Ohio Board Advisory Opinion Op 01-003

The Supreme Court of Ohio
BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS ON GRIEVANCES AND DISCIPLINE
41 SOUTH HIGH STREET-SUITE 3370, COLUMBUS, OH 43215-6105
(614) 644-5800 FAX: (614) 644-5804
OFFICE OF SECRETARY
OPINION 2001-3
Issued June 7, 2001
[CPR Opinion-provides advice under the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility which is superseded
by the Ohio Rules of Professional Conduct, eff. 2/1/2007.]
SYLLABUS: A law firm may obtain a loan from a third party financial institution to
advance expenses of litigation in a personal injury matter accepted on a contingent fee
basis and may deduct the interest fees and costs of the loan from a client’s settlement or
judgment provided that certain conditions are met. The law firm may not secure the loan
with the client’s settlement or judgment. The terms of the loan, including the amount
borrowed, the interest rates, and costs of the loan must be appropriate and reasonable. At
the outset of the representation, the client must be informed and must provide consent.
The terms of the loan must be disclosed to the client and must be agreed upon by the
client in the contingent fee agreement. The contingent fee agreement must inform the
client of whether repayment of litigation expenses is contingent upon the outcome of the
matter. The contingent fee agreement must clearly state whether contingent fee
percentages are computed before or after deduction of costs and expenses. As required
by Section 4705.15 (B) and (C) of the Ohio Revised Code, the contingent fee agreement
must be reduced to writing, signed by the attorney and the client, and a signed copy must
be given to the client. At the time of, or prior to the receipt of compensation, a signed
closing statement must be provided to the client.
OPINION: This opinion addresses the ethical propriety of a law firm borrowing money,
using the funds to advance costs and expenses of litigation in a personal injury matter
accepted on a contingent fee basis, and then passing the interest fees and costs of the loan
to the client as expenses of litigation.
Is it proper for a law firm to obtain a loan from a third-party financial
institution, use the money to advance costs and expenses of litigation in a
personal injury matter accepted on a contingent fee basis, and then deduct
the interest fees and costs of the loan from a client’s settlement or
judgment as an expense of litigation?
A law firm inquires as to obtaining a loan from a third-party financial institution for use
in advancing expenses in a client’s personal injury litigation. The law firm would secure
the loan, but not with the client’s settlement or judgment. The law firm would make
monthly payments of interest to the institution and would be obligated to repay the loan.
The law firm’s obligation to repay the loan would be triggered at the conclusion of the
client’s representation by settlement or final judgment.
Withdrawn by Adv. Op. 2021-02 on April 9, 2021

Op. 2001-3 2
At the outset of the representation, the lawyer would disclose the arrangement between
the law firm and the third-party financial institution. The lawyer and the client would
enter into a contingent fee agreement that would include client approval of the loan
agreement between the law firm and the financial institution. The contingent fee
agreement would provide for the deduction of the interest fees and cost of the loan from
the client’s settlement or judgment. At the closing with the client, all of the figures
would be set forth in writing.
As a reminder to Ohio attorneys, DR 2-101(E)(1)(c) requires that all communications to
the public regarding fees and charges must clearly state whether contingent fee
percentages are computed before or after deduction of costs and expenses and whether in
the event of an adverse verdict or decision the litigant is liable for repayment of litigation
expenses. In addition, as required by Section 4705.15 (B) and (C) of the Ohio Revised
Code, a contingent fee agreement in a tort action must be reduced to writing, signed by
the attorney and the client, and a signed copy must be given to the client. At the time of,
or prior to the receipt of compensation, a signed closing statement must be provided to
the client.
Part 1. Law firm obtaining a loan from a financial institution to advance litigation
expenses.
Under DR 5-103(B) of the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility, Ohio lawyers are
permitted to advance the expenses of litigation and to allow a client’s repayment of
expenses to be contingent on the outcome of the matter. Examples of expenses that may
be advanced include court costs, expenses of investigation, expenses of medical
examination, and costs of obtaining and presenting evidence. The repayment of expenses
may be contingent on the outcome of the matter.
DR 5-103(B) While representing a client in connection with contemplated
or pending litigation, a lawyer shall not advance or guarantee financial
assistance to the client, except that a lawyer may advance or guarantee the
expenses of litigation, including court costs, expenses of investigation,
expenses of medical examination, and costs of obtaining and presenting
evidence, the repayment of which may be contingent on the outcome of
the matter.
DR 5-103(B) does not address whether a lawyer may obtain a loan from a financial
institution for use in advancing litigation expenses in personal injury litigation. Nor, does
the rule address whether fees and costs of a loan obtained by a lawyer may be deducted
from the client’s settlement or judgment.
The Board considers the application of other rules, namely, DR 5-103(A), DR 5-104(A),
and DR 3-102(A), to the question raised. The prohibition in DR 5-103(A) is that “[a]
lawyer shall not acquire a proprietary interest in the cause of action or subject matter of
litigation the lawyer is conducting.” Under the proposed facts, the law firm is not
securing the loan with a client’s settlement or judgment; therefore, the lawyer and the law
firm are not obtaining a proprietary interest in any one specific cause of action.

Op. 2001-3 3
The prohibition in DR 5-104(A) is that “[a] lawyer shall not enter into a business
transaction with a client if they have differing interests therein and if the client expects
the lawyer to exercise his [her] professional judgment therein for the protection of the
client, unless the client has consented after full disclosure. A law firm’s decision to
obtain a loan from a third party financial institution does not involve the lawyer in a
business transaction with a client, provided that the loan is not secured by the client’s
settlement or judgment. In contrast, financial assistance from a financing company to a
law firm, used to pay a lawyer’s legal fees and expenses and secured by the company
receiving an interest in the lawyer’s anticipated proceeds from a client’s money
judgment, intertwines the attorney in a business transaction with a client. See, Ohio Sup
Ct, Bd of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline, Op. 99-6 (1999) advising that “[i]t is
ethically improper for an attorney to receive financial assistance from a company in
exchange for the company receiving an interest in the attorney’s anticipated proceeds
from a client’s money judgment.”
The prohibition in DR 3-102(A) is that “[a] lawyer or law firm shall not share legal fees
with a non-lawyer, except that [exceptions not applicable herein]. When a law firm
obtains a loan that is not secured by a client’s settlement or judgment, it does not
constitute the sharing of legal fees with a non-lawyer. In contrast, a loan between a
lawyer and a third-party financial institution secured by a specific client’s settlement or
judgment constitutes an improper division of a legal fee with a non-lawyer. See, Ohio
Sup Ct, Bd of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline, Op. 94-11 (1994) advising that “[i]t
is improper under DR 3-102(A) of the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility for an
attorney to refer a client to a financing company that require the attorney to prospectively
agree to pay the company a percentage of a legal fee when earned as a quid pro quo for
the company’s agreement to loan money with interest to a client.”
Upon review of these rules, the Board finds that there is no rule prohibiting a lawyer from
obtaining a loan from a third party institution for use in advancing the expenses of
litigation provided that the loan is not secured by the client’s settlement or judgment.
However, the client should be informed. Under DR 5-107(A), a lawyer should inform
the client that the law firm is obtaining a loan for use in advancing the expenses of
litigation and obtain client consent.
DR 5-107 (A) Except with the consent of his [her] client after full
disclosure, a lawyer shall not:
(2) Accept from one other than his client any thing of value related
to his representation of or his employment by his client.
Part 2. Deducting interest fees and costs of a loan from a client’s settlement or judgment.
As to the deduction of interest fees and costs of a loan from the client’s settlement or
judgment, the Board finds it proper to do so. Interest fees and costs of a loan obtained by
a law firm are a client’s “expenses of litigation.” The interest fees and costs of a loan
obtained by a law firm are not the law firm’s “costs of doing business.” Since clients are
not always financially able to obtain a loan to finance the expenses of litigation, the
clients look to lawyers to advance the expenses of litigation. Depending upon a lawyer’s

Op. 2001-3 4
financial position, a lawyer may need to obtain a loan in order to advance the litigation
expenses. As a fiduciary for the client, the lawyer must negotiate appropriate and
reasonable loan terms.
Other state ethics committees find it proper for interest to be deducted from a client’s
judgment or settlement. See e.g., Ass’n of Bar of the City of New York, Formal Op.
1997-1 (1997); Illinois State Bar Ass’n, Op. 94-6 (1994); State Bar of Georgia, Formal
Op. 92-1 (1992); New Jersey Sup Ct, Advisory Comm, Op. 603 (1987); Missouri, Office
of Chief Disciplinary Counsel, Informal Op. 970066 (undated). Further, in Chittenden v.
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, No. 00-C-0414, 2001 WL 508342,
at *6 (La May, 15, 2001), the Louisiana Supreme Court held that an attorney is not
ethically prohibited from entering an agreement that obligates the client to reimburse the
attorney for interest charged on loans used to fund litigation expenses.
This Board finds it proper for the interest fees and costs of a loan, used for advancing
litigation expenses, to be deducted from a client’s settlement or judgment, provided that
certain conditions are met. Thus, this Board advises that a law firm may obtain a loan
from a third party financial institution to advance expenses of litigation in a personal
injury matter accepted on a contingent fee basis and may deduct the interest fees and
costs of the loan from a client’s settlement or judgment provided that certain conditions
are met. The law firm may not secure the loan with the client’s settlement or judgment.
The terms of the loan, including the amount borrowed, the interest rates, and costs of the
loan must be appropriate and reasonable. At the outset of the representation, the client
must be informed and must provide consent. The terms of the loan must be disclosed to
the client and must be agreed upon by the client in the contingent fee agreement. The
contingent fee agreement must inform the client of whether repayment of litigation
expenses is contingent upon the outcome of the matter. The contingent fee agreement
must clearly state whether contingent fee percentages are computed before or after
deduction of costs and expenses. As required by Section 4705.15 (B) and (C) of the Ohio
Revised Code, the contingent fee agreement must be reduced to writing, signed by the
attorney and the client, and a signed copy must be given to the client. At the time of, or
prior to the receipt of compensation, a signed closing statement must be provided to the
client.
Advisory Opinions of the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline are
informal, nonbinding opinions in response to prospective or hypothetical questions
regarding the application of the Supreme Court Rules for the Government of the
Bar of Ohio, the Supreme Court Rules for the Government of the Judiciary, the
Code of Professional Responsibility, the Code of Judicial Conduct, and the
Attorney’s Oath of Office.