, and brackets—that are present in the text of the quoted source, leaving the quoted text
otherwise unchanged.
firearm “does not run afoul of double jeopardy.” Id.; see also, e.g., Griffin, 1993-NMSC-
071, ¶ 31.

{14} Defendant contends that, although the statute appears to authorize multiple
punishments, the statutory language is ambiguous as to whether the enhancement
applies to every noncapital felony without exception. In particular, Defendant claims the
language is ambiguous as to whether the statute authorizes multiple punishments for
offenses that by definition already require the use of a firearm, such as shooting at or
from a motor vehicle.

{15} To determine whether the Legislature authorized multiple punishments for
noncapital felonies necessarily committed with a firearm we first look to the plain
language of the statute. See State v. Olsson, 2014-NMSC-012, ¶ 18, 324 P.3d 1230
(“The plain language of the statute is the primary indicator of legislative intent.”).

{16} The 2020 version of the firearm enhancement statute states:

When a separate finding of fact by the court or jury shows that a firearm
was brandished in the commission of a noncapital felony, the basic
sentence of imprisonment . . . shall be increased by three years, except
that when the offender is a serious youthful offender or a youthful
offender, the sentence imposed by this subsection may be increased by
one year.

Section 31-18-16(A) (2020). Reviewing the plain language, we recognize that the
Legislature intended for the firearm enhancement to apply when “a firearm [is]
brandished in the commission of a noncapital felony.” Id. (emphasis added); see also
State v. Quintana, 2021-NMSC-013, ¶ 12, 485 P.3d 215 (“[W]hen a statute contains
language which is clear and unambiguous, we must give effect to that language and
refrain from further statutory interpretation.” (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted)). Section 31-18-16 (2020) contains no language exempting any category of
noncapital felonies from enhancement, including crimes necessarily committed with a
firearm. Although the Legislature could have created such an exception, it did not do so.
See generally State v. Greenwood, 2012-NMCA-017, ¶ 38, 271 P.3d 753 (“[T]he
Legislature knows how to include language in a statute if it so desires.” (alteration in
original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Interpreting the plain language
in this manner also supports the purpose of the firearm enhancement statute: to impose
greater punishment for crimes committed with a firearm because those crimes are
“more reprehensible.” Baroz, 2017-NMSC-030, ¶ 27. We therefore reaffirm that the
Legislature authorized multiple punishments when a firearm is brandished during the
commission of a noncapital felony. Id. ¶ 25 (“Section 31-18-16(A) thereby authorizes
multiple punishments for the commission of a noncapital felony with a firearm.”); Griffin,
1993-NMSC-071, ¶ 31.

{17} Here, Defendant was subject to three separate firearm enhancements—one for
each conviction for shooting at or from a motor vehicle. Shooting at or from a motor
vehicle is a noncapital felony. See § 30-3-8(B) (defining shooting at or from a motor
vehicle as either a fourth-, third-, or second-degree felony, based on the harm caused).
Thus, similar to Baroz and Griffin, even if the conduct supporting shooting at or from a
motor vehicle and the firearm enhancement was unitary, the plain language of Section
31-18-16 (2020) “authorizes multiple punishments for the commission of a noncapital
felony with a firearm.” Baroz, 2017-NMSC-030, ¶ 25; accord Griffin, 1993-NMSC-071, ¶
31. As a result, applying firearm enhancements to Defendant’s convictions of shooting
at or from a motor vehicle does not run afoul of double jeopardy.

3. Sufficient evidence was presented of Defendant brandishing a firearm in
the commission of shooting at or from a motor vehicle.

{18} Defendant also argues that the State failed to provide sufficient evidence that he
“brandished” a firearm, as required by the enhancement statute. See § 31-18-16(A)
(2020) (requiring the jury to find that “a firearm was brandished in the commission of a
noncapital felony”). In doing so, Defendant does not contest that he shot a firearm but
instead claims that Victims “did not see or hear a gun before being struck with bullets.”
Absent evidence that Victims were aware of the presence of the gun before Defendant
shot them, Defendant claims there is insufficient evidence that he displayed or made the
firearm known to Victims, as required by the firearm enhancement statute. See § 31-18-
16(D) (2020) (defining brandishing as “displaying or making a firearm known to another
person . . . with intent to intimidate or injure a person”).

{19} In reviewing a sufficiency of evidence challenge, the Court “indulge[s] all
reasonable inferences in support of the verdict, and disregard[s] all evidence and
inferences to the contrary.” State v. Zachariah G., 2022-NMSC-003, ¶ 9, 501 P.3d 451
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The ultimate question becomes whether
a “rational jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt the essential facts required
for a conviction.” State v. Astorga, 2015-NMSC-007, ¶ 57, 343 P.3d 1245 (internal
quotation marks, citation, and emphasis omitted).

{20} “Jury instructions become the law of the case against which the sufficiency of the
evidence is to be measured.” State v. Holt, 2016-NMSC-011, ¶ 20, 368 P.3d 409 (text
only) (citation omitted). Here, the jury was provided with special verdict forms requiring it
to answer whether Defendant brandished a firearm in the commission of the
corresponding crimes. The jury was also provided with an instruction defining
brandishing in accordance with Section 31-18-16(D) (2020). Thus, the jury was asked to
decide whether Defendant “display[ed] or [made] a firearm known to another person . . .
with intent to intimidate or injure a person.” Id.

{21} In reviewing the record, we conclude the evidence was sufficient for a reasonable
jury to conclude that Defendant brandished a firearm. At trial, Defendant testified that as
Victims parked their car, he ducked behind his car, placed the firearm on his car hood,
and fired multiple shots in the direction of Victims’ car. Testimony from the surviving
Victims and Defendant established that these where the only two cars in the parking lot
and the cars were parked a few spaces apart. Given the close proximity of the cars, a
reasonable jury could conclude that Defendant displayed or made the firearm known to
Victims, if not by placing the firearm on his car hood and pointing it in the direction of
Victims’ car, then surely by firing sixteen shots from the firearm.

{22} As for Defendant’s intent to injure or intimidate Victims, the jury heard evidence
that, prior to shooting Victims, Defendant was live on Instagram where he continuously
showed the firearm used in the shooting to an audience of hundreds of followers, stating
he was going to “put four [people] to rest” and “murder” the guys coming to fight him.
With such evidence, a rational jury could conclude that Defendant intended to intimidate
or injure Victims when he displayed or made the firearm known to them. See Lukens v.
Franco, 2019-NMSC-002, ¶ 52, 433 P.3d 288 (“Juries may . . . draw inferences from all
the surrounding circumstances.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).

{23} Defendant claims that his use of the firearm did not meet the definition of
brandishing because Victims did not see or hear the firearm before being shot. This
argument fails for two reasons. First, Defendant’s view of the facts is contradicted by the
evidence at trial. The record shows that one victim testified that, as their car parked, he
saw a person standing outside Defendant’s car pull out a gun, and another victim stated
that as the car parked, he heard shots. Only the driver did not see or hear the gun, as
he was struck while parking the car and went unconscious.

{24} Second, to the extent Defendant argues that brandishing must occur before any
discharge of the firearm, we find no support for such a temporal requirement in the
firearm enhancement statute. Instead, the plain language of Section 31-18-16(A) (2020)
states that the firearm must be brandished “in the commission of a noncapital felony,”
indicating that the brandishing may be contemporaneous with the noncapital felony. Id.
(emphasis added). Thus, the jury was allowed to consider Defendant’s conduct as it
reasonably related to the commission of shooting at or from a motor vehicle, including
the act of shooting itself.

{25} Finally, we reject Defendant’s attempt to graft a subjective knowledge
requirement onto the definition of brandishing by requiring a victim to actually see or
hear the firearm. Defendant provided no authority to support his claim that the statute
requires a victim’s knowledge of the firearm in the context of brandishing: instead,
brandishing may be accomplished by either “displaying or making a firearm known to
another person.” Section 31-18-16(D) (2020). “As a rule of construction, the word ‘or’
should be given its normal disjunctive meaning unless the context of a statute demands
otherwise.” Hale v. Basin Motor Co., 1990-NMSC-068, ¶ 9, 110 N.M. 314, 795 P.2d
1006. Thus, the term “displaying” stands alone as a separate possible means of
brandishing. See Territory v. McGrath, 1911-NMSC-026, ¶ 5, 16 N.M. 202, 114 P. 364
(“If a statute makes criminal the doing of this or that or that, mentioning several things
disjunctively, there is but one offense, which may be committed in different ways.”
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).

{26} In short, Defendant’s act of placing the firearm on the hood of his car when
Victims arrived readily supports a reasonable conclusion that he displayed the firearm in
this case. We therefore affirm the imposition of his firearm enhancements, but we
remand to the district court for resentencing to correct the length of each enhancement
from three years to one year. See § 31-18-16(A) (2020); Revels, 2025-NMSC-021, ¶¶
52-53.

B. Defendant’s Posttrial Motion Raising Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

1. Procedural history

{27} Three months after the verdict, Defendant fired his trial counsel. Defendant then
hired new counsel, who filed a motion requesting findings related to ineffective
assistance of counsel (IAC) over ten months after the verdict. The State responded that
Defendant’s motion was a request for new trial subject to the strict ten-day deadline in
Rule 5-614(C) NMRA. See Rule 5-614(C) (“A motion for new trial based on any other
grounds [than newly discovered evidence] shall be made within ten (10) days after
verdict.”).

{28} The district court held a hearing on the motion where Defendant presented
evidence of his IAC claim. At the close of the hearing, Defense counsel acknowledged
the motion was a request for a new trial based on “other grounds” subject to Rule 5-
614(C) and conceded the motion was filed more than ten days after the verdict. The
district court agreed with the parties and dismissed the untimely motion because it was
divested of jurisdiction to order a new trial. The district court also determined it was
without authority to make findings related to Defendant’s IAC claim and Defendant had
failed to cite a procedural mechanism that would allow such findings after the posttrial
motion hearing.

{29} On appeal, Defendant now argues the district court erred in denying his motion
for a new trial without making findings and conclusions related to his IAC claim. To
remedy the asserted error, Defendant asks this Court to either (1) conclude that the
record adequately establishes IAC, vacate Defendant’s convictions, and remand for him
to plead to second-degree murder, or in the alternative, (2) remand for the district court
to enter findings of fact related to his IAC claim. We address these contentions in turn.

2. The district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing Defendant’s
motion without issuing findings of facts related to his IAC claim

{30} We begin by reviewing the district court’s dismissal of Defendant’s motion
pursuant to Rule 5-614(C) without making findings of fact related to his IAC claim. We
review the district court’s ruling on a motion for new trial for abuse of discretion. State v.
Moreland, 2008-NMSC-031, ¶ 9, 144 N.M 192, 185 P.3d 363. Legal questions
concerning the district court’s postverdict authority are subject to de novo review. State
v. Martinez, 2022-NMSC-004, ¶ 5, 503 P.3d 313.

{31} Despite Rule 5-614(C)’s clear limitation that a motion for a new trial based on any
grounds other than newly discovered evidence “shall be made within ten days after the
verdict,” Defendant filed his motion over ten months after the verdict. As a result, the
district court did not abuse its discretion by concluding it was without jurisdiction to grant
Defendant a new trial. See State v. Lucero, 2001-NMSC-024, ¶¶ 9-10, 130 N.M. 676, 30
P.3d 365 (holding that “the filing requirement in Rule 5-614(C) is jurisdictional” and the
trial court was without jurisdiction to rule on an untimely motion for a new trial); see e.g.,
State v. Ortiz, S-l-SC-36788, dispositional order (N.M. Mar. 4, 2019) (nonprecedential)
(reversing the district court’s grant of a motion for new trial on “other grounds” under
Rule 5-614(C) because it was filed more than seven months after the jury verdict).

{32} Nonetheless, Defendant argues the district court abused its discretion by
concluding that it lacked authority to make findings related to his IAC claim. Defendant
contends that because his motion explicitly requested an evidentiary hearing and
findings related to IAC, the district court had discretion to either deny the motion
outright, or, after holding the evidentiary hearing, issue findings of fact and conclusions
of law for his IAC claim. Defendant asserts that once the district court conducted the
hearing, any conclusion that the court lacked authority to issue findings of fact was a
mistake of law amounting to an abuse of discretion. See Sena, 2020-NMSC-011, ¶ 15
(noting that a trial court abuses it discretion if “its discretionary decision is premised on a
misapprehension of the law” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).

{33} However, even if we concluded that the district court had the authority to issue
findings of fact for Defendant’s untimely posttrial IAC motion, Defendant provides no
support for the exercise of this authority being mandatory. Where a party cites no
authority to support an argument, we may assume no such authority exists. In re
Adoption of Doe, 1984-NMSC-024, ¶ 2, 100 N.M. 764, 676 P.2d 1329. With no authority
mandating the district court to issue findings related to Defendant’s IAC claim, its refusal
to do so was not a misapprehension of the law amounting to an abuse of discretion.
See Sena, 2020-NMSC-011, ¶ 15; cf. Montoya, 2015-NMSC-010, ¶ 68 (“[T]he district
court’s misunderstanding of its authority and obligation to consider mitigating
circumstances, which resulted in its failure to consider altering the basic sentence, was
an abuse of discretion.”)

3. The record is not adequately developed to resolve Defendant’s IAC claim

{34} Even in the absence of findings of fact, Defendant contends that this case
presents one of the rare circumstances in which either (1) the record is sufficiently
developed for this Court to conclude trial counsel was ineffective without further inquiry;
or (2) he has established a prima facie case of IAC warranting remand for an
evidentiary hearing. See Garcia v. State, 2010-NMSC-023, ¶ 29, 148 N.M. 414, 237
P.3d 716 (“[D]epending on the adequacy of the record, we may either dismiss or
remand an ineffective assistance of counsel claim to allow for further development of
the issue before the trial court. In rare circumstances, however, the record may be
sufficiently developed that an appellate court can rule on the issue without further
inquiry by the trial court.”); see also State v. Roybal, 2002-NMSC-027, ¶ 19, 132 N.M.
657, 54 P.3d 61 (“[A]n appellate court may remand a case for an evidentiary hearing if
the defendant makes a prima facie case of ineffective assistance.”)

{35} The State responds that the record is insufficiently developed for this Court to
decide Defendant’s IAC claim because essential facts regarding counsel’s
representation—particularly as to plea negotiations—are still in dispute. See State v.
Hunter, 2006-NMSC-043, ¶ 31, 140 N.M. 406, 143 P.3d 168 (“Where the trial court has
held an evidentiary hearing regarding counsel’s effectiveness, both sides have had the
opportunity to develop their positions, and the essential facts regarding counsel’s
representation are not in dispute, we believe it is inconsistent with judicial economy to
require additional proceedings on this issue.” (emphasis added)). The State further
argues that Defendant has failed to establish a prima facie case of IAC that would
warrant remand for an additional evidentiary hearing.

{36} Defendant’s IAC claim centers on trial counsel’s handling of plea negotiations
and his alleged misunderstanding of the law governing a juvenile defendant’s eligibility
for an amenability hearing. Specifically, Defendant first claims that trial counsel’s
performance fell below that of a reasonably competent attorney because trial counsel
did not understand that juveniles convicted of first-degree murder are not granted an
amenability hearing. See State v. Jones, 2010-NMSC-012, ¶ 17, 148 N.M. 1, 229 P.3d
474 (“[A] serious youthful offender is not entitled to an amenability hearing because,
upon conviction of first-degree murder, the child must receive an adult sentence.”).
Second, Defendant claims that trial counsel declined the possibility of a second-degree
murder plea without conveying the offer to Defendant. See Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S.
134, 145 (2012) (holding that “as a general rule, defense counsel has the duty to
communicate formal offers from the prosecution” to the defendant).

{37} However, the record before this Court is insufficiently developed to permit a
determination of IAC without further factual inquiry. First, the limited record does not
support that Defendant’s trial counsel had a fundamental misunderstanding of when a
serious youthful offender is eligible for an amenability hearing. Rather, trial counsel
acknowledged that the nature of the convictions for a serious youthful offender
determines whether the defendant is entitled to an amenability hearing. Trial counsel
elaborated on discussions with another attorney, not involved in the case, on potential
legal challenges to existing case law seeking to pursue an amenability hearing for a
serious youthful offender, notwithstanding a first-degree murder conviction.
Nonetheless, trial counsel admitted that it was an issue to be litigated and the outcome
was not guaranteed.

{38} Second, the record does not establish whether the State actually extended a plea
offer for second-degree murder, the specific terms of any such offer, or whether the
State would have been willing to resolve the remaining charges. Although the record
reflects that the State extended a written plea offer to first-degree murder with a
sentencing cap of 20 years several months before trial, Defendant contends the State
later discussed a possible plea offer to second-degree murder at a meeting days before
trial. The State confirms the meeting, but contends that the discussion did not rise to the
level of an actual plea offer for second-degree murder. Based on this unresolved factual
dispute between the parties, it remains unclear whether second-degree murder was
categorically “not on the table,” as the State asserts, or whether the parties were open
to exploring the possibility of a second-degree murder plea offer. Furthermore, the
evidence is unclear as to whether the State was willing to extend any potential plea offer
that would have required an amenability hearing as a matter of law. See Jones, 2010-
NMSC-012, ¶ 48 (“[T]he trial court lacks the statutory authority to impose an adult
sentence on any youthful offender without [holding an amenability hearing].” (emphasis
omitted)). Because these unresolved factual disputes go directly to Defendant’s claim of
IAC, we disagree with Defendant that the existing record is sufficient for this Court to
resolve his claim on direct appeal. State v. Crocco, 2014-NMSC-016, ¶ 15, 327 P.3d
1068 (“Without an adequate record, an appellate court cannot determine that trial
counsel provided constitutionally ineffective assistance.”).

{39} Based on these unresolved factual disputes, Defendant is also unable to
establish prima facie IAC on the existing record. See Roybal, 2002-NMSC-027, ¶ 19
(“[I]f facts necessary to a full determination are not part of the record, an ineffective
assistance claim is more properly brought through a habeas corpus petition.”). We
therefore presume that counsel’s performance was reasonable and note that Defendant
remains free to raise his IAC claim in a habeas corpus proceeding. See State v.
Arrendondo, 2012-NMSC-013, ¶ 38, 278 P.3d 517 (“Without such prima facie evidence,
the Court presumes that defense counsel’s performance fell within the range of
reasonable representation.”); Hunter, 2006-NMSC-043, ¶ 30 (“[H]abeas corpus
proceedings are the preferred avenue for adjudicating ineffective assistance of counsel
claims.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).

C. Defendant’s Sentence Does Not Constitute Cruel and Unusual Punishment

{40} Defendant’s final contention is that his sentence constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment and Article II, Section 13. Defendant
did not raise this issue below; therefore, we review for fundamental error. State v.
Trujillo, 2002-NMSC-005, ¶ 64, 131 N.M. 709, 42 P.3d 814 (reviewing a defendant’s
unpreserved cruel and unusual punishment claim for fundamental error).

{41} Defendant was sentenced to a total term of fifty-four years, with sixteen years
suspended. Defendant argues this sentence is harsh for crimes committed as a juvenile
and he must be given a meaningful opportunity for release. See Ira v. Janecka, 2018-
NMSC-027, ¶ 1, 419 P.3d 161 (recognizing “a special category under the Eighth
Amendment for juvenile offenders,” requiring that juveniles “should receive a meaningful
opportunity to obtain release by demonstrating maturity and rehabilitation”). Defendant,
however, does not dispute that his sentence was authorized by law. See Trujillo, 2002-
NMSC-005, ¶ 66 (“It is rare that a term of incarceration, which has been authorized by
the Legislature, will be found to be excessively long or inherently cruel.” (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted)). Defendant also does not dispute that, under
NMSA 1978, Section 31-21-10.2(A)(2) (2023), he may be eligible for a parole hearing in
twenty years, giving him a meaningful opportunity for release. See Ira, 2018-NMSC-
027, ¶¶ 2, 4, 39 (concluding that a defendant who was sentenced to ninety-one and
one-half years as a juvenile had a meaningful opportunity for release where he would
be eligible for parole at sixty-two years old and that the sentence was not
unconstitutional).

{42} Defendant instead claims that the prison system does not adequately rehabilitate
inmates to ensure they are afforded a meaningful opportunity for release; therefore,
Defendant argues, there is a strong chance that he will not be granted parole because
he will not have had access to the treatment necessary for his rehabilitation. This
argument is speculative, as Defendant does not identify any treatment actually being
denied. Cf. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) (“In order to state a cognizable
[Eighth Amendment] claim, a prisoner must allege acts or omissions sufficiently harmful
to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.”); State v. Augustus,
1981-NMCA-118, ¶¶ 9-10, 97 N.M. 100, 637 P.2d 50 (holding the trial court’s sentence
after the defendant’s heart surgery did not exhibit a deliberate indifference to his
medical needs). If any specific issues regarding the lack of adequate rehabilitative
treatment do arise, Defendant may seek an appropriate remedy at that time. See
Cordova v. LeMaster, 2004-NMSC-026, ¶ 9, 136 N.M. 217, 96 P.3d 778 (explaining that
an inmate may challenge their conditions of confinement by a petition for writ of habeas
corpus or a civil rights lawsuit). Accordingly, we reject Defendant’s contention that his
sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the United States and
New Mexico Constitutions.

III. CONCLUSION

{43} We affirm Defendant’s convictions and remand to the district court to correct the
length of the firearm enhancements in accordance with Section 31-18-16(A) (2020).

{44} IT IS SO ORDERED.

JULIE J. VARGAS, Chief Justice

WE CONCUR:

MICHAEL E. VIGIL, Justice

C. SHANNON BACON, Justice

DAVID K. THOMSON, Justice

BRIANA H. ZAMORA, Justice